A Communist Revolution in the Post-Communist Era: The Rise of Maoism in Nepal

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by

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Abstract
In 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) began an insurgency that, to date, has claimed more than 3,000 lives in the landlocked kingdom of Nepal. The voiceless and exploited people are locked in a system that began centuries ago, under various principalities and polities, including local lords, British imperialists, a hereditary prime ministership, constitutional monarchs, and, finally, elected officials who gained power during the 1990 Jana Andolan. The many minority ethnic groups of Nepal, long discounted by these rulers, are attempting to maintain the integrity of their cultures in a rapidly changing modern world. The success of the Jana Andolan or Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) relied on the collaborative efforts of the coalition of Nepal’s communist factions, the United Left Front (ULF), in conjunction with the Nepal Congress Party. The movement seemed to indicate the longstanding failure of the monarchy, like previous ruling powers, to address the concerns of the people—many Nepali groups have embraced communism as a viable alternative. Public awareness of the widening disparity between the wealthy and the bulk of the Nepali people has been heightened by the affluent tourists who pay exorbitantly to see and trek the Himalayas. After many attempts to achieve representation for their individual economic and ethnic interests, the Nepali people have been disappointed by the inefficacy and corruption of the latest representative system. As the fledgling Nepali democracy, characterized by a round robin rotation of 10 prime ministers in twelve years, struggles to establish its legitimacy, the Maoist guerilla movement is gaining popularity. Revolutionary communism has appeared to answer the many hopes of the people with the CPN (Maoist) working at the grassroots level to overthrow the parliamentary democracy and create a communist republic. Since 1996, insurgent communism has spread from the rural villages where it gained popularity as the “People’s War,” across the seventy-five provinces of the Himalayan Kingdom. This all begs the question: will there be a communist revolution in the post-Soviet Union era?
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Rebecca T. Lehman
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Introduction

In my lifetime, I have only known the fall and failings of communism. The Berlin Wall toppled, former Soviet-bloc countries demanded democracy, and the Soviet Union collapsed. In the past few years China progressed from “Most Favored Nation” trading status with the United States to a full-time member of the World Trade Organization. Everywhere it seemed the world was making headway against communism. But in the Nepali foothills above Pokhara, I was introduced to a world where communism and rebellion are very much alive and thriving. My own research exposed me to a nation in which communism has been a part of politics for more than half a century. Today, much of the Nepali population remains at or below the poverty line with one of the lowest literacy rates in the world. In elections and rural uprisings the Communist Party and Maoist factions have begun to, apparently, cater to the needs of a long-silenced voice ... the voice of the people of Nepal.

II Nepal Background

Nepal’s geography is one of the most unique in the world. The tallest mountain range in the world, the Himalayas, constitutes the nation’s northeastern 1,236 km border with China’s Tibet. The foothills of the Himalayas, or the Mahabharat Chain, make up the central part of the landlocked nation. The Terai floodplain region, where the Himalayan mountains drain into fertile plains and river basins, constitutes the 1,690 km southwestern border with India (CIA World Factbook 04.03.02). The singular nature of Nepal’s geography has made it a challenging place to farm. In the foothills terraces make farming possible, though paddy development is time and labor intensive; in the Middle Mountains people grow dry land crops. This subsistence farming maintains many Nepali’s, with the most marginal farmers owning less than 1.02 hectares in the
Terai lowland region, or .2 hectares in the Middle Mountain areas (Karan and Ishii 89). Barely farming enough to feed a family, using labor-intensive techniques in the terraced hillside, has forced the poorest to find other income in order to survive. “Many parts of the Nepalese hills have long been ‘deficit areas’; people have had to emigrate for work and in search of new agricultural land” (Whelpton 37). These small property owners are actually counted as part of the Nepali landless, since their land holdings barely provide enough for a family. “Landlessness is considered to be an overriding development issue,” creating a culture of rural households “mired in insecurity, indebtedness, and feelings of powerlessness” (Karan and Ishii 92).

The Himalayan peaks and picturesque heights of the Annapurna and Everest mountain ranges made it exceedingly difficult for India, China, or Britain to incorporate the Nepali nation. Being a landlocked state has compounded the ability to export what products are available in spite of the 1993 United Nations Law of the Sea Article 69 dealing with the Rights of Landlocked Nations equitable access to the sea. Rather than producing a number of goods for export, many Nepali’s are capitalizing on the growing tourist trade in the Himalayan Mountains and the jungles of the Terai. Since Sir Edmund Hillary’s 1953 ascent of Mount Everest, which both China and Nepal claim as their own, tourists have flocked to trek the mountains. The economic impact of tourist trekkers cannot be understated. In the case of Nepal the tourist culture brings a series of destabilizing forces, not the least of which is the environmental impact of Western throwaway society. “An increased demand for firewood and overgrazing by livestock associated with high-altitude trekking and tourism have depleted the forests and alpine pastures in many areas” (Karan and Ishii 20). Additional impacts on the Nepali lifestyle, brought on by tourism, include rapid exposure to the consumerist Western culture and the new technologies of
modernization which have heightened Nepali consciousness of the disparity between the wealthy and the impoverished.

Not all of the influences of tourism have been negative, as the Nepali government realized the economic impact of tourist investment in around the country, steps were taken to create preservation districts that tourists would want to explore. The Sagarmatha National Park, home to Mount Everest and the Sherpa ethnic group, was declared a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1979. In the Terai region the Royal Chitwan National Park is an example of foreign investment in environmental resources, private entities like the World Wildlife Federation have contributed funding to preserve the natural park habitat. Once a private hunting ground for the ruling Rana party and their British cohorts, the park is now a jungle preserve replete with wild Asian rhinoceros and elephants.

*The People of Nepal*

Modern Nepalis are characterized by the geography and history that has shaped their nation, the diversity of races and ethnic groups in the region, and by their passionate involvement in religion. The rich history of Buddhist and Hindu religions gives Nepal its rich templed character. Nepal’s capital and primary city, Kathmandu, boasts the Buddhist stupas of Boudha and Swayambhunath and the Hindu temple district of Thamel. The differences between various ethnic and religious entities have largely been ignored or downplayed by Nepal’s rulers. For centuries these differences were glossed over by leaders, ranging from Prithvi Narayan Shah to the present day members of parliament, in order to present a unified country. While this picture of unity is maintained in official dogma, possibly to maintain the steady flow of Western aid into
the landlocked nation, there are notable differences among the Nepali people. These differences range from caste, to ethnic, to regional, and even religious divisions.

The multiple ethnicities that make up Nepal contribute to the diverse and colorful surroundings that comprise the nation of 24 million people (CIA World Factbook). More than two thousand years ago Indo-Aryan peoples arrived in Nepal, where they established control over the indigenous Tibeto-Burman communities (Brown 2). The Parbatiya, or Nepali-speaking ethnic groups, is comprised of the Gorkhali, Maithili, Bhojpuri, Awadhi, Tharu, Danuwar, and Majhis. The Parbatiyas, the majority of whom live in the Terai and Middle Mountain areas, are connected to the Indo-Aryan language family. The Tibetans, from the Middle Mountain and High Mountain (Himalayas) regions, are made up of the Sherpas, Limbu, Rai, Tamang, Newar, Gurung, Thakali, and Magar ethnic groups and related under the Tibeto-Burman language umbrella (Karan and Ishii 137). Recently immigrants from North India have added to the diverse ethnic background. In addition to a variety of ethnicities, there are a number of caste divisions within these ethnic groups. In the Middle Mountains the result of inter-marriage and Hinduization of non-Hindus by the Parbatiya, or Nepali speaking, ethnic groups has resulted in a 45.5% majority for the high-caste Parbatiyas ranks of Brahman, Thakuri, and Chetri. The Brahman caste, at the top rung of the caste system ladder, is comprised of the landholding elite. The most active in deposing the monarchy in favor of the multi-party representational system, the Brahmins are represented heavily in the membership of the Congress and Nepal Communist Party (UML) parties. The Magar ethnic group is the next largest entity with 10.8% of the population (Whelpton 57). In the Terai, rapid emigration of North Indians has resulted in no clear caste or ethnic majority.
Centuries of corrupt and unenlightened leadership have led the political figureheads to persist in their unfounded projection of “one Nepal” unity and have resulted in rampant generalizations about local issues. These generalizations promote the idea that there is one nation-wide religion, Hinduism, and one nation-wide identity, Nepali. These assumptions overlook many caste, ethnic, regional, and religious issues and attempt to craft a statewide sense of unity. Since Privthi gained power by conquering the region, the appearance of Nepali unity was well enforced by his powerful Gorkha warriors. The Ranas likewise maintained an image of unity, preserved and enforced by the army while King Birendra enforced a similar unity through the one party Panchayat system. Even since the Jana Andolan Movement for the Restoration of Democracy the idea of one version of Nepali unity has prevailed. However, the political divisions of being low-caste or an ethnic minority (or both which is usually the case) are complex — creating a difficult atmosphere for political representation in the post-Panchayat parliament.

The misperception of Nepali unity has prevailed and is evidenced in the complaints of the initial constitution committee member, Justice Bishwanath Upadhyaya after the initial poll for ideas and issues that should be addressed in the 1991 Nepali constitution. He complained: “the vast majority of suggestions submitted to the commission concerned linguistic, religious, ethnic, and regional issues” (Hutt 35). That these issues have come to the forefront in the surveys speaks to the true opinions of the average Nepali. Their concerns were not the highbrow politics of the political parties that were demanding representation in the multi-party system. Their concerns were far simpler: not what language will children be taught in at school, rather, what language will be spoken to conduct daily affairs at the market. The equitable distribution of foreign aid, which language to speak in the day-to-day village proceedings, and whether there should be a
national religion — some of the pertinent issues raised by the surveyed Nepali’s — were summarily dismissed by the constitutional committee as “peripheral” to the issue of creating a new constitution. The political parties had been battling for recognition from the King for so long, that the issues central to the people were ignored or forgotten. While political systems were being discussed, the Nepali people languished with few steps being undertaken on their behalf to alleviate the poverty in the regional districts. Arguments over which style political system should be implemented were central during the constitutional debate, while issues that were forefront concerns to the average Nepali were written off as unimportant. Politicos like Bishwanath Upadhyaya, “called upon all political parties to educate the people on basic constitutional subjects” (Hutt 36). This implies that the issues raised pertaining to ethnic, regional, or religious issues were not a basic constitutional subject. This position could be considered ironic by Americans, who have been operating within the context of the same constitution for more than two centuries and who have discovered that these issues are indeed constitutional material.

**III Political history**

The unification of Nepal as one geographical and political entity began in 1769 with the Gorkha king Prithvi Narayan Shah’s expansion of his tiny Gorkha principality, located in the center of what is now Nepal. Under Prithvi’s military conquests, the influence of the Gorkha ethnic group quickly expanded. “The nationalist history of today styles him ‘the Great’: he is the Father of the Nation and his conquests are referred to as the ‘unification’ of Nepal” (Whelpton 156). The unified Nepal benefited from the trans-Himalayan trade routes (Brown 3). New trade produced a lucrative, tribute-based enterprise for the monarch based in Kathmandu. Since Prithvi gained his power by subjugating the multiple religious, ethnic, and regional principalities, his
powerful Gorkha warriors enforced the unified image of the Gorkhali state. The Gorkha ethnic group identified the conquered region as being Gorkhali, however, minority ethnic groups of the 48 conquered principalities, like the Magars and Gurungs, did not lose their ethnic identity under the Gorkha rule. Politically discounted, ethnic groups that were not ethnically Gorkha or parbatiya (Nepali speaking) were incorporated within the lower tiers of the caste system, blurring the political distinction between caste and ethnicity. While the working peasants may have been acutely aware of ethnic and religious distinctions, Prithvi was either unaware or did not acknowledge these differences. While the Prithvi believed Nepal to be unified under one system of governance, and therefore presumably of one religion, one language, and one caste system, members of the minority ethnic groups that served within the Gorkha armies still placed emphasis on ethnic identity. "The Gorkha, Magar, Rai, or Limbu soldier's sense of being a 'Gorkhali' was weak when compared to the sense of belonging to their own community, a community which ... might not be correspond with one of the ethnic or caste categories recognized by the Nepali State" (Whelpton 44). There was no mixing between ethnicities or religious groups like the American "melting pot" of immigrants and no resulting, overwhelming Nepali identity formed during this time period. Under the Gorkha king, only one characteristic was common to every principality unified, or subjugated, by Prithvi's rule irregardless of ethnicity or religion: the newly centralized state extracted surplus from every principality, enriching the rulers at the expense of the peasantry (Brown 3).

As the army continued to conquer the Himalayan region and Prithvi expanded his control, conflict with the British East India Company arose. The British influence in the area, which began in earnest with the conclusion of the war with the British East India Company in 1816 (Karan 11), introduced Nepal to Western society. While Britain did not colonize Nepal, much of
the country was ceded to the British and the fierce Gorkha warriors were often committed to British entanglements in India and Europe. In foreign campaigns, the army was reputed to be fierce-some and ruthless. Throughout the 1800s, the Gorkha warriors were repeatedly made available to Britain though the country was never officially a British colony. Increased demand for the soldiers in Europe led to the expansion of the ranks of the ethnic army, increasing the membership from non-Gorkha ethnic groups like the Magars and Garungs. British records entertain the popular belief that the upper strata of the army remained ethnically Gorkha (Whelpton 43). This belief could indicate the lower social standing of ethnic minorities like the Magars and the Garungs, or a possible British romanticization or misinterpretation of the army makeup.

The Rise of the Ranas

In 1846 upstart Jung Bahadur Rana murdered all of his potential opponents and took control of Nepal from the Prithvi dynasty. To assert the legitimacy of his (and his family’s) claims to rule as a hereditary prime minister, Rana set up a tradition of inter-marriage between the Rana family and the Shahs (Brown 158). The king, meanwhile, maintained a nominal political position though he was still revered by the Hindu populace as the earthly incarnation of the Hindu god Vishnu. To maintain power and amass wealth, the Ranas isolated Nepal from much of the outside world. By restricting foreign travelers access to the nation, restricting the imports of modern goods (except for their own use), and limiting the education and opportunities of the peasant class. "... the Ranas were profiting splendidly from their exploitation of the Nepali people in a manner which did not encourage any dramatic economic and social changes" (Brown 12).
Maintaining the Ranas

The British, who had trimmed Nepal to its current boundaries, “saw the hill kingdom as an ‘outer strategical frontier’ and part of a stable chain of buffer states acting as a barrier between China and Russia” (Brown 11). The Ranas desire to maintain a closed society, and negate the increasing British influence in their country, coupled with the British desire to continue the flow of Gorkha troops, meant that the British helped the Ranas in their efforts to “deliberately [keep] the country isolated, forbidding entry to Westerners as far as they could” (Nationalization p 5). Using isolationism, and “traditional orthodoxy, the Ranas locked Nepali in a time warp from which the country emerged in 1951 totally unprepared to face the modern world” (Brown 13). The Gorkha soldiers who served in Europe returned from their experiences in the West, on behalf of the British in World War I and II, with an increased communal awareness of the world outside of Nepal. Their heightened sensitivity to the disparity between their homeland and the world they observed, albeit at war, in Europe could not be downplayed by the Ranas after the war. Despite attempts by “the British to insulate their Gurkha troops from subversive influences,” Nepali soldiers were exposed to “a range of experiences which raised their political consciousness” (Brown 15). Many veterans applied their heightened awareness to political causes outside of Nepal, since there was no opportunity for political expression under the Ranas within Nepal. As expatriates living in India, the former Gurkhas joined with political exiles and Nepali students at Indian universities in active involvement in political organizations — like the Indian Nationalist Movement, All-India Gorkha League (1921), and the Communist Party of Nepal (1949) — where ideas about Nepal’s future were circulated and the highly influential beginnings of a revolutionary political movement were initiated (Brown 16).
Revolution and the Fall of the Ranas

In 1951, when the Ranas were overthrown, “King Tribhuvan signed a tripartite agreement in Delhi, known as the ‘Delhi Compromise,’ for power-sharing with the Nepali Congress Party and the Ranas” (Nickson 359). Though the Compromise was penned in India without the Nepali Congress Party, the Nepali Congress Party played a large role in bringing the Ranas to their knees. As King Tribhuvan was fleeing to the Indian embassy in Kathmandu, which eventually led him to New Delhi, “At virtually the same time … the Nepali Congress launched its Mukti Sena (Liberation Army) against the regime” (Brown 18). The Mukti Sena was comprised of “mostly ex-servicemen from ethnic minorities” (Whelpton 525). These former soldiers had seen something of the outside world and recognized the failings of the Rana regime. By pressing the Gorkha soldiers into service for the British, the Ranas inadvertently exposed the soldiers to the world beyond Nepal’s isolation. The possible applications of the Western technologies and ideologies that the Gorkhas were exposed to in Europe, had numerous practical applications within Nepal. The soldiers were unable to apply these new ideas in their homeland because of the intransigent, restrictive nature of the Rana in the regional administrative districts. Many activists were forced to operate from India, where the 1947 British abdication of power had fostered the growth of numerous ideological and political organizations. The 1950-51 time period was ripe for political activism, the King, the Communist and Congress parties, the Mukti Sena revolutionaries, and even a small ethnic uprising contested the legitimacy of the Rana leadership. An ethnically-Limbu uprising in eastern Nepal during this time period, speak to the timeliness of confronting the Rana’s.
Acting simultaneously but never in a unified manner, the Nepali Congress Party, made up of the enlightened landed-gentry or Parbatiya Brahmans, incited the *Mukti Sena* to begin an uprising when the royal family sought refuge in India. A large-scale people’s movement, vocally denouncing Rana authority might have changed the course of Nepali history during the 1950 movement, however, the level of public consciousness was low, meaning the *Mukti Sena* received little outside support. The revolutionary potential of the *Mukti Sena* movement was used as leverage against the Ranas, in conjunction with the flight of King Tribhuvan, and the pressure from the fledgling political parties. As “the guardian of the Nepali king,” India was able to manipulate the situation and support a ruler, the Hindu god-incarnate King Tribhuvan, that would look to India for support. Internationally, India feared the recent and uncertain developments between the new political parties: the Congress Party appeared willing to work with the Communist Party, and from exile in India “King Tribhuvan, under the protection and guidance of New Delhi, made no statement in support of the Nepali Congress and did not ally himself in any way with the liberation army” (Brown 19). Though the Rebels gained some support in the countryside and some territory was captured in the Terai, a region which had long been economically depressed, the lands seized were not vital to the Ranas. The disorganized *Mukti Sena* was unable to maintain an offensive or prolonged struggle: “it was a motley crew which lacked co-ordination, and strategic and tactical sophistication” (Brown 20). The King’s support could have significantly altered the outcome of the efforts of the *Mukti Sena*. The influence of the religious connotations tied to the kingship cannot be understated in this instance. Being a deity contributed immeasurable legitimacy to the actions of the King. Acting without the political parties or the revolutionary entities involved in the collapse of the Ranas power, and with the heavy support of the Indian government in New Delhi, King Tribhuvan signed the
‘Delhi Compromise’ in which the monarchy “had an overwhelming advantage. In contrast to the Ranas, who were discredited, and to the Nepali Congress, who were inexperienced, the monarchy commanded respect and prestige” (Brown 21).

Monarchical Usurping Democracy

As control was wrested from the Ranas, essentially setting up a constitutional monarchy, King Tribhuvan returned to Kathmandu. His 1951 Royal Proclamation promised that an elected assembly was to craft the new constitution, though when King Tribhuvan died in 1955 the elections had not been allowed to take place. His son, King Birendra, appointed members to a special Constitution Committee. “This constitution entrenched the power of the monarch, by reserving emergency, residuary, and other ultimate powers in the crown. Despite the formal appearance of a parliamentary system and a constitutional monarchy, the King retained the right to dissolve parliament and the cabinet” (Nickson 359). This system allowed political parties like the Nepali Congress Party and the Nepal Communist Party to contest for seats in parliament in the first general elections. “A timid attempt at land reform by the new Nepali Congress government … provoked the wrath of feudal landlords allied to the palace. On December 15, 1960, Mahendra, supported by the military, took power in a bloodless coup” (Nickson 360). The resulting 1962 Panchayat system, which allowed no political parties to operate, succeeded in silencing the efforts of democracy.

The efforts of the King Birendra were supported by United States, which felt threatened by the expansion of communism in Asia. “Economic development was seen as the key to political stability and was deemed essential to hold back the communist tide” (Brown 65). The United States miscalculated the movements of the then-communist party, assuming “that Nepal
was in the grip of a ‘revolution of rising expectations’ and that this made it vulnerable to subversion. This was incorrect. The Nepali peasantry was not yet politically conscious nor mobilized and was, therefore, most unlikely to explode into open rebellion” (Brown 65). Without complete awareness of the situation in Nepal, the United States government inadvertently helped perpetuate the system that would foster militant communism today—the very thing they feared in the 1960s.

Additional problems plagued poorly educated, though well-meaning, “Most-Developed-Nations” that tried to channel foreign aid dollars into Nepal. “The aid programme financed the expansion of the bureaucracy and the spread of government institutions” (Brown 66). Government officials, some of whom became extremely wealthy, repeatedly misused these development funds. Funds that were earmarked for rural village development found their way into the coffers of either the Kathmandu or village landlord elite, rarely into the intended development projects. One of the hazards of such a heavy reliance on foreign aid included “the tendency of officials to defer to their Western, donor counterparts ... undermin(ed) the creation of a sustainable, domestic, institutional capability” (Brown 67). As the bureaucracy continued to develop, sporadic, unrelated development projects were begun. Meanwhile, the clandestine political parties continued to operate furtively, they had little or no influence in the Panchayat system.

*The Jhapa Movement: The Initial Rise of Revolutionary Communism in Nepal*

Inability to effect change within the Panchayat, combined with the dogmatic split between the Sino-Soviet communists, led to the splintering of the Nepal Communist Party. The most active faction was the Koshi Regional Committee of the Nepal Communist Party in
southeastern Nepal. “Influenced by the Cultural Revolution in China, and by the teachings of Charu Mazumdar, the architect of the Naxalite uprising in neighboring West Bengal, they launched an underground guerrilla movement, known as the Jhapa Movement” (Nickson 361). The movement was largely contained where it began within the eastern Nepali district of Jhapa, the regional homeland of a majority of upper-tier Chetri caste Nepali’s. “This took substance in particular, in the Jhapa Uprising, in the hijacking of a Royal Nepal Airlines airplane by Nepali Congress gunmen, in the mysterious burning of Singha Durbar (the home of the government’s Central Secretariat), in an attempt upon the life of the king, and in the alleged activity of a small, armed anti-panchayat force in the eastern hills which was discovered and thoroughly crushed by the Royal Nepal Army” (Brown 88). The rebels were brutally put down, forcing “a detailed self-criticism within the ranks of this faction, from which emerged a deep distrust of ‘imported’ political dogmas and a new emphasis on constructing a specifically Nepalese road to socialism” (Nickson 361). Still unable to operate in public, the Chetri caste politicos reorganized the party as the Nepal Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist). With the numerous splinter Nepal Communist Parties still operating under the term “Nepal Communist Party” the splinter groups became known by the dogma they followed. As the NCP (Marxist Leninist) quietly established “clandestine party cells” around Nepal they became known as the MALE, taking the first two letters of Marx and Lenin into their classification. These party cells operated in small community districts as social organizations harmlessly sharing ideas about farming and communism with some local villagers. Within these informal community groups the communist doctrine was explained.

Abuses within the Panchayat system, which contributed unrest amongst the increasingly impoverished Nepali poor, and surfaced “in 1979 as a result of the torture of a group of students
who had publicly protested against the hanging of the prime minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto" (Nickson 361). The student protesters, predominantly the children of wealthy landowners of the Parbatiya class, sparked nationwide protests against the Panchayat system, though senior politicos were reluctant to back the protests “followed in the wake of radical student activists and sought to gain some political credibility by speaking out in their name” (Brown 90). The important result of the protests was that, in 1980, a referendum was held on the future of the Panchayat system. “While the government used all the financial and political resources at its disposal, the opposition was hampered by the prohibition placed upon the formal organizational structures of political parties” (Nickson 362). Though the referendum was passed in favor of maintaining the Panchayat system, the system was modified, however, “to allow direct elections by universal suffrage to the National Assembly and to make ministers responsible to the assembly rather than to the king” (Hutt 10). “Ironically, the liberalization of the Panchayat System, which was intended to give the regime a new lease on life, instituted changes which would contribute directly to its demise some ten years later … creating a political environment conducive to the evolution of party politics” (Brown 95). The old guards of political elites, including local landlords, were not elected in some of the 1981 elections for the local panchas. Instead, “the defeat of over 70% of the old guard panchas in favor of newcomers, who pledged to eliminate corruption, introduced a new factor into Nepali politics” (Brown 95).

Though King Birendra seemed to have regained his footing, by 1985 the situation in Nepal had not improved. The Congress Party launched “the satyagraha, a non-violent civil disobedience movement, supported by sections of the Left” which gained widespread support, especially in urban areas (Brown 98). Reports varied on the number of political arrests made by the regime, however, numbers range from one to several thousand. The aborted movement failed
to bring to bear any change in the one-party system and the outlawed political parties remained fragmented.

*Working Together for Multiparty Representation*

In 1988, the Congress and Communist parties began to realize that they would have to work together to overthrow the *Panchayat* system. The Congress Party and MALE met in August 1988, and “concluded an understanding to the effect that they would ‘direct identical activities against the system on the basis of functional unity’ during a forthcoming movement without actually forming an alliance” (Brown 104). As charges of misuse of funds peaked after survivors of the 1988 earthquake failed to receive the internationally donated funds, “the integrity of the *Panchayat* democracy, which had never been a quality found in abundance, was shattered and few could mount a spirited defense of its continuing existence” (Brown 4). On 28 December 1989, the myriad communist parties in Nepal formed a coordination committee with the Nepali Congress Party, beginning the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD). The MRD was popularly referred to as *Jana Andolan* or the “Peoples Movement.” “In a remarkable display of ideological unity, seven of the various communist groups, spanning the pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese, and pro-Maoist factions (except Mashal), joined the committee and on 10 January 1990 they founded the United Left Front (ULF), with a minimum programme which included the abolition of the *Panchayat* system and the restoration of multi-party democracy” (Nickson 365). Caste boundaries and religious differences were secondary to achieving a system in which every Nepali could have a voice. The “Peoples Movement” utilized a variety of tactics, with many of the political factions working together to demand a multi-party system of then constitutional monarch King Birendra. Since it was difficult to unite two long-embattled political
ideologies, rather than create one political entity executing the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, "the parties undertook to pursue separate but complementary campaigns" (Brown 116). The government and Jana Andolan clashed on 18 February 1990, Nepal's traditional 'Democracy Day.' The first instance of a citywide strike in Kathmandu took place on 19 February, effectively shutting down commercial and transport sectors. After fifty days, which culminated in demonstrations in Kathmandu, "negotiations between the palace and the leaders of the Jana Andolan resulted in a partial diffusion of the crisis when the king agreed to drop the ban on political parties" (Brown 117).

Radical efforts were undertaken in Bhaktapur, a town that in 1988 saw "Karna Prasad Hyoju, a former member of the reformed Panchayat, lynched by a mob who accused him of embezzling funds intended for victims of the 1988 earthquake" (Brown 118). The government responded quickly, executing several citizens and arresting the leader of the local Workers and Peasants Party—including his 175 supporters. "To magnify the tragedy, police action in the aftermath of the killings was crude and insensitive. The bodies of the victims were not returned to their families but, instead, were impounded by the police and taken to Kathmandu. This amounted to a gross violation of traditional sensibilities and it enraged the city" (Brown 188). "As government suppression increased, the populations of the cities showed a more stubborn defiance, displaying new forms of protest, such as voluntary blackouts at certain times in the evenings, silent marches, and the public burning of various symbols of the regime" (Hutt 17). By 6 April 1990, the populations of two towns neighboring Kathmandu marched to the capital apparently to celebrate the king's proclamation that the cabinet and prime minister had been dismissed because of "the ministry's failure to maintain law and order" (Hutt 18). However, the crowd turned violent and tried to march on the palace. During the two days that followed, the
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king and the two political parties sued for a truce, possibly because the two parties accepted their "common interest ... both of whom feared that they would loose control" (Hutt 18).

"Immediately after the new interim government had been installed a series of violent incidents occurred in the capital" (Hutt 19). With the partial realization of the goal, and pressure from outside polities, the unified political factions splintered. Every group had differing opinions about the fate of Nepal. "Once the movement was called off, a large number of new parties emerged, many of which represented ethnic, religious, and regional concerns" (Hutt 32). The spirit of unity that seemed to characterize the Jana Andolan was reduced to infighting over particulars of the new state. Many of the communist parties declared that the revolution wasn't over, as the interim government undertook the smallest steps towards a democratic government. The construction of a new constitution and creation of a new state meant unifying and consolidating the varied interests of the multiple ethnicities and classes that lie within the geographical borders of the country. Anarchy ensued, due to huge disputes regarding the future of the Hindu state. The interim government set about trying to create a constitution that would enable the country to continue as a constitutional monarchy, with political parties and representation for the people.

Members of the Constitution Recommendation Commission set out with the best of intentions during the summer following the Jana Andolan movement, polling the country for various issues that should be addressed. In a telling move, Justice Bishwanath Upadhyaya complained that "the vast majority of suggestions submitted to the commission concerned linguistic, religious, ethnic, and regional issues" (Hutt 35). Minority representation of Tibeto-Burmans in the hills and the discrimination against people of Indian-origin in the Terai were issues brought up in some of the regions visited by the constitutional committee members. Still
others demanded representation of other non-Hindu religions in a secular state and the recognition of languages other than Nepali. These concerns were deemed “peripheral” to the issue of creating a new constitution and Bishwanath Upadhyaya “called upon all political parties to educate the people on basic constitutional subjects” (Hutt 36). In many respects disadvantaged and voiceless Nepali’s, once given a voice, talked about the things that were most important to them. Stricken by poverty, repeatedly abused by those in power, and witness to discrimination of language, caste, and religion, their concerns were more immediate than who should control the army or term length for legislators.

While the constitution was completed in August, and approved by the Council of Ministers on 15 October 1990, on “29 October the king released his own amended draft of the new constitution” (Nickson 370). This caused uproar among the most vocal agents of Jana Andolan. By 6 November protest marches had been organized by the Nepal Communist Party (Mashal) in conjunction with other Maoists parties like the Nepal Workers and Peasants Party. The loosely confederated, and more moderate, communist parties of the United Left Front (ULF) did not officially back the marches or the successive strikes or bandhs, though they probably supported the ideology of the protestors. Of the king’s new draft, few of his amendments were accepted, the most important concession was the acceptance by the interim government of “the proposal by the king to establish a Raj Parishad (“State Council”), with a 15-member standing committee headed by a royal appointee, and with a majority of its members appointed by the king” (Nickson 370). This state council reminded many witnesses of the Panchayat system of the corrupt Council of Ministers. The militant Mashal party denounced the scheme as a return to the 1951 ‘Delhi Compromise’ that had enabled the king to re-establish the powers of the
monarchy in 1960. This became “a major political accusation by Mashal against the ‘revisionist’ ULF, which it accused of going back on a key demand of the MRD” (Nickson 371).

Elections and the Splintering of the ULF

Because of pressure from outside forces, the end of 1990 saw the loose alliance between the Congress Party and the ULF begin to unravel. The remnant politicians from the king’s Panchayat system allied themselves with the Congress Party. Their shifting from the agents of the king to the agents of the Congress Party was subtle and unheralded, but during the elections former Panchayat politicos ran for parliamentary seats under the Congress Party banner. This collusion between the two forces sped the severing process between Congress and the ULF. The Congress Party was under pressure from the Indian government, which favored the Congress Party. “The United States government was also averse to the prospect of a ‘united front government’ at a time when its ideological onslaught against communism was reaping enormous dividends” (Nickson 371). In the first few days of 1991, the Congress Party broke with the ULF. Without the Congress Party to work with and the elections approaching quickly, disputes amongst the various communist factions within the United Leftist Front surfaced. “Although the seven parties had managed to work together and with Congress to bring down the Panchayat system, the four which were not represented in the cabinet ... pulled out in December, alleging that the Marxist-Leninists were concerned with their own interests rather than those of the coalition” (Hutt 62).

The ideological differences between reformist and revolutionary communists had never been addressed in the ULF, which had been established with the common goal of achieving a multi-party system for various political entities of differing political ideologies to work out how
to run the country. “The Nepal Communist Party—Fourth Convention and the Nepal Workers and Peasants Party broke away to form a rival United National Democratic Movement, later renamed *Sanyukha Jana Morcha* ('United People's Front')” (Nickson 371). The main party, constituting more conservative communist elements, was composed of the former NCP (Marxist) and MALE united under the new name United Nepal Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), known by the acronym UML. The UML's desire to remain one entity is grounded in the legislative stipulation that in order for a party to be recognized as a legitimate political party it must receive 3% of the vote. It is telling that 47 parties “applied for recognition by the electoral commission and 44 were accepted for registration and allocated election symbols. Only 20 parties eventually fielded candidates, only eight actually won seats, and only six obtained the three percent of the national vote needed to retain their status as national parties in the next election” (Hutt 50). The United People’s Front was a survivalist merge of small Maoist parties so that they could contest in the election. The United People’s Front or the NCP (Unity Center) was an ideological return for the Mashal and Masal factions to the Fourth Convention splinter group they originally came from (Thapa 3). Including the Workers and Peasants Party, the United People’s Front “won 11 seats in total and obtained 6.3% of the popular vote” (Nickson 378). Their strong showing in the parliament race made them the third largest political party in the nation and eligible, as a party, to contest in the 1994 elections.

*Revolutionary Maoism in Nepal*

In the 1994 election, while the United Marxist Leninist party played the dominant role as an opposition political force to the Congress Party and held about a third of the seats in parliament, revolutionary factions like Fourth Convention, Mashal, and Masal worked together
gaining a foothold in local politics. As the NCP (Unity Center), these factions worked as the United People’s Front. Initial success at overturning the Panchayat system faded into the very real necessity of applying the new constitution to everyday life. But the new government was plagued with problems. Accusations of ineptitude, inefficacy, and illegitimacy stormed around the new government. While the Panchayat system has served to line the coffers of the king and his personal friends, the panchas, “the legitimacy of the [new] administration was progressively undermined as evidence of inefficiency and malpractice mounted” (Hutt 139). As noted above, when the Constitution Committee polled the populace the majorities of the responders identified religious, linguistic, ethnic, and regional issues rather than questions of political protocol. (Brown 152). These issues were summarily dismissed as a threat to national unity. By dismissing these suggestions, the first time the voiceless of Nepal were silenced was the very first opportunity they had to speak. This simply marginalized the people not directly involved with drafting the constitution. Younger members of the Magar ethnic group were active participants in petitioning for ethnic recognition and linguistic concessions within the new constitution. These same youths, probably discouraged by the inactivity of the new government, “were also believed to be behind the Maoist raids which began causing casualties in several districts in 1996” (Whelpton 61).

As the myriad of political entities promised to support the people of Nepal in the second national election in 1994, only parties which had received at least 3% of the national vote in 1991 were allowed to field candidates. Disputes arose within the NCP (Unity Center) and the group split between two different charismatic leaders Nirmal Lama and Prachanda. The two groups operated under the same name NCP (Unity Center) for a year until the faction loyal to Prachanda regrouped as the NCP (Maoist). At this time the group dedicated itself to an armed
The intent of the Maoist party was to mimic the Peruvian Maoist movement called *Sendero Luminoso*. As early as the first election in 1991, posters appeared "denouncing the elections and praising the 'revolutionary war being waged by Peruvian communists'" (Nickson 376). The Mashal and Masal factions’ support of the Peruvian movement is traced to their inception as a political party in the names Mashal and Masal, which reflect two different ways to pronounce the Nepali word for 'torch.' Connections between the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM) and Prachanda, strong in this age of globalization and evidenced in a RIM memorandum of friendship and understanding which acknowledges "... the efforts by our Nepali revolutionary comrades to prepare and launch revolutionary people’s war which alone can bring about the new democratic revolution" (Nickson 382).

*Directions in a Post-Communist Era*

The dedication to armed conflict in order to achieve their struggle for ideological dominion illustrates how these revolutionaries think they have no other option. Predominantly made up of young, disadvantaged youths, the members of the Maoists come from districts which were neglected "in state development policy and in the associated economic decline ... this combination of neglect and decline has led to emigration as young men leave for ... the Terai respectively in search of employment" (Nickson 379). In the western hill districts, the minority and low caste Nepali’s also witnessed, first-hand, the failure of the Congress Party to reprimand or otherwise punish the members of the old *panchas* who siphoned money for the district off for themselves. Amidst this backdrop of economic disparity, with the Congress Party failing to follow through with the promises of the 1991 election year, the Maoists began their Sija Campaign which "consisted of a training programme after which the cadre went back to practice
what they had learnt” (Thapa 4). In the hills, these Maoists supplied political structure and opportunity for the long-oppressed people, ranging from farming techniques and sharing in the labor to build new roads. In many respects these farmers were being “taught to speak” in the methods of economic advancement as they were also learning the language of communism. “Learning to speak” the language of the politics in their district has empowered farmers and small-time crafts people to affect small changes in their daily lives. However, the rampant corruption that was handed down from the Panchayat system continues in the corruption of the new government. That so many of the former panchayas were absorbed by the older ideological factions of the Congress Party and the UML must have been disheartening for the Magars and the Limbus, whose protests had originally helped the Jana Andolan achieve the success that it did. Watching the success of their strikes further the goals of these lifelong politicos contributed to the feelings of powerlessness of the hill minority groups. All of the efforts to affect change had affected those who understood the political system — in many respects making the legislators and representatives very wealthy again at the expense of the people the money was earmarked for in the first place. The popularity of the Maoist movement is shown in the membership of the NCP Masal Party, which is supported by one of the main Nepali minority groups, the Magar ethnic population (Whelpton 60). The Mashal and Masal groups have petitioned repeatedly, emphasizing the need for minority representation. The views of the UML and the Maoist parties differ as the Maoists petition for a communist republic as opposed to the UML’s centrist viewpoint, which seeks to work within the framework of the 1991 Constitution in a parliamentary-style system. The Maoists have gained popular public support by calling for minority representation within the established political system, filling the ranks of the revolutionary movement with members of every minority group.
The Maoists factions have achieved ‘successes’ outside of their small village cadre training programs, lately utilizing guerilla tactics to relieve banks of their money and police headquarters of their weaponry. The ability of the group to implement strikes or bandhs, which can shut down transportation networks, schools, and businesses around the country have shown the Maoists are accomplishing and undertaking activities that support the people. The Maoists began to fill a void that the Brits, Ranas, monarchs, and politicos had paid little more than lip service to. In 1992, R. Andrew Nickson concluded, “the future prospects of Maoism in Nepal will ... depend largely on the extent to which the newly elected Nepali Congress government addresses the historic neglect and discrimination of the small rural communities which still make up the overwhelming bulk of the country” (383). Since Nickson’s article the situation in Nepal hasn’t changed. The World Bank cites that “despite advances, Nepal remains one of the poorest countries in the world with more than 11 million people—nearly half its population—living below the poverty line” (World Bank Jan 02). In its 1998, report Britain’s Department for International Development concluded “in rural areas those without land or with marginal landholdings and so-called untouchables are very poor and suffer particular discrimination and exclusion” (DFID 2).

Controversial reactions to the violence of the Maoists have only perpetuated the climate and culture of violence. Since economic and social conditions failed to improve, the Nepali Congress tried to legitimize repeated, though short, tenures in the office of prime minister. Just as the King once underestimated the people involved in the political parties, the Congress Party and Nepal Communist Party UML have underestimated the demands of the ethnic minorities. Being high caste Parbatiya Brahmins has contributed to the misinterpretation of the goals of the ethnic minorities by the old guard political parties. For so long the two forces waged a battle for
legitimacy, but once political legitimacy was achieved (namely access to the development coffers themselves) the idea of serving the poor and disadvantaged faded. While Congress and UML have waged an ideological battle for control of the new parliamentary system, the highly educated, landed aristocratic members of the two parties have persisted to deafly ignore the demands of the people. International polities have tried to force the hand of the Nepali government, by supporting the anti-communist actions of the Congress Party. This has given the Congress Party increased desire for international recognition, seeking victories against the UML or Maoist Parties to earn caveats from the Indian and United States’s governments. Because the Congress Party expected to lose monetary support from most developed nations if communism gained popularity in the country, every effort was undertaken to insure the popularity of the UML or Maoist Parties did not continue to advance.

Fearing this rising left, Congress used the “advantage of their party ruling at the Centre and many did not hesitate to use the state machinery against their opponents” (Thapa 4). Police officers arrested and, sometimes, tortured supporters of any communist cause. Working with the people of the local Congress Party the police took part in suppressive actions against the people in the rural western hill districts. “The response of the Nepali Congress government was a police operation codenamed Romeo (R for Rolpa) to “win the heart and minds” of the people” (Thapa 5). The Congress Party was desperate to appear legitimate in the eyes of the rest of the democratic world and as a result turned to acting as undemocratically as possible. Ultimately the efforts increased the support of the Maoist camp, the exact opposite reaction intended by the original actions of the Congress Party. As the Maoists gained support in the mid-western hills, “The Nepali civil society, represented by the Kathmandu intelligentsia, the human rights activists, the mainstream media, among others, seemed more or less unaware of the extent of
state repression” (Thapa 6). These efforts were undertaken in a clandestine manner by the Congress Party in order to quietly eliminate their competition in the hill districts. These initiatives went unnoticed in Kathmandu and among the nations which donate international aid to Nepal. Had there been awareness they would have called for public scrutiny of the actions of the Congress Party. With the advent of the Maoist factions regular anti-government guerilla operations, the Congress Party can point to their clandestine attempts to snuff out their competition in the mid-1990s as legitimate.

With 24-hour news channels focused on the terrorism of the Middle East, the actions of Nepali Maoists are usually restricted to small banner headlines at the bottom of the screen: ‘Twenty Maoists Dead in Accham,” or “Maoists Raid Bank for Rs. 15,000.” The economic backwardness and geographic smallness of the country, irregardless of the Himalayas, have kept Nepal outside of the mainstream news. Strikes in Nepal may not be headline news to a lot of people, but the governments of the United States and India have been very careful to nurture close ties with the Nepal Congress Party. The global collapse of the communist Soviet Union and Eastern-bloc nations fostered belief in democracy. To half the nation of Nepali’s, living at or below the poverty line, international treaties are not as important as feeding their family. Feeling neglected by every voice that has supposedly represented them to this point, religiously, ethnically, and economically disadvantaged Nepali’s have been taught to speak. The failure of the elite to hear their voice has effectively radicalized the peasantry, who see violence as their only recourse. The potential for a communist revolution in the post-Soviet Union era is forcefully transitioning into a reality.
Bibliography:


Electronic sources

4 March 2002

Journals
HONORS COLLEGE PROJECT PROPOSAL

As a member of the Honors College, you are required to complete an Honors project. This project permits you to build on your experiences throughout your college career and develop a unique product (paper or creative work). The project qualifies for three credits of Honors 499, and is graded. In addition to presenting your work, successful completion requires an abstract for the Honors College. See the Guide for the Senior Honors Thesis available from the Honors College.

The first step in undertaking an Honors project is to identify a topic and a BSU faculty member, who will serve as your project adviser. If you need help developing your proposal, finding a topic, or identifying a project advisor, you are welcome to discuss possibilities with Dean James Ruebel or Assistant Dean Joanne Edmonds before submitting the proposal. When your proposal is ready for approval, sign up for an interview with Dean Ruebel or Edmonds in 104 Carmichael and bring this signed, completed form with you. Make appointments by calling the Honors College at 5-1024.

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Graduation date: SPRING 2002
Academic Advisor: JOANNE EDMONDS
Project Advisor: DR. KEN HALL
Title of Honors Project: "A COMMUNIST REVOLUTION IN THE POST-COMMUNIST ERA: ANALYSIS OF THE MAOIST UPRISING IN KATHMANDU, NEPAL."

Please type or print all information requested. Write clearly and concisely. Explain all abbreviations and technical terminology. Check your spelling! (You may do this on a separate form if you wish, and you may combine answers to the questions below.)

1. The Honors project should broaden your educational experience through independent work that adds to your knowledge and develops your talents. How will your project help you accomplish these objectives and add to your personal goals? Why, in short, do you want to do this particular project?

2. When are you signing up for HONRS 499 (or what is the proposed equivalent?)

3. What will be the outcome of this project? (Be specific—e.g., a paper, finished piece of research, creative activity...)

A 20+ page ANALYSIS OF MAOISM AND REVOLUTION IN NEPAL. THE COMPLETED THESIS WILL PROBE THE TURBULENT 1990's, THE BRUTAL DEATHS OF THE ROYAL FAMILY, AND THE CURRENT SHIFT TOWARDS COMMUNISM. ANALYSIS WILL BE DIRECTIONS AT SOURCES OF COMMUNIST POLITICS IN NEPAL AND REASONS IT IS BEING CONSIDERED BY NEPALI'S.
4. Objective or Thesis (include target audience, purpose):

Discussion of the circumstances leading to the Nepalese creation of a democratic government. Analysis of yearly turnover and adjustments in the legislative body. A look at recent, rapid popular votes for Communist, "Maoist," candidates.

5. Project Description (please be specific—approximately two paragraphs):

Short overview of Nepali history, current politics and culture. Report findings on revolution and demonstrations (both religious and political) in Nepal—specifically Kathmandu. Examination of the rapid rise of Maoism and the influences of communism on Nepali culture and politics.

To be a thoughtful combination of existing text-based resources and also partially founded on my own experience in Nepal this past spring.

6. State what the importance or implications of this project is (or are). I.e., what do you expect to learn, or what would others learn from knowing about your anticipated results?

I expect to confirm or disprove the idea that communism is favored by the Nepalese. Delving into the source of Maoism is key to this research. Others will benefit from an expanded world view and appreciation of Nepali culture and politics.

Rebecca Lehman 14.01.02

Student's Signature

[Signature]

Date 16/11/02

Project Advisor's Signature *

Date

*Your signature indicates that you have read and approved this proposal.
Overview: This is a graduate level survey of non-Western history, with topical focus on the interactions between religion and revolutionary change in the past two centuries. The course will begin with an introduction to non-Western historiography, and will draw contrast between colonial era and post-colonial era understanding of culture and society. There will be common reading assignments for each night of the course, with the expectation that students will use these readings as the basis for class discussions. Each evening students will submit a 1-2 page written summary/reactive to their weekly reading assignment. Students will develop individual reading/research projects that will result in a final paper of between 20-30 pages in length. These projects, which must be approved by the instructor, will address the course topic via a case study. These projects should be regional (e.g., Christianity and the Marxist Revolutionary Movements in 20th Century Latin America; Religion and Revolution in Contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa) or more specific (e.g., Religion and Revolution among the Kurds; Revolutionary Hinduism and Islam in the Nationalist Era and its Legacy to the Contemporary Pakistan-India Conflict; Religion, the Russian Revolution, and Contemporary Russia). To initiate these projects students will spend the first two weeks of the course developing their core bibliography for these projects. This bibliography will consist of both books as well as important scholarly journal articles.

By the third week of the course these individual reading projects will become the basis of nightly summary presentations to the class, and will contribute to class discussion. By mid-term students should have a 3-5 page perspectus of their paper projects ready for class presentation; during the last two weeks of the course students will make oral presentations of their projects to the class (this will include having a draft of the paper ready for class commentary/critique, that will provide students with the opportunity for constructive criticism prior to the submission of the final paper).

Grading: is based on the students overall participation and contributions to the course (participation in discussions, oral presentations, etc. – 50%) and the final paper project (50%).
**COURSE OUTLINE**

*Wednesday January 9 and January 16: Introduction to Non-Western Historiography/Overview of Religious Change in the 19th and 20th Centuries*

Readings: Hand-outs/Bibliography Development for Student Projects


**Review of Student Bibliographies** (should be typed and ready for submission – two copies, one for student and one for instructor)

*Wednesday, January 30: Class Discussion of James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak, pp. 184-354*


*Wednesday, February 13: Class Discussion of Karen Armstrong, The Battle for God, pp. 233-371*

*Wednesday, February 20: Topical Discussion of the 19th and 20th Century Colonial Era and its Revolutionary Legacy (Marx, Lenin, Gandhi, Mao, et. al.)*

Reading Hand-outs

*Wednesday, February 27: Class Discussion of Rashid, Taliban*

*Wednesday, March 6: Student presentations of their paper perspectus*

3-5 page update on where paper is heading

* Duplicate for class members (don't need to foot note yet)*

**SPRING BREAK**

*Wednesday, March 20: Religion and Revolution in Contemporary Asia Hand-outs, Civil Islam*  

*Wednesday, March 27: Class discussion of Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*  

*Wednesday, April 3: Class discussion of Virginia Garrard-Burnett, On Earth as It Is in Heaven: Religion in Modern Latin America*  

*Wednesday, April 10: Religion and Revolution in Modern Africa Hand-outs*  

Presenting them needed by Tuesday noon

*Wednesday, April 17 and Wednesday, April 24: Student Project Presentations*

Religion, Revolution in Africa

PAPERS DUE: relatively complete not ready plant

Duplicated by Monday of Presentations

Argentina religion's revision

**follow up book... going against Marval-Revolution Peasant Force format that Thesis Repubs This**

Presentations are summaries don’t read.