Canada's Role in United Nations' Peacekeeping Forces

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Senior Honors Thesis

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Canada's foreign policy changed abruptly during World War II. Before the war, Canadian involvement in world affairs was minimal because of a policy of isolationism. "Like their American neighbors, Canadians rejoiced that the Atlantic separated them from the sordid diplomacy and quarrelsome politics of the old world."¹ Since the war, Canadian soldiers have been a familiar sight in various areas of the globe. The reason for this is not that Canada has become an aggressive, conquering military power; rather, Canada has become a peacekeeper.

Wearing their blue United Nations berets, Canadian soldiers have kept the peace in troublespots from the Dominican Republic to the Congo (now Zaire) to West New Guinea. No other country is as closely identified with United Nations' peacekeeping operations, due to the fact that Canada is the only country to have participated in every operation. Canada changed from a pre-war policy of non-involvement to a post-war policy which stresses involvement in conflicts as peacekeepers.

This paper will look at Canada's role, through United Nations' operations, as a peacekeeper in the world. It will attempt to answer these questions: What is peacekeeping? Why is Canada especially fit for peacekeeping? How is the peace kept? What positive and negative aspects result from Canada's peacekeeping? Under what conditions will Canada become involved in a peacekeeping operation?
How does the Canadian public feel toward their country's peacekeeping role? What does the future of Canadian peacekeeping hold? What changes in policy should Canada make, if any?

Peacekeeping plays a key role in Canada's post-World War II foreign policy. A record of Canadian involvement in U.N. peacekeeping operations is located in this paper's appendix. "The Canadian capacity, both to encourage the development and to respond to the requirements of peacekeeping, remains as the single uniquely useful and pathbreaking contribution to genuine collective security in post-war Canadian policy." Canada first emerged as a leader in peacekeeping efforts during the Suez Crisis of 1956. The diplomatic efforts of Lester Pearson, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, earned him a Nobel Prize for diffusing the crisis with the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). This was the first major U.N. peacekeeping force created. Canadian involvement in these early days of peacekeeping provides credibility to the claim that "Canada pioneered in the arts of peacekeeping."3

The definition of peacekeeping can vary. In general terms, peacekeeping describes "all international police actions where persons under the sponsorship of an international body or commission are assigned to observe, report, survey or separate physically hostile forces."4 Another, more specific definition refers to "those operations involving the use of personnel from various nations for the purpose of separating hostile forces."5 This paper will use the first, broader
definition in referring to peacekeeping. Under this definition, U.N. involvement in Korea will be omitted.

Separating physically hostile forces has resulted in a policy of interposition for most peacekeeping forces. UNEF was created to "secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities" in the Gaza area and Sinai Peninsula of Egypt, according to the U.N. orders given the force. This meant that "the only strategy available was for it, with the consent of the parties, to physically impose a presence between them to ensure that hostilities did not recommence." Interposition is also used by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The main requirement for UNFICYP was to prevent a recurrence of fighting. This goal "led the force commander to adopt interposition as his principle strategy." Security Council resolutions 338 through 341, adopted during the 1973 crisis in Cyprus, "virtually predetermined that their principle strategy would be interposition." Later, in UNEF II and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), exclusive U.N. buffer zones were secured which aided in the strategy of interposition. These zones are considered to be a "considerable advantage in the execution of a strategy of interposition."

Under the broader contexts of diplomacy, peacekeeping is an instrument to be used in peacemaking. The two should not be confused, although in theory the two are interdependent. "Peacekeeping is not an end in itself, but a means to relax tensions and provide a measure of stability while peace talks
Peacekeeping is often seen as an interim solution, while peacemaking involves long-term stability and the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces. In practice, peacekeepers may remain for periods of time which are much longer than originally anticipated in the interim solution.

The use of peacekeepers has also been entitled "preventive diplomacy." This refers to the use of U.N.-sponsored forces in order to avoid involvement by the superpowers and their proxies, which could escalate. "The less obvious and ulterior aim [of peacekeeping] is to make the world safe for the balance of power by isolating localized conflicts from great power competition -- 'preventive diplomacy' in essence." The United Nations hopes that peacekeepers will prevent a World War I-type situation in which superpowers are drawn into a minor crisis. As an alternative to superpower involvement, peacekeeping forces from a variety of medium-to-small-sized nations deal with a crisis "that the larger states would previously have dealt with on their own initiative." In some situations the U.S. and U.S.S.R. also participate, either bilaterally or with the consent of the other.

The majority of the world's peacekeeping operations have been sponsored by the United Nations, an organization which has a history of Canadian involvement. "Since 1945, Canada has been one of the most active proponents of a strong and effective United Nations." Reasons for this support include "a sense of guilt about Canada's pre-war 'isolationism,' and its failure to give sufficient support to the League of Nations."
World War II forced Canada to abandon its isolationist policy and to "take a more realistic attitude towards, and a more active participation in, the whole gamut of international affairs."\(^{17}\) The United Nations provided the means for this participation.

Once in the United Nations, Canada discovered that it possessed some special qualities which suggested a role as a peacekeeper.

Without colonies, border disputes, or a history of military intervention in the affairs of weaker neighbors, Canada could appear disinterested, moderate and impartial. Its professional army, maintained more as a diplomatic asset than for any genuine reasons of national security, was easily adaptable to peacekeeping, a role that particularly captured the attention of the Canadian public.\(^{18}\)

Canada's involvement in every U.N. peacekeeping operation supports this claim that Canada was generally acceptable on political grounds, as well as being competent to aid in the technical aspects of peacekeeping. This active role as peacekeeper has contributed to a belief by the Canadian public that "Canada surpassed most, if not all, other member states in its contribution to the work of the organization."\(^{19}\)

A major reason behind Canada's involvement in United Nations' peacekeeping operations is that the country is considered to be a "middle power". This term describes Canada's position in the hierarchy of world powers: between the superpowers and the lesser nations. Previous to World War II, Canada had been a noninfluential, unimportant nation in the scales of world power. This changed during World War II
as Canada's active role boosted Canada's importance relative to the rest of the world. Canada emerged from the war with the fourth-largest air force in the world, the third-largest navy and an army of over half a million men and women. These were evidence of her efforts in the war, which were "second only to those of the Great Powers." In her post-war role, Canada aspired to "a degree of influence comparable to the scale of her participation."

At the formation of the United Nations in San Francisco, Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King attempted to create a special category to recognize middle powers such as Canada. He feared that Canada would be lost among the much smaller, weaker nations in the General Assembly. The attempt was "soon tacitly abandoned" when no agreement could be reached on which states to admit to the ranks of middle powers. "The line was almost impossible to draw on the basis of either distinct interests or separate functions."

There were relatively few cases in which the interests that were pursued by the middle-sized nations were distinct in character from those of their associates, small as well as great. There were a few cases - [settlement in Indo-China, UNEF] - where distrust of the larger states and lack of resources on the part of the small ones imposed a special role on the middle powers; but such instances were relatively few and did not lead to any clear cut division that would give the middle states a separate and clearly-recognized position.

Besides being a middle power in terms of strength, Canada was seen as a middle power "in the sense of being accustomed to searching for the middle way, both in its domestic affairs and as a long-term interpreter of Empire
and Commonwealth to puzzled Americans and suspicious recruits from Asia, Africa and the Caribbean."25 Canada is also seen as being midway between the most industrialized and the developing countries. This view allows it to be "sympathetic to the needs of the latter while enjoying the standard of living of the former."26 This sympathy results partly from the common experience of developing from a colony to a full-fledged nation and the problems this entails.

The first manifestation of policy from this image as a middle power was a "functional basis"27 for involvement. Prime Minister King developed this policy, which could be translated into "let those who can, do." Canada was to offer the services which it could best fulfill. King's successor, Louis St. Laurent, "set limits on the kind of service a 'secondary power' such as Canada could provide."28 The primary service which Canada could provide was that of peacekeeping.

"Middlepowermanship" is a word which describes a country's fulfillment of its role as a middle power. Peacekeeping has been described as "a badge of middlepowermanship"29 and "the international activity most associated with middlepowermanship."30 Because the "preventive diplomacy" nature of peacekeeping disqualifies the major powers from involvement in peacekeeping operations, middle powers have assumed the role of peacekeepers.

In the bipolar Cold War era, peacekeeping seemed to be an apt function for 'middle powers' like Canada, given their non-great power status on military strategic matters and the sophistication
of their paramilitary and logistical support capabilities. Indeed, Canadian peacekeeping efforts in this era were viewed by Canadians as the epitomy of successful middle-powermanship.\textsuperscript{31}

Besides having a policy which supported peacekeeping, Canada also had the resources and expertise needed.

The successful deployment of peacekeeping forces in unstable and unpredictable situations requires either the logistic support of a major power, or the support of states like Canada with small but highly competent forces and expensive equipment.\textsuperscript{32}

A major benefit for Canada which has resulted from involvement in peacekeeping is independence. By serving as a peacekeeper, Canada has developed a foreign policy which is independent of the superpowers. In particular, peacekeeping distinguishes Canada's foreign policy from that of its powerful southern neighbor "which is accustomed to taking unilateral actions internationally."\textsuperscript{33} Canada is undoubtedly closely tied to the United States, whether politically, militarily, economically or socially. However, in the field of foreign policy, peacekeeping offers a role which is independent of the United States. "While a foreign policy totally free of Washington's influence seems impossible, the symbolic independence attached to middle-power status gives Canada the appearance of a posture different from its neighbor."\textsuperscript{34} Peacekeeping has provided a vehicle for developing an independent policy without angering allies. Although Canada is a faithful ally of the United States, Canada does not want to appear to be subservient to the U.S. or to be a satellite of
the U.S. Peacekeeping supports this delineation. In the area of peacekeeping, Canada has been a leader, not a follower. Besides independence, Canada gained a reputation as "a political middleman, a trustworthy mediator."35

Inherent in the position as a middle power are limitations. In Canada's case, the rank which it held in the world after World War II has declined. Opponents to Canada's active international role "pointed out that Canada no longer held the exaggerated position in the world which had fallen to it by default at the end of the Second World War."36 Despite economic gains (thus gains in power) by Canada since the war, the recovery of Western Europe, the Soviet Union and Japan outpaced Canadian efforts. In the hierarchy of world powers, Canada slipped from being a high middle power to a low middle power.

As a middle power, Canada has influence in some areas which the large and small powers do not possess. "Yet the need to accept these obligations is accompanied by only a limited capacity to lay down the conditions under which they shall be implemented."37 Middle powers do not operate in a vacuum. In every issue there is East/West conflict. Also, each middle power is individually unable to enforce a policy on its own. Canada has realized "that a refusal to act with others might leave her impotent to take any effective action at all."38 Policies must be developed collectively in order to be effectively imple-
Canada's aid may be important and desirable in a given situation; it is rarely so indispensable that other states can be pressured into following Canada's lead against their better judgment or to their apparent individual disadvantage. In the Suez Crisis, for example, Canada was able to play a leading part in the establishment of UNEF. Her best efforts were not enough to secure the creation of a permanent stand-by force as a regular instrument for dealing with future crises. 39

Middle powers operate realizing that the superpowers "still carried the decisive weight in world politics; they still provided the strength without whose backing their smaller associates would be largely ineffective." 40

To fulfill the country's policy of middlepowermanship, Canada's military has prepared to be called upon for future peacekeeping duty. In 1964, Canada "became one of the first countries to earmark part of its armed forces to be trained and available for U.N. service." 41 This earmarking of forces aids greatly in the rapid deployment of the peacekeepers, which "has always been essential." 42 Preparation is also necessary because the destination is not likely to be known far in advance. Canadian forces also have valuable experience at peacekeeping. From 1949 to 1980, "Canadian personnel served 33,174 man-years in peacekeeping operations at a total cost of $266 million." 43 As a result, Canadian military officers are regarded as "probably the most experienced group of field officers to be found anywhere in regard to the varied problems and tasks that peacekeeping presents." 44
In 1964, the several branches of the Canadian armed forces were united. This move was criticized as giving Canada one large peacekeeping force which was inadequate for use in existing alliances. "It is clear that [unification] was designed to increase the capacity of the armed forces for conflicts at the low end of the scale, whatever effect it had on the capacity to contribute in conventional war situations." Peacekeeping involves different areas of the Canadian Armed Forces. Military units are provided by the Mobile Command, while Air Transport Group (a part of Air Command) is responsible for the transportation of peacekeepers to overseas locations. Canadian Forces Communications Command, as its name indicates, "operates and maintains strategic communications for the Canadian Forces." The organization of the military is designed to meet the increased commitment to peacekeeping which was stated in the White Paper on Defence of 1964: "The combined land, sea and air forces normally stationed in Canada and at Canadian ports will be sufficiently flexible to satisfy any conceivable requirement for U.N. or other operations." Although Canada's military was prepared to keep the peace, Canada's policymakers in the early 1970s were not as willing. In 1970, guidelines were established for the use of Canadian peacekeepers. This was a change from earlier days when the government had been characterized as "eager." No longer would a request from the United Nations be suff-
icient reason to send Canadian peacekeepers to a trouble-spot. The 1970 White Paper on Defence stated that future responses "should be decided upon in each instance in light of [Canada's] assessment of real hope that the operation will be effective." The White Paper then spelled out its terms, stating that Canada would not participate unless these problems were dealt with satisfactorily: (1) inadequate terms of reference; (2) lack of cooperation by parties to peacekeeping operations; (3) absence of political support of some of the great powers; and (4) insufficient international logistic and financial resources.

By 1974 Canadian diplomats had drawn up another set of standards for Canadian participation in peacekeeping operations.

Such ventures had to be linked to movement toward a political settlement amongst the parties to the conflict; the peacekeeping force had to be responsible to a political authority, preferably the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and this authority should have the power to supervise the mandate of the force; the peacekeeping force had to have a clear mandate, including freedom of movement; the parties to the conflict had to accept the force; and there had to be a clear and equitable method of financing the operation. The Secretary-General was requested to be the authority of peacekeeping forces because his authority, experience had proven, "held out the best hope of success." Previous operations such as UNEF, UNFICYP and ONUC were established under the General Assembly's Uniting for Peace Resolution, and lacked political authority. All other preconditions
were in response to past Canadian experience with peacekeeping. It was an attempt to improve peacekeeping as an instrument of international stability by correcting past mistakes.

Canada's policy balanced eagerness for involvement in peacekeeping operations (shown by its military preparedness) and its hesitancy to become embroiled in a worthless operation (shown by its conditions for involvement).

After 1956 Canada was always a coy flirt amongst the peacekeeping set, and when seduced, a somewhat nagging mistress. 'We are anxious to avoid the conclusion being reached that we would be happy to continue,' Mitchell Sharp reminded newsmen of Canada's role in Cyprus in the wake of the 1974 civil war on that island. But continue Canada did and she remains a mistress to peacekeeping.

Canada has generally followed the guidelines which were established in the early 1970s. In 1973, Canada withdrew from the International Commission of Control and Supervision in Vietnam when it decided that its conditions were not being met. Canada also withdrew from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) after only six months because of dissatisfaction. On the other hand, Canada remained involved in two other cases after being satisfied that its conditions were being met. These were the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II). These examples show the serious attention paid by the government to the conditions for involvement.

Peacekeeping is not as simple or as saintly as the
name implies. On a balance sheet of performance, many negative aspects would be listed alongside the positive aspects. Lester Pearson, the Canadian diplomat who helped form UNEF in 1956, realized one major problem with peacekeeping. He criticized the U.N. resolution which created UNEF by saying, "It does not provide for any steps to be taken by the United Nations for a peace settlement, without which a ceasefire will be only of temporary value at best."53 His words can also be applied to the U.N. force in Cyprus, known as UNFICYP. That operation started on March 27, 1964 and has lasted to date. Field Marshall Lord Carver, who was deputy commander of this force in 1964, stated, "Sometimes U.N. peacekeepers don't add to a solution, but help prevent it. In Cyprus, their presence complicated matters."54 Peacekeepers reduced tensions to the point that there was no impetus to reach a peaceful settlement. The U.N. forces partitioned the island with their policy of interpositioning. Since 1964, over fifty Security Council resolutions have been passed extending the operating term of the peacekeepers. A temporary solution has become permanent.

It must be added that UNFICYP has performed many admirable tasks which offset its entanglement in the dispute. Lord Carver said, "The U.N. force in Cyprus had reduced the fighting, reduced casualties. It also prevented overt invasion from outside sources, or escalation of the conflict."55
Hampering the ability of the peacekeeping forces in Cyprus was a lack of military intelligence. This problem is not restricted to Cyprus. Interpositioning places U.N. forces in a delicate situation between hostile forces. Information regarding threatening movements or attempted infiltration is necessary for self-defense and territorial integrity. However, such information-gathering is seen as spying if done by peacekeepers. There is a worry that the information would fall into the wrong hands. "Thus, although military intelligence has never been an acceptable facet of peacekeeping, the force commander must have current and accurate knowledge of the political and military aims of all disputing parties." In Cyprus, U.N. force commanders "tried to make up for this by keeping in touch with the influential leaders in the area." In one case, the Canadian contingent on Cyprus stopped a Greek attack on a Turkish-held castle because "it was in the right place at the right time, not because of intelligence." In other operations, notably the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a lack of military intelligence was evident.

The 1978 UNIFIL situation gave rise to several incidents, including direct attacks on peacekeeping troops, which might have been prevented had the force had timely information on the intent of the parties involved.

It is obvious that "an appropriate mandate and strategy can be of little value if not translated into practice at the required time and place." Despite the problems and limitations associated with
peacekeeping, the people of Canada have remained generally supportive of Canadian involvement in United Nations' peacekeeping operations. One exception was in 1967 when President Nasser of Egypt "not only demanded the removal of UNEF but invited the Canadians to lead the retreat."61 This singling out of Canadian troops "touched off a flood of criticism"62 at the government's unconditional participation in U.N. operations. As a result, guidelines were developed. Also at this time, the public became disillusioned with the duration of peacekeeping operations. Some, such as Kashmir and Cyprus, seemed endless. Also, in the Middle East the peacekeepers "had failed to prevent the recurrent flare-up of violence."63 This low point in public support did not last long, polls indicate. "Despite the UNEF expulsion in 1967, 64 percent of Canadians polled in 1970 favored the establishment of a permanent United Nations force."64

The more prevalent public view of peacekeeping since World War II has been supportive. One source mentions "the national obsession with peacekeeping"65 that Canada possesses. Hugh Winsor of the Globe and Mail stated that "peacekeeping is Canada's bag."66 He explained that the public supports Canada's involvement in UNEF II "because it does give us a world role other than tagging along as a junior partner in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."67 This restoration of UNEF in 1973 was an example of Canada's willingness to be involved in peacekeeping operations.
Because of Soviet objections to Canada's NATO affiliation, Canada was almost excluded from the UNEF II contingent. However, Canadian diplomatic maneuvers resulted in the inclusion of a Polish contingent and a new invitation for Canada. "The incident suggests that Canadians would have been disappointed if their vocation for peacekeeping had been seriously challenged or interrupted." This reflects a general public support for peacekeeping.

Also reflecting support for peacekeeping are extensive interviews conducted in 1975 of the Canadian foreign policy elite. These "confirmed that they continue to support the peacekeeping role and see Canada as exceptionally qualified for it." The interviews, conducted by the Canadian Institute for International Affairs, showed that 94 percent of the foreign policy elite agreed that Canada "should continue to support peacekeeping, and this purpose for the armed forces was ranked second in importance only to the defense of sovereignty."

With so much public support for peacekeeping, one can surmise that the future will be a continuation of Canada's participation in United Nations' peacekeeping operations.

There are several compelling reasons why peacekeeping is on the current and will be on the future international agenda throughout the 1980s and beyond. The first are the innumerable grave crises which threaten international peace and security and cry out for resolution; the second is that much still needs to be done to improve the political, structural and operational capability of peacekeeping. It is
one of the few viable, effective and available instruments of conflict management.\textsuperscript{71}

In the cases of Cambodia and El Salvador, Canada has already shown some indication of willingness to be involved in peacekeeping operations. In June of 1981, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) called for a U.N. peacekeeping force in Kampuchea (Cambodia) "as part of a three-point proposal for an end to hostilities in that country."\textsuperscript{72} Though such a proposal would pose many problems, the Canadian secretary of state for foreign affairs stated that "Canada was favorably disposed to such a notion."\textsuperscript{73} Concerning El Salvador, no such specific proposals have been made. "But it is known that, during President Reagan's conversations with Prime Minister Trudeau in Ottawa in July 1981, Trudeau suggested that a Rhodesian-type settlement might be appropriately applied to the El Salvador situation!"\textsuperscript{74} For unknown reasons, this suggestion was not pursued.

An analysis of Canada's involvement in United Nations' peacekeeping operations reveals that Canada should continue to be a peacekeeper in the future. This does not suggest that Canada should be eager to keep the peace. Guidelines are necessary so that the liabilities of peacekeeping are lessened and the chances for successful peacekeeping increased. With established guidelines, peacekeeping is a role that should be welcomed. "So long as the Canadian government steers clear of any 'obvious follies' such as bragging about its crisis-solving ability, foisting itself into disputes
uninvited, or overcommitting itself in areas of dubious worth, "why shun the blessed function of peacemaker?"75

The use of peacekeeping troops may not necessarily be blessed, but the term indicates the moral righteousness connected with peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is a foreign policy which is seen as "good", since its goal is to prevent war, which is "bad". In terms of morality, peacekeeping is difficult to attack. A country which is closely identified with peacekeeping will as a result have an improved image in the world. The image of Canada has improved as it has helped to keep the peace since World War II. Future peacekeeping would continue to add to Canada's positive image.

Looking at Canada's recent history, peacekeeping can be seen as an ideal role for that country to play in the world. Having decided to abandon isolationism after World War II, Canada had several choices concerning what foreign policy course to chart. Being located next to the United States offered an obvious option -- Canada could be a proxy to the U.S., an extension of American foreign policy. Canada could be to the U.S. what Cuba is to the U.S.S.R. Proximity and close economic ties with the U.S. could have pulled Canada into the U.S. orbit. But Canada, having recently removed itself from the British orbit, sought to chart a course which did not closely tie it with another nation. Peacekeeping offered an alternative to being a U.S. puppet, while at the same time not being anti-American.
Peacekeeping offers the precious commodity of independence in foreign policy to Canada -- independence from the U.S., the U.S.S.R., the U.K., the Third World, the Commonwealth. The only tie which binds Canada is that of the United Nations, an organization which Canada can freely support without shame. Rising from the destruction of the Second World War, the United Nations is an organization of noble purpose -- the maintenance of international peace and security. Since the creation of the U.N. in 1945, Canada has been a firm supporter of the organization. Peacekeeping is consistent with that support, and consistent with the goal of international peace and security. It is also more than just rhetoric. By providing peacekeeping forces, Canada shows a definite resolve to act to support the U.N., not just to praise the U.N. by way of words.

Peacekeeping operations without the support of the United Nations are more hazardous and less assured of success than U.N.-sponsored operations. This is illustrated by Canada's participation in the International Commission for Control and Supervision in Vietnam in 1973. The withdrawal of Canadian forces after six months and the military defeat of South Vietnam by North Vietnam are indications that the operation was a failure. Other attempts to create peacekeeping forces in El Salvador and Cambodia should be avoided unless the United Nations sponsors the operations.

In general, Canada should not become involved in conflicts which the United Nations is not already involved.
This policy can be termed "selective isolationism."
Only after the United Nations agree to send peacekeepers
to a trouble spot should Canada send peacekeepers. It
would be wise to assume that since Canada is so well-
prepared and experienced in the field of peacekeeping that
she should use that talent whenever possible. A selective
policy ensures a higher rate of success and therefore
enhances the long-term commitment to peacekeeping.

How selective should Canada be when deciding to
commit Canadian peacekeepers? The first condition, as
stated, is that the U.N. should be the sponsoring organ-
ization. It is the only organization that has the wide-
spread political authority necessary for a successful
operation.

Canada should support every United Nations' peace-
keeping operation, whether by supplying soldiers, commu-
ications, logistics, etc. However, some factors should
influence the extent of the support offered. The operation
should be under the authority of the Secretary-General,
who should have the power to supervise the mandate of the
force. Financial commitment should be assessed clearly
and equitably in advance. Voluntary contributions have
"proved unreliable" in the past. UNFICYP has been plagued
by deficits from the start because of a voluntary system
of financing. Canada has been forced to absorb the direct
costs of maintaining its contingent on Cyprus for this
reason, which "amounted to over $35 million (Canadian
dollars) between 1964 and 1978."77

A link must be made between the presence of peacekeepers and the political settlement between the parties to the conflict. A finite time limit should be established to the duration of peacekeeping operations. If no movement toward a political settlement has been made by the end of a set number of years, then the peacekeepers should be withdrawn. Emphasis should be made on the temporary nature of peacekeeping. It is simply a first step toward the goal of peace. When no more steps are taken by the parties to the conflict in that direction, it should be clear that the parties do not have the same goal as the U.N. The U.N. should then stop attempting to impose that organization's goals upon parties which do not seek peace.

The location of the conflict should also influence Canada's participation. If Canadian interests, whether economic or political, are involved, Canada should be more willing to keep the peace in that area. If the conflict is not near any Canadian interests, less effort should be made to be involved.

The support of the members of the Security Council is another factor. If both the U.S.-and the U.S.S.R. support a peacekeeping force, its chances for success improve. This should lead to more Canadian involvement. If a force is created which is opposed or not supported by a major power, then Canada should scale back involvement.

A last factor is the use of military intelligence by
peacekeepers. Every effort should be made to allow peacekeepers to possess the military intelligence which is necessary to perform their duties.

If many of the these factors are met favorably, then Canada should offer to play a large role in the peacekeeping operation. Conversely, if only several or none of the factors are met favorably, then Canada should keep its commitment minimal.

The future should offer many occasions in which Canada will be asked to support a United Nations' peacekeeping operation. One look at the globe today brings to mind several potential areas for the use of peacekeepers. Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Falkland Islands, Namibia, South Africa, Angola, Iran, Iraq and the Phillipines are some of the potential troublspots where Canadian peacekeepers may someday find themselves. This is not to be feared -- it is the job of a peacekeeper. The injection of Canadians into the crises of the world pays substantial rewards to Canada in the form of an independent foreign policy and enhanced image. Although dangerous and not without drawbacks, Canada should continue to keep the peace.
FOOTNOTES


5 Ibid.


8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., p. 178.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., p. 114.


13 Ibid.


17 Keenleyside, p. 12.
18 Stevenson, pp. 151-152.
19 Ibid., p. 151.
20 McInnis, p. 147.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ichikawa, p. 3.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Tucker, p. 112.
32 Cox, p. 38.
33 Ichikawa, p. 21.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., p. 3.
36 Ibid., p. 5.
37 McInnis, p. 150.
38 Ibid., p. 147.
39 Ibid., pp. 150-151.
40 Ibid., p. 156.
42 Cox, p. 37.
43 Pearson, p. 120.
44. Cox, p. 37.

45. Ibid., p. 38.


47. Cox, p. 37.

48. Ibid., p. 38.

49. Ichikawa, p. 6.

50. Tucker, pp. 112-113.

51. Ichikawa, p. 6.

52. Tucker, p. 113.

53. Ibid.

54. Field Marshal, Lord Carver, "Keeping the Peace in Cyprus," Ball State University Lecture Series, March 28, 1985, 11 a.m., Student Center, Ball State University, Muncie, Indiana.

55. Ibid.

56. Murray, p. 179.

57. Carver.

58. Ibid.


60. Ibid.

61. Lyon and Tomlin, p. 16.

62. Ichikawa, p. 4.

63. Lyon and Tomlin, p. 16.

64. Ichikawa, p. 19.

65. Stevenson, p. 155.


67. Ibid.

68. Lyon and Tomlin, p. 17.
Ibid.

Ibid., p. 33.


Ibid., p. 363.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.


Rikhye, Indar Jit and Michael Harbottle, Bjorn Egge. 


APPENDIX

UNMOGIP - United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

To supervise in the State of Jammu and Kashmir the ceasefire between India and Pakistan

January 24, 1949 to date

Canadian involvement - January 1949 to January 1979, military observers

UNTSO - United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine

To assist the mediator and truce commission in supervising the observance of the truce in Palestine called for by the Security Council. Since then, has performed various tasks entrusted to it by the Council.

June 11, 1948 to date

Canadian involvement - 1954 to date, military observers

UNEF - United Nations Emergency Force

To secure and to supervise the cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of the armed forces of France, Israel and the United Kingdom from Egyptian territory. After the withdrawal to serve as a buffer between Egyptian and Israeli forces.

November 12, 1956 to June 1967


UNOGIL - United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon

To ensure that there was no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other material across the Lebanese borders.

June 12, 1958 to December 9, 1958

Canadian involvement - military observers

ONUC - United Nations Operations in the Congo

To ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, maintain territorial integrity, prevent civil war and remove all
foreign military personnel and mercenaries.

June 15, 1960 to June 30, 1964

Canadian involvement - July 1960 to June 1964, aircraft personnel (air and ground), staff personnel, signals

United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea

To maintain peace and security in the territory under the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority established by agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands.

October 3, 1962 to April 30, 1963

Canadian involvement - supporting aircraft and crews

UNYOM - United Nations Yemen Observation Mission.

To observe and certify the implementation of the disengagement agreement between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic.

July 4, 1963 to September 4, 1964

Canadian involvement - Air unit (aircraft and helicopters), fifty officers and other ranks

UNFICYP - United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

To prevent the recurrence of fighting, to maintain status quo in the buffer zone and contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and return to normal conditions.

March 27, 1964 to date

Canadian involvement - March 27, 1964 to date, infantry and staff officers. April 1976 to date, medical center

Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic

To observe the situation and to report on breaches of the cease-fire between the two de facto authorities.

May 15, 1965 to October 22, 1966

Canadian involvement - one military advisor

UNIPOM - United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission

To supervise the cease-fire along the India-Pakistan border.
September 23, 1965 to March 22, 1966

Canadian involvement - October 1965 to March 1966, air unit

**UNEP II** - United Nations Emergency Force II

To supervise the cease-fire between Egyptian and Israeli forces. Also to man and control the buffer zones.

October 25, 1973 to July 24, 1979

Canadian involvement - November 10, 1973 to October 30, 1979, logistics: signals, air and service units

**UNDOF** - United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

To maintain the ceasefire between Israel and Syria in the Golan Heights and provide a buffer zone.

June 3, 1974 to date

Canadian involvement - June 5, 1974 to date, logistics: signals, supply and transport units

**UNIFIL** - United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

To confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from south Lebanon and to assist the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.

March 19, 1978 to date

Canadian involvement - Signal, movement control and communications units