Presidential Campaign Advertising and "Daisy"

An Honors Thesis (ID 499)

By

Kathy L. Bowersox

Kevin Dean

Ball State University
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The "daisy" commercial. At first mention, the harmless sounding title appears innocuous enough. But for the millions who watched the 60-second advertisement on September 7, 1964, on "Monday Night at the Movies," it would go down in history as one of Madison Avenue's all-time shockers. For years to come, even those who had missed the once-run commercial would have something to say about "daisy."

My plan is to look at the advertising strategies of political campaigns and examine in greater detail the 1964 presidential run-off between Barry Goldwater and Lyndon B. Johnson.

I will utilize journals, newspapers, magazines, books and any other sources appropriate and necessary to formulate conclusions based on a variety of opinions and ideas. I propose to analyze political advertising to discover its impact and implications on voters and campaign strategy.

I will examine:

* The political communications process.

* Political advertising - background and overview.

* Goldwater and Johnson - the candidates and the issues of the 1964 Presidential campaign.

* Political advertising in the 1964 Presidential campaign.

* Political advertising - some conclusions and a look at the future.
Communication Chapter One

Before anything can be said concerning political advertising and campaigning, it is important to first look at the function of communication in our environment.

The sender, or source of communication, is usually the first party examined when one looks at a classic transportation model of communication process. Through his encounters with other people and objects, a sender experiences and formulates meaning. This meaning typically takes on a symbolic form, typically words. After the sender chooses a way of packaging his message, he is ready to send it on to the receiver.

A listener or viewer, the receiver, derives the meaning of the communication out of his experience with the communicator's stimuli. This makes the listener's or viewer's brain an indispensable component of the total communication system. Both his expectations of the stimuli he is receiving and his life experiences interact with the communicator's output in determining the meaning of the communication.

People seem most capable of receiving and understanding sounds in which they are already familiar. If a sound can evoke past experiences which have been stored in the mind and are available for recall, a person will respond most readily (Scwartz, p.27).

Before the sender can create a message, focus must first be placed on the effect desired. Other considerations include: the characteristics of the medium to be used; the personal relation between the audience and the media through which they
will receive the stimuli, in the situation and at the time they are likely to view or hear it; and the previous experiences of individual members of the audience that can be evoked to generate the effect desired by the sender. So, a message is really not the starting point for communicating. Only after considering the effect the sender hopes to achieve and the communication environment where receivers will be experiencing the stimuli can the final product, the message, be determined.

The commercial must function as part of the receiver's environment. To produce the desired behavioral effect, the television spot (commercial) must interact with all the elements present in a person's environment. This is because research has found that a person does not decide which candidate he will support just by listening to a political spot in isolation. (Schwartz, p.100). The information we receive from others, along with our own past experiences help us to form perceptions to guide us in our decision-making.

A great deal behind the purpose of political advertising involves tuning in on the attitudes and beliefs of the voter. The hard part comes when the sender must decide the best ways to affect these attitudes with the proper auditory and visual stimuli. For example, if a candidate's research shows that most people feel one candidate is clearly superior to all others, advertisements don't have to hit the viewer over the head with this information in order to make it work for him. Buying patterns and research has shown that commercials which
attach to something that is already within the viewer are inherently more successful than the ones which attempt to tell the viewer something. (Schwartz, p.96).

With this understanding, commercials should be more of an attempt to get things out of people, instead of trying to get things across to people. And the media which helps the candidate most directly to do this is the television.

In order for the candidate to communicate effectively to the masses via television, he will first need to retain the services of professionals to aid him in polishing up his "act." The advertising agencies and the campaigns they can create to aid the candidate in his quest for victory will be covered in a later chapter. Now, though, it is important to note that others are involved with the making of the candidate before a single commercial ever reaches the airwaves. These others are usually known as "image makers."

Image makers help the candidate to convey the best possible image to the voters. While the candidate may know a great deal about how he wants to keep taxes down, he is probably not a professional in the field of communications. He needs someone to teach him how to convey his ideas, and more importantly, his image to the voters through the various media.

The image people work with concepts such as handsome, youthful, charismatic, etc. They are most concerned with makeup, lighting, camera angles, wardrobe, visual backgrounds and how the candidate looks to the viewer. They attempt to keep their
candidate moving at all times - through old age homes, shopping centers, schools, etc., and they make the best use of television to communicate his outside appearance, his image, to the voters.

Candidates must be coached on the most effective ways to communicate their image to the masses. Some are encouraged to speak to small groups or individuals on the street while others are helped to communicate those personal qualities most likely to win votes. Some take criticism well, while others insist on running the campaign in their own way. While some candidates recognize the importance of talking to smaller groups while being shown on television, others feel that if it is good to talk to a few, it must be better to talk to a whole street full of 100. The image maker can help in this situation by explaining that the home viewer wants to feel like the candidate is talking directly to him, not shouting at him and 1,000 other people.

When Richard Nixon was running for the presidency in 1968, one writer observed the image making process in this way:

"So this is how they (the image makers) went into it. Trying with one hand, to build the illusion that Richard Nixon, in addition to his attributes of mind and heart, considered, communicating with the people one of the greatest joys of seeking the presidency; while with the other hand they shielded him, controlled him and controlled the atmosphere around him. It was as if they were building not a President but an Astrodome, where the wind would never blow, the temperature never rise or fall, and the ball never bounce erratically on the artificial grass"(McGinniss, p.39).

It has become popular for some to speak of political candidates as products that can be marketed and sold like laundry
detergent, or formless beings who need an image created for them by media specialists. Leonard Hall, a past National Republican Chairman has said that they must sell their candidates and their programs the way a business sells its products.

Others adamantly disagree. One of Nixon's public relations men, Jim Howard, has insisted that you cannot sell the candidate like a product. He has stressed the importance of staying away from gimmicks and contends that you should never let the candidate wear a hat he does not feel comfortable wearing. According to Howard, "You only need two percent additional buyers to make a product campaign worthwhile. In politics you need a flat 51 percent of the market and you can't get that through gimmicks" (McGinniss, p.47).

Arie Kopelman supervised the Hubert Humphrey account for Doyle Dane Bernbach until the agency was dismissed. He claims that in the end, communications alone can't do it. "I don't think it's possible to merchandise a vegetable. Eventually, the man must show himself. And if the advertising is too slick, it's not then the communication of the man but the communication of the communication" (McGinniss, p.130).

Joseph Napolitan was campaign manager for Milton Shapp, a democratic candidate for Governor of Pennsylvania in 1966. Shapp ended up losing the election, though he spent close to half a million dollars on television air time and production. Napolitan admitted to trying to change Shapp's image, but he disputed the Republican charge that they were trying to sell Shapp like a product (McGinniss, p.161).
Napolitan believes that it is impossible to change a candidate, although it is possible to change his image somewhat. He prided his campaign organization on its ability to select and develop the issues Shapp presented according to the findings in the polls. He said during the campaign that if a view the candidate was supporting was shown to be unpopular, it was deemphasized, while what was found to be positive was stressed.

In actuality, the type of polling or consumer research done during the elections are of the same type conducted for soap and other consumer products. Napolitan means Shapp was not an nonentity when he says that Shapp was not sold like soap, which is true. But we all know that bad soap and good soap are both sold in much the same way.

An angry observer of the 1968 presidential election was Donald Kurtz, partner in the New York advertising agency of Kurtz Kambanis Symon. He definitely goes along with the idea that politicians are marketed like soap. Kurtz expressed his viewpoint by commenting on the state of most political advertising campaigns, "Reasonable discussion of the issues? Out. Pick the gut issues, dramatize 'em and exploit them. Budget? Forget it; spend whatever it takes to get elected; that's what's important" (Galano, p. 233).
Political Advertising Chapter Two

Some people have voiced the opinion that politics have always been a con game and that advertising, in many ways, is a con game, also. It shouldn't be surprising then, that politicians and advertising people should have found one another. It is not surprising, either, that they began to work together, once they realized that the citizen does not so much vote for a candidate as make a psychological purchase of him (Gilbert, p. 26).

Since 1952, advertising agencies have tried to sell Presidents. In 1956, when Dwight Eisenhower ran for re-election, Batton, Barton, Durstine and Osborne, who had been on a retainer throughout his first four years, accepted his campaign as a regular account.

Agency chiefs that handle political accounts are often party faithful: Doyle Dane's William Bernbach is a devout Democrat and Erwin Wasey's David Williams is a Republican. But some agencies are bipartisan.

Generally speaking, agency creative people are Democrats and New Left advocates, so much so that during election years it is sometimes difficult to find an agency that handles campaigns for Republican or Conservative candidates. Sometimes the creative people are slightly less than enthusiastic about the party or candidate he is working for.

The man who wrote the Nixon slogan, "This time vote like your whole world depended on it" is Norman Herwood and he was and still is a liberal democrat. Then there is Leo Burnett,
the agency president and midwestern conservative who was true to his feelings when he wrote the Goldwater line, "In your heart, you know he's right" (Buxton, p. 160).

Some agencies, such as one of the nation's largest, J. Walter Thompson, reject political accounts altogether. They believe that acceptance or denial of a political account may evoke criticism from other of the agency's commercial clients. Plus, the campaigns are short-term by advertising agency standards because commercial product maker/agency relationships can go on for over 30 years.

In the summer of 1965 Carl Ally, president of a New York advertising agency, said that agencies should not take political campaigns. He contended that 20-, 30- and 60-second commercials introduce unfavorable elements into a campaign, including the "television personality," a presentation of his record out of context, sloganeering and putting a premium on techniques rather than substance (Galanoy, p. 230).

It is interesting to note, though, that by 1968 Ally was involved with McCarthy's campaign for a seat in the Senate. When questioned about his new stance, Ally rolled his eyes and said, "We (Jim Durfee, Peter Berla and Ally) are doing it as individuals. The campaign is not being run like a well-oiled machine. It's more like a Dixieland band—when the spirit moves you, you get up and blow" (Galanoy, p. 233).

From the beginning of televised politics, many professional party workers, campaign managers and politicians themselves
have believed that the man who makes the best appearance on television stands the best chance of being a candidate to begin with. And the man who makes the better appearance has more of a chance of being elected.

Some argue that television wears out a candidate. This can be true if the agency uses a campaign approach— the approach normally used when advertising a product—in creating and airing television spots. They may make only a few commercials, and they are recorded so far in advance that they can only touch on general problems rather than specific issues of the day. By using this approach, naturally the public tires of the candidate very quickly because they keep hearing the same irrelevant thing over and over again.

The public's demand for a fresh candidate can be satisfied with videotape, combined with a task-orientation approach. Videotape commercials can be assembled in hours instead of days and a producer can create a number of spots on issues of immediate importance, with minimal cost. Those who follow the task-orientation approach feel that if a voter is forced to see a commercial several times, at least he should be able to get more and more out of it each time he experiences it.

Television seems particularly valuable to politicians who can be charming and charismatic but lack ideas. The print media are used more to convey ideas, while it matters less that a politician convey ideas to a television camera.

Most campaign managers and agency people want the voters
to think only about the candidate and the issues in the early part of the campaign. A greater focus can be placed on specifics after the campaign has been put into motion. The specifics should tell the voter why he should support the candidate and why a given problem is important to him. Then in the final weeks of the campaign, voters are asked to come out for what some call the one-day sale. By running the campaign in this fashion, the voter does not feel frustrated. A voter would feel frustrated, indeed, he would be asked to perform the impossible if he was told why to vote for a candidate and that he should, in fact, get out there right away and vote, if the election was still 8 weeks away. The political ad should not ask the voter to take an action he cannot possibly take. The voter cannot vote until election day.

The real dilemma in political advertising is how to surround the voter with the proper auditory and visual stimuli to persuade him to vote for a specific candidate. Tony Schwartz, an advertising genius who has worked on several political campaigns including that of Lyndon Johnson, believes that the best political commercials are similar to Rorschach patterns. According to Schwartz, "They do not tell the viewer anything. They surface his feelings and provide a context for him to express his feelings" (Schwartz, p. 93).

Another challenge facing advertisers is the fact that it is usually very difficult to change fixed beliefs. And research has shown that political advertising is not likely
to change strongly held attitudes or convince a liberal Democrat to vote for a conservative Republican (Mendelsohn, p.42). But the agency can take heart in knowing that most political decisions result from an interaction of many feelings and attitudes, so advertising can play some part, however small. Political advertising may be especially useful in helping to persuade a person who usually expresses a negative attitude about a candidate, but agrees with many of the positions he expresses. If the advertiser can bring out that "agreeing" feeling deeply enough, he may be able to change that person's voting behavior.

According to a poll done in several states in 1969 and 1970 by Michael Rowan, it is personal qualities like honesty and integrity that tell a voter whether the candidate will be able to handle problems when they arise in the future. (Brozen, p.173). So, if one follows the results of the poll, it would logical to stress these attributes in a political campaign and go easy on ideas, ideas and more ideas if voters become too easily bored by them all.

The effects of nonpaid media such as news, word of mouth and editorials must all be included in the advertiser's consideration of the candidate's campaign. Because a candidate gets more free time in a campaign than paid time, the paid media can be used to put nonpaid media in context. Say there is a great deal of news being generated about a candidate and the campaign manager does not feel that an accurate picture of the
candidate is being painted. The candidate's image can be greatly improved when the paid media can then pick up where the unpaid media left off and give the candidate a better chance of being shown in a better light.

Political advertising, then, has been around for many years, and it appears that it is here to stay. As more and more dollars are being pumped into the campaign budgets, a larger percentage of the total is being spent on television advertising. Though it is a costly medium, a large and varied population of the voters watch it and television has about the best all around reach and frequency of any other medium.

Some problems inherent with television advertising for political candidates will be considered later. One last thought on television advertising, expressed by Robert MacNeil, follows:

These, then are the qualities that the television era demands of political candidates: personality above all else—a personality not too specific and not the least abrasive, a personality which is pleasantly neutral enough to be built upon; a pleasing appearance with no features which may light unflatteringly on television; assurance—a way of comporting yourself that suggests, with modesty, that you know more about anything than anyone else and could handle any crisis; articulateness—an ability to put anything you say, even if it is, "I don't know what we're talking about," in such a commanding and authoritative way that your grasp and leadership qualities will flow through into every living room. In other words, you should be an actor (MacNeil, p.162).
In a study by Mendelsohn concerning the 1964 Presidential election, it was found that 77 percent of all the voters sampled (1,297 of a total of 1,689) declared that the candidate for whom they had voted had been their choice "since he was nominated at his party's convention" (Mendelsohn, p. 14). When the 1,297 voters who chose their candidates prior to Election Day were asked whether they had ever considered changing their minds during the course of the campaign, 81 percent (1,115) said that the possibility had never even occurred to them.

So it seems that long before millions of dollars worth of commercials had ever been seen on the air, most of the voting public had already begun to make up their minds about who they wanted to see in the White House. Some say Barry Goldwater never had a chance; he spoke too freely on too many subjects and seldom took the time to think before words were allowed to escape from his mouth. Lyndon Johnson had already proven that he could step in after the unfortunate death of John Kennedy and continue on with the duties of the office.

Certain issues were of such importance during the course of the campaign that they had a great deal of bearing on the type of advertising used in the campaign. A candidate's particular stance or opinion would oftentimes come back to haunt him in the form of a commercial or print advertisement. So, a discussion of both Goldwater and Johnson is necessary at this point, in order that the later discussion of their advertisements may be looked at in its proper perspective.
Barry Goldwater has never deviated from his self-imposed mission to "make the word conservative a respectable word" since he arrived on the national political scene in 1952 (McDowell, p.4). There was no mistaking his determination to seek the nomination for President as an avowed conservative. According to Goldwater, "I have always stood for individual responsibility and against regimentation"(McDowell, p.18).

In Goldwater's "Suggested Declaration of Republican Principles," he rejected the notion of a planned stalemate in the war against communism and declared that victory must be the goal. Some of his feelings on various issues of the day follow; he:

- condemned deficit financing.
- wanted to work toward a sound and balanced budget.
- condemned 30 years of tinkering and interfering in the lives of American farmers.
- affirmed the principle of voluntary unionism.
- condemned the concentration of power in the hands of a few unconscionable men.
- maintained that the graduated tax is confiscatory and that its effect, and to a large extent, its aim, is to force men to stay at a common level.
- was against the progressive features of the income tax.
- had suggested that participation in Social Security be made voluntary.
- opposed federal aid to education.
- contended the minimum wage was complete economic nonsense.
- voiced his opinion that America's long-range missiles were not dependable.
told Young Republicans in Washington D.C. that at best, political platforms are a packet of misinformation and lies.

expressed the conventional military view that nuclear weapons were just another form of armament and should not be shrouded in emotion and fear.

suggested in New Hampshire that the Supreme Commander of NATO should be given the power to order the use of nuclear weapons.

raised the possibility that nuclear weapons be used to defoliate the Vietnam jungles.

In making his formal announcement on seeking the Presidency on January 3, 1964, Goldwater proclaimed that he would give the voters, "a choice, not an echo." He defined the issue of the 1964 campaign as one of "conscience" and "a definite choice" (Cook, p.14). The campaign would be one of principles, not personalities, suggested Golwater, and he made a promise to the voters that there would be a direct and decisive confrontation between two antagonistic political philosophies. The race would be one between Lyndon Johnson of the Democrats representing the welfare state, and Barry Goldwater of the Republicans representing a society of free, independent, responsible individuals (Goldwater, p.166).

From the beginning, Goldwater decided that the campaign was going to be run his way. This may have been the very reasoning that ended up hurting him most in the long run because he would not easily accept advice or criticism, no matter how constructive. During the New Hampshire primaries, for example, he did not find it necessary to retain competent public relations advisors. Because of this and because he did
not see the importance of selecting a competent manager, then doing what the manager advised, Goldwater made a series of remarks that would haunt him for the duration of the entire campaign.

Before Goldwater had learned the full story of Fidel Castro's action in cutting off the water supply to the naval base at Guantánamo, he declared that Castro should be told to turn the water on "or the Marines are going to turn it on for you and keep it on" (Kessel, p.60).

In New Hampshire, he also made statements concerning the use of long-range missiles and the problems with Social Security. All his statements stressed militarism abroad and a rejection of long accepted social and political tenets at home. Henry Cabot Lodge ended up winning the New Hampshire primary with 35.5 percent of the vote, Goldwater was second with 23.2 percent, followed by Rockefeller with 21.0 and Nixon with 16.8 percent.

Goldwater's declarations in New Hampshire may have caused many who intended to vote for him to have real doubts as to whether or not they agreed with some of his strong statements. It was easy for conservatives to support Goldwater because he, too, was a conservative. But it became much more difficult to stand behind a candidate who would often make rash statements before considering their consequences.

Goldwater also made a series of statements early in the campaign that implied he would be more than willing to threaten.
or to actually put into use, nuclear weapons for American gains. He helped to create for himself an image of an impulsive man who shoots from the hip, who talks and acts first and thinks afterward (Johnson, p.102). He once even stated, "I want to lob one (nuclear bomb) into the men's room of the Kremlin and make sure I hit it."

Goldwater felt that the press began placing labels on him in New Hampshire. He felt that by expressing his concerns that the Social Security system was approaching bankruptcy and by attempting to keep it from collapsing, the media interpreted him to mean that Social Security should be abolished. Because the voter is so totally dependent on the media for information about the candidates, Goldwater's quick remarks coupled with instant pick up and some distortion by the press could have placed him in trouble with the voting public from his campaign's onset. Plus, some thought many of his statements were exploited by his opponents in the Republican party and by the Democrats.

The strange thing about Goldwater's statements concerning the use of nuclear weapons is that he was merely expressing the conventional military view. In the Pentagon, the belief that nuclear weapons are just another form of armament and should not be viewed with emotion or fear, is a respectable point of view. But, to civilian America, emerging from a generation of Cold War anxiety, the thought of nuclear weapons was terrifying.
After Goldwater's defeat in New Hampshire, certain changes resulted that would help to change his image, somewhat, of a "war-monger." Goldwater retained the services of good public relations people, an advertising agency and good campaign managers. Set speeches were the order of the day and fewer press conferences were arranged. Goldwater was made to rely more on the written word so that frequent off-the-cuff remarks could be more easily avoided. His schedule was cut back to give him more time to rest so his spirits would be high when he did make appearances. The Goldwater camp finally realized that campaign techniques would have to be adopted to fit the special needs of a unique human being named Barry Goldwater, rather than be designed to have Barry Goldwater imitate the campaign methods used successfully by others.

The issues of the 1964 Presidential campaign were essentially centered around nuclear war and Social Security. While Goldwater questioned the effectiveness of Social Security, Johnson mandated to expand it with medicare; when Goldwater called for a return to the sink-or-swim policy toward the poor, Johnson felt that he should call for an expanded government program to eradicate poverty; after Goldwater called for a strengthening of states' rights, his opponent asked for more federal protection of civil rights. According to Lyndon Johnson, the Democrats choice for the Presidency, the voters could make a choice between programs of social retreat (proposed by Goldwater) and programs of social progress (Johnson, PK3).
At the campaign's onset, Johnson stated that the separate differences between Goldwater and himself had shaped political philosophies in substantial opposition to each other. He felt, as most others did, that their differences came to light most directly on the two overriding questions of peace and domestic reform.

Johnson decided early in the campaign to separate the Goldwater challenge from the traditional Republican party. This separation was at the heart of their "frontlash" strategy, an attempt to practice a politics of consensus that would make it as simple as possible for lifelong Republicans to switch their votes to the Democratic column in November (Johnson, p. 114).

The program submitted to the voters by Johnson included a commitment to press on with the war on poverty, to provide greater educational opportunities for all American children and to offer medical care to the elderly. He proposed actions to conserve the nation's water and air supplies and natural resources and to tackle the country's longstanding housing shortage.

As the campaign moved forward, and advertising was being utilized to show Goldwater as the "war-monger," Johnson was working to create an impression in the voters minds that he "does not shoot from the hip." Because of the stir created by some of Goldwater's off-the-cuff statements, Johnson was careful to avoid mistakes that might come from impromptu replies to loaded questions. He wanted to be known as an economizer.
He is one who will cut waste and pinch pennies when it comes to spending the taxpayer's dollar.

A great deal more background information on Goldwater has been provided in this study because his actions and the issues and ideas he represented provided much of the fuel for the fire in the race for the Presidency. Johnson was in the lead from the beginning and did not have to worry about playing catch up. Goldwater was forced to be on the defensive a great deal of the time because many of his ideas differed greatly from the ideas of others seeking the office of President. Plus, Johnson already had the clear advantage because he already had the opportunity to prove himself worthy of the office.

With this background information on the candidates in mind, the next chapter dealing with their advertising campaigns and strategy should be more easily understandable. The discussion of the "daisy" commercial, which this paper basically centers upon, would be meaningless unless one could examine the political climate and the issues of the 1964 Presidential election.
After Goldwater's loss in the New Hampshire primaries, 
a strategic decision was made to write off the Oregon 
primary. Since he had small hopes of winning there, he would 
at least avoid adverse reactions by conducting a minimal 
campaign in Oregon.

Billboard's bearing his handsome likeness and the slogan, 
"You Know Where He Stands" lined Oregon's highways. Although 
a minimal amount, according to Goldwater's standards, was 
spent on television, radio and newspaper advertising, their 
camp still spent more than did his rivals Nixon and Lodge. 
But, as expected, Goldwater's efforts did not begin to rival 
Rockefeller's. With limited time and limited cash, the 
Goldwater coalition had decided to concentrate these scarce 
resources on the crucial California primary.

The results of the Oregon primary proved decisive only 
for Henry Cabot Lodge; it was the end of any realistic hope 
that he might be nominated. Nixon and Goldwater remained 
right where they had been prior to the primary, while Rockefeller 
edged out in front.

Encouraged by his victory in Oregon, Nelson Rockefeller 
poured $3.5 million into the California primary. The major 
thrust of his Spencer-Roberts (advertising agency) directed 
effort was to picture Rockefeller as mainstream, responsible 
Republican. One newspaper advertisement for Rockefeller 
featured a photograph of him surrounded by pictures of Lodge, 
Nixon, Romney and Scranton, on the same page. On the opposite
page was a photograph of Goldwater by himself. The headline caption asked, "Which do you want? A leader or a loner?"

The pamphlets mailed out by Rockefeller in California attacked Senator Goldwater on the nuclear issue. "Whom do you want," the pamphlet asked, "in the room with the H-Bomb button?" When opened, it showed pictures of Rockefeller and Goldwater and queried, "This man?" or "This man?" The brochure also contained pictures of Richard Nixon, William Scranton, George Romney and Henry Cabot Lodge. The pamphlet proclaimed, "These men stand together on party principles." The implication was that if the voter favored any other candidate besides Barry Goldwater, he should cast a vote for Rockefeller.

Because of the flyer's nuclear reference, it proved to be highly controversial. The pamphlet had not even been cleared by those (Nixon, Scranton, etc.) who appeared to be in support of Rockefeller.

Goldwater spent close to a half million dollars on an extensive newspaper and television campaign for the California primaries. In his pamphlets and newspaper advertisements, he wanted to communicate that he was a spokesman for true Republican views, rather than an extremist. One flyer contained statements on a variety of issues by Republican leaders who represented almost the entire spectrum of party views.

Full page advertisements were taken out in the Los Angeles Times. One of the most effective of these was a reproduction of a letter Rockefeller had written Goldwater praising the
Arizonian for his efforts to build the Republican party.

After the primaries were over and Goldwater had secured the nomination, real work began on his advertisements for the Presidential election. Most of his commercials would show him talking, but he proved to be stubborn and hard to direct when it came time for taping. He did not like video sessions and would often refuse to redo a flubbed commercial by saying, "Let it go" (Galanoy, p. 229). The agency people cringed when he wanted to start talking about nuclear topics.

Although Goldwater's commercials were not nearly as controversial as Johnson's, the Republicans still managed to design some unique advertising of their own. They led off their campaign with a five-minute television spot on September 15, 1964, that was seen in 187 cities. The theme of the commercial was that their party was "the party of peace through strength." An announcer's voice told of "the failures at the wall of shame in Berlin," and failures at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba and Vietnam. Then Goldwater came on to say that communism is the only great threat to the peace.

Goldwater went on to say that some people distort their proper concern to make it appear that the Republicans are preoccupied with war. "There is no greater political lie," he said. "I am trying to carry to the American people this plain message. This entire nation and the entire world risk war in our time unless free men remain strong enough to keep the peace."
The Republicans based their entire advertising campaign on the feeling that television was Goldwater's best medium and Johnson's worst. They spent over $4.6 million of their $4.8 million budget on television spots on half-hour programs. Edward Nellor, director of radio and television for the Republican National Committee, said Goldwater's commercials would be longer, fewer and directed to more specific audiences. His spots would appear on NBC's "Today" show and ABC's "The Lawrence Welk Show" on Saturday nights. Nellor also reported that the spots would concentrate on the Goldwater personality, "on the theory of running with the strongest face" (Time, p.97). The New York based agency, Erwin Wasey, Ruthrauff & Ryan, prepared the commercials' format.

One of Goldwater's ads had this type of format: "The debate that never was! Bobby Baker Scandals," and the voice of Johnson saying that Baker, the former secretary to the Senate Democratic majority, was the first person he saw in the morning and the last person seen at night.

After the airing of some of Johnson's "shocker" commercials, (which will be covered in the discussion of his advertising strategies) the Republicans put together their own surprise film package. But leaked reports of what it contained aroused such a commotion that it never got on the air.

Actually, the commercial was more like a short film. Entitled, "Choice," it was produced in response to an analysis of Goldwater's situation. It was clear that Goldwater's ads
need to fight back.

The film painted a shocking picture of society under the control of Lyndon Johnson. Negroes were rioting in the streets, rampant moral decay was shown with girls running about in topless bathing suits, and a man, suggestive of the President, was shown driving a Lincoln Continental and throwing beer cans out the window. The final scene was included because of press reports from Johnson's ranch that the President had driven his Lincoln very fast one day and that someone in it was drinking beer.

Though Goldwater's spot suggested that a Johnson victory would mean domestic discord, it was never aired. So the only commercials that would truly adhere in the viewer's minds were those coming out of the Johnson camp. Which brings us to "daisy."

The commercial, quoted from the New York Times and the spot's creator, Tony Schwartz, went like this:

A little girl with wind tossed hair was shown in a sunny field picking daisies. As she plucks the petals from one daisy, she counts. On the soundtrack, coming in stronger and stronger, a male voice counts backwards. When the girl reaches ten the man's voice, in the doomfilled cadences of the countdown, reaches zero. The screen is rent with an atomic explosion. "These are the stakes," says the voice of Lyndon Johnson, "To make a world in which all of God's children can live, or go into the darkness. Either we must love each other,
or we must die." As the screen goes to black at the end, white lettering appears stating, "On November 3, vote for President Johnson." And the doom-filled voice returned to urge viewers to vote for President Johnson on November 3: "The stakes are too high for you to stay at home."

Because of the immediate, intense controversy created by "daisy," it was shown only once, on "Monday Night at the Movies," on September 7. According to newspaper reports, thousands of people phoned television stations and political headquarters to complain about the commercial, and they were not all Republicans.

Republican National Committee Chairman Dean Burch called the commercial "libel against the Republican nominee" and said the GOP committee had received 1,300 calls of protest. (Newsweek, p.77). One woman from Alexandria, Va., called to complain that her four-year-old daughter went to bed crying after having seen the "daisy" commercial.

Burch demanded that the President be called to halt the "smear attack on a United State Senator." He said, "This horror-type commercial is designed to arouse basic emotions and has no place in this campaign."

Goldwater also had a remark about the spot. "The homes of America are horrified and the intelligence of Americans is insulted by weird television advertising by which this administration threatens the end of the world unless all-wise Lyndon is given the nation for his very own" (Gilbert, p.215).
The reason that "daisy" is so interesting and so controversial is because of its effect on viewers (and even nonviewers). Many people, especially Republicans, complained that the spot accused Goldwater of being trigger-happy. But there was not even an indirect reference to Goldwater in the commercial, nor was his name ever mentioned. Someone unfamiliar with the 1964 political climate viewing the spot today would not perceive any allusion at all to Goldwater. But, "daisy" brought an intense reaction in 1964.

Because Goldwater often voiced his support of nuclear weapons, the commercial evoked a deep feeling in many people that Goldwater might actually use those weapons. According to "daisy's" creator, Tony Schwartz, the mistrust in Goldwater was not in the spot itself, rather it was present in the people who viewed the commercial. "The stimuli of the film and sound evoked these feelings and allowed people to express what they inherently believed," said Schwartz (Schwartz, p.93).

It is interesting to note that when people try to recall the commercial today, they are more apt to recall their feelings, not the actual content of the commercial. Even in a New York Times article written on May 22, 1972 by Ted Venetoulis, the story quotes things that were never even in the commercial:

In 1964, the Democrats demolished Goldwater with a simple one-shot television spot. A little girl gently picking daisies moved happily across an open field. Suddenly, a mushroom cloud filled the air and the announcer asked sternly: "Whose
finger do you want on the trigger?"

After each attack on the agency responsible for the commercial, Doyle Dane Bernbach, the Democrats replied that the commercial is really not so terrifying considering everything Goldwater has said and done on the subject of atomic weapons and their control.

The democratic party's media coordinator, Lloyd Wright, said that the issue (of nuclear weapons) certainly is alarming when it is considered that a man would make the kind of statements Goldwater has made. He said, "I think it's extremely important that the American people understand what kind of man wants to be in the White House" (Robertson, p.18). Wright also said that after they've aired the "hard-hitting" spots, to put Goldwater on the defensive, they would move into the positive areas of President Johnson's accomplishments— "peace, prosperity and legislative progress."

Before the Republicans had complained formally about "daisy," the Democrats had detonated another commercial affectionately called, "ice cream." According to the September 15, 1964 issue of the New York Times, "ice cream" went like this:

Shortly before 11 Saturday night, a little girl licking an ice cream cone appeared on millions of television screens all over America.

While the little girl concentrated on her ice cream, a woman's tender and protective voice told her that people used to explode atomic bombs in the air and that the radioactive fallout made children die.

The voice then told of the treaty preventing all but underground nuclear tests, and how a man who wants to be President of the United States voted against it.

"His name is Barry Goldwater," she said. "So if he's elected, they might start testing all over again."

A crescendo of Geiger-counter clicks almost drowned
out the last words; then came the male announcer's tag line:

"Vote for President Johnson on November 3rd. The stakes are too high for you to stay at home."

While the complaints were still be registered for this and the "daisy" spot, the Democrats went on showing a number of other commercials, each in its own way as damaging to Goldwater, but not stimulating the same protests.

In one spot, the screen showed a telephone that rang and rang. A hand reached toward the receiver and then stopped short. A voice then asked, "Who do you want answering the phone when Krushchev calls?" Another showed a pair of hands tearing up a Social Security card, to remind viewers that Goldwater was trying to do away with Social Security. Another spot showed a number of Rockefeller for President posters lying on a floor, with feet trampling on them. It was directed to those Republicans upset by the treatment Rockefeller and other Republican liberals had received at the convention in San Francisco.

One other spot was more light-hearted (considering the intensity of some of the others). It pictured a large map of the U.S., and a saw that could be seen cutting off the eastern states, which then floated away. It was done to remind voters of a remark made by Goldwater in a reckless moment in 1961 that, "sometimes I think this country would be better off if we could just saw off the Eastern Seaboard and let it float out to sea." Yet another commercial showed a purported Ku Klux Klansman saying, "I like Barry Goldwater. I think the
way he thinks."

When the campaign was over, the Johnson and Goldwater forces had produced and broadcast 29,300 television commercials and 63,000 on radio. And there was no doubt that the one's done by the Democrats were regarded by most as a viciously clever attempt to keep alive doubts of Goldwater's trustworthiness with the nation's nuclear arsenal. And there was little doubt that the commercials by the Democrats, and the film that was never seen, which was produced by the Republicans, crossed the boundaries of responsibility.

The campaign was deplored, praised and joked about. David Ogilvy, president of the enormously successful New York based agency of Ogilvy Mather, commented that, "Political advertising is so dishonest (in the 1964 campaign) that if we ran their kind of advertising for products, we would be put in jail. Their kind of advertising is the most crooked in the world" (Galanoy, p.233).

Donald Kurtz, a partner in Kurtz Kambanis Symon, felt that the country should, "eliminate political advertising in broadcast media entirely. It's too powerful - it's a dynamite charge used to open a beer can" (Galanoy, p.234).

It appears that both the "daisy" and "ice cream" spots benefited from media reinforcement. Though each was shown only once, and only a fraction of the voting population was exposed, they became, by word of mouth and the press, an immensely popular topic of conversation for the entire country. People
like Dean Burch and Thurston Morton contributed to spreading the word, simply by attacking the commercials so vehemently. The spots were described over and over so that the central message was reinforced again and again. Some believe that the secondary transmission of the message implanted the commercial's theme in even the most unreceptive minds (Schwartz, p.112).
Many say that although television was used extensively by both Democrats and Republicans in their quest for the Presidency, the election's final outcome would probably have been unchanged, even if the medium had not been used at all. As was mentioned previously, President Johnson was ahead of Goldwater before the campaign and throughout its duration. Surely the medium did have some profound effect on the voters' attitudes toward the candidates and it may have had an effect on the number of votes received on election day. But most believe that Johnson would have swept to victory in any case (Gilbert, p.215).

Until some far-reaching research is undertaken, it is impossible to prove that campaigning by television commercials is doing benefit or injury to American political life. Just as many authorities say that such advertisements are helpful as say that commercials do, in fact, hinder the voter in his decision-making process.

While there has been no sudden invasion of public office by rascals and charlatans, some people argue that, "Oh well, nobody really pays attention to all those commercials anyway." Other critics proclaim that at least in earlier times the voter was master of his own mind, whether he was passive, disinterested or what have you. These critics wonder if the voter can still be master of his mind if bombarded with political messages, both subliminal and otherwise.

According to Terry Galanoy, author of "Down the Tube," the television commercial is a highly concentrated capsule of
powerful drugs. Over half the people in this country have seen over 15,000 hours of television by the time they are 17 years old. According to Galanoy, "The commercial is not a pitch or separate entity to them. It is part of their life. It tells them what to eat, what to put on their face, what to wear, to drive, what to do with their time, and whom to elect" (Galanoy, p. 236).

So, while you don't have to live with a bad product you were cajoled to buy because of the commercials, you have four years to live with a President. And you can't go back to your old brand again.

The new campaign strategies have seemed to escalate the already overwhelming costs of political campaigning, thereby imposing severe strains on the democratic process. It is becoming more and more a race only for the rich, simply because only the rich could afford the unbelievable costs of campaigning.

Since almost all of the candidates have adopted the mass marketing type of approach in their campaigns, new dangers have arisen. Most advertisers try to find out two basic things before they attempt to market a product - what the public wants and what the public can be induced to accept. Such an approach puts the political function in turmoil, when applied to campaign strategy. This is because no longer will the candidates offer themselves as leaders. They will simply be followers, going by what their polls tell them the public wants.
I would suggest that improvements are definitely called for, if the runaway costs and bombardment of advertisements are to be slowed down. I propose that a limit be placed on the amount of money that may be spent by any candidate in an election. There should be a limit on the amount of private donations. Some system should be set up wherein all candidates would receive equal amount of time on television, all free of charge. The cost of the television time may be picked up by newspapers, television stations or the government or a combination of all three. An unwritten law should be enacted that says a candidate's own words may not be used against him. Stations would then be required to reject political commercials for a candidate in which he used film clips, still pictures or tape recordings of another candidate, unless the other candidate had been given the opportunity to screen his opponent's ad and reply to it immediately.

There are other changes necessary in the area of political campaigning that should be discussed by governmental committees. And the changes should be made soon, as costs are rising and it is more difficult than ever for the average voter to make decisions because of all the complex issues being thrown into campaigns at this point already.

One thing seems certain. Politics is and always will be much more emotional that it is rational. We will always, I believe, identify with a President in ways we identify with no other public figure. We want him to be larger than life, a
living legend and yet quintessentially human.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


