A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF REVITALIZATION IN
CLEVELAND AND ST. LOUIS

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Table of Contents

- Title Page................................................................................................................................. 1
- Table of Contents....................................................................................................................... 2
- Abstract........................................................................................................................................ 3
- Methodology and Literature Review............................................................................................ 4 – 14
- Cleveland................................................................................................................................... 15 – 34
  - History of Decline...................................................................................................................... 15 - 17
  - Neighborhood Revitalization: Hough....................................................................................... 18 – 23
  - Downtown Revitalization: North Coast Harbor................................................................. 23 – 28
  - The Gateway Center Sports and Entertainment Complex.............................................. 28 – 34
- St. Louis.................................................................................................................................... 35 – 54
  - History of Decline...................................................................................................................... 35 - 39
  - The Jefferson National Expansion Memorial................................................................. 39 – 44
  - Busch Stadium.......................................................................................................................... 44 – 49
  - Neighborhood Revitalization: Jeff-Vander-Lou.............................................................. 49 – 54
- Holistic Evaluation...................................................................................................................... 55 – 59
- Conclusion.................................................................................................................................. 60 – 61
- References................................................................................................................................. 62 – 64
- Appendix A................................................................................................................................. 65
Abstract

In the latter half of the 20th century, large Midwestern cities in America have had to devise creative, effective, and socially just ways of revitalizing their urban cores. This was necessary due to the fact that during the preceding decades of the 20th century, most populous cities in the Midwest underwent a profound decline due to many reasons, including: increased urban sprawl; the rise of the suburbs; white flight from the urban core; industrial decline; the increasing importance of the automobile in American culture, and a failure to adequately predict and plan for these eventualities. This research paper is a comparative study of select revitalization projects in the cities of Cleveland, Ohio and St. Louis, Missouri, beginning with the major decline in American cities during the first part of the 20th century, up to the present. As Alexander Garvin states, “Only when a project also has beneficial impact on the surrounding community can it be considered successful planning” (Garvin, 2002) Thus, the analysis of revitalization in these cities considers not only the downtown area, but also how inner-city neighborhoods have fared alongside downtowns. By analyzing select revitalization projects, comparing how successfully they were implemented and to what extent they have benefited their respective cities, it is possible to shed light on best practices for revitalizing the built environment.
Methodology and Literature Review

The basis for comparing Cleveland and St. Louis is due to the fact that they share many similarities, including: geographic location in the United States, ethnic composition, revitalization issues experienced. Most importantly, Cleveland and St. Louis have shared the fate of being among the most deteriorated cities in the Midwest: St. Louis experienced the largest decline in population percentage of any city in America from 1950-1990 (Stanley, 2004), and Cleveland’s decline was so spectacular that it was commonly called ‘the mistake on the lake’ during the 1970’s and 1980’s (Holly & Warf, 1997). Also, both cities have applied innovative and ambitious revitalization schemes to reverse the decline of their urban cores, while redefining the overall character of their city. Furthermore, both cities have struggled with the decline of their inner city neighborhoods, in large part due to issues stemming from racial segregation in the 20th century. Finally, these cities share the problem of being in a state of flux at the dawn of the 21st century, due to the fact that they can no longer retain the identities they struggled to cling onto in the previous century.

In the case of St. Louis, once the fourth largest city in America, this city is suffering from a pattern of unsustainable sprawl that has been an ongoing factor for many decades. Eric Sandweiss, in his study of the evolution of St. Louis’ urban landscape comments that even when the city was first expanding at the beginning of the 19th century, “The lackluster appearance of the city center aggravated…a tendency in St. Louis that has continued to the present day: a constant centrifugal growth” (Sandweiss, 2001). This historic pattern has to change, in a time when the detrimental effects of urban
sprawl are being more clearly understood and addressed than ever before. Cleveland has also had to change its image, due to the problem experienced by many rust-belt cities: The changing nature of employment on the regional and national levels, shifting from an industrial- to a service-oriented economy.

While similar on many levels, there are pronounced differences between the two cities: Specific problems experienced and addressed, the nature of their political systems, historic attitudes toward planning, and their implementation of Federal programs are all areas where these two Midwestern cities diverge. In the final section of this paper, the relative success or failure of the revitalization efforts pursued by these cities during the 20th century will be analyzed according to research methodology established by previous studies of urban revitalization.

Several authors have studied ways in which to analyze the success of revitalization in terms of evaluating individual projects, the revitalization of the city’s downtown area, and the city as a whole. The criteria for this type of analysis varies from author to author, from economic measures to traditional social indicators such as information on crime levels, education attainment, and population levels. Aspects of each of these approaches have been selected to scrutinize the degree to which the revitalization strategies pursued by the study cities could be considered successful. The selection of the various aspects of these authors’ approaches was accomplished by evaluating their applicability to the scope of this research, which is based on the analyzing revitalization success on the project and urban core levels.

In conducting an analysis of how successful Cleveland and St. Louis have been implementing revitalization efforts on a holistic level, this body of research employs
evidence of how established researchers identified positive signs of urban revitalization in previous works on the topic. Statistical measures of success have not been explored in this research, based on conclusions from previous research methods. In their book “Comeback Cities”, Paul Grogan and Tony Proscio state their case against measuring the success of revitalization on mere statistics, stating “In a world where the best data can lag reality by as much as ten years, statistics alone aren’t very helpful during periods of rapid change” (Grogan & Proscio, 2000). Instead, these authors choose to analyze success based on more abstract principles, and this research emulates that example.

The four trends that Grogan and Proscio use to identify successful revitalization in “Comeback Cities” are: the maturing of community action groups into organizations that have a significant positive effect; rebirth of functioning private markets in former inner-city wastelands; decreasing crime rates; and ‘unshackling’ inner-city life from large bureaucracies that prevent mobility and innovation. Three out of these four principles cannot easily be evaluated in terms of numbers, and instead rely on gleaning the dominant trends in particular cities by studying the evolution of that city’s revitalization strategy through the years. The only trend that can be analyzed through statistical information, crime rates, has to be assessed according to how serious the reported crimes are. For instance, a significant decline in the number violent crimes such as homicides offsets a mild increase in the number of thefts, despite the fact that there are many more thefts than murders.

The method of analysis described in “Comeback Cities” is especially relevant given the methodology applied by Bernard J. Frieden in “Downtown, Inc.; How America Rebuilds Cities”. According to Frieden, crime reduction played a significant role in the
revitalization of American cities during the 1970’s and 1980’s, as the preconceived notions of potential shoppers and tourists regarding public safety in a negative light had to be dispelled before they would return to the urban core. Contemporary studies regarding why people were reluctant to come downtown concluded that shoppers thought the inner city was a place where “Interracial tensions periodically erupt in mob violence…roving gangs of adolescents terrorize peaceable citizens…[and]…muggings, burglaries, rape and vandalism are commonplace” (Frieden, 1989). A decreasing crime rate was seen as a key indicator of success for inner-city revitalization during the two decades before the 1990’s, and has subsequently continued to be seen as an important ingredient in the revitalization of blighted urban areas.

The evaluation of specific projects designed to revitalize cities requires the application of criteria differing from those used in analyzing revitalization for the city as a whole. In his book, *The American City: What Works and What Doesn’t*, Alexander Garvin uses six ingredients of success in his analysis of projects in American cities, most of which are applied in the following analysis of revitalization projects in Cleveland and St. Louis: Market, Location, Design, Entrepreneurship, Financing and Time.

Market is the ingredient concerned with supply and demand, applicable to the evaluation of revitalization projects due to the fact that demand for any development in an urban area is the most critical element of success. As Garvin states, the term ‘market’ means “…a specific population’s desire for something and its ability and willingness to pay for it in the face of available alternatives” (Garvin, 2002). Beyond merely financial details, this ingredient is demonstrative of continued public interest in projects with implementation timelines often measured in the span of years, requiring continual support
from public or private entities, or possibly a combination of both. One final indicator of a
city’s health revealed by the market, regards the continued public support of a given
project’s operating costs. The plain fact that enough people prefer this development over
alternative developments in their geographic region is in itself an accomplishment.
Because the urban core’s prosperity is often tied into the entire city’s health, this is an
especially applicable ingredient of success.

Another ingredient of a successful project, as defined by Garvin, is location. According to this author, “Location consists of two elements: a site’s inherent
characteristics and its proximity to other locations” (Garvin, 2002). Examples of
successful site characteristics given in “The American City…” include enjoying a
remarkable view, or possessing housing stock with attractive architectural features. This
ingredient of success is included in the following research with the following caveat;
instead of being as evenly concerned with aesthetic site characteristics as with the overall
location, the emphasis is placed on the importance of site location above characteristics.
This is due to the fact that the importance of creating an aesthetically pleasing
revitalization project is obvious and universal. From the perspective of an urban planner,
the element of location and how the site enhances its environs by spurring on further
development and interest in an area, is more important when gauging the success of a
revitalization project than aesthetic appeal.

A further ingredient of success, significant in analyzing urban revitalization
projects and defined by Garvin in The American City, is financing. While obtaining the
necessary financing for a project is always required, Garvin frequently refers to examples
of successful project financing that had ample amounts of innovation, foresight or a
combination of both. Such examples include the revitalization of a Philadelphia neighborhood known as Society Hill in the 1950’s. This project utilized Federal urban renewal funding available at the time from the Housing Act of 1949, and intended for the reconstruction of urban areas by the massive clearance of blighted districts, to selectively remove only the worst of the blight and incompatible buildings from this neighborhood. In the meantime “Banks provided mortgage money for housing construction and rehabilitation because it was federally insured” (Garvin, 2002). This allowed the city to use vacant sites, acquired, cleared and prepared using Federal funding, to build infill residences that attracted middle-class residents with a desire to live downtown. By the 1970’s the qualities of innovative and insightful financing resulted in a vibrant, revitalized neighborhood with historic structures, increased population and rising property values. In urban planning, long-range planning is vital to the success of any project, considering financial implications many years into the future is a critical component of success.

Although Garvin lists Entrepreneurship as one of the ingredients one should use when analyzing the success of projects in an American city, stating that these people “…are needed to assemble, coordinate, and inspire all the participants in the development process” (Garvin, 2002), this ingredient of success has been relabeled as ‘Leadership’ in the following analysis of revitalization in Cleveland and St. Louis. The reason for this is that while the ‘Entrepreneurs’ as described by Garvin are a vital, necessary component of successful projects, this paper is primarily concerned with the application of public sector, urban planning prescriptions to inner city revitalization. The defining characteristic of an entrepreneur is the fact that they will take on greater than normal
financial risks in order to organize and operate a business, and this is not widely applicable to public servants such as mayors or planners.

Garvin attempts to equate private sector ‘Entrepreneurs’ to public sector ‘Entrepreneurs’ in The American City: “The difference between private and public entrepreneurial activity is only in the form of payment. The private entrepreneur is paid in hard currency, the public entrepreneur in power” (Garvin, 2002). However, several main characteristics of entrepreneurs are not addressed by Garvin in his explanation. Public sector ‘entrepreneurs’ instrumental in successful revitalization projects in St. Louis and Cleveland did not take a substantial personal financial risk, nor did they greatly profit from any achievements that were the outcome of their efforts. Also, once planning and project implementation is completed, public-sector leaders do not operate the businesses created by their efforts. Finally, while it is true that some public servants are motivated by a desire to increase their political power, other city officials are primarily motivated by a genuine desire to enhance their city’s built environment, and seek no personal reward for their work.

Several examples of leaders who sought neither financial nor political gain from their participation in revitalization projects are mentioned in this body of work. These leaders vary, from long-time city residents such as Luther Ely Smith, who lead the charge in organizing the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial in St. Louis, to neighborhood leaders such as Famicos founder Sister Henrietta in Cleveland’s Hough neighborhood. Public sector ‘Leaders’ are sometimes more interested in abstract and humanistic concepts, such as the ‘revival’ of their particular city’s inner urban area, or creating ‘equitable’ access to public transportation for all city residents than mere personal gain.
The reason these people do what they do is not for a payoff, but because they have a genuine desire to improve the built environment, and for this reason they are included with Garvin’s previously defined public- and private- sector entrepreneurs into as larger ingredient of success called ‘leadership’.

The final ingredient Garvin feels is necessary for evaluating the relative success of specific projects is time. Three time sequences affect the success of a project- first, the time during which a person passes through the area; second, what will occur in an area twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week; and, third, what occurs over the long term, a span oftentimes of years or decades (Garvin, 2002). The fruits of successful urban planning projects are typically enjoyed at least several years after a project has been completed. This can be either the completion of the first phase of a project or the project in its entirety, but in either case the third sequence of time is important to consider in urban planning research. In some instances, such as the evaluation of downtown revitalization, what will occur over the twenty-four hour period is pertinent to how successful a project will be. Thus, the second and third time sequences Garvin describes are considered to be the most useful for this research.

The literature devoted to detailing and evaluating revitalization trends in St. Louis and Cleveland encompasses many researchers personal perspectives, and in each city’s case, has been published by many different sources. These sources range from articles in scholarly journals and other periodicals to entire books devoted to the subject of rebuilding a specific neighborhood, or the history of the city as a whole. In each case, the details are extracted from the discourse while taking away only a small amount of personal opinion regarding a particular topic. Through the effective application of this
approach in analyzing previous studies, the conclusions of this research will not be influenced by possible conflicting personal views on a subject.

Cleveland has been studied for several decades by prominent academics studying the cause, effect, and possible remedy of urban decline in this city. The most prolific writer on the subject of Cleveland’s decline and the methods employed to reverse this trend has been Norman Krumholz, director of planning in Cleveland during the 1970’s, and now a professor of Urban Affairs at Cleveland State University after spending several years as President of the American Institute of Certified Planners. During his tenure as Planning Director, he spearheaded an experiment in planning known as ‘Equity Planning’, a method whereby planners working within the framework of government use their skills to influence and advocate for underrepresented constituencies, for which he received widespread recognition as an authority on trends in urban planning. His research regarding planning in Cleveland is extensive and detailed, and is the best source for information regarding revitalization in this city.

Other sources concerning revitalization in Cleveland include Dennis Keating’s “Metropolitan Reader”, a detailed account of the role urban affairs have played in the fortunes of Cleveland, and Elise Bright’s chapter regarding Cleveland in the book “Reviving America’s Forgotten Neighborhoods: An Investigation of Inner-City Revitalization Efforts”. Sources for individual projects in Cleveland include examples from Garvin’s book on analyzing American cities, Freiden’s “Downtown Inc.”, articles by various authors in the Journal of Urban Affairs, and publications by Cleveland’s planning department.
In the case of St. Louis, instead of mainly stemming from an urban planning ‘guru’, as is the case regarding Norman Krumholz in Cleveland, literature regarding urban revitalization comes from myriad academic authors based in the city’s four universities. Articles from the Public Policy Research Center at the University of Missouri- St. Louis provide research on a wide range of subjects pertinent to the study of revitalization in St. Louis, from assessing the effects of specific projects, to studies of revitalizing St. Louis in a more general sense. These articles were written by scholars from UMSL, other universities in St. Louis such as St. Louis University and Washington University, or academics from institutions in states other than Missouri. Several of the articles used in this research and many others were combined in a three-book series published by UMSL analyzing the trends in urban planning, politics, and urban affairs that have shaped and continue to guide the city’s development.

Sources on revitalization in St. Louis come from many sources other than the Public Policy Research Center. Several comprehensive histories have been written concerning the stages in the development of St. Louis, and these provide researchers with the sense of context necessary to understand the broad trends affecting a single project. The defining work on St. Louis for years prior to the 1980’s is James Primm’s “Lion of the Valley”, a chronicle of the city from its founding in 1764 as a fur trading outpost along the Mississippi River until the work was published in 1980, and no investigation of the history of St. Louis is complete without referencing Primm’s detailed accounts of life and politics. In contrast to Primm’s work, Eric Sandweiss’ “St. Louis: The Evolution of an American Landscape” has a narrow scope, concerned only with the past trends that brought about the urban landscape in St. Louis that we see today.
Perspectives from individual planners and politicians who have worked in St. Louis comprise the final collection of research examined in this research. The Canadian urban planner, Rollin Stanley, wrote about his experiences working as a planner in St. Louis at the beginning of the 21st century in “Plan”, a Canadian publication. In this article, readers obtain a sense of how contemporary funding efforts are devised for future projects. Another important individual perspective is Barry Checkoway’s “Revitalizing an Urban Neighborhood: A St. Louis Case Study”. This account of revitalization in a neighborhood located within a few blocks of downtown St. Louis provides a link between downtown and neighborhood revitalization efforts in the city, demonstrating the reciprocal influence downtowns and inner-city neighborhoods have on each other.
The story of Cleveland’s fortunes during the 20th century is the tale of a prosperous, vital industrial powerhouse of a city, mired in a seemingly inexorable decline. This city reached its peak in 1920, when it was officially ranked as the fifth largest city in the United States (Case Western Reserve, 2009). This was the year that the Cleveland Indians won the World Series, the year when the Cuyahoga river region, centered on Cleveland, generated more patents than any other region in the country (Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, 2009), and also the year when the wealthy Cleveland suburb of Shaker Heights “…exhibited the highest per capita income of any city in the United States” (Holly & Warf, 1997). But from these lofty heights, Cleveland began a spectacular descent, due to a disastrous combination of industrial decline, festering racial segregation in its inner-city neighborhoods, and the rise of suburbia in American culture during the latter half of the 20th century.

Beginning in 1920’s, a thin trickle of the most affluent people began leaving the pollution of downtown Cleveland for the budding suburbs (Lay & Cram, 2006). This slow but steady trickle became an accelerating exodus during the 1950’s, when Veterans Administration and Federal Housing Administration Programs provided millions of mortgages for soldiers returning from the Second World War (Duany, Plater-Zyberk, & Speck, 2000). The flight to the suburbs can be attributed not only to the increased affordability of the suburbs, but also the concurrent decline of inner-city neighborhoods. This was mainly due to the fact that Eastern European immigration, a large source of labor for the industries in Cleveland, had halted during the First World War, necessitating
the employment of African-Americans immigrating from the south. This lead to a 308% increase in the black population of Cleveland over the course of ten years in the early part of the 20th century (Keating & Krumholz, 1999), and the subsequent creation of segregated, ghetto housing in central city neighborhoods. As early as 1931, “… a local statistician observed…[that]…the city was “decaying at the core”” (Keating & Krumholz, 1999). These circumstances were at the root of many future problems for Cleveland, including the dramatic decline of its historic neighborhoods and destructive race riots during the 1960’s.

Although the heart of Cleveland was beginning to suffer in the post-war decades, the most damaging trend to occur was the decline of industry in the region of the United States now referred to as the ‘Rust Belt’, of which Cleveland became the ‘buckle’. During the initial stages of inner-city decline, and especially after the Second World War, the economy of Cleveland was booming. Manufacturing was supplying the metropolitan area with many high-paying jobs in a diverse mix of heavy industry, particularly in the fields of steel production, automobile manufacturing and machinery. However, this all changed during the 1970’s, when “Many large multi-establishment firms in mature industries, increasingly mobile in a competitive world economy and hampered by the high-cost, unionized labor of the Midwest evacuated the decaying cities of the Great Lakes…to find greener pastures-and higher profits- in the Sunbelt or overseas” (Holly & Wharf, 1997). These changes in the economy had dire consequences for gainful employment in Cleveland; the city lost over 130,000 jobs between 1958 and 1977, and the percentage of well-paying manufacturing jobs in the city went from 47 percent of all jobs in 1970, to just 27 percent by 1987 (Keating & Krumholz, 1999). Real median
family income in Cleveland, which rose 22 percent in the 1960’s, dropped by 11 percent during the 1970’s (Holly & Wharf, 1997).

This rapid industrial decline, combined with the decay of the inner city and the flight to the suburbs during the post-war years, essentially gutted Cleveland. The next two decades saw people leave the faltering city on a pace the country had never seen before, when “...between 1970 and 1980, the metro area lost 8 percent of its population, or 165,000 people, while the city of Cleveland lost 24 percent, or 177,000 people, one of the steepest declines in U.S. urban history” (Holly & Wharf, 1997). The situation continued to deteriorate as crime, poverty, unemployment, and poor housing came to characterize the inner city. In 1978, Cleveland became the first American city since the Great Depression to default on its bonds (CITI). When Norman Krumholz, director of planning from 1969-1979, wrote of Cleveland in his 1982 American Planning Journal article regarding equity planning, he declared that “…the fiscal and economic disparities between central city and region were wider in Cleveland than in almost any other place in the U.S. Unemployment, poverty, crime, inadequate education, rotting housing, and other elements of the urban crisis were concentrated in the city, and particularly in the city’s low income neighborhoods” (Krumholz, 1982).

**Neighborhood Revitalization-Hough**

“In 1950, the Hough neighborhood was home to a population of generally middle-class whites. Ten years later, in a shattering model of residential turnover driven by racial
fears, Hough had become a black, lower-class slum” (Warren, 1995). These are the words that Dennis Keating used to describe Cleveland’s Hough neighborhood in 1995, neatly summarizing how a decade’s span had drastically changed the character and economic vitality of this area.

Hough Neighborhood Boundaries and Location in Cleveland

This middle-class, white neighborhood, encompassing a 2-square-mile area on Cleveland’s east side, became symbolic of Cleveland’s massive, flawed urban renewal projects in the 1950’s, exclusively on the east side of the city, a result of which “…demolished much more housing than they built and contributed to severe overcrowding and deterioration on the entire east side of Cleveland…” (Keating & Krumholz, 1999). In the exodus from neighborhoods scheduled for demolition, African-Americans poured into nearby Hough in search of low-cost housing, eventually leading
to local realtors encouraging whites to sell their homes and move to the suburbs, while simultaneously renting or selling homes at premium rates to incoming black residents.

As the neighborhood became more segregated and less affluent, an increasing number of negative trends began to emerge, including “…building code and sanitary violations…overcrowding, vandalism, and arson” (Bright, 2000). Much of the blame for these developments can be put squarely on the shoulders of area realtors and landlords, who “…converted many large, single-family homes into multifamily tenements and rooming houses in disregard of city housing codes” (Keating & Krumholz, 1999). Hough was quickly degenerating into a ghetto, its residents segregated from the rest of the city by race and forced to accept a substandard level of city services.

The frustration of residents boiled to the surface in 1966, when “…a barroom argument between a white bartender and a black customer led to four days of riots in Hough…leaving four blacks dead” (Bright, 2000). Additionally, these riots served to gut the neighborhood, as it left over 250 fires in its wake (Warren, 1995). The civil rights movement led to the opening of previously ‘white only’ suburban neighborhoods to middle- and upper-class blacks, and everyone who could get out of Hough did so in the next few years. By the end of the 1960’s, only “…the poor, the elderly homeowners, and the disabled…[were left]… in the riot-torn central city neighborhoods” (Bright, 2000). These remaining residents of Hough were in an unenviable position, being the least affluent, most discriminated group of people in Cleveland, living in one of the most rundown and riot-damaged neighborhoods.

By Hough’s nadir in the early 1970’s, revitalization efforts for the neighborhood were already underway. The revitalization process was to take many years and suffer
numerous setbacks as different measures were applied with varying results. However, despite these hurdles, several revitalization efforts succeeded in their objectives, making Hough a more stable and livable neighborhood while using the ingredients of success outlined by Garvin.

*Market-*

Due to Cleveland’s extreme decline in the latter half of the 20th century, with the city losing both jobs and population, at first glance there did not appear to be much of a market for a rundown neighborhood such as Hough at the start of the 1970’s. However, what must be remembered is that the people who were left in Hough were the ones who could not afford to live in the suburbs, and had no alternative but to live in the decaying inner-city neighborhoods. These people had to live in Hough, and the opportunity for inner-city residents to live in dignified, endurable conditions made the market for affordable housing strong.

Thus, despite the fact that Cleveland achieved substantial vacancy rates during the 1970’s and 1980’s, the city government recognized that it was within their interests, as well as the neighborhood residents’ own interests, to rebuild the neighborhood. As a result of the depressing conditions experienced in inner-city neighborhoods, there “…was massive central city abandonment: By the early 1970’s there were some 35,000 properties in Cuyahoga County on which $87 million was owed by the landowners in back taxes, penalties, interest, and fees. Approximately 16,000 of these vacant delinquent parcels were in the city, with $40 million owed on them” (Bright, 2000). Cleveland was hemorrhaging residents into the suburbs, which in turn was causing the city to lose millions of dollars in taxes. The desire and willingness to pay for the revitalization of
Hough was present in both city hall and the neighborhood, but they needed people who could lead the way in such an undertaking.

**Leadership**-

The latter half of the 1960’s was when Cleveland officials began attempting to address how badly the situation had deteriorated, and this was also the time period in American history when Lyndon Johnson’s ‘War on Poverty’ was in full swing. This national trend directly affected Hough, as the Office of Economic Opportunity, created through legislation tied to the War on Poverty, provided $1.6 million to establish the Hough Area Development Corporation. This organization, one of the first Community Development Corporations in the United States, used federal housing subsidies and local foundations to build new and rehabilitated housing in Hough, as well as some commercial developments (Keating & Krumholz, 1999). However, by the time that Ronald Reagan cut off funding for this CDC in 1984, it had not achieved any meaningful results. The assessment of this program from planners in Cleveland was that although it succeeded in building housing, “…overall, its contribution to the physical stabilization of the neighborhood generally is seen as minimal” (Keating & Krumholz, 1999).

**Financing**-

A Catholic nun named Sister Henrietta of the Sisters of Charity founded a much more successful and longer-lasting organization, Famicos, in 1969. She had originally moved to the Hough area in 1967 after the riots, “…to help residents with their basic needs in the face of extreme poverty and deprivation” (Warren, 1995). But three years later, and partially as a result of her previous work in the neighborhood, she developed a program “…to acquire, rehabilitate, and lease deteriorated housing to very-low-income
families” (Keating & Krumholz, 1999). This model was used to great effect in Hough. It used Community Development Block Grants, local and national foundations, and corporate investors looking for low-income housing tax credits to acquire and rehabilitate housing, while simultaneously leasing to low-income residents and training them in the “rudiments” of housing maintenance (Warren, 1995). The tenants’ rent was put toward the debt accrued by obtaining and renovating the properties. As soon as the fifth year, and as late as the fifteenth year, tenants could purchase the properties themselves. This model was so successful, that “…by 1995, the program also was in use by the 14 neighborhood-based nonprofit housing corporations that made up the Cleveland Housing Network” (Keating & Krumholz, 1999).

A number of other related programs developed concurrently with the Famicos program assisted the revitalization efforts in Hough, the most important of these programs being the Cleveland Land Bank. The Land Reutilization Authority was enabled by the Ohio state legislature in the late 1970’s, and activated by the adoption of a city ordinance. This led to the establishment of the Cleveland Land Bank, a way in which the city could gain control of vacant or nonproductive properties by bidding on them, sometimes for a price as low as $10. Once a property entered the Land Bank, the Government Action on Urban Land program was applicable. This program allowed developers to increase their property yields; “…any lot can be sold to adjacent landowners for $1, and unbuildable lots with under 40 feet of frontage can also be sold to anyone for $1. This program has resulted in an increased stock of affordable housing being provided by developers” (Bright, 2000). Thus, the third sequence of time, what will
happen over a span of years, came into play in Hough’s revitalization due to the programs created by Cleveland’s city officials during the 1970’s and 1980’s.

**Location**

The neighborhood’s location, close to downtown Cleveland, was one of its greatest assets before the age of suburbs and highways. However, in the years when the Famicos Foundation was using their successful model for revitalizing affordable housing, eventually culminating in the construction of three major housing developments by 1994, location once again became an advantage for Hough. Due to the shifting patterns in area employment, “…all three major housing developments in Hough have been helped by the enviable location of the neighborhood. It lies midway between downtown and University Circle, the two largest job locations in Cuyahoga County. Its also only a few blocks from the Cleveland Clinic, the city’s largest private employer” (Keating & Krumholz, 1999). Hough’s location, deemed trivial during the lowest point of the neighborhood’s history when highways and urban renewal were devastating neighborhoods in Cleveland, was eventually seen as an asset for low-income residents.

**Downtown Revitalization- North Coast Harbor**

The North Coast Harbor development was conceived as a way for Cleveland to attract people downtown, generating revenue from tourism, beautifying the area, and spurring new growth among downtown businesses. Located on Lake Erie, and within three blocks of the center of downtown, this project was meant to capitalize on Cleveland’s lakefront location and bring together numerous other developments along the
lake, including the new Gateway stadium development and parks recently acquired from the control of the Federal government.

*The Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, Cleveland*

When George Voinovich was Mayor of Cleveland from 1979-1989, his administration focused on budgetary reforms due to the city defaulting on its bonds in 1978, and also the revitalization of downtown (Keating, 2007). City officials, local business leaders, and heads of development corporations were solicited to participate in the formulation of a group known as ‘Cleveland Tomorrow’, a group concerned with major revitalization in Cleveland, including developing the waterfront. After years of studying the options available for redeveloping Cleveland, in 1988 the Cleveland Planning Commission introduced the Cleveland 2000 “Civic Vision” plan. This document outlined how the city could be made more attractive and fiscally productive by the turn of the millennium by revitalizing areas downtown, and the types of projects that Cleveland should be involved in developing.
One of the projects deemed particularly worthy of pursuit during the initial stages of implementing the 2000 vision was the North Coast Harbor project. This project was “…inspired by the success of Baltimore’s Harbor place revitalization project in attracting tourists” (Keating, 2005), and was to feature an excavated harbor on the site of parking for the municipal stadium opened in 1988 with a promenade and small park. Eventually, this site became the location for two main attractions in downtown Cleveland: The Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, and the Great Lakes Science Museum. To ensure the success of these projects, city hall under the Voinovich administration would go to great lengths, including the use of public funding to the sum of millions of dollars. They felt this would be justified to create a new “…gleaming downtown” (Grogan & Proscio, 2000), despite criticism from equity planners such as Norman Krumholz.

Market-

The market for a development such as the one conceived by the Cleveland Plan Commission for North Coast Harbor is highly dependent on the type of attractions placed on site. The museum was acquired by Cleveland through an intense bidding process, pitting eight American cities against each other to decide who could give the museum’s New York-based backers the best financial deal, while still being able to tie the museum to some local facet of Rock and Roll history (Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, 2007). Cleveland ended up winning the right to host the ‘Rock Hall’, partly due to national newspaper and radio contests designed to ascertain how popular such a development would be with the prospective city’s residents. Cleveland handily won these contests due to the support of thousands of local residents, impressing the Rock Hall developers (Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, 2007). The willingness of
Cleveland residents to pay for the Rock Hall in the face of existing alternative cultural and entertainment venues in the city was clear to both city officials and developers after this process.

**Location-**

The lakefront has been a major feature of Cleveland throughout the city’s history. Cleveland was founded at the junction of Lake Erie and the Cuyahoga River as a port to receive goods. In large part due to the 1830 completion of the Ohio Canal, the city quickly developed into a major hub of commercial activity, and by 1846 the lakefront was located at the confluence of the canal, new railroads, and piers for shipping. The lakefront was used for numerous developments prior to the North Coast Harbor project, including the 1937 Great Lakes Exposition, several city parks, a short-lived urban renewal project called Erieview, and a fancifully proposed ‘International Jetport’. The North Coast harbor project was conceived as a way of using the natural resource of the lakefront “…to make downtown Cleveland an attraction for visitors, mostly tourists and conventioneers” (Keating, 2005).

**Leadership-**

That the Voinovich administration went to great lengths to secure the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum is a testament to how certain they felt that this museum would draw enough people to the city to make it a worthwhile investment, and how strongly he felt this project could revitalize downtown Cleveland. Voinovich believed the additional tax dollars accrued from the Rock and Roll enthusiasts flocking to the city museum, estimated at seven hundred thousand a year (Keating et al., 1995) would not only aid local businesses downtown, but also spur new economic growth and
development. This shift in how people perceived Cleveland, from a run-down, post-industrial wreck to a tourist-oriented cultural center, was “…create jobs and provide economic stability” (Keating et al., 1995) for the entire city. In acknowledging that Cleveland’s future was no longer tied to heavy industry, Voinovich demonstrated a visionary approach to one of Cleveland’s main problems, it’s image at the ‘mistake on the lake’.

**Financing**

Financing for the North Coast Harbor project was to be achieved at the taxpayer’s expense. Both the Rock Hall and the Science Museum were to be acquired though “…funding from a variety of public sources” (Keating, 1995). This was to cause some criticism, due to the fact that the Rock Hall alone came with an $84 million price tag. When searching for available funds, city officials raised part of this money by “…diverting property taxes from the deficit-ridden city school district” (Keating et al., 1995). This loss of revenue was to be made up by the new economic developments envisioned when tourists came to see these attractions.

**Time**

This ingredient of success was to cause the most distress among city residents and some local officials. When the project was conceived by the Plan Commission and endorsed by both Cleveland Tomorrow and mayor Voinovich, the city was at a historic low point. The legacy of flight to the suburbs and industrial job loss was manifest in the distressed inner-city neighborhoods where only the residents who could not escape their depressing surroundings dwelled. Diverting public monies away from revitalization projects in these neighborhoods and the public schools, drawing much criticism, financed
the North Coast Harbor developments. One of the most vocal opponents of this financing method was former city planner Norman Krumholz, who claimed that these developments brought “…a lot of hype, and some good press, but most people in the city will be doing worse” (Clark, 1995). The North Coast Harbor developments were implemented at a time when Cleveland stood at a crossroads; city officials could either spend money on improving the quality of life for city residents directly, by investing in neighborhoods and the school system, or they could try to spur further economic development by remaking the downtown image.

**Gateway Center Sports and Entertainment Complex**

Cleveland has been home to numerous professional sports teams over the years, and when revitalization efforts were being devised, the three principal teams were; the Indians baseball team; the National Football League Browns; and the National Basketball Association Cavaliers. Following in the footsteps of other cities at the time, and complementing Cleveland’s “Civic Vision 2000 Downtown Plan” for revitalization, city planners and officials decided that it was in their best interests to keep these teams in Cleveland by building new stadiums. During the planning phase, the Gateway Sports and Entertainment Complex “…was identified as the catalyst for redevelopment of [the central market area] of downtown” (Chapin, 2004).
The Central Market area of downtown Cleveland had been home to a much-frequented marketplace since 1857, but had deteriorated significantly during the city’s decline after the Second World War. By the early 1980’s, most of its buildings had been demolished, the warehouses replaced by large surface parking lots. Thus, “…despite its excellent location and its symbolic importance for downtown Cleveland, the future site of Gateway was predominately a surface parking reserve, with only a few remaining blighted buildings” (Chapin, 2004).

The planning process for Gateway took the better part of a decade, as project implementation and financing were debated. The project underwent a series of different conceptualizations, and at one point almost included “…a domed, multipurpose stadium for professional baseball and football” (Garvin, 2004), with the public providing one hundred percent of the funding. The final plan for Gateway Center, opened with much local and national fanfare in 1994, included a baseball field for the Indians, a basketball arena for the Cavaliers and Rockers, and three thousand two hundred parking spaces.
located in two garages. Gateway was connected to the immense Tower City office and retail complex, and was serviced by Regional Transit Authority buses and trains using the station located at Tower City. Local hotels, restaurants, and entertainment businesses were all to profit from local residents’ and tourists year-round patronage of Gateway. The whole Gateway project was part of the larger effort Cleveland officials made to re-invent their city’s image from “…a city with a notorious reputation as an uncultured, working-class city void of sophistication…[to]…an important center of cultural consumption” (Holly & Wharf, 1997), able to compete regionally with fellow rust-belt cities such as Pittsburgh, Columbus, and Detroit.

Market-

When planning began on Gateway Center, there was no certain way for the planning commissioners to determine if the market for sporting events in downtown Cleveland would be strengthened by this development. In previous years, as the city declined in population and affluence, there had been a marked drop in the number of attendees. This situation came to a head during the Voinovich administration of the 1980’s, when the Cavaliers had moved to a venue halfway between Cleveland and Akron, Ohio, and the Indians were “…rumored to be for sale with a buyer likely to relocate the team to another city” (Keating, 2007). Gateway Center was a proposal for using city funds to keep the teams in Cleveland, but the project met opposition from inner-city residents who preferred alternative entertainment that cost less, and would like to see city funds being used to improve inner-city quality of life.

However, the city’s suburban residents were also participants in voting on whether or not to fund the new stadiums, and they overwhelmingly approved of the
A Comparative Study

project in a 1990 referendum (Keating, 2007). In the event, city planners, Mayor Voinovich and his successor Mike White were justified in their belief in how professional sports teams and well-placed arenas can attract more spectators: “In 1999 annual attendance at the 43,000-seat Jacobs [baseball] Field was 3.5 million, almost three times annual attendance at its predecessor, Municipal Stadium, which could accommodate double the number of spectators” (Garvin, 2004). In addition to justifying the effort made in keeping the Indians and Cavaliers in Cleveland, the entire Gateway Center district has experienced a marked revitalization. Existing blighted or underutilized buildings are being renovated as housing for upper middle-class tenants, and “A total of seven residential projects, with a combined total of over 800 units, have opened in the district since 1994, with almost an equal number of units currently in the planning stages (Chapin, 2004). Thus, Cleveland officials who argued that the project would bring more residents downtown, due to the fact that there was a market for living in a revitalized downtown district located close to sports stadiums, were correct in their claims.

Leadership-

Although planning for Gateway Center began under the Voinovich administration, much of the late-phase planning and all of the implementation was coordinated by a new mayor, Michael White, who “…made downtown corporate development a cornerstone of his administration” (Nelson, 1994). White tied much of his political capital to the success of Gateway Center, going so far as to ruffle some feathers from state politicians when he “…led the fight to obtain a $400,000 per-year tax limitation for the project from the Ohio legislature” (Nelson, 1994).
Larger problems were encountered in the form of opposition from city residents, concerned with the fact that the project would mean diverting taxes for schools and neighborhood rebuilding. However, the mayor managed to placate these opponents, by proposing that “…$240,000 of the $400,000 tax payment go to the Cleveland school system, and the establishment of a $1 million pool from which the school system would get another $360,000 a year” (Nelson, 1994). Consequently, White overcame the opposition from local sources by compromising with them regarding how revenues and tax payments would benefit city residents in a more direct way than mere downtown revitalization.

Financing-

From its inception, the issue of how Cleveland, with all its economic woes, could fund a project on the scale of Gateway Center was always contentious. When financing for the first conceptualization of the project was proposed in 1984, “The idea of a 100 percent publicly funded, domed, multipurpose stadium for professional [sports] was rejected by a countywide referendum” (Garvin, 2004). How the project would be financed changed several times, with the end result being “…voter-approved “sin” taxes on tobacco and alcohol” (Keating, Krumholz, & Wieland, 2002). These taxes were approved for the entire Cuyahoga County, and were to cover debt service on “$169 million worth of bonds” (Garvin, 2004), and be the main funding for a public-private bundle that would pay for the Gateway Center’s $450 million price tag. The rise in game attendance and the growth of new development in the district surrounding the project site were foreseen as a way to make up for the diverting of city monies from neighborhood building and schools. This opinion has been at least partially justified, as property values in the district “…have
increased 13% since 1993” (Chapin, 2004), leading to increased revenue from property taxes.

*Location-*

The location for the project was well selected to enhance a number of preexisting downtown developments. The connection to Tower City served to improve the number of shoppers at this location, as well as providing Gateway Center with a connection to local transit systems, with both locations building off each other’s attributes (Garvin, 2004). Also, although it has been recognized that many residential projects arose in this location due to tax abatements, and new hotels were needed in the Cleveland area before Gateway Center was constructed, the fact that it was built in the center of downtown did “…play a role in where this demand was met, ultimately leading to the genesis of a vibrant urban district where one did not previously exist” (Chapin, 2004). Infrastructure upgrades and design improvements attracted residential and hotel development, which in turn provided the “critical mass necessary to support retail establishments and restaurants” (Chapin, 2004). The difference in what the Gateway Center site was previously compared to what it has become could not be more striking; it has gone from a large parking lot, to the centerpiece of an entire revitalized district in downtown Cleveland.

*Time-*

This ingredient of success should be analyzed from two different perspectives: City officials, and city residents. From the perspective of city officials, Gateway Center was a triumph, fulfilling exactly what it was intended to do by revitalizing a large swath of downtown Cleveland and acting as a catalyst for economic growth. Mayor White regarded this project the “…crown jewel in the White administration’s economic
revitalization program” (Kusmer, 265), and his frequent local television appearances on behalf of the project put him in a position to reap much of the political clout yielded by its apparent success. However, this point of view has to be compared to the fact that “Despite these new sports stadiums and tourist attractions, the symptoms of decline continued” (Keating, 2007). Statistics have been used by equity planning advocates to level criticisms of the project’s effect on Cleveland, including the fact that population loss continued and the number of students in public schools dropped.
The decline of St. Louis, Missouri, during the 20th century was the result of many decisions made throughout the city’s history. Unlike Cleveland, a city that rapidly declined in the span of a few decades, the decline of St. Louis was a more drawn-out affair, with roots further back in the city’s history. In “St. Louis: The Evolution of an American Urban Landscape”, author Eric Sandweiss states that in 1836, a mere fourteen years after St. Louis was officially incorporated as a city, “The lackluster appearance of the old city center aggravated (and was in turn aggravated by) a tendency that has continued in St. Louis to the present day: a constant, centrifugal growth” (Sandweiss, 2001). St. Louisans’ preference to spread out their city during the 19th century would have ramifications for the city’s future development far into the 20th century and beyond.

Part of the reason for St. Louis’ ‘centrifugal growth’ was due to the fact that early landowner and property developers saw themselves as “…Western town-makers, shaping separate, privately governed domains”(Sandweiss, 2001). Instead of building close to the city center, these early developers used the vast amounts of empty land in St. Louis County to their advantage; building outside formal city boundaries, they avoided regulation by city officials as well as paying taxes for city services and infrastructure improvements. However, while the developers had no obligation to pay taxes for the upkeep of city services, in 1858 “…the County judges from districts outside the City made their first move, imposing a special tax on the entire County with the proceeds going largely for improvements in the rural parts” (Jones, 2000). At this point in the city’s history, the urban population within city limits far outnumbered the rural
population of St. Louis County, and most residents found the countywide taxes unacceptable.

For this reason, in 1876 a referendum was held in St. Louis County over the issue of completely separating the city from the County. The result of the referendum was not only the total separation of St. Louis from the County, but also the permanent establishment of the city’s boundaries (Jones, 2000). Although city officials attempted to predict and provide enough room for healthy expansion, they had grossly underestimated that amount of land that would be required, and within decades they were feeling confined by the city limits imposed in 1876. As urban development increased at the beginning of the 20th century due to increasingly effective means of transportation such as automobiles and the trolley system, eventually developing right up to the city boundaries, “What seemed like a magnificent idea in the 1870’s, getting rid of those pesky county rubes who were always wanting infrastructure handouts…appeared terribly short-sighted. The buffer between the urbanized City and bucolic County had disappeared” (Jones, 2000). Now, properties in the county were directly competing with the City, offering a tempting alternative to the congested, polluted City center. In this way, the exodus of city dwellers to the suburbs began much earlier in St. Louis than in many other American cities.

This eventual decline in population was unanticipated by city officials and planners. In 1904 St. Louis was the fourth largest city in the United States, and hosted the World’s Fair and the Olympic Games (the first English-speaking country to do so). During the next two decades, the city experienced a period of growth and prosperity as it profited from its diverse economic base and the rise of the automobile industry, St. Louis
being second only to Detroit in possessing automobile manufacturing plants during this time. European immigrants and African-Americans from the rural south flocked to St. Louis seeking employment throughout these years, steadily increasing the population, despite the fact that the city had run out of room to expand.

Although few people predicted any loss of population in St. Louis’ future, one city official who foresaw problems related to population outflow was the influential American city planner Harland Bartholomew. As early as 1917, he had “…noted with alarm the seemingly inexorable trend of westward movement from the old urban core to new districts in the western expanse of the city” (Heathcott, 2005). Over the coming years, despite growth in the city’s population, Bartholomew continued to warn of an impending crisis. His analyses were backed up by evidence of rapidly declining rates of growth, and the city’s inability to house incoming families, despite an increase in the overall population. Spikes in the growth rate due to periodic immigration surges and increased manufacturing during the Second World War calmed Bartholomew and most others into predicting eventual population growth beyond the 1940’s, but this merely masked the underlying trend of population decline (Heathcott, 2005). Nevertheless, city officials were stirred to action in 1940, when the St. Louis posted its first ever net population loss.

A new comprehensive plan was unveiled in 1947, based on modeling predicting that the city was actually going to increase in population over the ensuing decades, and “…would have population of 900,000 by 1970 – the end point of the plan” (Abbott, 2007). This type of population forecasting, widely used in American planning at this time, turned out to be erroneous, but city planners subscribed to this forecast as though its
conclusions were definite. To prepare the city for population growth, city planners and officials believed that slum clearance was necessary to remove blighted, ‘obsolete’ sections of the city. Consequently, the ‘St. Louis Housing Authority’ and the ‘Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority’ were established with the power to carry out a large-scale urban renewal operation, removing blight to create vacant land for new development.

Although many American cities experienced the effects of blight and suburban flight, St. Louis experienced them earlier and more severely, due to the fact that “…other cities, no more wisely managed but with much larger areas and the ability to expand by annexation (a device not available to St. Louis), masked their deteriorating cores more effectively” (Primm, 1998). Blight clearance in St. Louis after the Second World War was regarded as an essential part of revitalizing the urban core, and as such it was heavily employed during the latter 1940’s and the 1950’s, with planners drafting “…a dramatic slum-clearance scenario, covering nearly one third of the city’s total inhabited land” (Heathcott, 2005). Unfortunately, many of the residents affected by the slum clearance were poor African-Americans, who had suffered from the same pattern of segregation and discrimination seen in all American cities. This forced them to live in urban ghettos until the landmark court case of Shelley v. Kraemer put an end to racially restrictive covenants in 1948. During the housing turmoil that followed this court decision, with rampant blockbusting, redlining, and continued white flight to the suburbs, inner-city poverty remained primarily concentrated in African-American neighborhoods, continuing to make them vulnerable to the bulldozers of urban renewal.
By the mid-1950’s, the stage was set for St. Louis’ massive decline during the latter half of the 20th century: Urban renewal was leveling huge swaths of poor, minority residential neighborhoods, replaced by Le Corbusier-style high-rises such as the massive Pruitt – Igoe public housing project; City planners were preparing for an expansion of the population, when the exact opposite was to occur; the City itself had long-ago separated itself from the County, establishing boundaries that were too small for much future expansion and creating a fragmented political and financial landscape in St. Louis County; The rise of the suburbs, already a problem for St. Louis since its inception, had city residents across the country abandoning the inner-city in droves; and finally, manufacturing, long a major economic activity in St. Louis, was increasingly moving from the Midwest to the Sunbelt. By 2000, the census recorded a population loss of 500,000 people in forty-five years, the largest percentage population decrease of any city in the Midwest. Due to this massive decrease, “Enrollment in the public school system went from 150,000 students to 36,000…[and]…property tax, long the staple for civic revenue, dropped to levels that could no long sustain city services” (Stanley, 2004). St. Louis had been employing revitalization strategies for over forty years, longer than many cities, but had they achieved any positive results?

Jefferson National Expansion Memorial

City officials first conceived of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial in the early 1930’s, as a way to rehabilitate St. Louis’ riverfront and celebrate the men who had made the territorial expansion of the United States possible. From conception to reality,
the project took over thirty years to organize and implement, and was a central planning issue in St. Louis during this time. To bring this project to fruition, a huge area of the city’s riverfront would have to be cleared, designers and financing found, and politicians and businessmen convinced of its potential beneficial impact on the urban core.

St. Louis Gateway Arch, Framing the Court House

The most famous aspect of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial is the St. Louis Arch, an enormous concrete arch covered in stainless steel, commonly referred to as the Gateway Arch, or Gateway to the West. In addition to the Arch, the old St. Louis courthouse and the Museum of Westward Expansion were included as attractions in the site design. The primary purpose of this development was not only to revitalize the riverfront, but also to give St. Louis a memorial “…comparable to the greatest in the world” (Primm, 1998), a feature that would promote the city to businesses and tourists.
Market-

In order to raise funds for the project, bond issues worth millions of dollars would have to be publicly approved by a majority vote, and politicians in Washington D.C. would have to be persuaded to match city funding. Both of these groups would have to be convinced of the necessity of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial for any kind of progress to be made, as per Garvin’s requirement that the market must be willing to pay for a specific project. Initially, things went according to the wishes of the project committee; a bond issue was passed in 1935, and President Roosevelt approved Works Progress Administration funds for the project in that same year. Additionally, the city council approved the taking of properties on the site through the use of eminent domain. However, in 1936 “…taxpayers…challenged the bond issue as having been adopted in a fraudulent election” (Primm, 1998), and it was only saved by the fact that the presiding judge was either “…impressed by the importance of the project or perhaps by its powerful sponsors…” (Primm, 1998) that the Memorial was saved. Another test for the project came in 1939 when several congressmen in Washington attempted to repudiate Federal commitment, and again in 1945 when the postwar Congress was more interested in balancing the budget than financing the Memorial. Each of those times, enough support was found to continue making plans, but on both occasions there was heavy political pressure in the national capitol to abandon the project.

Leadership-

The principal leader of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial was a civic attorney named Luther Ely Smith, a long proponent of riverfront revitalization. Along with mayor Bernard Dickmann, Smith was instrumental in assembling a group of
prominent St. Louis businessmen who favored the Memorial and had the political clout to silence any opposition. This group was to be known as the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association. Both Smith and Dickmann had their respective roles to play in creating the Memorial: “Dickmann’s efforts were critical in maintaining congressional support for the project. Smith was pivotal in negotiating funding through a federal bureaucratic maze, in securing funding for the association, and ultimately in raising the local funds for the [competition to design the Memorial, held in 1945]” (Tranel, 2007). Additionally, Missouri Senator Thomas Hennings was instrumental in obtaining financial support from the Federal government in the postwar years, when the government was tightening its purse strings. Hennings not only led the charge in support of the project, but also convinced other politicians of the need to fund this and similar projects (Primm, 1998).

Financing-

The initial bond issue and WPA funds provided the Memorial, secured due to the influence and salesmanship of Mayor Dickmann and the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, with $9 million in financing. However, although this proved adequate for the initial purchase of land and demolition of existing buildings, the project was lengthy, and with the interruption of the Second World War and the deaths of both Smith and Dickmann, momentum for finance generation was temporarily lost during and immediately after the war years (Tranel, 2007). In 1949, Senator Hennings became the torchbearer for the Memorial, championing the project in Washington. Due to his persistence and political acumen, “…$12.25 million (1958), $6 million (1965), and $9.5 million (1976) were added to complete the Gateway Arch and the Museum of Westward
Expansion” (Primm, 456). Once this funding was secured, other state and city businesses and organizations supplemented the amount, raising a further $1.5 million dollars. Finally, in 1967 “…the city voters approved another Arch and Museum bond issue of $2 million” (Tranel, 2007). Project financing was secured by appealing to the city voters, politicians in Washington and the local business community.

Location-

The location of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial had been the subject of much discussion before the project’s inception. Occupied by warehouses since the early 19th century, almost the entire area had been leveled by a fire in 1849. When the commercial buildings were “…rebuilt without sprinkler systems” (Tranel, 2007), occupancy was negatively affected. This, combined with the decrease in riverboat traffic in subsequent years rendered the area blighted, and by the 1930’s it was ripe for clearance and new development. Although the Memorial eventually succeeded in revitalizing a limited area of the riverfront, its consequences were not entirely positive. By leveling a key area of downtown, the Memorial “…spurred a series of wholesale clearance projects-most of them far more controversial-in the central blocks…” (Sandweiss, 2001). The precedent set by this project would become the rationale for urban renewal projects that would displace thousands of people and level entire neighborhoods during the 1950’s and 1960’s.

Time-

The extended time sequence of the Memorial has to be analyzed in order to evaluate its success, in keeping with Garvin’s third time sequence. Formulated in the mid-1930’s, it took city officials more than thirty five years to recognize their vision for
the project, with major interruptions such as the Great Depression, Second World War, elections, and the death of its chief architect disrupting any initial progress. That the Memorial was finished at all is therefore something of an achievement. And despite the fact that some city officials viewed its construction as a precedent for racially questionable slum clearance, it did spur increased tourism and new development. In 1975, the Gateway Arch had so many visitors that city officials claimed “…only Lenin’s Tomb and the two Disney theme parks recorded more visitors” (Primm, 1998), and in 1965 a new baseball stadium was built adjacent to the Memorial. Thus, the Memorial satisfied the criteria for successfully considering the ingredient of time.

_Busch Stadium_  

As St. Louis is a city with a rich sporting history, one of city officials favored approaches to tax generation and tourism is by encouraging and supporting sports venues. When the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial was in the final stages of planning, the architect Eero Saarinen complained about the fact that there hadn’t been any new construction downtown for many years, giving the Memorial’s setting a decrepit appearance. As a solution to the lack of new development in the vicinity of the Memorial, in 1958 officials at the Federal Land Clearance Authority proposed the construction of a new stadium for the city’s baseball and football teams, the Cardinals. The stadium was pitched to civic leaders and city residents based on three main premises; First, the stadium would “…become an anchor for more extensive renewal efforts” (Phares, 2006), an important factor in complementing the Memorial. Also, the new stadium would hold
“…nearly fifty thousand, some fifty percent greater than [the old stadium, Sportsman’s Park] (Primm, 1998). At the time, city officials believed that it would generate more tax revenue due to increased game attendance and tourism, both seen as vital in an era when St. Louis was losing tax money on account of population loss and suburban flight. Busch Stadium was completed in 1966, and it hosted the football Cardinals until the franchise had a better offer from the city of Phoenix, in the form of a new stadium and a lucrative incentive package. The baseball Cardinals stayed in St. Louis throughout the life of Busch stadium, eventually partnering with the city to construct a new baseball stadium in the same location in 2005.
Market-

Due to the fact that St. Louis had long been a ‘baseball city’, at one time even possessing two professional baseball teams (the St. Louis Browns interests were sold to Baltimore in 1953 after a negative publicity scandal), there was a clear market for baseball as a revenue-generating operation. Also, by the 1950’s the National Football League was being broadcast on national television, finally earning it a place among the nations official pastimes. Despite the fact that the AFL/NFL merger was still over a decade away, the sport was on the rise, and it seemed prudent to house them in an expanded stadium. Although there were available alternatives for sports entertainment in St. Louis in the 1950’s and 1960’s, such as the National Hockey League St. Louis Blues and a short-lived professional basketball team, residents of the region were quick to respond to the increased amenities and seating at the new stadium, and the baseball Cardinals alone drew over three million fans a year to their games (Ponder, 2004). Thus, the stadium not only satisfied and stimulated existing demand, but also succeeded in bringing these people downtown.

Leadership-

The designer of the Gateway Arch, Eero Saarinen was but one of many voicing the opinion that there needed to be something more than the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial to jumpstart development in downtown St. Louis. One of the principal leaders in the Busch Stadium project was August “Gussie” Anheuser Busch, grandson of the brewery founder and President and Chief Executive Officer of the eponymous company. In 1953 he had bought the Cardinals amid rumors that they were going leave St. Louis, and as a member of the Civic Center Redevelopment Corporation’s
board of directors, Busch “…was instrumental in getting the “new” Busch Stadium built” (Phares, 2006). This board of directors essentially comprised “…a virtual who’s who of the 1960’s St. Louis business elite” (Phares, 2006), epitomizing the support that the new stadium had among the local business community. The CCRC was the entity tasked with undertaking the actual redevelopment project, and was operated as part of a triumvirate with the City and the Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority. The LCRA acquired and cleared all land for the stadium, and undertook the actual construction with financial backing from the City and CCRC, eventually handing over ownership to the CCRC.

Another main figure in the success of this project was Charles Farris, chief of the Federal Land Clearance Authority in St. Louis, who “…proposed the building of a downtown stadium” (Primm, 1998), basically giving the city a green light to use land cleared using Federal funding to construct a stadium.

**Financing** -

Unlike many stadiums, the Busch Stadium built in the 1960’s was financed almost entirely with private funds. Public funding for the project was limited to just $6 million “…for public improvements” (Phares, 2006). The remaining $27 million cost of the stadium came from several private investors, including; $20 million collected through a fund-raising drive headed by the president of First National Bank; $5 million from the Cardinal’s owners, Anheuser-Busch; and $2.5 million from the May Company (Primm, 1998). The final price tag, after the construction of four adjacent parking garages, was $51 million, with only $6 million being financed by the public. Despite the fact that property taxes were abated under the downtown redevelopment plan until 1993, when Anheuser-Busch began paying full taxes “…exceeding $1 million a year” (Phares, 2006).
the stadium did make annual contributions of $150,000 in lieu of taxes beginning in 1967. The benefits of minimal public financing were readily apparent by the time Busch Stadium was replaced by a new ballpark in 2005; “Minimal public support for a large-scale venture led to expanded property and amusement tax receipts plus a focus for major urban redevelopment” (Phares, 2007).

Location-

The location for Busch stadium was well chosen for numerous reasons. By complementing the Gateway Arch and other redevelopment projects associated with the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial the environs of the stadium became a focal point of the new downtown economic strategy, which is “…tourism, amusement, and sports” (Phares, 2006). In 2001, when a new ballpark was being proposed as a way to keep the Cardinals downtown after the team was sold to mostly local investors in 1995, the location of Busch stadium had been so successful that the new stadium was built in almost the exact same location. Whereas the old Busch stadium was meant to act as a catalyst for downtown redevelopment based on tourism and amusement, the new Busch stadium is part of a ‘Village Ballpark’, “…a development adjacent to the new ballpark consisting of mixed-use retail, office, and residential space” (Ponder, 74). The restructuring of downtown St. Louis into a leisure-oriented space has largely been achieved since Busch stadium was finished in 1967, and the fact that a new urbanist-themed development has been proposed for this location in addition to a new stadium is further evidence of how successful this site can be when occupied by a sports venue.
Busch stadium was developed during a period when St. Louis, and many other Midwestern American cities, were going through a fundamental change in character based on necessity, from densely populated industrial cities to suburb-ringed entertainment centers. As an integral part of this new theme for downtown, the stadium was instrumental in making it a success. The new stadium doubled the number of attendees at football and baseball games, becoming “…a major asset to downtown St. Louis, especially to the weekend hotel, restaurant, and entertainment business” (Primm, 458). Also, at a time when the city’s finances were stretched to the breaking point after failed renewal attempts and massive population loss, the fact that it was built using primarily private financing provided a measure of relief for the taxpayers. Finally, despite the tax abatement given to the new stadium during much of its lifespan, there was not a complete loss of revenue owing to the annual $150,000 payment and the increase in downtown visitors.

**Neighborhood Revitalization: Jeff-Vander-Lou**

Efforts to house low-income families in St. Louis during the latter half of the 20th century were a mixture of abysmal failures and moderate successes. The city embraced Le Corbusier’s vision for public housing in the mid-1950’s, destroying old, poor neighborhoods and replacing them with high-rise apartment buildings surrounded by green space. The largest of these projects, Pruitt-Igoe, ended up as the poster child for public housing in this period. Consisting of thirty-three eleven-story apartment buildings
with a combined capacity for three thousand families, it was initially hailed as a great success, and “…attracted wide and favorable comment from architects and planners as a model for other cities” (Primm, 1998). However, it rapidly declined for multiple reasons, including lack of recreational space for the thousands of children ‘stacked’ in the high-rises, lack of nearby amenities such as shopping facilities and health services, inadequate public transportation service, vandalism, and crime. By 1975, twenty years after it was constructed, Pruitt-Igoe was completely demolished, its memory haunting St. Louis to this day.

The emphasis on Le Corbusier-style public housing projects in St. Louis during the 1950’s had a detrimental effect on inner city neighborhoods, as ‘blighted’ residential areas were bulldozed and replaced by doomed high-rises. Because City officials were concentrating on these projects, funding was not available for neighborhood revitalization efforts. Combined with the City’s focus on building new highways through older neighborhoods to facilitate commuters with jobs downtown and racially biased housing policies implemented by landowners in the inner-city, the eventual failure of Pruitt-Igoe and similar projects left inner-city residents scrambling for effective ways to save their neighborhoods at a time when there was widespread disillusionment in publicly-funded housing schemes. One such neighborhood was Jeff-Vander-Lou, a “…predominantly black, low-income 500-square-block area in the near north side within a dozen blocks of the downtown business district” (Checkoway, 1984). Neighborhood residents’ successful revitalization efforts in the face of these obstacles are demonstrative of the significance of dedication can be in neighborhood revitalization.
In 1967, as the fate of public housing projects such as Pruitt-Igoe became increasingly clear, Jeff-Vander-Lou (JVL) was a neighborhood in dire straits, due to redlining, lack of code enforcement, reduced services and the constant threat of urban renewal projects leveling the area for a highway or new housing project. Despite these problems, “…a core of owners of structurally sound houses who had stable employment, some of whom had lived there for years, others who had been displaced before” (Checkoway, 1984) wanted to remain in the neighborhood. Responding to a series of crises, these residents organized into an effective independent organization named after their neighborhood, Jeff-Vander-Lou. Leaders of this organization were responsible for encouraging all community residents to participate in revitalizing their neighborhood, eventually building the capacity to undertake multiple programs designed to benefit differing interest groups such as the elderly and single-parent families.
Leadership-

As with many other community organizations, the project leaders in Jeff-Vander-Lou were local residents and business owners who felt that they could have a positive impact on their community. Their first victory was achieved by forcing the City building commissioner to acknowledge the deteriorating conditions in the neighborhood and “...force landlords to improve conditions through inspection and code enforcement” (Checkoway, 1984). From this simple beginning, local leaders quickly began to force major concessions out of the city, including the “…clarification of the city’s plans for JVL and…a promise of no urban renewal” (Checkoway, 1984). After JVL was set up as an independent organization whose primary purpose was to serve the interests of their neighborhood, the line between community participation and leadership was less distinct due to increased community input. The president of JVL was merely one of the first ‘core group’ of residents to begin organizing, and he largely “...developed experience through trial and error” (Green, Kremer, & Holland, 1993).

Financing-

JVL was unable to obtain Federal funding for their first major project as an independent organization, the acquisition and rehabilitation of old housing in a central target area within the neighborhood. Members of the community were not discouraged however, as they initiated their own program of housing rehabilitation, with their first attempt financed through “…membership dues, fundraising projects, a bank loan and contributions from businesses and residents, and completed by volunteers at a cost of only $18,000” (Checkoway, 1984). This success led to a St. Louis businessman and former resident of JVL financing additional dwelling units and providing office space and
staff salaries, and the founding of another neighborhood foundation with the mission of seeking and managing private contributions, which eventually raised over $1 million. As the organization continued to enjoy success in their endeavors, the Department of Housing and Urban Development agreed to insure mortgages and subsidize interest for the neighborhood housing rehabilitations. In selling the rehabilitated houses, JVL managed to make a small profit that was subsequently reinvested in capital improvements for the neighborhood.

Location-

Despite the fact that JVL was situated close to downtown St. Louis, which was being extensively redeveloped at the time JVL was organizing and rehabilitating, the neighborhood saw little benefit from this location. Planners in St. Louis were fond of practicing ‘triage’, meaning that they divided up neighborhoods into three categories: neighborhoods that were stable; neighborhoods that needed urgent attention to prevent a decline; and neighborhoods beyond saving. JVL was designated a neighborhood beyond saving, and openly regarded as a possible site for extensive renewal efforts until the neighborhood organizers managed to secure a promise of no urban renewal. Also, most of the North Side of St. Louis was either blighted or in a state of decay when JVL was being revitalized, meaning that even if the neighborhood could be brought back from the brink it would still be surrounded by blighted districts.

Time-

Time was on the side of JVL when the promise of no urban renewal had been secured from the city, as community organizers could start planning for the future of their neighborhood. Housing rehabilitation projects were undertaken, additional partners
solicited, and more sources of funding acquired. Once a formula had been devised to rehabilitate housing without substantial amounts of funding during the first project undertaken by JVL, there was no limit to how many other houses could be rehabilitated provided the willpower was still available. In lieu of the fact that funding was secured, additional projects were developed, further improving the neighborhood. Fifteen years after JVL was formed, they had added “…more than 800 units and $21 million of capital improvements in the neighborhood”(Checkoway, 1984).
Cleveland and St. Louis offer an interesting comparison in how Midwestern American cities dealt with the problem of blight during the 20th century and the solutions devised to revitalize inner-city areas. Each city has been through its own unique combination of events that lead to their gaining a reputation for massive urban decay.

In the case of St. Louis, the problem started early in the city’s history, when city leaders decisively separated the City from the County. This guaranteed that the city would be unable to combat the rise of suburbia through annexation, a method many other cities with small downtowns successfully used to sustain themselves during the transition period when manufacturing moved to the Southeast and Southwest, forcing many residents to adjust to the new service economy. Due to these circumstances St. Louis has been focused on revitalizing its inner city for longer than cities such as Cleveland, a city that experienced a sharp, rapid decline beginning at the height of deindustrialization in the 1970’s.

Despite their differences, these cities faced a similar set of problems. These include the widespread abandonment and decay of inner-city neighborhoods, a lack of jobs downtown, and decreased tax revenue due to a lack of functioning businesses and amenities at a time when cities were intent on transforming themselves into tourist destinations and attractive leisure centers for suburbanites. Both cities faced an image problem at their nadir; St. Louis was known as a city that hemorrhaged residents to the suburbs, and built the now infamous Pruitt-Igoe housing project during the urban renewal approach to revitalization; Cleveland was known as “The Mistake on the Lake”, and
gained widespread negative press due to events such as the Cuyahoga river catching fire, and when the city defaulted on its bonds in 1978.

In “Comeback Cities”, four trends are identified to analyze how successful a city had been in its revitalization. These are: maturing of community action groups into organizations that have a significant positive effect; rebirth of functioning private markets in former inner-city wastelands; decrease in crime rates; ‘unshackling’ of inner-city life from large bureaucracies that prevent mobility and innovation. Three of these trends can only be analyzed in an abstract fashion, as they do not rely on statistics, and could include a measure of personal opinion from the analyst. The only statistical measure is the decrease in crime, and this measure must be analyzed in context of the nature of the crime. For instance, an increase in murders is more significant than an increase in theft.

In the case of Cleveland, its most significant achievement in revitalizing the inner core is the rebirth of private markets in former wastelands. The Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum and the Gateway Sports Complex are both located on sites that were once disinvested or underutilized, but now they attract hundreds of thousands of visitors downtown and complement surrounding businesses and attractions. St Louis was not as successful as Cleveland, partly due to the ‘Time’ ingredient of success of their individual projects. Although projects such as the sports stadiums and the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial revitalized portions of downtown whilst keeping their professional teams in the city for at least the next twenty-five years (the NFL Cardinals leaving for Phoenix in 1988), the urban renewal projects undertaken during the 1950’s contributed in the creation of urban wastelands, rather than revitalization. Also, while Cleveland’s sports complex was part of a larger plan including neighboring amenities such as hotels,
and restaurants, Busch Stadium’s development was limited to the stadium itself and four parking garages. Although there was an assumption that Busch stadium would act as a catalyst for these businesses, it was not part of an overall plan, failing to meet Garvin’s requirement for a project’s impact over a twenty-four hour period.

One trend both Cleveland and St. Louis successfully implemented was the success of their community action groups maturing into organizations that had a significant positive impact. The accomplishments of Jeff-Vander-Lou in St. Louis and Famicos in Cleveland were both considerable, epitomizing what a small groups of dedicated individuals can do for their neighborhoods. In each case, the organization was comprised of local residents with a vested interest in turning around their decaying neighborhoods, with the only significant difference being the level of support from city hall. Creative programs such as the Cleveland Land Bank, implemented at the mayoral or even state levels, aided Famicos. This stands in contrast to Jeff-Vander-Lou in St. Louis, which had little support from city hall during their neighborhood revitalization projects, and had trouble obtaining money from HUD before they had emphatically demonstrated the feasibility of their projects.

This difference in political support for neighborhood revitalization between these two cities is indicative of how inner city organizations were ‘unshackled’ from large bureaucracies, a trend with both positive and negative implications. While Jeff-Vander-Lou was free to pursue projects of interest to local leaders and residents, they had difficulty getting funding for their initial projects partially due to their lack of connections with any politicians. They also failed to create a larger organization composed of representatives from multiple neighborhoods, missing opportunities for
meaningful revitalization efforts with surrounding neighborhoods. Meanwhile, the
success of Famicos in Hough lead to the formation of the Cleveland Housing Network, a
larger organization with greater ability to influence city officials and develop best
practices for neighborhood revitalization.

With the exception of neighborhood revitalization, revitalization projects
developed in downtown St. Louis and Cleveland such as North Coast Harbor, Gateway
Arch, Busch Stadium and the Gateway Sports Complex were all conceived and
developed using the local bureaucratic apparatus. The resounding theme in all of these
projects was the coordination of private and public leadership in order to organize and
finance a development that would beneficially impact the inner city. By combining public
and private interests, these leaders achieved results that would have been impossible
without forging a partnership. Thus, while a certain amount of flexibility should be
maintained in the case of neighborhood organizations, with a leadership composed of
local residents, large-scale projects in the city center require communication and
cooperation between businessmen, financiers and the city bureaucracy. Due to this
necessity, these projects are exempt from being evaluated in the context of this trend.

The last trend for successful revitalization outlined in ‘Comeback Cities’ is the
decrease in crime. In comparing crime rates in these two cities, the long-term impact of
revitalization efforts is a primary concern. Therefore, crime rates from the beginning of
the 1990’s through to the present day are taken into account. By the early 1990’s both
Cleveland and St. Louis had reached their lowest point, and had been pursuing
revitalization projects for at least a decade. As the data from ‘Appendix A’ demonstrates,
by 1990 St. Louis was dealing with a more pronounced crime rate than Cleveland, in both
violent and property crime. By 2007 both city’s crime rates had dropped significantly, with St. Louis showing the largest decline, in part due to the fact that its crime rate was higher in 1990. Using crime levels as an indicator of revitalization, both cities have improved the safety and livability of their urban cores, although St. Louis still lags behind Cleveland and many other cities.
Conclusion

In revitalizing their downtowns, both St. Louis and Cleveland had to adopt inventive revitalization strategies requiring foresight, visionary leadership, dedication and an awareness of the direction Midwestern American cities were going. Both cities successfully constructed projects downtown capable of fulfilling a role as major tourist attractions, reinventing their images. The major difference between the two was the approach they took to neighborhood revitalization, with St. Louis committing to major public housing projects that were flawed by design, and neglecting the type of community-based approaches used so successfully in Cleveland. Also, the city of St. Louis has more challenges than Cleveland in the era of suburban sprawl due to their separation from St. Louis County in 1876. In the final analysis, successful revitalization is dependent on many factors: the appropriate use of the bureaucracy to achieve project goals; leadership able to predict long-term benefits of their project and raise public support for it; the creative use of financing; and insightful site location. However, the overriding theme for inner city revitalization must be a holistic approach inclusive of both neighborhoods and major attractions.

The major lesson learned from analyzing neighborhood revitalization in these two cities is the importance of community organizing. In Hough and Jeff-Vander-Lou, their successful approaches were based on the ideas and support of local residents, who understood how they wanted their neighborhood to look, feel, and function. Dynamic, committed leaders with experience in their community were necessary to rally local support, financing, and goodwill, and who were willing to learn how the bureaucracy works in
order to obtain state and federal support and funding. Also, it should be understood that even in the worst, most decayed inner-city neighborhoods, there still exist residents and leaders who wish to spend their time and money improving their community rather than finding a way to leave it.

In the case of large-scale projects such as museums and sports stadiums the importance of cooperation between public- and private-sector leaders should be emphasized. These entities exist in a symbiotic relationship, with one highly dependent on the other, and coordination is key if revitalization is to serve the interests of both parties. Healthy, functional relationships are vital, and efforts should be made to foster an air of trust and open communication between the public- and private-sector to ensure the success of large-scale projects intended to revitalize downtowns. This is especially true when considering how private-sector decisions, such as the relocation of a sports team, can affect a city’s image in an era when cities are attempting to reinvent themselves as cultural and tourist destinations.
References


### Appendix A

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>City/Population</th>
<th>Violent Crime Total</th>
<th>Property Crime Total</th>
<th>Violent Crime %</th>
<th>Property Crime %</th>
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<tr>
<td>1990 Cleveland</td>
<td>9,341</td>
<td>36,269</td>
<td>1.82%</td>
<td>7.06%</td>
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<td>513,487</td>
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<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>14,076</td>
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<td>396,685</td>
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<tr>
<th>City/Population</th>
<th>Violent Crime Total</th>
<th>Property Crime Total</th>
<th>Violent Crime %</th>
<th>Property Crime %</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007 Cleveland</td>
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<td>Cleveland</td>
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Source: United State Department of Justice: Bureau of Justice Statistics
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/