ADIMIRAL TIRPITZ AND THE ORIGINS OF
THE ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL RIVALRY
1898 - 1906

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PATRICK J. CAVIGAN
ADVISOR - DR. WILLIAM G. EIDSON

BALL STATE UNIVERSITY
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We do not by any means feel the need to stick our fingers in every pie, but on the other hand . . . the days when the German happily surrendered the land to one of his neighbors, to another the sea . . . those days are over . . . we don't want to put anyone in the shade, but we too demand our place in the sun.

Prince Bernhard von Bulow

(December 6, 1897)
The political unification of Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century led to the development of a powerful industrial and military state, rivaling any nation in the world. A natural increase in population, from 41,000 in 1871 to 65,000 in 1910, added to Germany's rapidly growing military capacity. But the British Empire, which could not match the land strength of Germany, felt secure behind a fleet which was twice as large as its strongest adversary. In this respect it could be interpreted that Anglo-German relations never reached the breaking point until Germany expressed a desire to challenge British control of the high seas.

Yet naval matters were not the only point of discontent. As long as Germany was determined to dominate the continent, an Anglo-German conflict was inevitable. The traditional British doctrine of a balance of continental power and British isolation from European disputes was shattered by the advent of a powerful state in Central Europe. Therefore, the Anglo-German naval rivalry was only an overt expression of a much deeper conflict. However, the origin of the naval rivalry was complex. Although a naval conflict was inevitable, domestic politics, rapid technological change, and two dynamic personalities made the naval rivalry unique from the other so-called causes of the Great War.

Naval questions were not new in British politics. Prime Minister William Gladstone, for example, had resigned in 1894 primarily over the question of his opposition to naval expenditures. England's long naval tradition was continually used by politicians, both left and right; therefore, Englishmen were extremely susceptible to mass hysteria whenever the question of a threat to England's naval domination was raised in either the House of Commons, or on the hustings. Unlike Britain, Germany did not have a long naval tradition, but, the German federal system
played a pivotal role in construction of the Germany navy. Germany did not have to make yearly appropriations like England. Once the naval laws were passed, which established a specific number of ships, no further Reichstag action was needed even if the expense of the original ships increased due to design changes. Therefore, the shock and panic tactics, necessitated by the British Parliamentary system and the pay as you go plan, were not fundamental in Germany where the schedule of construction was removed by law from the list of annual debatable issues. The fact that the German Navy developed after unification, however, made it a national institution in a Federal state where even the army was under the control of state monarchies.

According to Article 53 of the Constitution of 1871:

The Navy of the Reich is unified under the supreme command of the Kaiser. The organization and structure of the same is within the jurisdiction of the Kaiser, who names the officers and civil servants of the Navy also to be sworn by the other ranks.

Because of the peculiar place the navy had in the German political system, it had the support of both the Liberals and Nationalists. It drew its strength from the rising middle-class throughout "the associated governments" of the German Empire.* The German navy, contrary to British claims, was neither a conservative militarist arm of the Junkers nor completely dominated the army.

The German navy did not have restrictions on its Officer Corp. Unlike the army, in which a majority of the officers came from the Junker class, the navy was staffed by men of middle-class backgrounds. Friedrich von Hollman, Hugo Pohl, Reinhard Scheer, for example, and even Alfred von

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* The "states rights" leaders insisted that there was not a "Germany" but state governments within the framework of the German Empire.
Tirpitz, came from liberal middle-class families. Although the liberal backing began to breakdown in the 1890s, the middle-class Social Democrats and even the Catholic Center Party continued to back the navy and insured Reichstag cooperation.

German Liberals wanted a national symbol, but since Prussian bayonets were fresh in their minds, i.e. the Revolution of 1848, they could not identify with the Junker-dominated army. German liberals, in the tradition of British liberalism, saw their navy as a symbol of a constitutional nation state. Their ships were expressions of German technical excellence, "floating manifestations of German 'Kultur.'"3

After Kaiser Wilhelm II became Emperor in 1888 the unified navy was split into various administrative units with Wilhelm II taking an active and detrimental part. Tirpitz claimed, "The real reason for Caprivos (chief of the Admiralty) dismissal was that the Kaiser wanted to divide the powers of the Admiralty in order to be able to intervene personally."4

In June of 1897, Wilhelm appointed Admiral Tirpitz State Secretary of the Imperial Naval Office. In a few days Tirpitz issued the memorandum which was to become the guideline for all future naval construction. He made it quite clear that "for Germany the most dangerous enemy at the present time is England."5 He disregarded his previous assumption which considered the Russian and French Navies as a threat to Germany and concentrated on Great Britain. Tirpitz was the driving force behind the German Navy. Construction and deployment tactics all fell into Tirpitz's hands, and he knew he was placing a sword in the side of many Englishmen: "We had never hoped for British approval during the creation of our sea power."6

Alfred Tirpitz, by his own evaluation, was a mediocre student. Because of his poor showing in school and his father's insistence that he keep studying. Tirpitz decided to join the navy. At the age of sixteen "to
everyone's surprise" he passed the entrance examinations to the Naval Cadets' Institute. After four and a half years he was commissioned and assigned as a sub-lieutenant on board the flagship Konig Wilhelm in 1870.

During his early career Tirpitz had a great respect for the British. He stated that he felt more at home in Plymouth than in Keil. But, Germany's victory over France in 1871 changed his opinion of England. Britain seemed to resent Germany because she was no longer the "whipping boy" in Europe. Although naval relations were still good, the upper-class in England abandoned the German side. By 1898 even the naval relations broke down: according to Tirpitz, "when the younger British officers began to pay less attention to manners (the result of the lowering of the social standards of the recruits) and to alter their behavior toward us in consequence of the agitation against us." Therefore, even before his appointment as State Secretary of the Admiralty, Tirpitz was ever cognizant of the way Germany was intimidated on the sea. Fishing vessels refused to fly the German flag for fear of reprisals from Dutch and Danish fishermen, and since Britain controlled the docks in Hamburg; the German Merchant Marine was almost totally registered in foreign countries. Tirpitz saw this as a legacy of Chancellor Bismarck. According to Tirpitz, Bismarck had an affection for England which adversely affected his judgment. In any case since Germany had not developed a strong navy immediately after unification, Tirpitz's expansion programs came as a shock to the British.

Although a poor student, Tirpitz always favored the sciences, and he placed a strong priority on technological improvements in naval construction. He also favored officers who could evaluate the construction of naval vessels. He caught the eye of Admiral Albrecht von Stosch who also stressed the need for a strong German battleship fleet. Stosch wrote, "Tirpitz was way ahead of his time in the energy with which he drove our
sea power forward after centuries of neglect." No one apparently doubted this energy. Admiral Gustav von Senden, a mild critic, wrote, "Tirpitz is a very energetic character, he had too big a head of steam not to be a leader. He is ambitious . . . he would never stand for treatment like given to Admiral Hollmann for he is much too self conscious and convinced of his own excellence." In any case the Kaiser had great faith in Tirpitz. After returning from the Far East, Wilhelm told Tirpitz, "We have a navy bill ready but we need you to put it into operation."

Above all else, Tirpitz should be remembered for his handling of naval appropriations in the German Reichstag. Although he ultimately failed to get enough, especially for submarine construction, his work in the passage of the Naval Laws of 1898, 1900, and 1908 laid the basis for the German High Seas Fleet.

Tirpitz, immediately upon his appointment as State Secretary of the Imperial Naval Office, issued a memorandum, dated June 15, 1897, which laid down a specific plan for the German Navy, both in types of ships built, and their deployment. Because of Germany's lack of harbor facilities, the memorandum was most decisive in setting up a concise list of priorities which were to be drawn up "based on the most difficult situation in war into which our fleet will meet." Tirpitz "implied" that the most dangerous enemy was England: "We must urgently require a certain measure of naval force as a political power factor" against England. Tirpitz advised against raiding, a trans-Atlantic naval war, and stipulated that the navy was to be concentrated in the North Sea. Tirpitz explained that, because of geographic factors and Germany's lack of coaling stations, building a world-wide fleet would be foolish. Although Britain scoffed at Germany's claim that the navy was built as a political lever and not a battle fleet, the memorandum was quite explicit in stating that Germany's
High Seas Fleet would be limited to two squadrons of modest tonnage because of shallow harbor facilities. Such a fleet, even in the wildest imagination, could not be much of a threat to the British Grand Fleet.

Tirpitz also stressed that any auxiliary vessels would be of little value since all operations would be close to Germany's coast. In any case, such vessels did not contribute to the political significance of German's fleet. The strength of the home fleet, to be completed by 1905, was to be:

1. fleet flagship
2. squadrons of 8 battleships
3. battleships in reserve

Auxiliary vessels were to include:

8. armored ships
6. large cruisers
18. small cruisers *

All vessels stationed in foreign waters had to meet the requirements of the home fleet; however, those ships would have to be considered expendable. Three large cruisers, nine small cruisers, and four gunboats with six in reserve would be designed for overseas duty. Estimates of the cost of fleet construction was put at 566 million marks.**

In keeping with his emphasis on technical improvements, Tirpitz explicitly warned the German Reichstag not to copy the designs of foreign ships: "Germany must maintain a certain proud initiative in incorporating ship design."14

Tirpitz's strategic doctrine was quite simple. Rather than attempt to create a navy with worldwide range or variety in both size and types of ships like Great Britain, Germany would build only homewater "capital"

* Ships of less than 3,000 tons.

** The value of the mark was approximately 25%.
ships stationed in the North Sea to back any small vessel in foreign waters.* This particular strategy seemed to fit all of Germany's needs. It was less expensive since the ships were designed to require only existing domestic port facilities, and that limited range cut operating expenses. By concentration in the North Sea, fewer ships were required, yet their navy would appear strong enough to satisfy the demands of the German public.

Before the final draft of the 1898 Naval Law was introduced into the Reichstag. Tirpitz asked the German Colonial Society to instigate a propaganda campaign. Leaflets, pamphlets, and two thousand copies of Captain Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power on History*, were distributed throughout Germany. The Navy League also got into the act and stressed the decline of Germany's navy in relation to the major powers. England, they publicized, had sixty-two ships of 5,000 tons or more, France thirty-six, Russia eighteen, while Germany had only sixteen. In ships constructed between 1889-1897, Britain had twenty-four new battleships compared to Germany's six. The League publicized that with the nineteen battleships included in the Naval Law, Germany would be close to parity with England and surpass Russia and France. Due in large measure to this propaganda, the Naval Law passed the Reichstag without major revision on March 26, 1898, 212 votes to 139.15

Tirpitz was pleased with the passage of the naval law, but at the same time, he was reserved because he had received only what he thought was the bare minimum. The Navy Law of 1898 provided a cornerstone, but vast sums were needed for research, dock and harbor facilities, and new personnel. Tirpitz knew the limited potential of his fleet and asserted

*Large, heavily-armored ships which were capable of lying in the line of battle, i.e. battleships and battle-cruisers.*
in his memoirs that "the plan for the battle fleet was composed without any thought of a war against England."\textsuperscript{16}

The 1898 Naval Law was received without much comment in Great Britain. The English, in fact, were only concerned that an increase in the size of the German Navy would disrupt the fleet plans of France and Russia; therefore, necessitating a British expansion program to maintain the two-power standard. But, by October 11, 1899, Englishmen were forced to focus their attention on Germany.

The outbreak of hostilities between Great Britain and the Boer Republics brought cries of action from the German public. Although the German foreign office was quiet for four years the German Government had informed President Kruger that the Transvaal should grant any concessions asked for by Great Britain -- a week after the war broke, Kaiser Wilhelm declared:

\begin{quote}
We are in bitter need of a strong German Navy if the increases demanded during the first years of my reign had not been continuously refused in spite of my warnings . . . . How differently should we now be able to further our flourishing commerce and our interests overseas.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

Both Tirpitz and Count Bulow were surprised by the Emperor's statement. Privately they had tried to keep the Kaiser from making any statement on the naval question, but, Wilhelm's speech was written without consulting either the chancellor or the foreign office. Therefore, it caused an uproar, not only in Britain, but in the German Reichstag, whose members felt that the Emperor was usurping their power in regulating fleet construction. The Kaiser, however, reassured foreign secretary Bulow. Germany, he claimed, would remain strictly neutral for at least twenty years. After the navy-building program was completed, however, Germany could use different language. In this respect the Kaiser mirrored Tirpitz. But unlike Tirpitz, who did not want to increase German's naval strength until
1905, the Kaiser wanted further appropriations; he ordered Tirpitz to prepare a new naval bill.

Coinciding with the British seizure of three German ships off Delagoa Bay -- which were allegedly taking contraband to the Boers -- Tirpitz's new Naval Bill was formally introduced into the Reichstag in January of 1900. As expected the naval proponents used the seizure of the German ships to stir up public opinion to accept another tax-burdening naval law. Tirpitz, however, warned the Emperor not to make any public statements; because, the Germany navy would never be sufficient to threaten England with attack. But, in introducing the second navy law, even Tirpitz found it necessary to publicly state: "The Navy must be equal to its most difficult task, battle against Great Britain." German Chancellor Prince von Bulow was aware of the uneasiness the fleet would cause in England, but, he also publicly announced that Germany must fulfill her destiny: "Our fleet must be built with out eyes on English policy." Great Britain responded by abandoning the Naval Defense Act of 1889. Britain was not going to give up her supremacy at sea; her naval programs would be made strictly in accordance with German naval programs.

The German Naval Law of 1900 provided for a fleet twice as large as that allotted in the 1898 law. By 1920, Germany was to have a fleet of thirty-eight battleships, twenty large cruisers, and thirty-eight small cruisers. Although six reserve battleships and four foreign-service cruisers were cut by the Reichstag, the main fleet proposals were passed with little opposition.

The cost of the new fleet became progressively more expensive. Each ship built was larger than its predecessor with accompanying increases in personnel and operating costs. Unlike the 1898 Naval Law, ships had to be replaced every fifteen years. Therefore, many of the existing vessels
which were to be included in the proposed battle squadron, had to be replaced. To keep up the construction rate of approximately three capital ships a year, German shipyards also had to be assured of a steady stream of orders to justify expansion. To answer the industrialists, Tirpitz had to state that the naval decision must be regarded as irrevocable. Total expenditures were estimated at 1.2 billion marks for ships and an additional 320 million marks for harbors and dockyards.

Tirpitz wrote in his memoirs that when the second navy law passed he was quite aware that it was bound to have quite a different political significance from the first, particularly in terms of alliances. He reasoned: "It would give the other navies of the world a chance of establishing a certain balance of power at sea by means of coalition with us." Tirpitz was right about the political significance of the new naval law, but his assumption that it would create alliances favoring Germany proved to be the exact opposite of the eventual outcome.

Amended to the new law was Tirpitz's memorandum which became the strategic plan for the German Navy. The German Empire desired peace and security in its economic development and world trade, but, "Not peace at any price, but peace with honour, satisfying the just requirements of Germany." Because Tirpitz looked upon the concept of an economic war or a preventive war as a legitimate form of foreign policy, he feared a British blockade. He publicized, by way of the memorandum, that Germans had to fear another "Copenhagen." It was a fatal error because he stirred up unnecessary public antagonism.

The British did not consider trade rivalry as a cause for conflict after 1897. The earlier disagreements over German abuse of free trade, the

*The British bombarded Copenhagen in 1807, taken the entire Danish fleet as a prize back to England without a formal declaration of war.
particularly between 1884 and 1885, had been resolved. After 1900, Germany was a larger market for England than Australia and Canada combined. British machinery and steel goods constituted over half of England's exports to Germany. Britain, on the other hand, was receiving a great deal of competition in the Far East from Japan and the United States. The German colonies were a drain on the German Federal treasury and Britain had no wish to take them from Germany.

The memorandum also declared that the German Navy would not have to be as strong as its greatest adversaries. Germany only needed a fleet of sufficient size to make the cost of a war against the German Navy so great that the strong naval powers would seek peace with Germany in order to keep their position relative to other naval powers. The enemy, Tirpitz reasoned, would not be able to concentrate its forces and totally destroy the German fleet because the victor would be at the mercy of other naval powers. Tripitz's strategy, known as the "risk theory", raised a storm of controversy in England because England was the only major sea power to which the theory could be applied.

The "risk theory" was keyed to the political situation of the 1890s and did not take into account changes in political alliances. In this respect it was obsolete before it was ever pronounced. Tensions between France and England had been relieved after the Fashoda crisis, and while British and Russian interests in the Far East were being disputed, the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 eased the tension in the Far East. Therefore, there was no guarantee that if England attacked Germany, a combined fleet would attack Great Britain. By 1904, in any case, the "risk theory" was shattered when Britain and France signed the Entente Cordialis and totally irrelevant after the destruction of the Russian fleet during the Russo-Japanese War.
Yet the greatest falacy in the risk theory was that it disregarded the fact that a naval battle was more decisive than decisions on land. A superior fleet could inflict serious damage on an only slightly weaker opponent with virtually no damage to itself. Admiral von Spee's entire cruiser squadron, for example, was destroyed by a superior British squadron in 1914, with the loss of only seven men.24

After the Boer war the British public tried to forget about the German war. But the Kaiser continued to publicise his new toy. He placed a chart in the Reichstag, for example, comparing the German and British navies. By 1903 the British had to respond. For one, Britain began to construct a new North Sea base at Rosyth on the Firth of Forth.25 The selection of this base was made because it commands the North Sea and is 375 miles from both Helegoland and the Danish Straits.* But, the decisive step was taken in October of 1904 when Sir John Fisher was appointed as First Seelord. Fisher ordered a further change in the deployment of the British navy. Convinced that Germany was the major threat, he ordered the formation of a home fleet with up to 88 per cent of Britain's naval strength stationed in the North Sea. Fisher's inauguration was pivotal in another respect. He made the creation of a public naval rivalry with Germany his number one priority. Nor was there any doubt as to Fisher's intentions. In a long letter to Lord Esher, head of the Royal Committee on Naval Affairs, Fisher stated:

It is the discussions which keep alive popular fears and popular interest, upon which alone rest the Navy estimates. A nation that believes itself secure, all history teaches is doomed. Anxiety, not a sense of security lies at the root of readiness for war... An invasion scare is the mill of God which grinds you out a Navy of Dreadnoughts, and kept the British war-like in spirit.26

In preparing annual budgets, needs were considered in November, but

* Helegoland, recently acquired by Germany, became their major naval base in the North Sea. Today it is an amusement park.
by January 1, news of the budgets had leaked out and had begun to appear in the public press. By March 1, when the budgets were published, strong lobbies were already preparing the public for heavy naval expenditures. British needs were placed in the perspective of the ship-building programs of foreign powers. The English naval proponents played a game of naval mathematics and used public opinion to pass appropriations.\(^{27}\) English naval budgets, therefore, were a product of public histeria. A writer for the London Times aptly stated during the naval panic of 1909: "The people will be quite sane in a fortnight - they always went like this in March."\(^{28}\)

Fisher was the perfect British counterpart to Tirpitz in another respect. From appointment in October, 1904, until his resignation in 1910, he shook the very foundation of the British navy. In 1910, he turned over to his successor a technically efficient and highly-trained fighting force. J. L. Garvin, editor of the Daily Telegraph, called Fisher \"the genius incarnate of technical change.\"\(^{29}\)

Unlike Tirpitz, Fisher met with strong resistance among Liberal Members of Parliament\(^{-}\) but, like the father of the German fleet, Fisher had the complete support and friendship of his monarch, Edward VII. All of his naval proposals were approved, except for his plan to reorganize the office of the Admiralty. He scrapped 160 ships with the words \"They can neither fight nor run away.\"\(^{30}\) He also reorganized dock workers and retrained officers. Tirpitz and Fisher became personal antagonists. From 1904 to 1910 the Anglo-German naval rivalry was, in fact, often more a personal conflict between these two strong willed individuals than a conflict between nations. Both used the popular press to attack the other. In this six year period their roles also changed. While Tirpitz instigated the conflict, Fisher perpetuated it. On several occasions Tirpitz called for a \"naval holiday\" but Fisher responded: \"Tell him
(Tirpitz) I'll see him dead first." Yet, they respected one another.
Fisher claimed, "Tirpitz brought the gift of organization and the foresight of design without which the German fleet would have floundered in a quagmire of political backering and mismanagement." Tirpitz respected Fisher technical genius. Above all, Fisher's cherished new battleship H. M. S. Dreadnought. Ironically, Fisher's new ship also opened a new chapter in the saga of the Anglo-German Naval rivalry. Because of Fisher's Genius, the massive British fleet was now obsolete.

Until 1906, very few people could seriously consider the German fleet a threat to the security of England. In 1906, Britain had forty-seven battleships less than fifteen years of age, to Germany's eighteen, and an even more overwhelming advantage in smaller auxiliary vessels. But when King Edward VII launched the prototype of Fisher's new battleship -- christening her H. M. S. Dreadnought -- it opened a fresh can of worms. The Dreadnought, utilizing turbine engines and a new heavy-calibre gun configuration, was the fastest, most heavily-armed ship afloat, superior to any ship in the world. Although this vessel was the ultimate ship for the British Navy, Germany, with no hope of matching Britain's superiority in older types of ships, was now starting on even terms with Great Britain.

By 1910, both Fisher and Tirpitz were out of office. The naval rivalry, in any case, had taken on a new perspective: personality and politics no longer played a role in the conflict. The respective navies of Great Britain and Germany were now the symbols of a greater conflict of interest, and it was already too late for compromise.

Germany had good reasons for developing a strong navy. Germany's Merchant Marine was the second largest in the world. With the exception of coal, Germany lacked many of the resources needed for industrial development. Germany, as the major power on the continent, deserved the
prestige of having warships throughout the world. The humiliation of having three German Merchant ships stopped and impounded by the British during the Boer War was proof enough for most Germans that the Kaiser needed a fleet.

Great Britain overlooked these valid German claims for naval power. The British reasoned that Germany was going to invade Britain when the fleet was ready. The English also overlooked the liberal makeup of the German navy. Englishmen rightly claimed that her navy was a lifeline which could not be placed in jeopardy, but failed to see that sea power was also essential. Most of Germany's raw materials, as well as some food stuffs also had to be imported.

Unfortunately, the German cause was lost in the translation of Kaiser Wilhelm's public statements. In any case Englishmen were only too willing to accept any German challenge as a direct threat to British survival. Britain remained supreme as long as her sea power was not threatened. Britain would not give up her position no matter what Germany demanded. The fear of being eclipsed by Germany as the reigning world power was very real in the minds of British leaders. From the British point of view, Germany controlled the continent no matter if her ambitions were legitimate or not; the world would come to her feet if she also controlled the sea.
"H.M.S. DREADNOUGHT"
NOTES

1 James Hale, Publicity and Diplomacy: With Special Reference to England and Germany 1890-1914. (Boston: Peter Smith, 1940), p. 332.


3 Ibid., p. 38.


5 Ibid., I, 209.

6 Ibid., I, 268.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid., I, 15.

9 Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent, p. 66.

10 Ibid., p. 71. Admiral Hollmann resigned under pressure as State Secretary of the Admiralty and Tirpitz was appointed to his position.

11 Tirpitz, My Memoirs, I, 119.

12 Tirpitz's Memorandum is quoted in Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent, appendix I. Also see Germany, Foreign Ministry, German Diplomatic Documents 1871-1914, 4 Vols. (London: Methuen Co. Ltd., 1928-1931).

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid. For one, Tirpitz ordered that all wood or other combustable furnishing be removed from German warships. In 1916 the British lost three battle-cruisers due to uncontrollable fires in officers quarters Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent, p. 159. Germany, German Diplomatic Documents, Vol. 3, pp. 127-154.

15 Tirpitz, My Memoirs, I, 58.


19. Ibid., I, p. 123.


21. Ibid., p. 31.


25. Ibid., I, p. 421.


27. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, I, p. 36.

28. The Times (London), March 7, 1902, p. 2.

29. Hale, Publicity and Diplomacy, p. 338.


31. Ibid.


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