The Cincinnati Civil Defense Corps and Air Raid Warning System
During World War II

An Honors Thesis (Honrs 499)

By

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May 3, 1999

May 8, 1999
Abstract

In viewing the Cincinnati Civil Defense Corps, an evaluation of the importance of the air raid wardens and the air defense system will be conducted. The thesis will look at problems faced in creating a system from scratch as well as to look at the reason an air defense system was created in a city in which an air attack was impossible. Cincinnati, itself, represents an average size mid-western city, and in that respect, the lessons learned from this research could theoretically be applied to any equal size city in that respective area. Two interviews were conducted in order to get a first-hand account of what the air raids were like during the war. The majority of research was done at Cincinnati Historical Society Library, where most of the original documentation lies.
World War II was a testing ground for many new technologies. Among these technologies was the airplane. Though it had been speculated upon, and tested previously on a small scale during the Spanish Civil War as well as World War I, its true potential as a weapon of war was still somewhat unknown. What World War II illustrated is that a civilian behind friendly lines was in more danger than ever before. The airplane allowed terror bombing to take place. A commander might feel that a peace can be brought forth, if he can convince the civilian that the price of war is too high.

America felt the pressure of bombing raids by the enemy both directly and indirectly. While not in the war, America watched as the Germans shifted their attacks from military to civilian targets during the Battle of Britain. Then we felt the true power of a sneak attack by an air force as America saw its Pacific Fleet crippled at Pearl Harbor by the Japanese. This taught the Americans that in order to prevent this from happening again, we had to believe the impossible. The government had to make its citizens aware that at any time, they too could be subjected to this kind of attack. The citizens followed along dutifully, and volunteered by the thousands to help keep their city safe from any such disasters. They formed into government created groups called the Civil Defense Corps (CDC). The basis of the CDC was to have the average citizen responsible for the safety of a portion of the city. This could allow every person to feel a part of the war.

The Cincinnati CDC was split up into several different sections from nurses and medical faculty to volunteer fire fighters. The focus of this thesis, though, resides in the work and organization of the air-raid wardens as well as the air raid system itself. In this discussion, two serious questions must be understood. First, why set up an organization to watch the skies, when in all probability, there was no chance for an attack on Cincinnati?
Secondly, there must be a discussion of the reasons for the civilian’s involvement. Was their involvement a response to the government’s propaganda to instill fear in the citizen, or was the government’s involvement a response to the citizens’ needs? The role of this thesis is not only to give a descriptive look at what the air-raid wardens did and what the air-raid system was like, but also to answer the two aforementioned questions.

The city of Cincinnati was not unlike every other mid-major sized city in the United States. In early 1942, the city established its own CDC and sent a call out for volunteers to join the group. These calls were answered by thousands of people, and were not just restricted to the average civilian. Any number of owners of major stores or outlets worked as well. One of these people was J.M. Markham, President of the Miami Equipment Company. He wrote to the Mayor James Garfield Stewart personally and informed the mayor that he was willing to “offer my services for any assignment of your choosing in the interest of our local defense during our present national emergency.” The mayor’s office wrote back to Markham later in order to inform him that like any other civilian, he could be a part of the Cincinnati CDC, by discussing it with the local recruiting office. This was an important step for the fledgling system. They recognized that the system would be for every citizen, and that their treatment would be equal. It did not matter if you were a president of a company, or if you were a farmer off the street. You could be of assistance.

To become an air-raid warden was not the most difficult thing in the world. Basically the process began with an application to the CDC. On this questionnaire you were asked several simple question. You had to provide your name and other basic personal information, what type of machinery you could operate (truck, auto, motorcycle,
typewriter, etc...) and what kind of weapons you could use proficiently. After you completed the survey, based on your skills you would be assigned initially as a fire watcher. If you chose to continue on and become an air-raid warden you merely had to complete twenty hours of first aid. With this training you were now able to become an air-raid warden.

The wardens first and foremost job was to be the leaders in the streets during a possible air attack. What this entailed was to make sure that all motorists had gotten themselves off the streets and were taking shelter in a prescribed air-raid shelter or standing next to a building, using it for protection. A second job utilized their fire-watching experience. They called in damage reports to the relay office so that fire extinguishing priorities could be established. Since there weren’t any air-raids on Cincinnati during the war, it must be explained that these wardens were still ready for the real event. Their skills were honed during elaborate blackouts that called for them to estimate damage from paper bombs dropped on the city. This will be explained in detail later.

The leader of the CDC in Cincinnati was Brigadier General Dana T. Merrill (ret.). He was basically responsible for coordinating the groups into a working machine and deciding which people would be in various branches of the Cincinnati CDC. He also acted as a liaison to the head office in Washington D.C. Other duties involved supervision of air-raid work; heading up the committees to plan the blackouts; and working with civilians to build a better city system.

In July of 1942, Cincinnati decided to conduct a planned dim-out of the city. Their plan was to find out how good their system was. What resulted led to a public
outcry criticizing Cincinnati’s air raid efforts. Apparently in the haste of getting a system operational, the city did not install air-raid sirens properly. Several letters were sent to the mayor complaining that the sirens could not be heard in their area. As Clarence H. Kaufman, a civilian from Montgomery, stated, the “method now in use is a joke,” and that he “could not discern air raid sirens from traffic noises.”\footnote{Frank Favret was in the district commander’s staff and he related that most of the dim-out infractions occurred because “the signal could not be heard or recognized.”} This pointed to a major problem in the development of a proper air-raid warning system. A team was put together by Mayor James Stewart to find out how to solve the problem of an air-raid system that could not be heard. Heading this team was Howard Wilson, head of the engineering section in the CDC.

Wilson discussed the problem with local experts on sound wave travel and determined that there were eight factors to consider in creating the perfect warning system. In letters back to the troubled civilians he voiced his concern and quoted the features that needed to be taken into consideration in looking for a better siren. These included the “frequency, quality of sound, loudness, ease of coding signal, type of device, effects of weather, directional characteristics in sound, and intensity.”\footnote{This was a major hurdle that needed to be overcome by the Cincinnati CDC. If they were to win the respect of the civilian and make the civilian feel safe, they had to install a system that worked one hundred percent of the time. If this could not be accomplished, the public might not feel that this task was as important as the officials claimed it was to be.} Wilson’s team took all suggestions of the public as well to try to put together a better device. Tillman Underwood suggested that he look into using a public address
system. Conveniently, Underwood stated that he had one and was willing to allow the city to use it. This proposal was ultimately turned down and by September a solution was still being worked out. But this was at least a sign that the people were willing to give impact regarding the committee’s problems, and wanted to help out. It would not be until the following year that the system would be completed and ready to alert the citizens of Cincinnati to an air attack.

The fact that the Wilson group took so long to formulate a plan indicates the evident lack of urgency shown by the mayor’s office. Was the slowness due to city officials’ awareness that no danger attack existed? Or was mere government incompetence as it relates to the government. Neither cause can be excluded based on the evidence. It again reiterates a major question of this thesis, was this air-raid system something drawn up by the government to preoccupy the people while it conducted a war? Or was it a sincere attempt by the government to protect its people and prepare for war on the homefront.

There were many rules when it came to the warning system, not overly complicated. These warning systems were the basis for the defense of the city if it should ever come under an attack. First and foremost, there were three messages that went out over the warning system: Yellow, Blue, and Red. The Yellow warning was a confidential warning that went to large factories in which the time to prepare for the raid was twenty minutes or longer. This warning was like a tornado watch, only a possibility. These included major production factories like General Motors and General Electric, whose personnel was so large that they required a long time to prepare. This was sent through the relay system and sent only to those businesses on the list. A Blue warning was also a
confidential warning sent to businesses. The businesses on the Blue list needed shorter
time to prepare, but needed longer than the Red alert would allow them. This warning
was also a signal that stated an attack was possible but not definite. The final and most
important warning was the red warning. This was a warning that was sent over an audible
warning device. This warning meant that an attack was imminent and that you should
immediately seek shelter. These were the rules in effect on May 5, 1942.¹³

There were three major questions that were asked when a business asked to be put
on the Blue or Yellow list. They were as follows:

1. Do they need to take essential preparatory steps?
2. Do these steps require considerable(sic) more time than that available
   following Red warning?
3. Has assurance been given that prompt and effective action will be taken
   upon receipt of the preliminary warning?¹⁴

If all of these were answered in the affirmative, the business qualified for the Blue
of Yellow list. (As mentioned above). It is misleading to say that only a war-production
business would be given the clearance of a Blue signal according to the federal guideline.
It would be more appropriate to assume that a company that was important to the
production of war-goods was given the benefit of the doubt when it pertained to whether
or not it was going to be put on the list.

In early 1943, it was discussed that the Red warning was not a sufficient warning
for the citizens so a more elaborate system was to be worked out. Though the Blue and
Yellow warnings still operated for businesses, a Blue and Red system was used for the
pedestrian and driver as well. This system stated that coded signals would be used on the
audible warning devices to let the man or woman on the streets know what was going on
so that they could take the necessary steps for their safety. A Blue signal was in effect
when a long steady blast was heard on the air-raid signal. If you were in a car you were to flip your lights to low beam and try to get to a safe place. If you were walking, continue, but start looking for the nearest air-raid shelter. Bus and trolley drivers could continue during a Blue warning.\textsuperscript{15}

When you heard a rising and falling sound or a series of short blasts, a Red warning was in effect. If you were in a car, you were to turn out your lights and get to an air-raid shelter. If you were on a bus or trolley, exit the vehicle and either get to a shelter or get next to a building. If you were walking, go to an air-raid shelter or next to a building. Once the Red warning was given, you were to remain where you were until the blue signal was given. Then you were to continue on cautiously until an “All Clear” signal, a second Blue signal, now distinguished as a White signal, was given. It should be noted that though there was significant documentation discussing the White signal, not once was there a description nor a mention of the sound of the signal. These allowed the average citizen on the street to prepare for the attack, and as we will see, would allow the air-raid wardens to get to their respective places on the street to help the civilians to safety.\textsuperscript{16}

With the new air-raid system in place, it was now time to test it out. Again a dim-out was prepared as a test of the system. On Sunday May 2\textsuperscript{nd}, an exercise was to take place that would test the abilities of the air-raid wardens. The exercise would take place at an unknown time and all civilians were expected to participate. There were several exemptions, though, that were given to ensure that commercial traffic would not be disturbed. Therefore, all traffic on the Ohio River was not subject to the test, all train and railroad operating devices were not subject to this exercise, and all Army and Navy
installations were free from the test. To put a twist in these exercises, the CDC hired pilots from local Lunken Airport to drop brochures indicating a type of bomb. There were three types of bombs: incendiary, UXB's (unexploded bombs), and high explosive (see attached sheet for example of what the bombs looked like). The air-raid wardens were to go about this operation as if it were the real thing. They would get out into the streets and guide people to safety, and then would observe where the bombs were dropped. The warden would then inspect the area around him and estimate the damage. In this inspection he or she would note the location of the bomb, type of bomb, number of people in the area of the bomb. The wardens performed their job and thousand upon thousands of reports were filled out. These reports now fill dozens of boxes and are at rest in the archives, waiting for someone to research them. In a bit of irony, Union Terminal, which now houses the Cincinnati Historical Society Library where the bulk of this research was done, was struck by several dummy high explosive bombs and received some “severe damage.” Luckily this was only a drill and not the real thing, or a true historic landmark would have been destroyed.

The next morning the reviews of the air-raid drill came back, and overall they spoke highly of the system. The citizens responded well to their duty and this was recognized the next morning by Merrill. He again reiterated that it was imperative that the city have full cooperation of the citizens, and that having this cooperation was the only way to run an effective drill. For this first large-scale drill, the Fifth Service Command Liaison Officer for civilian defense, Colonel Robert P. Harsh, came down from Columbus, Ohio to watch what transpired during the drill. Though he stated there were some minor problems, such as motorists not clearing the middle of the street for
possible emergency vehicles, the “public here responded very well.” The grades were in for the first drill, and though they weren’t A’s, they were definitely solid scores.

While a raid worked well on advance notice, it was necessary to drill in a surprise attack. A timeframe of one week in July was given for a possible drill, with the notion to see how the civilian would react when a raid could happen at any given time. So starting on July 11th and continuing through July 18th, the city was placed on notice that at any given time an exercise could happen. On Wednesday July 14th, the daylight raid took place. The results were not as reassuring as the first time, and the CDC came under fire from the public. Robert Heidler, a reporter for the Cincinnati Times-Star, decided that during the air-raid, he was going to walk around the city of Cincinnati and see if anyone would challenge him to get off of the street. Unfortunately for the CDC, he was not removed from the street as quickly as he believed necessary. He proceeded to write a scalding article on the uselessness of the air-raid wardens in respect to the job that they did. He noted that he was able to walk over four city blocks in downtown, down the middle of the street whistling, without being approached by a warden. He walked by his third warden before a fourth finally threatened him with bodily harm if he did not remove himself from the street. Interestingly enough, it was his arrogant attitude that riled two older gentlemen who stopped him. They viewed him as one of who would walk around invincible until “boom, they were hit by a bomb. That’d straighten ‘em out.”

Problems still existed with the air-raid warning system, and in this surprise exercise, these problems were readily identified. In Zone I (please see attached map for a description of zones) the signal was not heard clearly at several different street intersections. In Zone II the second Blue signal was never received. And probably the
largest infraction was that in Zone III the “All Clear” signal was accidentally relayed instead of the Red signal. These infractions were minor slipups probably caused by the work of a few volunteers. The operators in charge of relaying these signals from headquarters had probably only done this job once or twice, maybe never at all during an actual drill. This raises issues regarding why volunteer systems don’t always work as planned. This is mainly due to the fact that you have hastily trained people are in charge of important jobs. Perhaps the city never seriously trained anyone in these positions, because they never expected this system to be put to any serious use.

If anything good came out of this July 14th raid, it was the realization that more women were needed to aid the cause of the CDC. In a report that was released right before the raid, the Cincinnati Times-Star argued that more women needed to volunteer in order to make the system more efficient. It didn’t infer that women would be better at doing this job than men, but rather that the CDC was running low on volunteers and the need for women was great. This report was echoed by a memorandum that was sent throughout the CDC. This memorandum stated that a problem in the shortage of air-raid wardens was apparent in the outer edges of Cincinnati. It also stated that the “remedy is plainly seen in an increased enrollment and the use of women.” The women were important to the system because the amount of male volunteers was dwindling. As with every major corporation or business, the CDC quickly found out that the women were going to provide a significant role if only because they were more readily available than the men.

As mentioned above, the city was broken up into different zones, seven to be exact. These seven zones allowed the CDC to effectively test different parts of the city
without inconveniencing the entire city. This also allowed the management of the city by
the CDC to be a lot easier, since it created jurisdictions that can be managed
independently. Several times during late 1942 and early 1943, the city authorized several
blackouts to take place. The entire city almost never blacked out, but portions of the city
routinely did. This made inspection of which zones were having the most trouble easier.

It was during these routine inspections that once again the readiness of the city
was tested again. This time Ralph Stone, State Defense Council Chief happened to be the
one testing. On June 8th 1943, Zone I was subjected to a blackout. Stone decided that he
would come down and personally inspect the job done by the CDC air-raid division as it
related to following the rules of a blackout. Stone decided that the best way to inspect
would be to stand atop the tallest building in Cincinnati, the Carew Tower. On top of the
Carew Tower, Stone bore witness to a terrible sight. He noted that he “saw hundreds and
hundreds of violations. Cincinnati would have been a definite target tonight.”26 He made
it clear to the CDC that effective action would have to be taken and that night it was.
Thirty-seven arrests were made and was a promise of “more dramatic action” if the
problems persisted.27 The entertainment park “Coney Island” was angered that it “had to
close down all activity except dancing in the pavilion during the blackout.” Some of the
civilians were apparently losing interest in the protection of their city. Stone tried to
invigorate the masses by threatening them with large fines and the possibility of jail time
if the problem persisted.

Obviously some of the citizens had tired of the war preparation as it appeared
more likely that the war was going to be won by the Allies. So why did the city continue
to prepare for such an unlikely attack? There are three reasons that the city started a
wartime preparation. First of all, this was going to be the first time that the United States was ever remotely threatened with this situation. A system was not in place and what better time to get funding for a system than during a world war. This also meant that the city did not have the necessary training to handle a situation if one arose. This goes back to the old Boy Scout saying "always be prepared." If we hadn't prepared and the war turned from an overseas war to a continental U.S. war, there wouldn't have been enough time to prepare an adequate system. Remember it did take fully a year to get a somewhat adequate system installed in the metropolitan area.

Secondly, the activity tried to keep the civilians' minds on the war. This meant that these daily reminders might aid in production or just keep the general morale of the people high. If a civilian prepared for war everyday and did his part at home, that person could feel like s/he was overseas fighting the war. This gave older Americans as well as women and the disabled the chance to do their part for the war. As we have seen in other wars, when the morale of the population goes down, the morale of the drafted troop goes down as well. This can become as serious problem and can directly affect how the war is conducted and how the government is going to respond to the people.

Thirdly, and quite possibly most importantly, it made the civilians fear the enemy. If the average civilian thought that an air-raid was possible, that person might make sure that his/her production rate was high. The civilian might work extra hard because they thought that their work was important in stopping that eventual raid on his/her hometown. This was also important because it might relieve the citizen from their moral obligation as it pertained to war. How else might one explain the rejoicing in the destruction of another's city. The military could easily justify the destruction by telling the citizens, the
enemy would have done it to your city. Of course, with the memories of Pearl Harbor still fresh in the minds of the people, it wasn’t too difficult to persuade them of what the consequences could be.

All three of these examples can be seen in one artifact left over from the Cincinnati CDC. As mentioned above, the city devised a plan to drop “bombs” on the city during air-raids. On each of these bombs, there was basic propaganda to get the civilian involved in the war, and to feel, in a small way, a part of it. By examining this bomb, one could go through the aforementioned list and find examples of each in this “bomb.”

To justify the preparation for an air-raid, one only has to look at this “bomb.” At the bottom of the “bomb” message, a motto of sorts can be read. The message states “It’s better to have this training and not need it - - - than to need it and not have it.” This phrase can go a long way in justifying why it was important to get the training installed at the city level. Basically, one could infer that the government had the citizens in its best interest and that it was merely out to protect their lives with this training. This gives the civilian the unquestioned loyalty to the government of the city, because this motto has justified why the civilians are having to work so hard on preparing an adequate air-defense system. This also gives the civilian the answer to all the doubters who ask “Why do you continue to prepare when we aren’t going to get attacked?” With confidence a civilian can turn and respond that “It’s better to have this training and not need it, than to need it and not have it.” It is important that the civilians have an answer to the questions that they might be asked. If they can’t answer the question themselves, it begins to leave
doubt on what their purpose is in the grand scheme of things. This would start a process that could dismantle an entire system.

This “bomb” also tells the civilian that there are two fundamental questions that need to be known when it comes time for an air-raid. First, it wants to know if you know where your local air-raid warden is located and secondly, where do you need to report during the air-raid. Whereas these might be normal questions for the civilian to look at, a more important issue is at hand with these questions. These questions cause the uninformed person to go and check these answers out at a local center, or at least from a friend. This activates conversation about war or the preparation of a defense. If this civilian’s mind will, during this time, shift its thoughts towards the war, the job of this “bomb” is done.  

The final aspect, one of creating a fear for the enemy can again be found on the “bombs.” On the leaflets that were dropped, the phrase “HITLER or TOJO will give you no hint, BUT WE WILL,” made the citizen believe that a bombing could be imminent and that they had to fear the enemy. There was also an underlying principal in the wording that was used that is very interesting. Saying that the government will help you out and answers your questions gives the reader of this sign an assurance that the government will always be there to help you out if you need it. This sign went a long way to make the citizen fear the prospect of an air-raid and led them to follow the guidelines of blackout ordinances.

So why did the civilians gradually lose interest over the drills. When the warning system was put in place in early 1942, the prospect for an air attack was at its peak. The Germans were nearing their high-water mark for the war, and the Japanese had stretched
across the ocean and attacked a territory of the United States. It was not necessarily known at that time that an attack on their city was unlikely. When the government put out the regulations and sent them to every city in the United States, it made the prospect even more likely. The average civilian was not aware of what the capabilities of the opposing air forces were. What the government told them was that they had to fear the enemy and that it was not known if we could be attacked or not. For 1942 the propaganda worked for the majority of the civilians, and the civilians were afraid of what could happen.

In 1943, the story started to change. By the time the new air-raid warning system was put in place, the civilians were feeling some relief from the war. North Africa had been won, Sicily was being invaded, and the Japanese were being defeated at sea and on land. The Allies were winning and now the threat of attack was waning. The blackouts and dim-outs were good for awhile, but they soon grew on the average civilian. Rita Grievenkamp was ten years old in 1943 and remembers that when the sirens went off, there was an air of annoyance in her household. Though the family did adhere to the regulations, it was not without a kind of bitterness in the process. Mary Jackson was twenty-five in 1943 and working in a wartime factory. She remembered the same kind of feeling. For the first part of the war, the feeling was one of fear. The prospect of another sneak attack on the United States, and especially on Cincinnati, was unlikely but it was in the back of her mind. A sense of urgency drove her to take part in the daily preparation for war as well as the monthly blackout drills. But as the war wore on and the feeling of security increased, her worries subsided, as did her part in the blackout drills. She soon was taking part in the drills on what could best be described as a random basis. This didn’t mean that she blatantly opened her curtains and lit up floodlights in the backyard.
It just meant that if a curtain was open upstairs and a light was on, she might not run up and turn the light off and close the curtain.\textsuperscript{34}

Though these feeling were not necessarily the norm, they might be representative of a portion of the population that was responsible for some of the violations during the blackouts. Whether these feelings hindered the growth of the Cincinnati CDC is still not known, but it does show that there were people who chose to disobey a federal guideline, merely because it was an inconvenience to their daily routine. As the war wore on, there were probably several people who just decided that the war preparation was too much of a hassle. This does not mean that they were bad Americans. It didn’t even mean that they didn’t have a concern for their life or property. It meant that the control of the government on their daily lives was returning back to normal. They no longer believed that an attack could happen at any time. They more likely believed that it was highly unlikely and that unless the war took a turn for the worse, they were going to try to get back to a normal way of life.

What the Cincinnati CDC did for the community was to make an attempt to unify the people for one goal, to prepare to defend the city for an air attack. To answer the question, who decided whether the system would eventually be put in place is not an easy one to answer. To answer it as simply as possible, both the government and the people had a somewhat equal part in the creation of the system. The specific and in depth answer is a little more confusing. The people responded and though on the individual basis there was some dissent and some that refused to be a part of the system, the system on a whole was very effective. Though there were local some people who urged on the fledgling system and demanded that a better one be put in place, the government was the real
instigator of the system. As has been shown time and time again, the government sent regulations from Washington to the District Commanders on what kind of regulations needed to be enforced. The government can take credit for its command of the situation. It swiftly responded to the mere possibility that at some time the United States might come under attack, and then created a system that would allow the civilians to help defend their city. This system made sure to use every kind of propaganda support in order to mobilize the civilians. By the time the system was installed in Cincinnati, May 1942, the majority of the civilians worked to make sure that the system would work. Several wrote letters to the mayor’s office in order to ensure that their voice was heard, and that their complaints were recognized.

What does all of this mean? It all depends on the perspective that you take. One can believe that the government created the system because it believed in the security of its people and that it worked for the people. Or one could look at the situation and say that the government merely told the people what it wanted, and then gave it to them. No matter what the answer is to this question, the system put in place was worth the time and effort expended. The whole system boosted the morale of the people and helped continue the success of the war at home.

Overall, this thesis has taught me that with the proper leadership, a people can be led to believe just about anything. Even though there were people who knew that an attack on the Cincinnati area was extraordinarily unlikely, the people as a whole responded to the call for immediate action. This does not mean that the people were ignorant or even stupid, it meant that they were willing to do their duty for their country. This was the same kind of reaction that was taking place when men were being called to
duty to fight in the war. Though the citizens role was a little less clearly defined as compared to a soldiers role was an important role nonetheless.
Endnotes


2. Letter from J.M. Markham to the office of Mayor James Garfield Stewart, 27 July 1942 (CHSL:ACMC).

3. Letter from James Garfield Stewart to J.M. Markham, 10 August 1942 (CHSL:ACMC).


6. Letter from Dana T. Merril to Zone Coordinators, Staff, Commands, and CDC, 21 April 1943 (CHSL:ACMC).


14. Ibid.


16. Ibid.

17. Letter from Dana T. Merrill to J.J. Greenleaf, 12 April 1943 (CHSL:ACMC).
18. Letter from Dana T. Merrill to Zone Coordinators, 21 April 1943 (CHSL:ACMC).


21. Letter from Dana T. Merrill to Zone Coordinators, 8 July 1943 (CHSL:ACMC).


27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. N.A., “Just Suppose This is a High Explosive Bomb,” Poster, 2 May 1943 (CHSL:ACMC).

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Letter from Jane Landis to Zone Coordinators, 5 May 1942 (CHSL:ACMC).


34. Mary Jackson, Interview by Tom Bock, 11 March 1999.
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Stewart, James Garfield, Cincinnati, to J.M. Markham, Cincinnati, 10 August 1942 (CHSL:ACMC).

Wilson, Howard, Cincinnati, to Clarence H. Kaufman, Cincinnati, 22 July 1942 (CHSL:ACMC).

Wilson, Howard, Cincinnati, to Tillman Underwood, 24 July 1942 (CHSL:ACMC).
NOTE: The Area Control Alerting and Communications Area Control Center and each Zone Control Center's various Citizens Defense Corps Report Centers
Communication System operates between the Zone Control Center, which in turn connects with CPRS Report Centers.
Blackout Regulations Are Announced
For Cincinnati By Order Of Manager

Rules and regulations for blackouts and air-raid warnings were issued by City Manager C. G. Sherrell under authority vested in him by an ordinance passed by the Council of Cincinnati March 23. They follow:

(1) An air raid warning signal shall be given by the City Manager, warning that an attack may be expected.

(2) In the event of an air raid warning signal:
   (a) The drivers of all automobiles, trolley cars, and other free-wheel vehicles:
   (1) Shall immediately pull to the curb or roadway, turn off the engines or motors, and leave such vehicles standing until the all-clear signal is given:
   (2) Provided that the emergency vehicles as hereinbefore defined shall not be required to turn off their lights if the danger, building or masked in a manner approved by the Council of Defense.

(3) If the air raid warning signal is given and any vehicle, including automobiles, bicycles, street, traffic or beacon light or any public light on and in streets, lanes, alleys, squares, parks or bridges of the City of Cincinnati, or any other light, including a warning or danger signal, shall be illuminated or turned on at any time, it is hereby made unlawful for any owner, lessee or person in charge thereof, as the case may be, to be in the street, traffic or beacon light or any other light, including a warning or danger signal, during the event of an air-raid or blackout signal or alarm, provided, however, that street lights, traffic signals, beacon lights, warning or danger signals may remain lighted during a blackout if they are dimmed, hooded, or masked in a manner approved by the Council of Defense. Until the plant is extinguished, dimned or hooded of such street lights, traffic signals, beacon lights and warning or danger signals have been adopted by the Council of Defense, they may remain lighted between sunset and sunrise.

Y. No person shall wear, exhibit, display or use, for any purpose, any horn, sound or otherwise simulate any warning of an enemy attack, warning of a test or trial blackout, or any signal of the end of an attack or blackout or any other official signal unless authorized to do so by the Council of Defense.

The foregoing regulations shall apply to air raids and to blackouts, including tests, or trial blackouts and shall become effective on and after May 1, 1942.

Any violation of the foregoing regulations is punishable by fine not exceeding Five Hundred Dollars ($500) or by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or both such fine and imprisonment, provided by Ordinance No. 19-1454 passed by the Council of the City of Cincinnat...