A Comparison of Protestant Work Ethic vs. Leisure Ethic Beliefs
The United States and the United Kingdom

An Honors Thesis (ID 499)

by

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Rostow’s Stages of Economic Growth (1960) proposed a universal model of growth for industrial nations. The traditional society, due to lack of technology or its application, had a ceiling on attainable output per citizen which forced them to devote most resources to agriculture. In the transitionary period, institutions for mobilizing capital begin to appear, the scope of commerce widens and technological barriers to expansion fall. Then, in the take-off phase, growth becomes the natural condition. Investment and savings rise and technological development in industry and agriculture surges forward. After the society has matured, it reaches an "age of high mass-consumption," in which real income per person transcends the level needed to satisfy basic food, shelter and clothing needs. Although both the UK and the U.S. are currently in this stage and therefore have similar environments, the author suggested that this glut would change each nation’s work force, its leaders and the sectors in which the excess would be used in different ways. These three areas of change form a scale on which the similarity of the industrial environments of the two countries will be gauged.

The Work Force

Rostow (1960) postulated that the age of high mass-consumption would create a better-educated, higher-paid and industry-oriented vs. agriculture-oriented work force. Tables 1-5 show the statistics for these areas. Table 1 indicates that both countries have work forces that are more oriented toward industry than toward agriculture. However, the U.S. has increased its percentage in industry and reduced its percentage in agriculture much more than the UK. Given the land mass of the U.S., it is significant that only 3.7% of its work force is in agriculture as compared to 2.6% in England.
It has been theorized that as the industrial environments of countries become more similar, employee attitudes will also converge (Bell, 1973; Drucker, 1968; Fyans, Maehr, Salili & Desai, 1983; Gruenfeld, 1975; Latham-Koenig, 1973; Pascale & MaGuire, 1980; Sethi, Namiki & Swanson, 1984.) It also has been suggested that as industrialized countries pass into a "post-industrial age" a general shift of values will occur (Berry, 1971; Guerrier & MacMillan, 1981; Gunter & Gunter, 1980; Kelly, 1981; Latham-Koenig, 1973; Sethi, Namiki & Swanson, 1984; Triandis, 1973; Wilson, 1981; Veblen, 1899.) Veblen (1899) postulated a shift away from traditional values toward the consumption of goods as the major basis of prestige. However, the more current emphasis lies on a shift from the traditional work ethic to a leisure ethic:

   It is a shift away from largely material and economic goals toward social and personal goals—'quality of life.'

   . . . Most people will expect to be able to fit their work into their life rather than the other way round. . . . They will regard the organization . . . as a means to that purpose, not an end. They will be less concerned with pay and more with how their work is organized, whether it is interesting and how they can best combine it with their leisure. (Latham-Koenig, 1973, p. 82)

This paper will examine the literature for evidence that attitudes about the Protestant Work Ethic and the leisure ethic in the UK and the United States are converging to the extent that the countries' respective industrial environments are becoming more similar.
Table 1

Percentage Distribution of Employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Nonagriculture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>England</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>England</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>England</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>England</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>England</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>England</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PERCENTAGE CHANGE</td>
<td>US 95.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2 illustrates clearly that the work forces in both areas have become better-paid: personal income in Britain has increased 547% and in the U.S. 408%. Income has increased less steadily in Britain than in the U.S., but in the last two decades it has jumped 92% and then 93%.
Table 2

Personal Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>540.7</td>
<td>75.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage increase</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>811.1</td>
<td>92.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage increase</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1265.0</td>
<td>177.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage increase</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2165.3</td>
<td>342.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage increase</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2744.2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage increase</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL PERCENTAGE INCREASE 408 547

Note. Billions of dollars.


Tables 3-5 show that education levels in both countries have risen. However, it would appear that the emphasis in the UK is to complete secondary rather than post-secondary school. Between 1910 and 1975 secondary enrollment increased 2220% compared to 408.9% in the U.S. In 1980, 10% of the UK population was enrolled in secondary schools as compared to 6.4% of the U.S. population. The U.S., on the other hand, seems to place more emphasis on post-secondary education. The percentage of the population with four years or more of college increased 529.6% between 1910 and 1980, whereas in the UK the enrollment in universities only increased 384.7%. Also, in 1980, only 1.4% of Britain's population as compared to 5.1% of the U.S. population was enrolled in post-secondary schools.
Table 3

**Students Enrolled in Three School Levels, Mid-Year 1980**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (in thousands)</td>
<td>55,945</td>
<td>227,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All levels</td>
<td>11,293,269</td>
<td>53,573,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First level(1)</td>
<td>5,133,710</td>
<td>27,448,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second level(2)</td>
<td>5,360,097</td>
<td>14,556,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third level(3)</td>
<td>799,462</td>
<td>11,569,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) elementary and primary schools  
(2) high schools and secondary schools  
(3) post-secondary schools  

Note. From the Digest of Educational Statistics (1983-84) Table 162: Established total population and enrollment by level, in selected countries of the world, 1980 to 1981.

Table 4

**United States Education Level**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage, by level of school years completed</th>
<th>Median school years completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than five years of elementary school</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four years of high school or more</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four years or more of college</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1910  23.8  13.5  2.7  8.1  
1920  22.0  16.4  3.3  8.2  
1930  17.5  19.1  3.9  8.4  
1940  13.5  24.1  4.6  8.6  
1950  10.8  33.4  6.0  9.3  
1970  5.3  55.2  11.0  12.2  
1975  4.2  62.6  13.9  12.3  
1980  3.3  68.7  17.0  12.5  

PERCENTAGE INCREASE  408.9  529.6  54.3  

Note. Population 25 years and over

Note. From the Digest of Educational Statistics (1983-84) Table 8: Level of school completed by persons age 25 and over: United States, 1910 to 1982.
Table 5

United Kingdom Education Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Universities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>5382</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>5206</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>59(1922)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>4930</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>4005</td>
<td>1733</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>4987</td>
<td>3089</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>4828</td>
<td>3712</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERCENTAGE INCREASE 2220 384.7

Note. In thousands
Note. From European Historical Statistics (1980).

The work forces of both the U.S. and the UK have become more industry-oriented, better-educated and better-paid. However, with the exception of personal income, the U.S. is ahead of the UK in these areas. (It is possible that the U.S. position on personal income relative to the UK reflects the attitude that increasing personal income takes a back seat to increasing education level and improving state-of-the-art industry. This is a factor that will be discussed further under the uses of the increased benefits of industrialization.) The U.S., in response to an increasingly technological world, has increased its working force in industry and raised the education levels necessary to compete in this type of market to a greater degree than the UK. It is therefore possible to conclude that overall the U.S. has advanced further into the age of high mass-consumption with respect to these two areas.
The Leaders

Rostow (1960) suggested that the age of high mass-consumption, with its better educated and higher-paid work force, would bring about changes in the leaders of the work force. He referred to a change from an "oil baron" type to a "professional manager" type of leader. Implicit in these stereotypes seems to be the contrast between the "bureaucratic man" and a more flexible manager that has appeared increasingly in management literature (Barron, 1977; Ellis & Child, 1973; Guyon, 1980; Kuzela, 1980; Lehr, 1980; Lorenz, 1984; McPherson, 1980; Souder, 1981.)

The widely acclaimed In Search of Excellence (1982) and its British parallel The Winning Streak (1985), in their analyses of strategies that seemed to be working for successful companies, found an innovative, flexible leadership style to be at the center of many of these companies. Faced with a business world in which technology wreaks almost day-to-day changes, the companies have survived the challenge by quickly and continually responding to the changes. The researchers found that such an orientation called for a very different kind of manager than was required in the first factories and automated plants.

Peters and Waterman (1982) traced the history of management systems from the days of the first factories to illustrate the development of such an innovative leadership style. Until 1930, managers believed all problems of management could be solved if they learned a finite set of rules and techniques of management, a belief prompted by Taylor and the Gilbreths and their time and motion studies. Between 1930 and 1960, Mayo and his studies at
Western Electric's Hawthorne Plant introduced the important influence recognition of people can have on their work, and MacGregor's Theory Y proposed that people like work and can even be creative and responsible on the job. Managers reverted to mechanistic assumptions about man between 1960 and 1970, but they did accept the importance of external influence and adaptability to these influences. According to Peters and Waterman (1982), these developments opened the door for a new kind of management system beginning in the 1970s. The most successful companies would emphasize informality, individual entrepreneurship and evolution. At the managerial level, this would call for leaders who could give employees the freedom to innovate, take risks and be creative while still maintaining the necessary control. This section will examine the literature to determine the degree to which U.S. and UK managers have developed this kind of management system.

In an extensive impressionistic study of management in Britain, Dubin (1970) concluded that Britain has failed to reach the level and rate of innovation of American industry despite a tremendous demonstrated potential for technical innovation, and he pointed to executive attitudes, the social structure of British industry and the style of British management as the causes. Dubin (1970) observed that executive attitudes about perfectability and professionalization erect large barriers to innovation. Whereas American managers tend to believe present ways of doing things are inevitably replaced by even better ways, Britons accept the present as an end-state resulting from past developments which represent the highest achievement.
possible. This preference for stability rather than change naturally dampens the innovative spirit. As for professionalization,

until recently . . . most managerial recruits to industry had little or no prior training or education directly relevant to their business employment. . . . The contemporary situation in British industry and commerce well illustrates the strong persistence of the talented amateur executive, exemplifying the traditional culture, contrasted with the specialist and professional executive personifying the new industrial culture. The latter are to be found in science-based industries like chemicals, electronics and computers whose products and production technologies originated from highly sophisticated science applications. In traditional industry the non-professional executive is still a significant figure. There is no assurance that the culture of the new industries will influence or even supersede that of the traditional business sectors. The attitudes sustaining the propriety of amateur direction of complex organizations constitute a genuine roadblock to the widespread professionalization of British industrial management.

(Dubin, 1970, pp. 186-188)

In American industry, on the other hand, most candidates for managerial, professional and executive positions have some technical preparation through college and practical experience.

The social structure of Britain also has had detrimental effects on innovative management, according to Dubin (1970), and these effects are manifested in three ways. First, class position has limited recruiting the best talent available to a very
restricted source. Who is considered readily eligible is determined by their educational history, but the essential qualification is where the candidate went to school, not what he learned. Graduates of technical schools may eventually rise to executive positions, but in the meantime British industry is unnecessarily hampered by a limited source of recruitment. In American industry, "most corporate leaders do not come from established social elites. Nor do they have recognized symbols of social class such as titles. Instead power and prestige are measured very largely in direct proportion to status in the corporate community acquired during a career" (Sethi, Namiki & Swanson, 1984, p. 119). Businesses are more likely to favor the graduate with practical experience over the liberal arts major. Second, the institution of age-grading, which determines a manager's promotion largely on his age, dampens innovation because managers need not step up their performance until they reach the right age for promotion. Young managers are discouraged from exceptional performance because they know the rewards are not immediately available, and middle-aged managers, passed over for further promotion, know they have reached their ceiling. Further promotion holds no incentives and therefore these individuals do their jobs with minimum enthusiasm and even indifference. Such a practice is virtually non-existent in American industry. Third, the lack of managerial mobility in Britain limits the diffusion of ideas and business practices that can foster so much innovation in a field. A manager joining a company in Britain is likely to feel that he is establishing a life-time career with that company. This tendency seems to be
changing (Guerrier, 1980), but studies show that American managers are much more likely to change jobs more often in their lifetime (Inkson, 1970).

Finally, Britain's style of management was also observed by Dubin (1970) to restrict innovative strategies in three ways. First, managers tend to allocate resources to favor status rather than functional contribution with the result that lower levels of operation must make do with less. This is hardly the kind of behavior that fosters innovation. Second, British managers emphasize personal trust in their subordinates with the effect that they "place a premium on conforming thinking and conforming behavior, with obvious consequences for the introduction of innovating ideas and practices" (Dubin, 1970, p. 195). American managers, on the other hand, apply objective criteria known to all. Performance is judged against this standard rather than against model trustworthiness. Third, this emphasis on trust carries over into personalistic relations which cause both manager and subordinate to influence each other not in work terms but in terms of personal characteristics. Evaluating employees for their level of trust encourages them to butter up the boss and prevents them from demanding what they are worth for fear the boss will doubt their trust. Thus the employee has no reason to perform effectively.

In American industry there is a greater probability that universalistic criteria will prevail or, to put it most crudely, that the balance sheet and P and L statement will govern. It is not uncommon for British executives who visit their American counterparts to comment upon the pervasiveness of evaluating
almost everything in money terms. This is taken as evidence of American materialism. What is overlooked is that very effective universalistic measures of performance are grounded in a single medium of exchange—money. All means of costing, and measures of profitability, as well as rewards, can be measured in a common currency, thus encouraging substitution of universal for personal criteria of evaluation. (Dubin, 1970, p. 196)

The type of British manager that Dubin described is reminiscent of the bureaucratic man, who guards his control carefully from high in the organization. Research has shown that the British consider the ideal manager to be an autonomous, individualistic entrepreneur rather than a colleague-dependent organization man (Guerrier and MacMillan, 1981), that the British are more averse to participative management than Americans (Dickson and Buchholz, 1977; Jenner, 1984;) and that the two nationalities have different organizational beliefs (Dickson & Buchholz, 1977). Managers in Britain associated themselves with fellow managers whereas American managers associated themselves with their subordinates. These studies clearly indicate that, with the possible exception of the science-based industries mentioned earlier, British management is still largely bureaucratic, and that as such, Britain is behind the U.S. in developing the kind of management system needed to cope with increasing technological advances in the world market.

The Use of Benefits

Rostow (1960) postulated that the mature society would reach a phase in which real income per person would transcend the level required for their basic needs. In this age of high mass-consumption, Rostow (1960) suggested the glut would be invested in three main areas, and indicated that the excess would favor certain sectors in a
definite progression: a monetary concentration in personal consumption and wages would be followed by greater investment in the welfare state and lastly by commitment to external aggression. This section will examine personal and government expenditures to determine the degree to which the U.S. and the UK have progressed in this pattern.

The actual dollar figure spent in personal consumption still far outweighs the money spent on the welfare state or external aggression in both the U.S. and the UK, indicating that these countries are still firmly entrenched in the first phase of the age of high mass-consumption. However, several trends are worth noting. First, the percentage increase in government spending on social services is greater than the percentage increase in any other government category or in personal consumption in both the U.S. and the UK. It increased 613.7% in the UK and 370.2% in the U.S. between 1970 and 1980. Second, these numbers indicate that expenditure in this sector is increasing much quicker in the UK than in the U.S. Third, personal consumption in the UK shows a large shift in spending from such items as food, tobacco, clothing and durable goods to spending on services. Personal consumption in the U.S., however, shows very little change at all. From these factors it is tempting to speculate that personal spending in the U.S. is now taking a back seat to other categories. This possibility was mentioned earlier as reflected in the statistic that Britain's wages are increasing more than wages in the U.S. However, the number of dollars spent on personal consumption is much greater than the amount spent in any other area, and Table 6 shows that rather than increasing, the percentage increase in spending on defense, social services and other services have
decreased between 1970 and 1980. It becomes evident, then, that the U.S. is progressing in Rostow's pattern only so far as increases in government spending on social services are outstripping increases in personal consumption. Britain, on the other hand, seems to be making a definite shift toward the welfare state. The percentage increase in government spending on social services is phenomenal, and the shift in spending within personal consumption away from necessary items toward services is a significant move further into the age of high mass-consumption.

Table 6

Government Expenditure in the United Kingdom

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National debt</td>
<td>1.802</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>20.328</td>
<td>217.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense (1)</td>
<td>4.269</td>
<td>6.408</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>92.002</td>
<td>613.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social services (2)</td>
<td>6.170</td>
<td>12.890</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>49.902</td>
<td>613.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services (3)</td>
<td>2.487</td>
<td>6.725</td>
<td>170.4</td>
<td>30.875</td>
<td>359.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. (1) Defense, overseas aid, other overseas services
(2) Health, social security, assistance to agriculture and industry, roads, housing, law and order
(3) Local services, education, other environmental services, other public services


Government Expenditure in the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense (4)</td>
<td>47.506</td>
<td>83.865</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>144.9</td>
<td>72.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social services (5)</td>
<td>14.476</td>
<td>80.973</td>
<td>459.4</td>
<td>380.7</td>
<td>370.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services (6)</td>
<td>12.457</td>
<td>38.131</td>
<td>206.1</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>122.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. In billions of dollars
Note. (4) National defense, international affairs
(5) Income security, health, social security, veterans benefits, commerce and housing credit, aid to agriculture, law and order
(6) Education, natural resources and environment, energy, community and regional development, general science, space and technology, general government

Table 7

Personal Consumption in the United Kingdom

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>% of total expenditure</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>11460.4</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>16100</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>42240.3</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcoholic drink</td>
<td>2494.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>4900</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>18278.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>2604</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>4480</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>8814.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing, fuel and light</td>
<td>4530.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>12600</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>44965.7</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>3690.4</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>6440</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>18284.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cars and motorcycles</td>
<td>935.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3080</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>9739.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other durable goods</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3640</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>11501</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other goods</td>
<td>4079.4</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11200</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>24874.5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services</td>
<td>4900</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>15400</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>60073.7</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>36668.8</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>77840</td>
<td>112.3</td>
<td>238772.5</td>
<td>206.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. In millions of dollars
### Table 7

**Personal Consumption in the United States**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>% of total expenditure</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>% of total expenditure</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>% of total expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>85800</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>119600</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>301200</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcoholic drink</td>
<td>13100</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>19200</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>43900</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>8100</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>10800</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>20600</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing, fuel and light</td>
<td>65500</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>93900</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>266200</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>33400</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>46600</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>104500</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cars and motorcycles</td>
<td>30000</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>36200</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>214700</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other durable goods</td>
<td>24700</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>35200</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>86300</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other goods</td>
<td>17300</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>26300</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>95900</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services</td>
<td>43600</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>63900</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>180100</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>321500</td>
<td>---</td>
<td><strong>451700</strong></td>
<td><strong>40.5%</strong></td>
<td><strong>1313400</strong></td>
<td><strong>190.8%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Expenditure Increase**: 190.8%

**Note.** In millions of dollars

Employee Attitudes

Rostow (1960) suggested that as a country enters the age of high mass consumption the society ceases to accept the further extension of modern technology as an overriding objective. . . . The emergence of a welfare state is one manifestation of a society's technical maturity; but it is also at this stage that resources tend increasingly to be directed to the production of consumers' durables and the diffusion of services on a mass basis. (Rostow, 1960, p.11)

Attitudes shift from the traditional work ethic to the leisure ethic, and as the importance of technology decreases, attitudes about education also change. Studies that research changes in employee attitudes about leisure vs. hard work, education and the welfare state are examined to determine the degree to which Great Britain and the United States have progressed in the age of high mass-consumption.

The Leisure Ethic vs. the Work Ethic

Definitions. In studies of post-industrial value changes, the current emphasis is on a shift from the Protestant Work Ethic to a leisure ethic. The PWE is commonly defined as the belief that "work is good in itself and bestows dignity on a person. . . . By working hard a person can overcome every obstacle that life presents and make his own way in the world. . . . Wealth should be wisely invested to insure even greater returns and not foolishly spent on personal consumption" (Dickson and Buchholz, 1977, p. 83). The leisure ethic, however, has no such universally accepted definition. Rather four categories of leisure appear in the literature. In the earliest theories about leisure, the leisure ethic was defined as a consumptive ethic.
People above the line of bare subsistence . . . do not use the surplus, which society has given them primarily for useful purposes. They do not seek to expand their own lives, to live more wisely, intelligently, understandingly, but to impress other people that they have a surplus. Ways and means for creating that impression are called by Veblen conspicuous consumption. (Chase, 1934, p. xiv)

This kind of theory, however, has disappeared from the literature and given way to theories that emphasize personal fulfillment over material goods. Similarly, a definition of leisure as an "empty category of experience that is 'left over' when the life-sustaining activities have been accomplished" (Wilson, 1981, p. 284) has been refuted by those who advocate leisure as an adaptive tool (Gunter and Gunter, 1980; Kelly, 1980).

"Leisure, then, is found less at the margins of the social system in 'left-over time' that at the center of the working out of primary social relationships. In a social ecology characterized by considerable fragmentation and dispersion, leisure becomes a necessary social space for the location, development and enrichment of primary relationships" (Kelly, 1981, p. 307). Kelly (1981) cites evidence that suggests such leisure may be "interstitial" and found in moments interspersed through any day, even at work. This is in direct contrast with the fourth definition of leisure in which "the less hours one can spend working and the more leisure time one has available the better . . . [because] work has no meaning in itself but only finds meaning in leisure" (Dickson and Buchholz, 1977, p. 84).

Unlike this definition, the adaptive tool theory does not place the concept of the leisure ethic at odds with the work ethic. Rather, leisure is "nonserious in the sense of not threatening work and family roles . . . [and its] self-contained consequences can offer opportunity for trying out
identities that do not become lost in the more unyielding structures of the workplace" (Kelly, 1981, p. 316). The "non-work role identity may provide more satisfaction for the individual, but it does not compete with the "work-role identity." These theorists suggest that the adaptive tool theory is more realistic than a work vs. leisure dichotomy.

What is suggested is that the meanings of leisure are not pure but mix dimensions of intrinsic satisfaction, social meaning and identity development. What is added to previous models . . . is the significance of role-identity as a third dimension to the over-simple intrinsic-extrinsic division of satisfactions or motivations. . . . At any time, leisure would seem to be a social space for innovation and experimentation with new role identities as well as for the recovery and redefining of old ones with minimal risk to economic or familial roles. (Kelly, 1981, pp. 316-317)

It also seems that by calling their definition of leisure an adaptive tool, they are intimating that this kind of attitude about leisure is a better attitude than one that places leisure in direct opposition to work. Studies have shown that older persons raised under the PWE, which effectively places work at odds with leisure, have a difficult time adjusting to what they define as "forced" leisure (Gunn, 1977; Hochschild, 1973; Mulac, 1977; Pomeroy, 1977). In that both work and leisure are and will be major components of life and since it is postulated that values are shifting from an emphasis on work to an emphasis on leisure, it is reasonable to suggest that an integration of the two would indicate a better adjusted, more progressive society than the society that cannot reconcile work and leisure (Kando, 1980; Twardzik, 1976; Seligman, 1971). This theory will be used as a scale to judge each country's progression in the post-industrial
age in the next section, which reviews studies of work and leisure attitudes.

**Studies of Attitudes**

**Work vs. Leisure.** Several researchers have concluded from their studies in the United States that the PWE still dictates the current value system (deGrazia, 1964; Gunn, 1977; Lewis, 1982; Pomeroy, 1977). Lewis (1982) and deGrazia (1964) illustrate that

> It is clear that the leisure ethic has not permeated the business leader's world intact. The same qualities thought necessary for success in a career are cultivated in leisure pursuits so that by the time the world of play invades the world of work the former already looks much like the latter. It is necessary to juxtapose work and leisure: the latter is not really socially acceptable unless justified by the former. It is placing leisure in a context of work that validates it. (Lewis, 1982, p. 32)

The other researchers draw their conclusions from studies of the aged, who in their retirement have no choice between leisure and work. Gunn (1977) found that the term leisure is often perceived by the aged to be synonymous with idleness, laziness and non-productivity. In her study of 1600 elderly, Pomeroy (1977) reported that the aged consider leisure as burdensome. The subjects of these studies, both the young and the old, have clearly internalized the basic tenets of the work ethic.

Studies in the UK have also found workers with strong orientations toward the PWE (Child and MacMillan, 1973; Guerrier and MacMillan, 1981; Henley Centre for Forecasting, 1979). Child and MacMillan's (1973) study showed the orientation found in two of the American studies: work either followed the person home or dominated home life and leisure.
time to a large degree. The Henley Centre (1979) found that the young in Britain, unlike the older "trendy generation," have reverted to more traditional values. In a study of 1312 managers, Guerrier and MacMillan (1981) report that "more place a high value on the old Protestant ideal of hard work than place a high value on efficiency or ability" (p. 415).

The studies have shown very clearly that the PWE is still strong in both societies by measuring it directly. Other studies have less directly measured the presence of the work ethic in the countries. In a study of angling and satisfaction statements in the UK which is compared in the same paper to research in North America, Haworth (1983) points out a major difference between needs satisfied by angling in the two areas. In the U.S., escape from tension induced by home, family, work and environment is an important reason for angling whereas in the UK this reason was ranked very low in importance. This would indicate that, in the U.S., these elements of life, including work, are viewed as opposing leisure activities. The UK, on the other hand, was found to have a much smaller amount of this sentiment. In another study, Fyans, Salili, Maehr and Desai (1983) found that "amidst considerable variation in the meaning of achievement, a cluster of meanings is identified that generalizes across the 30 cultural groups. An inspection of this cluster suggests a system of beliefs that is not unlike Weber's (1930) description of the Protestant ethic" (p. 1000). This study also noted that cultures which scored high on the achievement cluster, of which the U.S. was one, stressed achievement whereas low-scoring cultures stressed affiliation.

Taking initiative and a choice are associated with school in high-scoring cultures but with lotteries in low-scoring cultures. Perhaps most intriguing is how initiative and choice are associated with work and school in high cultures but with play in low cultures. High
cultures apparently see freedom in work and work-associated activities such as school. Low-scoring cultures, in contrast, look to the realm of play for any such freedom. (Fyans, et al., 1983, pp. 1008-1009)

These conclusions would indicate that the more industrialized countries have a stronger work than leisure ethic. Rather than integrating work and leisure as they move across a continuum that stretches from an emphasis on play and affiliation to stressing work and achievement, high-scoring cultures move all the way to the achievement end of the continuum. A study by Gruenfeld and MacEachron (1975) also indicated that a more technological and industrial way of life is directly related to analytic cognitive skills (such as are predominantly associated with work) rather than people-oriented skills, which are more likely to be found in a leisure setting. Each of these indirect studies has indicated that the PWE persists in the U.S. The angling study found less of that orientation in the UK, and neither of the other cross-cultural studies collects data for the UK. It is therefore difficult to judge the strength of the PWE in the UK relative to its strength in the U.S. without more research. The next section reviews studies indicating that leisure and work are being integrated, which will allow for a more accurate assessment of the status of the leisure ethic vs. the PWE.

Leisure with Work. Studies in the U.S. have found support for the role of leisure as an adaptive tool. Kelly (1981) cited a study by Csikszentmalyi (1975) which showed "increasing evidence that much leisure of great importance may be 'interstitial' and found in minutes and moments interspersed through any day" (p. 307). Several studies have specifically provided evidence for leisure's importance in developing role identities. Stebbins (1979) studied adults who have concentrated on a single leisure skill and concluded leisure was essential to their self-concepts.
Kelly (1981) cited a study by Kelly and Masar (1980) that found leisure to play an important role in a person's shift from student life to the early stages of a home and family life. Kelly (1981) goes on to suggest that leisure is sought out not only for leisure's sake but because the "reciprocal actions of others in the interaction provide feedback that not only continues the role development but yields satisfaction as the role-identity is established and verified. There is, then, satisfaction not only in the theatre or sport event but in the role-identity development" (p. 313). He cites evidence from Zurcher (1975) and Brown and Haas (1980) that supports this idea.

Other studies have indicated that leisure decisions are not being structured by traditional structural variables such as work (Kelly, 1980). Rather, more immediate situational factors such as available companions and accessibility (Kelly, 1978), economic factors (Cheek and Burch, 1976) and intensity and skill-level of the activity (Gunter and Gunter, 1980) are correlated with the decisions.

Studies in the UK have also provided evidence for the adaptive tool theory. Rapoport and Rapoport (1975) analyzed case studies of British families and concluded that leisure is important to family and other roles throughout life's course.

For example, following a failed marriage, leisure often becomes the primary social space in which somewhat damaged identities are altered and tried out in new associational contexts. As work and family roles rise and fall in both salience and satisfaction, leisure is a source of not only new challenges, but also of additional or recovered social identities. (Kelly, 1981, p. 315)
The studies cited thus far have shown both a strong PWE orientation and use of leisure as an adaptive tool in the U.S. and the UK. Since these studies have not examined these orientations relative to each other, it is difficult if not impossible to conclude which system is more prevalent in each area of the world. It is also difficult to compare the countries' progression in the post-industrial age on the basis of these studies. Only Haworth (1983) has indicated that the UK may be further along in integrating work and leisure than the U.S. Fortunately, two studies have researched this area to shed a little light on both of these problems, and in both cases the researchers have found the U.S. predominantly adaptive in their use of leisure and Britain more PWE-oriented. Kelly (1982) studied the influence of cultural differences on leisure behavior and orientations in a pair of new towns, one in the U.S. and one in England.

The differences . . . are both marked and suggestive of cultural variety. Personal growth and self-expression are much more significant leisure motivations in the American new town with its higher education level and more expressive life-style. On the other hand, the working conditions of the British sample are reflected in the much higher salience given to compensatory motivations of difference from work combined with relaxation and rest. Further, the nature of activities and comments in leisure settings suggests that contrast with work constraints and routines is more of a factor in leisure decisions. (Kelly, 1982, p. 221)

For the British, work structures leisure such that the greater the difference between work and leisure, the better. This is clear support for the work vs. leisure dichotomy. In the States,
however, leisure to satisfy needs for personal growth and self-expression is more important, and this orientation clearly reflects the adaptive tool theory. Dickson and Buchholz (1977) tested 105 U.S. and 130 Scottish managers for their beliefs about work. Although they found no significant differences in work ethic beliefs or leisure beliefs, it was concluded that

the independence of the belief systems from each other was more in doubt in Scotland than in the U.S. In particular the value of leisure time for the Scottish respondents was related to the felt level of inequity of workers' rewards, contribution and desire for participation, as well as to the absence of belief in the work ethic. This result was taken to indicate a general dissatisfaction with the current organization of work in Scotland. Beliefs about work in Scotland are more intimately linked with societal and leisure considerations than they are in the U.S.A. (Dickson and Buchholz, 1977, p. 101)

Again this would indicate that the work vs. leisure dichotomy is more prevalent in the UK and the adaptive tool structure is functioning in the U.S. A U.S. study by Kleiber and Crandall (1981) found that the overall relationship between work and leisure ethics is low if the two are defined independently. Two hundred students did not view work and leisure dichotomously.

Within the countries there is evidence for each of the theories. At that point, when examining the U.S and the UK separately, it is impossible to conclude from the literature which leisure definition is operating more strongly. It is also difficult to determine which society is more progressive than the other. However, the two cross-cultural studies clearly
indicate that, relative to each other, the U.S. is more likely to view leisure as adaptive whereas the UK tends to place leisure at odds with work. It can therefore be concluded that in this respect the U.S. has progressed further in the post-industrial age.

**Education**

Rostow (1960), in suggesting that the technically mature society "ceases to accept technology as an overriding objective," indirectly suggests that attitudes about education will change. Murphy (1982) is more direct in delineating the relationship between education and society:

> The wider society is always seen as having the power to shape the school as to meet society's needs. For example the version of functionalism which emphasizes cultural values argues that society's values become embodied in the structure of the school which then functions so as to satisfy the essential prerequisites of the adult role structure. . . . Moreover, the requisites of the ongoing structural differentiation of American society are claimed to have resulted in the increasingly vital role of the educational system and in the process of academic upgrading. (p. 185)

Therefore, by examining trends in education, it is possible to determine some prevailing social attitudes, in this case the values of work and leisure. Education can also be assumed to reflect the technological level of the society by the standards it imposes for employment. This section will examine trends in education to determine accepted levels of education and current value orientations toward work and leisure in the U.S. and the UK.

**Educational Level.** An increasingly technological and specialized world requires highly specialized workers, and hence education has developed in such a way to satisfy society's needs (Murphy, 1982). It is well-documented
in both populations that the average number of years of schooling has increased and that whereas the high school diploma used to be the ticket to a secure future, now the push is for a college education. However, these systems did not develop in a cultural vacuum. Therefore, although the basic structure and accepted levels of higher education in the U.S. and the UK are very similar, the finer distinctions exist. These are the points this section will consider to determine the relative status of education in the UK and the U.S.

In the UK, higher education has a long history as an elitist activity. Colleges and universities were for the rich young men, the future statesmen, generals and scholars of Great Britain. In securing a position, a student's school background and family were more important than his actual school performance. Heath (1981) traced male students through school, exams and careers to determine if the old system has been replaced by a more meritocratic society. (Note: historically the elite have attended public schools.) He discovered:

- marked upward mobility . . . for the men who had gone to technical, grammar and direct grant schools. . . . The secondary modern and public schools— at opposite ends of the class structure— acted primarily as vehicles for status maintenance. . . . The extraordinary class-bound character of British education is the dominant aspect. . . . At the extremes of the class structure, we have 'social reproduction.' The . . . schools . . . acted as channels for the perpetuation and transmission of position. . . . In between, we see . . . three 'escalators' between the strata. But each escalator took people up only one floor. (Heath, 1981, pp. 472-473)

He also reported that students in major public schools were most likely to
become self-employed, students in direct grant schools became officials and administrators, students in minor public schools became farmers and grammar school students became non-manual workers. The self-employed relied most on school ties and family background whereas the salaried professionals competed in a more meritocratic setting. However, this was not to say the salaried professionals did not benefit from their background. Rather, Heath pointed out that

The public schools make sure that their boys and girls leave with the pieces of paper that the new world of academic credentials demands. . . . The crucial role of the contemporary school . . . is in getting its pupils through those exams. . . . The major public schools and the former direct grant schools . . . are undoubtedly the most efficient exam factories, and will continue to win. (p. 472, p. 474)

Therefore, Heath (1981) concludes that the meritocratic system is still a long time in coming for Great Britain.

In the U.S. elitism in education also has had its place. The earliest universities were for rich young men from good Eastern families. However, these types of schools, most often single-sex and private, and their enrollments are decreasing (Digest of Educational Statistics, 1983, p. 106). The opportunity for every man to obtain a good education has been a concept long valued by the U.S., and more students of every background take advantage of the opportunity every year. Since U.S. education lacks the class-bound character of British education, U.S. industry is more open to a meritocratic society.

Academic credentials are important in both societies, but the techniques used to educate the students differ in a way that reflects what each society values most. Heath (1981) called British schools examination factories, indicating that although the credentials are recognized as necessary, the actual schooling is a mere formality because each class is aware of its
potential positions. This agrees with Dubin's (1970) assessment that British managers are recruited for where they went to school, and not for what they learned. He noted that most managerial recruits had little or nor prior training or education directly relative to their business employment. Jenner (1984) concluded from a study of U.S. and UK business ideologies that "the traditional British value of being an 'all-rounder' showed through a rejection of specialized career paths" (p. 56). Dubin (1970)
found the only exceptions to be executives in science-based industries. However, he stated that even in these cases the executives "had to rise to executive ranks . . . [revealing] the explicit presumption that engineers and technologists are not qualified initially by their education for executive positions" (Dubin, 1970, p. 190). Heath (1981) noted that for students in this position upward mobility was very slow: most of a generation only moved up one level. In the U.S., on the other hand, the liberal arts major has been largely rejected as a potential candidate for industry positions. Peters and Waterman (1982) noted that current industry has begun to reject business schools that concentrate on "ivory tower analysis" to the neglect of practical, common-sense considerations. As Dubin (1970) claimed, "a high percentage of candidates for managerial, professional and executive positions in American industry have some sort of technical preparation. . . . What happens on the job in the way of specialization and training is, therefore, often viewed as an intensification of professional or specialist training already [emphasis added] received at the university or college level" (p. 186). It would seem, then, that although education levels and structures are similar, cultural values have deeply affected the educational techniques used and the qualities desired in the graduate. Kakabadse and Cooper (1980) concluded

More than likely the post-MBA reward in the U.S. is money, whereas in the UK the reward is status. Probably, the major difference lies in the attitudes of top management in England where the baronial status of being a top manager is more important than effectiveness at work and financial
The U.S. is heavily output-oriented, and the University Department in the UK is more concerned with intellectual and personal growth. (p. 51)

The relative status of education in the U.S. and the UK indicates that the U.S., because it better prepares its work force for the rigors of industry, is in a better position to succeed in the rapidly changing business world. It is a more adaptive outlook that suits it well for progression through the changes of the age of high mass-consumption.

**Education's Effect on Work and Leisure Attitudes**

Trends in education can reflect social values, and not only the value of education itself but also of work and leisure. For example, education has increasingly been presumed by many to be the main avenue to success and the better job (Mottaz, 1984). This popular notion reflects the value people place on success and a better job: they would endure four years or more of schooling to achieve those goals. This section will examine the literature to determine how higher education shapes work and leisure attitudes.

Several studies have suggested that higher education brings with it expectations of a higher style of living. Marsden, Reed, Kennedy and Stinson (1982) studied U.S. regional differences in leisure time activities and found "a general tendency of highly educated persons to participate more in both formal and informal spheres. . . . Attending college has a significant, positive effect on cultural life. . . . [It] appears a college education specifically is important in generating audiences for 'good' music, theatre, museums and concerts" (pp. 1040-1041). Kelly
(1982) suggests, however, that this is a role the highly-educated adopt regardless of the actual activity. "Social status differences are reflected more in how activities are done (in style) and in their interpreted meanings, than in which activities and companions are chosen" (Kelly, 1982, p. 223).

The literature indicates that these expectations also affect work attitudes. Mottaz (1984) found that "for [American] workers who report equal levels of intrinsic rewards, work satisfaction tends to be considerably lower among the better-educated workers. This effect appears to be due to the higher aspirations or work values associated with higher education" (p. 985). It is important to note that this value system was not found for the less-educated and the lower occupational levels. The literature suggests that the better-educated (who usually occupy higher-level jobs) and the lesser-educated (who usually occupy lower-level jobs) operate under different value systems. Peters and Rudolf (1980), with similar data, interpreted it as revealing the influence of the PWE on lower-level organization jobs but not on the higher-level positions. They cited studies by Leid and Pritchard (1976) and Merrens and Garrett (1975) which found that the PWE has significant motivational force for lower-level workers. At higher levels, on the other hand, the employees are motivated by expectations of intrinsic rewards which spring from their educational level. Kelly (1982) found that personal growth and self-expression are much more significant leisure motivations in the American new town with its higher education level and more expressive life-style. . . . The
trend toward legitimizing leisure as self-justifying and toward intrinsic satisfactions in American culture would be expected. . . . On the other hand, the working conditions of the British sample are reflected in the much higher salience given to compensatory motivations of difference from work combined with relaxation and rest. (p. 221, p. 223)

Kelly (1982) indicates that if the samples had been matched for education level the attitudes would have been the same regardless of nationality. Furnham (1984), in a study of work values and beliefs in Britain, found that the better-educated tended to be more work-involved and more in favor of the leisure ethic than their less-educated peers. Dickson and Buchholz (1977), in a comparative study of Scottish and American managers, found the higher-educated workers of both nationalities to value leisure. Therefore, it would seem that in this respect both the U.S. and the UK have progressed equally in the age of high mass-consumption. Higher education creates higher expectations of work and leisure in both.

The Welfare State

Rostow (1960) suggested that the welfare state could be one result of a society moving beyond the state of technical maturity: the emphasis on improving technology and industry would give way to improving the society's standard of living. This section will discuss in more detail the events that led to attitudes supporting the more humanitarian side of progress, and it will evaluate the degree to which these attitudes persist in both the U.S. and the UK.
Developing Humanitarian Attitudes

Much has been written about the development of the welfare state, and most agree that in the U.S. it began with the institution of the Social Security Act of 1935, "crafted in response to the great uncertainties and hardships imposed by the Great Depression and . . . designed primarily to insure a basic income during the so-called golden years or when forced idleness strikes" (Levitan, 1986, p. 5). After World War II, the emphasis was on helping veterans adjust to civilian life by subsidizing their training and education. In the 1960s and early 1970s, aid programs were extended to include the nonaged poor, the blind, the disabled and the working poor (Levitan, 1986). These early efforts at "short-term consumer welfare" have been blamed for establishing a long-term mind set in welfare recipients who would remain on the dole rather than work (Scott, 1982). Others claim that the ideal of the welfare system as founded in the 1930s saw "income support to meet immediate basic needs coupled with attempts to expand economic opportunities and to change institutions in order to promote long-term self-sufficiency" (Levitan, 1986, p. 5), but the evidence that the long-term goals are being met is mixed (Greenstein, 1985; Murray, 1984). These early policies were also challenged on the grounds that they concentrated on helping only the poor (Harper, 1984). Levitan (1986), however, cites more recent programs such as credit programs and disaster relief as evidence that the welfare system is a push for the security and well-being of all Americans and not just the poor.

For the development of the welfare system in the UK, Fraser
(1979) has advanced a theory linking the system closely to the labor movement in that country. Even before 1900, workers were demonstrating that they could dispense with the lobbying efforts and elect their own fellow workers.

In 1906, the Liberals won a big victory and 29 candidates supported by the new Labour Party were elected. It was to be a reforming administration. . . . The Liberal reforms between 1906 and 1911 play a big part in the history of social policy in Britain. . . . They included old-age pensions, health insurance for workers, unemployment insurance, school meals, and employment exchanges. . . . One can argue that the pressure of the Labour movement was necessary for these universalist policies. (Fraser, 1979, pp. 305-306)

As comparison, Fraser (1979) concluded that in the U.S. it was not union pressure that won reforms. Rather, it was the outrage of the working classes at the failure of capitalism that brought about reforms. That these workers were members of unions was not an overriding factor. Fraser (1979) supports this claim by pointing to the membership of the CIO unions (more unskilled and semi-skilled workers) versus the service and construction workers in the AFL unions and causally linking the CIO membership with the greater affiliation the CIO has with welfare legislation. The CIO members had more reason to seek reform, and thus it was the membership and not the union per se that brought about reform. Fraser (1979) also points out that American unions do not negotiate with the government as the British unions do because they lack the British alliance with the Labour Party. From these points, Fraser (1979) concludes that Britain has a universal
ideology and a political party that creates much greater pressure for reform. The U.S., on the other hand, is divided on the issue, and many unionists, as members of the middle class, reject what they consider spending on the lower classes. These current attitudes will be the topic of the next section.

Current Attitudes Toward Welfare

As mentioned in the section discussing the use of benefits gained from industrialization, Rostow (1960) postulated a progression from personal consumption to investment in the welfare state followed by a commitment to external aggression. As was concluded in that section, the UK has made a greater shift toward a welfare state than the U.S. This section will determine the degree to which public opinion reflects this progression by examining attitudes about welfare.

In the U.S., many researchers have found a strong opinion that welfare benefits have created a group of people that have no incentive to work, save or invest (Auletta, 1985; Bernstein, 1986; Jenner, 1984; Mead, 1986; Murray, 1984; Scott, 1982; Williams, 1986). Bernstein (1986) cited survey responses in which respondents said they would like to work, but only if they could earn more than they receive from welfare. Williams (1986) pointed out that "since 1948 the average duration of unemployment has increased by four weeks. It has done so because with unemployment payments as high as $250 a week some people search more leisurely for employment, are less diligent in keeping a job, and choose more seasonal employment" (p. 24). In a study of UK and U.S. managers, Jenner (1984) found that U.S. managers tend to agree that social welfare destroys initiative, thrift and
enterprise. That this reflects a growing conservatism in the U.S. about welfare is supported by Mead (1986) and Page and Shapiro (1982). Mead (1986) noted that Reagan's proposals to cut welfare in 1981 were supported by Congress. Page and Shapiro (1982) examined survey items asked since 1936 and found "changes in a conservative direction concerning government spending on social welfare, health, the cities, and drug addiction, and concerning government provision of both jobs and a decent standard of living" (p. 30). Camasso and Moore (1985) found that rural respondents are less supportive of social welfare programs and feel that close-to-home, family solutions to problems are better than government support.

However, there is some evidence that the welfare state is still favored (Greenstein, 1985; Index of International Public opinion, 1984; U.S. News and World Report, 1986). U.S. News and World Report (1986) found that 60.5% of respondents would rather retain Social Security than provide for themselves. The magazine did note that some respondents would have changed their answer if they knew of a workable alternative to welfare. In the survey cited by the Index (1984), 80% of those surveyed opposed cutting spending on entitlement programs such as Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and federal employment retirement benefits. Levitan (1986) suggested that an extensive welfare system as a buffer against economic insecurity was almost guaranteed to stay because of the public's resistance to major cuts.

Surveys in the UK have also shown that the public believes welfare has demoralized the workers (Golding, 1982; Index of International Public Opinion, 1984). Forty-three percent of the
respondents to an Index (1984) survey felt people live in need because of lack of willpower and laziness, and 57% agreed that Britain's welfare system removes the incentive for people to help themselves. Golding (1982) found that a quarter of survey respondents were in favor of a cut in unemployment benefits and also discovered strong hostility toward welfare claimants. *Time* magazine reported in 1985 that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher maintained Britain can not afford its generous welfare structure.

However, public support for welfare is indicated by the fact that in the same article she was criticized by Neil Kinnock, leader of the opposition Labour Party, which strongly opposes cuts. Brown (1985) and Land (1985) also criticized the government for its cuts in social services. The Index of International Public Opinion (1984) cited surveys in which 61% of the respondents thought the government should maintain its spending in public services even if it meant a tax increase, 68% were against providing for themselves and 68% thought it very important to put more money into the Health Service. Jenner (1984) found that UK managers did not agree that welfare destroys initiative, thrift and enterprise when compared with U.S. managers.

The evidence about current attitudes toward welfare in the U.S. and the UK is mixed: there is support for cutting and for increasing/reforming welfare benefits. However, the relationship of the labor unions to the government and social reform differentiates the two areas, and points up an important consideration. Britain has a more universalistic ideology in this area because of the Labour Party whereas the U.S. has no such supporting structure for its social policies and is much more
divided on the issue. Therefore, although it is difficult to determine which country is more conservative now toward welfare, it is reasonable to conclude that the U.S. would be more conducive to change because it does not have the barrier of the Labour Party that is so well-established the UK. It can only be concluded that were these countries to pass out of the welfare state, the process in the U.S. would involve fewer barriers to change.

Conclusion

In the section on industrial environments, it was concluded that the environments are converging in terms of their structure. For example, both emphasize increased education and industry over agriculture. However, in examining even these similar variables, it becomes apparent that different attitudes can result in the same structures. It is obvious that the U.S. has a more adaptive outlook on the world of business. It has concentrated its resources in industry to a greater degree than the UK, its work force is more practically trained and meritocratically rewarded and the management style emphasizes a great flexibility that breeds innovation so necessary to the rapid technological changes in the markets. The UK, on the other hand, has made its investments in personal consumption and wages, the welfare state and a society that still emphasizes family background and bureaucratic organization.

In the section on attitudes, three areas were examined. First, studies found in both the UK and the U.S. that elements of the leisure vs. work dichotomy (the PWE) and the adaptive tool theory were operating. However, two studies found the U.S.
predominantly adaptive in their use of leisure and Britain more
PWE-oriented. Second, while education levels and structure were
similar, the techniques used and the qualities desired in the
graduate differed such that the U.S. better prepares its work
force to succeed in the changing world. Third, the development of
the welfare state from the start has been a controversial issue
for the U.S. because it lacks a universal ideology and political
party like that of the UK, and this situation indicates that the
U.S. has fewer barriers to change in the welfare system.

The review of the literature would indicate that while the
industrial environments are becoming more similar, each country is
still so strongly influenced by its cultural values and social
mores that attitudes toward the PWE and the leisure ethic are not
converging. The evidence in the attitudes section clearly shows that
the U.S. stresses the adaptive model whereas the UK still has strong
connections to the PWE. Furthermore, this conclusion is also
supported by the evidence in the industrial environment section.
The U.S. has adopted much more adaptive techniques to deal with
the increasingly technological basis of the business world. The
UK, on the other hand, is still bogged down in the bureaucracy and
the elitism born of a nation enraptured by royalty and
titles. Therefore, it can be concluded that despite similar
industrial environments in the UK and the U.S., attitudes about the
leisure ethic and the PWE have not converged.
Bernstein, B. (1986). Some things are wrong with the system. Society, Jan-Feb, 10-15.


