THE ROLE OF JEWISH IMMIGRATION
IN THE PROBLEMS OF THE BRITISH MANDATE IN PALESTINE

HONORS THESIS BY
BARRY G. PEARSTEIN
FOR
DR. STANLEY GROSSMAN
PROFESSOR OF HISTORY
BALL STATE UNIVERSITY
MAY 1, 1976
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Rise of the National Movements</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbusism</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zionism</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabist vs. Zionism</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Involvement in Palestine</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Interest in Palestine</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Assurances</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Effect of Popular Attitudes</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Instruments of British Involvement</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration and the Mandate</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expectations Regarding Immigration</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Troubles</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Policy During British Involvement</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration and the Issues of the Mandate</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Complaints</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-Cultural Conflicts</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Complaints</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summation</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footnotes</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

In 1918, a British chemist named Chaim Weizmann, who was also an important figure in the Zionist movement, met with Prince Faisal, a Syrian nobleman, to discuss the matter of the establishment of a homeland for the Jewish people in the land of Palestine. All seemed to be in agreement; the atmosphere of those discussions seemed to be quite amiable. In the outcome of the dialogue, Faisal announced that the Jews were welcome.

In 1929, a Jewish youth wandered into the yard of an Arab family in Jerusalem to retrieve a soccer ball. The youth was stabbed to death by the landowner. The weeks that followed this incident saw the entire country convulse with violence.

What had happened between these two dates, that an atmosphere of goodwill should turn into one clouded with malice? The tension that arose in Palestine, which bedeviled two nationalities, an imperial government, and the conscience of the world was the result of a continuum of shortsightedness which characterized civil policy in Palestine.

It began with the dream of a few visionaries of a haven for persecuted Jewry, a vision which ignored the presence of half a million people; it continued with the machinations and errors of the policy adopted by the British government; it was intensified by the fervent nationalism that was rampant in the world in the early 20th Century; and was further aggravated by Jewish and Arab claims and counter-claims of injustices, claims which often led to bloodshed.

This strain that evolved between the Arabs and the Jews seemed especially unfortunate in the light of the fact that there originally appeared to be a basis of agreement. But there was little foresight
and even less understanding among the parties involved to support this basis. There was particularly little attention paid by all interests before the inception of the Mandate to the crucial matter of what the establishment of the homeland for the Jewish people would entail.

The population of Palestine in 1922, the beginning of the British Mandate, was roughly 757,000 persons. The Jewish population was about 83,000, about 11% of the total population. In the 1930's, the Jewish population had swelled to nearly 1/3 of the total population -- that meant there were more than 600,000 Jews in Palestine. The great increase was the result of the intrinsic requirement of the program to establish a Jewish homeland -- immigration of Jews into the country.

The problem in Palestine was this swell in the Jewish population: "It was...the influx of Jewish workers into Palestine...which aggravated the conflict." There were many immediate concerns and issues in the Palestinian Mandate. The development of self-governing institutions in Palestine and related political issues were crucial. Economic complaints were often voiced. Several investigations of the Mandate attributed the greatest importance out of all the issues involved, to the matter of the transfer of land ownership from Arabs to Jews. But all these issues gain their urgency from the extensive immigration of Jews into Palestine that was occurring during the days of the Mandate: if immigration wasn't the root of the problem, it was the fertilizer that nourished it. The Jews saw immigration as the fulfillment of 2,000 years of history; the British saw it first as an obligation and later as a headache; and the Arabs saw it only as a cancerous curse.
The role of Jewish immigration in the turmoil in Palestine must be examined in relationship to the way it interacted with Arab nationalism, with British intentions and responsibilities under the Mandate, with Arab-Jewish relations and the changes that occurred in these, and with specific aspects of life in Palestine. In this manner, immigration can be illustrated as one of the foundations of the dilemma that appeared in Palestine and which still shakes the world today.²
THE RISE OF THE NATIONAL MOVEMENTS

ARABISM

The area known as Palestine was a portion of the Ottoman Empire from the 16th Century till the dissolution of the Empire following World War One. The Arabs were ruled over by the Moslem Turks, but their rule was pretty nominal outside of the cities. The Arabs lived largely as tribesmen who controlled their own affairs, unless they gave a reason for Ottoman law authorities to make a foray into their territory. Because the Turks were co-religionists, because loyalty to specific tribes and princes rather than true nationalism existed among the Arabs, and because visible control by the Turks was at a minimum, Turkish rule was not viewed as anathema. The Arabs acceded to it.

In the year 1908, there was a revolution in the empire. Led by a group of reformers known as the Young Turks, the old monarchy was overthrown, and modern reforms such as a constitution were instituted. Under the re-organization of the empire, the Arabs were granted a significant amount of autonomy. The Provisional Vilayet Law provided for a minimum of official interference in Arab affairs by the government in Constantinople.

The effect of this law was not lost upon the Arabs. At this time there were rudiments of non-political nationalism among certain segments of Arab society. In Lebanon, Christian Arabs had begun a revival of interest in literature and culture around 1860; this renewed interest inspired Syrian leaders and was now beginning to catch on among Palestinian Arab leaders. The legitimation of the unofficial Arab autonomy was viewed by adherents of the inchoate Arab renaissance as just recognition of their rights. Gradually, however, influential Arabs came to believe that Ottoman rule was
politically subjugating the Arabs and that Turkish influences were corrupting Arab language and culture.

Differences between Arabs and Turks grew, and eventually Arab leaders became disenchanted with the policies of the Young Turks. Arab leaders presented several proposals for reforms to the Turkish government around the year 1914. These were rejected, and a nascent Arab nationalist movement went underground.

The nationalism of the Arabs maintained a peculiar position. On one hand it often consisted of a localized loyalty -- the Arabs traditionally tended to be more loyal to leaders than to territory. On the other hand there were several reasons why a "Pan-Arabism" often arose to transcend local loyalties: "The unity of the Arab world rests upon a number of factors; language...; historical tradition...; and a folk culture and tradition and a social heritage and social system." These are prime reasons why Christian and Moslem Arabs could both participate in the movement. Undeniably, the dominating element in Arab nationalism has been Islam. Language, law, and history, as well as social structures and customs, are derived from Islamic tradition and are believed to be absolute truths. Owing to the absoluteness of Islamic tenets, Arab thought is also permeated by dogmatic tendencies; naturally, Arab nationalist thought reflected these tendencies. Christian Arabs were considered to be a "millet" community, which means that they lived as a subculture among the Moslems. However, they were subject to the influences of the predominant Islamic society and exhibited many of its traits.

The Arabs sought during the earlier days of the nationalist movement to recover the lost glories of the Arab empires. These glories were conceived to be embodied in the Arab nation -- a
single nation, a single state. This state, the "Umma Al-Arabiyyah," existed in a latent condition according to Arab thought of the early 20th Century. It would come into fruition by achieving sovereignty over Arab lands -- "All the territories once conquered by Islam must revert to the Islamic realm even if they have been for centuries in non-Muslim hands." Thus it can be seen that a very forthright, religious determinism characterized Arab nationalist thought.

Religious motivations are not sufficient to successfully cause a people to congeal into a nation, according to Philip K. Hitti, an authority on the Arabs. Hitti maintains that nationalism needs a secular environment to succeed. The Arab nationalist movement didn't gain significant momentum until the onset of World War One, when physical suffering and political dialogue made independence seem to the Arabs desirable. However, it would be undesirable to downplay the effect of religious considerations upon the Arab masses. The upper strata of Arab society, the intellectuals and the leaders were influenced largely by political factors. Religious appeals made nationalism palatable to the common Arab. Political concern developed among the common Arabs later.

In 1916, the Arabs rose in rebellion against the Turks. This action was of great assistance to the Allies in defeating the Central Powers in World War One. The Arabs were spurred on by beliefs that the Allies would grant them independence after the war. There was no other reason for them to fight against Moslems.

In Europe, meanwhile, there was another nationalist movement operating -- under its own impressions about what would be granted by the Allies following the war -- to further its aims. This movement was Zionism, soon to come into a climactic clash with Arab nationalism.
ZIONISM

Zionism is somewhat unique among nationalist movements. Most of these take the form of exclusionary movements, seeking to cast off foreign influence. The nation, referring to the native community containing common culture and heritage, seeks to assert its energies by flexing its control over that area in which it lives. The nation is therefore consolidating its status within its traditional homeland. Zionism, on the other hand, was a movement looking from the outside in. It was the expression not of a nation confined to certain boundaries, but rather of a nation scattered throughout the world. It sought not just the removal of foreign influence from the homeland, but indeed a return of the nation to the homeland.

Zionism is the nationalistic expression of Judaism. Judaism is one of the Western World's most remarkable phenomena. It lies somewhere between a religion and a collective consciousness. It is the sum expression of the several millenia of experiences encountered by a people adrift in the world. The traditional site of the homeland of the Jews was conquered centuries ago by the Romans, who expelled the Jews, although some left voluntarily from it. Throughout the intervening time of this exile (known as the Diaspora), the Holy Land, known after Roman times as Palestine, continued to have an effect upon the religious culture of the Jews, as witnessed by the invocation "next year in Jerusalem." A return to the Holy Land has been an element of Judaism in one form or another since the Diaspora began.

Zionism is a synthesis of modern nationalism with this ancient concept of the return. It was a secularization of this
aspiration into political terms. Echoing Hitti's hypothesis, Zionism is a derivative of the events of the late 19th Century. It was a period of nationalist fervor and religious persecution in Europe. In those turbulent times a man named Theodore Herzl noted such crusades as the Italian and German unification movements, and atrocities such as the pogroms against the Jews that swept Eastern Europe and the notorious Dreyfus case in France. He and a few others began to see a need to solve the "Jewish Problem." They believed it was necessary for the Jews to obtain a land of their own. They viewed the Diaspora as an unnatural condition for a people who wanted to maintain a distinct cultural identity, and not to assimilate into the surrounding society. 9

But which land should be the home of the Jews? This was an issue that was greatly discussed among the Zionists. The British in the early 1900's offered the land in what is now Uganda to the Zionists. There was much debate among them about the desirability of accepting this offer, with those promoting it stressing the need for immediate refuge. 10 In the end, the proposal was declined. There was no doubt about the area where the Zionists longed to locate.

It was in Palestine. The strong effect of the land couldn't be denied. Palestine was seen by the Zionists as a solution to a growing apathy toward Judaism that they had perceived among Jews; they believed Palestine's emotional appeal would bring the wayward Jews back into the flock of the faithful. Indeed, Palestine was viewed as the key which would allow Judaism to achieve, through its reunion with the land of its roots, a "liberation and revitilization of the national mind." 11
It is important to stress the word reunion. There was no doubt in the minds of the Zionists that they had a claim to Palestine. Zionism assumed that contemporary Jews were the heirs of the ancient Jews; Palestine was therefore part of their birthright. The Zionists were bent upon claiming it.

The first Zionist Congress was held in Basle, Switzerland in 1897. At this convention the basic tenets of Zionism were established. These were: 1. The promotion of settling Jewish farmers, artisans, and manufacturers in Palestine. 2. The binding together of Jewry into a more coherent framework. 3. The strengthening and promotion of Jewish national sentiment. These were the core principle that were common to the many factions of Zionism that arose. Basically, there were two schools of thought: The political Zionists and the cultural Zionists. The former sought to establish a Jewish home in Palestine under political guarantees for its success. The latter sought to establish a Jewish home in Palestine without any political arrangements. In the end, the political Zionists became dominant in the movement. The Zionists planned to enact the Basle principles by achieving freedom of immigration into Palestine for Jews. Immigration was the key to the success of the Jewish Home. The object was to allow the Jews to control their own destiny; in numbers there is power. But among many Zionists there was the desire to establish more than just a community that was large enough to fend off external interference. They desired to establish a Jewish majority in Palestine. Sir John Campbell, in a report he made to the British government, stated that he found among many Zionists an attitude that as many Jews as possible must be packed into Palestine. Zionists in conjunction with English sympathizers
submitted to the World War One peace conference a memorandum demanding majority rights for the Jewish community in Palestine.

Did the Zionists have more in mind from the start -- were they seeking to turn Palestine into a Jewish state? It would appear that this desire was strong within the movement. Herzl wrote in 1896 that he dreamt of restoring the Jewish State. But few Zionists spoke openly about a state. The Zionists referred to the "Jewish National Home" when speaking about Palestine. This was a term unknown in international law. Max Nordau, an associate of Herzl, said "I did my best to persuade the claimants of the Jewish State in Palestine that we might find a circumlocution that would express all we meant, but would say it in a way so as to avoid provoking the Turkish rulers..."14 Howard Sacher also states that the term "National Home" was merely a euphemism for the word state.15

Yet there are numerous disclaimers from the Zionists about the intention to establish a state, even from political Zionists. Nahum Sokolow stated that Zionism didn't seek a Jewish state -- it sought merely to restore Jewish civilization and to establish a place for Jews to live in dignity.16 The Zionist committee for England in a 1916 outline of a program for Palestine did not specifically request the establishment of a sovereign state.

Nevertheless, the idea of Jewish sovereignty in Palestine was an integral part of the Zionist program. For the most part, sovereignty was not thought of in immediate terms -- hence the denials from some Zionists who did support the idea. Necessity called for it to be gradually developed as the time became ripe.

Chaim Weizmann wrote to Robert Lansing, the American Secretary of State:

The Zionist Organization did not want an autonomous Jewish government, but merely
to establish in Palestine...an administration not necessarily Jewish, which would render it possible to send into Palestine 70,000 to 80,000 Jews annually. Later on, when the Jews formed the large majority they would answer to the state of the development of the country and to their ideals. 17

Lord Arthur Balfour stated that he understood that a Jewish state was a matter "for gradual development." Although an immediate Hebrew administration was not sought in Palestine, one was envisioned by many for the future. It is undoubtedly true that "the authors, both of the Basle program and of the Balfour Declaration (which committed Britain to the program of the Zionists) envisaged the emergence of a Jewish Commonwealth as a natural result of the resettlement of the Jews in Palestine." 18

ARABISM VERSUS ZIONISM

It can be seen that both Arabism and Zionism possessed several characteristics that would contribute to growing animosity towards one another. The Arabs were seeking to re-establish ancient glory throughout the lands once ruled by powerful Arab sultans and caliphs. The Arabs viewed their lands as the home of Islam. There were close bonds of culture and social organization among the Arabs, despite traditional tribal rivalries. The Zionists were seeking to restore to the Holy Land the Hebrew culture it bore and nourished. They sought a refuge for persecuted Jews, where there would be no restrictions on entry. They desired to create a "National Home" which would determine its own destiny.

The newly nationalistic Arabs resented the manner in which their lands were treated in diplomatic circles by the Allies, notably by the French and the British. Such arrangements as the
Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, which partitioned the Middle East into spheres of influence, left the Arabs with the belief that their plans of national rebirth were being thwarted. Shukry al-Kuwatly, the President of Syria, said that "our (the Arabs') frontiers are not limits, they are wounds." The Arabs wanted their territorial integrity.

They therefore opposed the move instigated by the Allies to parcel the Arab lands into administrative units, which would meet the Allies' plans. The most significant opposition came against the partition of Palestine from Syria. Palestine had always been regarded as the southern portion of Syria, and it was administered in this fashion under the Turks. The inhabitants of Palestine and Syria both promulgated this position shortly after the end of the war -- at least as long as the government of Faisal, the Arab noblemen who had met with Weizmann and since then had been crowned King of Syria, seemed strong. Chekri Ganem, the head of a Syrian delegation to the League of Nations, told that body in 1919: "Palestine is incontestably the southern portion of our country." Even the British government admitted the truth in this statement. The Foreign Office guide noted that it was more precise to consider Palestine as southern Syria.

In 1919, an American fact-finding expedition, known as the King-Crane Commission, went to Palestine to evaluate the situation there. They found that there was indeed a strong, popular desire to keep Syria from being divided up. The Commission recommended that Syria be left intact -- a suggestion that went unheeded.

Before Faisal became king, and during his reign, Syrian nationalists advocated "full and unqualified" independence for Syria. Eventually the Faisal government fell, collapsing under
conflict with the French. After the government toppled, the Arab nationalists realized that a unified Syria was an impossibility. They then began to press for representative Arab government for Palestine.

Arab sovereignty was a crucial issue throughout the Middle East at this time. It should be remembered that the Arabs were pressing for rule over all the territory that once formed their dominion. This was a vast amount of land. Palestine to Westerners seemed like such a small portion; many questioned why the Arabs could not spare that small "morsel in Palestine" to the Jews for the realization of their aspirations. But this small "morsel" was of far greater consequence than it would seem. In Arab political thought, the creation of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine would seriously disrupt the economic and political integrity of the projected Arab state: "The presence of a Jewish state in the strategic center of the Middle East...will prevent the achievement of complete Arab independence everywhere and would make any Arab union impossible."23 In addition, Palestine was too sacred to the Muslim religion to allow any non-Muslim group to have control over it. It was unthinkable in both political and theological terms for the Arabs to relinquish control over Palestine.

Control became a dominant issue for the Arabs in Palestine. They had a good reason to expect their wishes to be met. The time was an era of international populism. The concept that native populations should enjoy self-determination of their destinies was in vogue. To the Arabs, this concept meant that they, the inhabitants of the land of Palestine for the last 1,000 years, would chart the future course of the area. It was into the midst of this hope that Jewish immigrants from Europe poured, representing a threat to the power the Arabs sought.
Jewish immigration became a nightmare to the Arabs. As more and more Jews wanted to come into Palestine, more land was purchased by the Zionists to settle them. The Zionists viewed Palestine as the potential home for all of World Jewry. It seemed to the Arabs that there were always more Jews entering, backed by a seemingly endless amount of money, and being settled on more and more land purchased at the expense of Arab farmers.

The fear of a Jewish takeover of Palestine was present among the Arabs well before the British Mandate began. Syrian nationalists had campaigned against Jewish immigration and land purchases prior to the war. During the military administration of Palestine, the military governor reported to the British government in 1918 that various articles in the British Press and speeches by several Jewish figures gave the Arabs the impression that the Jews were attempting to take over Palestine. This fear continued to be a strong force throughout the course of events in Palestine. In 1929, the Shaw Commission (which investigated riots that occurred around that time) concluded that the claims and demands of the Zionists regarding Jewish immigration aroused among the Arabs apprehensions that they would in time lose their livelihood and eventually pass under the political domination of the Jews.

It was mentioned earlier that there were two different schools of Zionist thought -- political Zionism and cultural Zionism. Although the political Zionists became dominant early in the movement, there was opposition to their activities from various groups of Jews. In England such prominent Jews as Lord Montague and Claude Montefiore expressed their antipathy to the attempt to give political rights to the Jewish community in Palestine. The Arabs were often aware of events that occurred in Europe regarding the future status of the
country. It is not inconceivable that they were aware of Jewish opposition to the Zionists -- and the idea that even Jews were opposing Zionist proposals could have given the Arabs more reason to be fearful of their future.

If the Arabs were conscious of the meaning of the events which were occurring, the Zionists were not. The Zionists seemed to lack perspective of their efforts and of the direction in which these were leading them. The Zionists didn't perceive themselves as a threat to the welfare of the Arabs. The failure of the Zionists to fathom properly the Arab attitude towards them, and to properly understand Arab nationalism, eventually set the two groups into irreconcilable camps.

Incredible as it might seem, the Zionists gave little consideration to the Arabs of Palestine in their plans; "The Zionist leaders simply would not consider the presence of half a million non-Jews an insurmountable obstacle, formidable enough to make them give up their cherished dreams..." According to Laquer, the Zionists acted as if the Arabs were of no consequence. To the Zionists, the Arabs seemed to be an illiterate bunch, with apparently few traits that bound them into an active community; the Zionists therefore scoffed at the Arabs as a political factor.

There were dissenting voices among the Zionists that proclaimed understanding and sympathy with Arab aspirations -- in fact, almost every Zionist congress passed a resolution to this effect. There were even proposals for a close relationship between Jewish and Arab culture. But it was all lip service, with little substance supporting it. Colonel Sykes of the military administration found that he had to remind the Zionist leaders that both Arabs and Jews had to share Palestine. Critics of Zionism argued later, after
several periods of violence, that the Zionists were paying the price for ignoring the needs and position of the Arabs.

In an environment of mutual mistrust, disdain, and misinterpretation, Jewish immigration into Palestine could only act as an irritant for the situation in the country. The conflicting aims of the respective national movements of the Jews and the Arabs pitched the two peoples into a battle, in which the Jewish immigrants were by the Arabs as reinforcements for the Zionist cause. Without more substantial attempts at rapport than the Zionists offered, the Arabs had no choice but to oppose Jewish immigration in order to safeguard their own needs.
The issues between the Arabs and Jews were influenced by the all-important third party in Palestine -- the British. The British had several desires regarding the future of the Middle East and Palestine. In fact, were it not for the wishes of the British, the trouble of later years might not have arisen, due to the fact that the extent of Jewish immigration would not have been as large as it was.

The milieu of British politics during the early Twentieth Century was rooted in colonialism. The British Empire stretched from the tropical paradise of the Bahamas to the squalor of the Indian subcontinent. The key to the maintenance of this great empire was the power of the British armed forces; the army was powerful, and of course the navy freely roamed the seas. One of the major links that aided the navy's ability to defend the empire was the Suez Canal, connecting the Mediterranean with the Red Sea, an adjunct of the Indian Ocean. The canal was the key to India.

The British came to realize during their involvement in World War One that this vital route was vulnerable. The Turks had launched a campaign from the Sinai Desert aimed at capturing the canal, but were repulsed. The episode alerted the British to the desirability of establishing themselves in this area for the security of both the canal and the empire.

Securing the Sinai Desert meant taking possession of one of the true crossroads of civilization -- the land of Palestine. During this time it was the property of the Ottoman Turks, with whom the British were at war. It could be taken as part of the spoils of
victory, but circumstances wouldn't permit such an uncomplicated action. Palestine is a special land that has always held a unique attraction for many civilizations. It is the Holy Land, where prophets of the Old and New Testaments and the Koran followed their destinies. It was coveted for centuries by Jews, Moslems, and Christians, with passions that ran high. Britain had to reach accord with the Allies regarding the status of Palestine; the French claimed interest in the area, and so did the Russians. However, the newly-found strategic importance of Palestine to the British dictated that no other power could have sole occupation of the territory.

Through secret negotiations, the British satisfied their desires. In an arrangement with France, to which Russia gave its approval, it was agreed that Britain and France would acquire certain territory of the Ottoman Empire to administer completely; certain Arab lands would become independent; Palestine would become internationalized. Thus, the famous Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 was to form the basis of the post-war geography of the Middle East.

Britain recognized certain facts regarding the conduct of the war in the Middle East. First, the Arabs, who were not engaged in combat yet, might conceivably fight against the Allies. The Arabs were mostly Moslem, like the Turks, and would side with their co-religionists should a "Jihad" -- a Holy War -- be declared. Second, the Turks would be hardpressed to repel advancing Allied troops should the Turks also be confronted with an uprising by the Arabs. The British decided that an incentive was needed to ensure the cooperation and friendship of the Arabs; the promise of post-war independence served this purpose well.

However, the European war effort of the Allies began to falter in 1917. The battle lines had stagnated in Europe; Russia was on
the verge of a revolution and was virtually out of the war. The Allies needed help. They turned for this aid towards Jewry, particularly the Zionists.

It was strange for the Allies to seek help in this direction. The Jews did not constitute a tangible state with material might. Yet it could not be denied that the Jews possessed great resources; popular opinion among many statesmen of the time attributed considerable influence in politics to the Jews. It was known by Britain that the Central Powers had been approached by the Zionists with a proposal for Zionist involvement in Palestine. In British opinion, it would be disasterous for them should Jewry align itself with the Central Powers. Since it was believed that Jewish efforts for the Allies would be invaluable, the British believed that an incentive for Jewish cooperation was needed.

Such incentive was not hard to determine. The movement to facilitate the return of Jews to Palestine was well known by British politicians. Representatives of the Zionist movement, notably Dr. Chaim Weizmann, had contacted the British. Western nations commonly viewed the Zionists as being very influential among the Jews of the world. The Zionists were also believed to have access to ample financial resources. Britain believed it was conceivable that Jewish support for the war effort could persuade Russian Jews to oppose the revolution brewing in Russia and keep that country in the war. But there was possibly an even greater gain in obtaining Jewish support, according to the Statesman Lloyd George. He believed that Jewish influence was keeping the United States out of the war. He thought that the United States would enter the war if this opposition was overcome, and the tide of battle would turn in favor of the Allies.
Thus the British embarked upon a course which would lead to the issuance of two pledges. One was to the Arabs, promising sovereignty over their native lands. The other was to the Zionists promising sanction of their efforts to resettle Jews in Palestine. The extent to which this obligation would be carried out became the crux of the Palestine dilemma, as Jewish immigration spawned more and more unrest. The two assurances committed Britain to an immense juggling act in an effort to fulfill its word.

BRITISH ASSURANCES

The British delineated the extent of Arab territory which was promised independence following the war in a series of letters between Sir Henry MacMahon and the Sherif Hussain, the leader of the portion of Arabia known as the Hejaz. In deference to the then secret Sykes-Picot agreement, the British intended to exclude Palestine from this area. The Sherif seemingly agreed. This settlement formed the basis of all subsequent conversations with the Arabs regarding sovereignty.

The British had started making promises to the Arabs during the war. They dropped leaflets over the Turkish Army urging Arabs conscripted into military service to desert and join the Allies -- in return for victory, the Arabs would gain their independence. Without such declarations, it is doubtful that the Arabs would have revolted against the Turks.

Following the war, the British made reassurances to the Arabs about their intentions. In a declaration to seven Arab delegates in June, 1918, the British stated that the policy of the British Government regarding the territory occupied by the Allies would be that "the future government of these territories should be based upon the principle of the consent of the governed." It appeared
to the Arabs that Britain would even include self-rule in Palestine. In a statement issued on November 7, 1918, Britain pledged to allow Palestine to choose its own government. Thus there appeared to be ample reason for the Arabs to believe that Britain was committed irrevocably to the extension of self-rule to them.

The statement of November, 1918 was an obvious repudiation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Indeed, the accord was permitted to lapse voluntarily by Britain and France. But it was not abandoned in favor of Arab sovereignty. The pact's abandonment came about as a result of a grant to the Zionists of a major role in post-war Palestine: the November, 1918 statement followed long after the issuance of the Balfour Declaration, which committed the British to the establishment of a "Jewish National Home" in Palestine.

The Zionists in Britain had campaigned for years for a Jewish national home. However, their visible support within the government seemed limited. Sir Herbert Samuel, a governmental figure who was Jewish, had expressed thoughts about the establishment of a Jewish enclave in Palestine back in 1914. But this idea was received coolly by the government at that time, which was headed up by Lord Asquith. It wasn't until another Zionist (whom Samuel introduced to key figures) became widely popular with the government that succeeded Asquith's that progress was made toward the establishment of the National Home. This Zionist was Chaim Weizmann, and the government was that of Lloyd George.30

The Lloyd George government began to have doubts not too long after the conclusion of the Sykes-Picot Agreement about its efficacy. There was doubt that British interests in Palestine would be adequately protected under an international administration. Within the government,
interest in the proposals of the Zionists increased. It was known that they were seeking British guarantees for the existence of the Jewish National Home, perhaps by placing it under British jurisdiction as a protectorate. Backing for the Zionists soon grew within the Lloyd George government. Lord Balfour became a herald in the government for the Zionists, giving them wholehearted support. The Zionists were also able to persuade Sir Mark Sykes, the British negotiator in the Sykes-Picot agreement, about the value of their plans to Britain. They were instrumental in influencing the debate of the War Cabinet regarding the manner in which to deal with Palestine following the war. Lord Balfour had the Zionists admitted to the discussions, and in the course of these dialogues the language of British and Zionist involvement in Palestine was worked out. This involvement was explained in a letter from Lord Balfour to Lord Rothschild, another prominent Zionist; the message contained in the letter constituted the now-famous Balfour Declaration.

Repudiation of the Sykes-Picot agreement before the end of the war would seem likely to produce great friction between the French and the British. Actually, this conflict was muted. One reason was the turmoil brewing in Russia. It didn't appear prudent to the British and the French to permit Russian participation in the post-war Middle East, since Russia was on the brink of a revolution. Further, since it was believed by France too that the power of worldwide Jewry could be a force in ending the war, France acquiesced to the decision to abrogate the pact for the sake of the war effort. It is ironic that a religious noted for a history of persecution should command such great respect among the combatants of World War One.
The net effect of British maneuvering before 1920 was the encouragement to the Arabs and to the Zionists that their aspirations would be satisfied. Both the Arabs and the Jews were given false expectations; the Arabs anticipated unqualified freedom and the Zionists foresaw clear sailing when relocating Jews in Palestine. The false hopes concerning the future of Palestine, especially regarding Jewish immigration into the country were additional factors contributing to the Palestine quandary.

THE EFFECT OF POPULAR ATTITUDES

The ready acceptance of Zionism by the British was grounded not only in the political benefits to the empire; it was also a result of Western attitudes of the time. It was an era of romantic ideals; there was talk about the self-determination by nations of their fate, of fighting a "war to end all wars." There were popular concepts regarding the nature of Jews and the Arabs.

The Protestant British viewed the Jews as the people of the Old Testament; the Jews were the children of Israel, who had lived in the Promised Land centuries before. It seemed that there was a glorious opportunity before the world now -- a chance to repatriate the Jews to their lost homeland. Such prominent Britons as Neville Chamberlain, Sir Samuel Hoare, Sir Thomas Inskip, and Mr. Ormsby-Gore, stated in a memorandum to the British government regarding the National Home:

_We further wish to impress upon His Majesty's Government our sense of the desirability both in the interest of the sacred land of Palestine as well as in the interest of the Jewish people, which has...awaited the hour of its restoration to its ancestral home._
The Prime Minister of the post-war government, Lloyd George, found the idea of returning the Jews to the Holy Land attractive. Lord Reading told Sir Herbert Samuel that his proposals of a Jewish national home appealed to the "poetic and imaginative" as well as to the romantic and religious qualities of his Lloyd George's mind. Lord Asquith was a bit less complimentary about Lloyd George though, saying that he didn't really care about the Jews, but merely saw them as a means of keeping "agnostic" France out of Palestine.

Common opinion regarding the Arabs and the Jews was instrumental in shaping policy for Palestine. The Arabs were viewed by the British as an uncivilized, backward people. The Jews were seen as a people of great culture, whose potential was stifled by the separation from their homeland. It was believed that the Jews would "civilize" the Arabs and make them "productive." Arab supporters in England held that the centuries-long absence from Palestine nullified any claim that the Jews had to the land. Zionist supporters in Britain countered that "mere physical possession, without contributions either to the land itself or to world culture, should not confer upon the Arabs a right to bar the virile and productive Hebrews from an opportunity to make a distinctive contribution to world civilization." Sir Mark Sykes wrote to the French minister Georges Picot that if the Jews' aspirations in Palestine were met, an ordered and developed Middle East would result. Since post-war stability in the area was desirable for the welfare of the Allies' interests, this argument was probably helpful in persuading France to renounce her desires in Palestine.

But some of the language of the time indicates that, in addition to qualitative judgements about Palestine, outright ignorance
about the area was involved in molding British opinion. Britain did not understand the nature of the Arab nationalism that was rising in the Middle East. It was a more potent force in Palestine than was believed; the nationalistic sentiment would not permit subjugation of the Arabs to a Hebrew culture. Nasir attributed the success of the British Cabinet ministers who backed Zionism in acquiring support from the government to the general misconceptions that were prevalent. It seemed, almost, that the fact that Arabs lived in Palestine was being completely ignored. Lord Robert Cecil, in a speech he gave, spoke of the government's wish that "Arabian countries shall be for the Arabs...and Judea for the Jews." He presumably thought that the Jews were the majority of the population, whereas in reality, the Arabs formed 93% of it.

THE INSTRUMENTS OF BRITISH INVOLVEMENT IN PALESTINE

The culmination of the factors at work in 1917 in Britain and Europe was issuance of the controversial Balfour Declaration. The Zionists were anxious at this time to receive official commitment to their cause from the British. The War Cabinet was currently debating what the British policy in the Middle East following the war would be. Lord Balfour was actively pressing the Zionist's case. The Zionists sought a statement which recognized their right to build up a Jewish cultural and national life in Palestine. Lord Rothschild sent to the War Cabinet a proposed draft which called for the recognition of Palestine as "The National Home of the Jewish People...." Objections to this wording arose within the Cabinet and resulted in a compromise text. Lord Balfour conveyed this version to Lord Rothschild in a letter:

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National
Home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

The Balfour Declaration formed the basis of British involvement in Palestine.

The Declaration worried the Arab nationalists, for they saw in it a threat to their position and desires in Palestine. The British sent an envoy, a Colonel Hogarth, to meet with the Sherif Hussain to clarify British intent to him and thereby alleviate Arab fears. Hogarth informed Hussain that the Zionist program in Palestine would be carried out in a fashion consistent with the economic and political freedom of the Arabs. Hussain was convinced of the sincerity of this message and voiced support of the Zionist aims within this context. Other Arab leaders, however, were not assuaged.

While the Balfour Declaration established the climate of British involvement in Palestine, the major instrument of this involvement was the League of Nations' Mandate for Palestine, which went into effect in 1922. This was the charter by which the obligations and responsibilities of Great Britain as the Mandatory were defined. The text of the Mandate makes several significant assertions and requirements. First, the preamble of the Mandate gives official international recognition to the Balfour Declaration and to the Jewish National Home:

The Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2, 1917, by the government of His Britannic Majesty, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish People, it being
clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country..."

It is interesting to note that the term "non-Jewish communities" is used in the clause defining the restrictions regarding the establishment of the National Home, and not the term Arabic; further, the clause regarding the protection of the rights and political status of Jews in countries other than Palestine is interesting.

It is not necessary to expound upon all of the provisions of the Mandate. The following articles are the ones of greatest significance:

Article 1 limits the terms of administration by Britain to the references of the Mandate.

Article 2 requires Britain to place the country under the conditions which will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home; to develop self-governing institutions; and for safeguarding the religious and civil rights of the entire populace of Palestine, "irrespective of race and religion." 42

Article 4 recognizes "an appropriate Jewish Agency" to assist the British in developing the country (this agency was identified later as the Zionist Organization). The Jewish Agency was instructed to represent World Jewry, not just Palestinian Jewry.

Article 6 states: "The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in cooperation with the Jewish Agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including state lands and waste lands not required for public purposes." 43
Article 7 requires the British administration to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up residence in Palestine.

Article 11 requires the British to set up a land system appropriate to the needs of Palestine, with regard to the desirability of promoting close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land.

Articles 13 and 14 deal with administration of the Holy Sites in Palestine.

Article 15 declares: "No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion, or language." 44

Article 27 requires consent of the Council of the League of Nations for any modification of the terms of the Mandate.

The Mandate did not give provisional independence to Palestine; the British had full legislative powers. The Arabs often viewed this fact as a betrayal of various statements previously made by the British to them. The Mandate never gave much recognition of Arab nationalism throughout its text. No references to the Arabs ever appear in its language; as the Peel Commission report on riots in 1936 stated on page 32: "Unquestionably...the primary purpose of the Mandate, as expressed in its preamble and its articles, is to promote the establishment of the Jewish National Home." The Mandate was conceived by sympathizers with the Balfour Declaration as the best manner in which to enact it. 45

What character was intended for the National Home? Many British statesmen equated the term "Jewish National Home" with the term "Jewish State." 46 Certainly many statesmen thought of some form of sovereignty for the Jewish community. Sir Herbert Samuel thought a "great autonomous Jewish community" should be established.
Lord Balfour told the War Cabinet in 1920 that he understood that the National Home would take the form of a protectorate continuing until conditions were adequate for a Jewish state to arise; the development of a Jewish state would thus be gradual and not immediate. General Smuts of the War Cabinet spoke of a "great Jewish state" rising again. It is undeniable that sentiment for a Jewish state was widespread among the other Allies as well—President Wilson was known to favor it, and an American report submitted to one of the peace conferences following the close of World War One recommended that Palestine be recognized as a Jewish state.47

The Balfour Declaration could be construed as intending the erection of a Jewish state. Many statesmen believed the term "National Home" to be synonymous with the term state. Of particular interest is Lloyd George's interpretation of the Declaration. He wrote:

It was contemplated that when the time arrived for according representative institutions to Palestine, if the Jews had meanwhile responded to the opportunity afforded them by the idea of a national home and had become a definite majority of the inhabitants, then Palestine would thus become a Jewish commonwealth.48

The language of the Declaration seemed to other British officials to point in the same direction that Lloyd George perceived it to. The Colonial Office wrote to a delegation of Palestinian Arabs in 1922 that the Balfour Declaration provided first for the establishment of the Jewish National Home and only secondly for the preservation or the rights and interests of the non-Jewish population of the country. The Declaration mentioned only "civil and religious" rights of the Arabs, and was not explicit regarding political rights of the Arabs. Lord Grey of Fallodon, a member of Parliament, stated the dilemma of the Balfour Declaration in 1923:
"I think we are placed in a considerable difficulty by the Balfour Declaration itself... A Zionist home, my Lords, means or implies a Zionist government... I do not see how you can establish other than an Arab government without prejudice to their civil rights."40

None of the subtleties of the arguments regarding the meaning of the Declaration were lost upon the Zionists. Certainly they seized upon the prevalent contention that the Balfour Declaration was a promise to the Jews of the world and not only to those Jews in Palestine. The ambiguity of intent among the British government could only have encouraged the Zionists to press their plans as vigorously as possible in order to test the possibilities. The Peel Commission stated that the Zionist leaders recognized that a Jewish state was not expressly prohibited by the Declaration.50

The Arab reaction was somewhat tempered. Some did not object greatly to the Declaration after they believed that the Zionist program was going to be carried out within prescribed limits -- this assurance was given to them during the Hogarth conversation. But others initially saw a threat to their objectives in the Declaration. The King-Crane Commission gave support to these worries. They reported: "If... the strict terms of the Balfour Declaration are adhered to... the extreme Zionist programme must be greatly modified... the erection of such a Jewish state (cannot) be accomplished without the gravest trespass upon the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine."51

Since the language of diplomacy is one of vagueness, the ambiguity of the Balfour Declaration was deliberate, in order to provide for Britain's convenience. The inexact nature of the Declaration allowed the British to utilize differing interpretations to meet different situations. During the latter days of the Mandate,
the terms of reference of the Balfour Declaration were invoked as a virtual repudiation of the Declaration itself. The Shaw Commission, which investigated riots in Palestine in 1927, stated that the confusing quality of the Balfour Declaration was one of the major problems that Britain and Palestine faced during the administration of the Mandate.

The British Mandate in Palestine was the outgrowth of the visions that the Allied Powers had for re-structuring the Middle East; the League of Nations was chosen to be the vehicle through which these dreams would be realized. The Mandate's basic philosophy was grounded in paragraph 4 of article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. It was stated here that the development and welfare of "backward societies" was a charge of the advanced nations of the world. The paragraph further stated that certain territories of the old Ottoman Empire were ready for independence and some were not. In those that were ready, the wishes of the populace had to be considered in selecting the Mandatory, the country which would provide guidance until the territory was ready to stand on its own.

The Arabian Peninsula and the lands in the area traditionally called Mesopotamia were accorded the benefits mentioned in article 22. Thus Iraq, Syria and the western portion of Syria called the Lebanon became what were known as "A" mandates -- areas to be accorded full independence after a short mandate period. But southern Syria -- the land of Palestine -- was not to be granted full A mandate status. Palestine was to be subjected to special treatment, for it would hardly be fair to the Jews to merely consider the desires of the existing populace of the Arabs, even though the Palestinian Arabs expected to be treated in the way article 22 provided for A mandates.
The British, with support of the Allied Powers, were determined to prepare Palestine for the establishment of the Jewish National Home. The British were prepared to ignore the nationalistic call of the Palestinian Arabs for self-determination. The Peel Commission of 1936 reported that the application of the Mandate system was meant to be conducted even in Palestine in the interest of the "well-being and development" of the existing population. But Lord Balfour once stated that there was to be a deliberate contradiction between the Covenant of the League of Nations and the policy of Allies in the case of Palestine; not even the pretense of consulting the Arab populace about their wishes was to be undertaken. Lord Milner, who was actually an Arab supporter, declared to the House of Commons in June, 1923:

Palestine can never be regarded as a country on the same footing as the other Arab countries... It is a sacred land to the Arabs but it is also a sacred land to the Jews and Christians; and the future of Palestine cannot possibly be left to be determined by the temporary impressions and feelings of the Arab majority in the country of the present day.52

Winston Churchill voiced opposition to provisional independence for Palestine because he felt it would be used by the Arabs to nullify the provisions of the Balfour Declaration. He firmly believed that the Balfour Declaration was a binding obligation upon Great Britain and that, because it was issued prior to the formulation of the League of Nations' promises, the Balfour Declaration took priority over the provisions of article 22 of the Covenant.

The initial consensus among the parties administering the Mandate about the fundamental purpose of the document also reflected the attitudes towards the importance of the Balfour Declaration; it
was held by the Peel Commission that it was unquestionable that the major purpose of the Mandate was to establish the Jewish National Home. The Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, the supervisory body of all the Mandates, concluded that undertaking towards the National Home was the Mandate's primary drift. Winston Churchill commented that this direction was also his understanding of the main obligations.

Interpretations such as these seem to indicate that the readers of the Mandate perceived the political status of the Arabs as a secondary matter. This interpretation, coupled with the Zionist sympathies of many British government officials, might lead one to suspect that the thrust of British administrative policy in Palestine was towards the creation of a Jewish state. In fact, Mandate policy never reflected this position. The British government decided against converting Palestine into a Jewish state. In a 1922 white paper, Winston Churchill elaborated the initial policy of the British government towards the relationship of the National Home, the Arabs, and Palestine. He stated that the government did not seek to convert Palestine into a Jewish state. He wrote: "The terms of the (Balfour) Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a home should be founded in Palestine." He further stated that what was sought in Palestine was "the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a center in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride." Thus it appeared that policy would not be directed towards establishing Jewish sovereignty over -- or in -- Palestine. The prevailing theme of the British administration in Palestine during the Mandate was
that the Jewish community in Palestine should not have a separate political status; rather, Palestine should become a bi-national state of Arabs and Jews.

In terms of the objective of converting Palestine into a bi-national state, the Mandate was a singularly poor text. It was littered with ambiguities and contradictions. The Peel Commission reported that there were several important obligations imposed upon Britain. Articles 2 and 6 were largely in reference to the Jewish National Home; sections of articles 2 and 3 were intended to equally affect Jews and Arabs; provisions for safeguarding the rights of all inhabitants were mainly intended for Arabs; and obligations to protect the Holy Places were intended equally for Jews, Arabs, and others in Palestine. However, the exact responsibilities were clouded by vague language in the Mandate. Much argument developed over the meaning of such phrases as "other sections" and "rights and position."54

The Arabs often contended that the Mandate required Britain to set up self-governing institutions which would lead to Arab rule. Britain rejected these arguments on grounds that such action would probably hamper the development of the Jewish National Home. Support for Britain's position came from Professor Reppard of the Permanent Mandates Commission -- he commented that he understood the requirements of creating self-governing institutions were to be enacted "in so far as they did not prevent that home (the Jewish National Home) from being established."55 The Mandate used the definite article (the) in referring to the program for the Jews. Hence, it would seem that the Mandate envisioned turning all of Palestine into the Jewish National Home, and not merely the establishment of such a home within the country. Under this interpretation, it
would seem that the only reasonable meaning of the Mandate's provisions regarding self-governing institutions is that these institutions would have to be aimed at the primary purpose of the Mandate -- the establishment of the Jewish National Home. Understandably, the Arabs refused to accept such a position.

Article 6 of the Mandate referred to immigration and settlement of Jews in the country. Arabs argued that this article actually restricted Jewish immigration according to the effect it was having upon Arab rights; if immigration infringed upon these rights, it would have to be curtailed. Yet there was no justification for an interpretation that Jews were required to remain the minority party of Palestine. Again, the vagueness of the Mandate allowed for conflict to develop over its enactment.

Two major commissions investigating the problem in Palestine under the Mandate criticized the document as being a major cause of the difficulty the British encountered in administering the country. The Shaw commission, which investigated the disturbances of the late 1920's, stated on page 144 of its report that the ambiguities of the Mandate made it impossible for Britain to govern without being criticized by either the Arabs or the Jews. The Peel Commission, which investigated the disturbances of 1936, concluded on page 112 of its report:

The general uncertainty accentuated by the ambiguities of certain phrases in the Mandate, as to the ultimate intent of the Mandatory power...has aggravated all the difficulties of the situation, and in particular has A) stimulated the Jewish desires to expand and consolidate their position in Palestine as quickly as may be and B) made it possible for the Arabs to interpret the conciliatory policy of the Palestine Government...as showing that the British determination to implement the Balfour Declaration is not wholehearted.
Thus the very guidelines for British involvement in Palestine were attacked for hindering Britain's actions in fulfilling its responsibilities.

The framers of the Mandate were not interested in the problems of converting Palestine into a bi-national state. They were interested in solving the problems of the Jewish people by enabling them to develop a national home in Palestine. This idealism left Britain with a host of dilemmas for which no ready solution was available under straightforward interpretation of the Mandate. Britain had forsaken the idea of turning over Palestine to the Jews. Eventually Britain found that it was forced to repudiate the original interpretation of the Mandate and, for the sake of peace, vastly restrict the activities relating to the Jewish National Home.

The effect that the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate had upon the Zionists was one of the most important results. The Zionists were encouraged to seek the maximum achievement possible for their goals. The Zionists were never persuaded to be flexible. Thus they were not inclined to accept anything short of a massive program to inject a stronger Jewish presence in Palestine. The adamant nature of this position was reflected in the Zionist's demands for ever-increasing immigration.
IMMIGRATION AND THE MANDATE

EXPECTATIONS REGARDING IMMIGRATION

The heart of the conflict which developed between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine lay in the widespread immigration of Jews into Palestine. There were many immediate issues of great volatility, but exacerbating all of these was the continuing flow of Jews into the country.

There can be no doubt that a large scale immigration of Jews into Palestine was conceived of from the beginning of British interest in Palestine. There were numerous factors backing such immigration, such as the sentimental support among many British officials regarding the return of the Jews to their native land; this sentiment could only have meant a desire to clear the way for the Jews to enter the country. There were the beliefs held by the British about the backward cultural state of the Arabs. "Civilizing" them through the example of Jewish labors in Palestine was an idea that held popular sway; this concept too could only have meant that the influx of Jewish workers into the country was conceived in large terms. There was the concept that the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate were not just promises to the existing Jewish community in Palestine, but instead to the Jewish people of the world at large -- the aforementioned documents were an invitation to them to return to their home. Finally, there was the language of the Mandate, requiring Britain to facilitate immigration and close settlement of Jews upon the land. Thus there can be no doubt that Britain and the League of Nations were determined to allow the entry of large numbers of Jews into Palestine.

It was a benevolent, well intentioned and horribly unworkable idea. It was guilty of the same fault that characterized Zionist
planning in general -- it did not take into account the opinions and decisions of the Arabs. The British didn't believe that there would be any conflict between the Jews and the Arabs. Lord Finlay, the Lord of Appeals, wrote to the League of Nations in August, 1921, while debate about the Mandate was proceeding, that "there is no reason for assuming that the establishment of the Jewish National Home incompatible with the well-being and development of the (Arab) people of Palestine... ." If anything, the British were encouraged to believe that cooperation between the Arabs and the Jews was assured. Chaim Weizmann and the Emir Faisal had worked out an agreement through which the Zionist program was to be carried out. Faisal and the Sherif Hussein had both vocalized their acceptance of the National Home -- why, then, should it fail?

The fault lay in different interpretations of the extent to which the Zionist program was to be fulfilled. According to Arab thought, the Zionists were to be permitted at most a limited immigration in order to strengthen the existing Jewish community so that it might retain its national character in an Arab land. The Zionists believed that there were to be no restrictions upon their entry into the country. They saw nothing in the Balfour Declaration or the Mandate which restricted them to remaining the minority of the country. Thus the stage was set for the collision between two cultures, two religions, and two nationalisms.

In July, 1932, the British government stated that immigration of Jews and their close settlement upon the land were indispensable in carrying out the Mandate. In 1937, the British asserted that there was nothing in the Mandate which required that immigration be allowed to continue indefinitely in order to establish the
Jewish National Home. The British, when caught in the middle of the imbroglio, embarked upon an inexorable course of gradually repudiating support for the Zionist program.

EARLY TROUBLES

The course of the Mandate was a pattern of increasing alienation between the Arabs and the Jews. Immigration was the fundamental factor augmenting the hostility that plagued British administration of Palestine. As more Jews poured into Palestine, issues became more pressing and mutual Arab-Jewish resentment swelled.

British administration essentially began with the military occupation of Palestine during World War One. Britain initially followed the custom of administering a conquered territory according to the laws of the vanquished power. However, Britain shortly began to prepare for the implementation of the Zionist program. In March, 1917, the War Office issued a 5-point program for settling the Jews in Palestine. In 1918, the Zionist Commission in Britain was charged with carrying out steps leading to the creation of the National Home. The Commission's responsibility was to help assure that good relations should prevail between the Arabs and the Jews. That year, Chaim Weizmann went to Palestine to begin meeting with various Arab notaries in an attempt to establish rapport.

Initially, it appeared that Arab-Jewish relations would be good. When in 1918 Colonel Hogarth went to speak with the Sherif Hussain in order to clarify British intentions in Palestine, he received encouragement from Hussain. Hussain sent messages to various followers assuring them that the British intended to protect Arab sovereignty. He also exhorted his sons to help allay suspicion about the meaning of the Balfour Declaration, and in a
written article he called upon the Arab population in Palestine: "to welcome the Jews as brethren and cooperate with them for the common welfare." 58

The Emir Faisal also expressed hopeful wishes. He announced in 1918 that he hoped both Arabs and Jews would make progress toward realization of their objectives. In June of that year, Dr. Weizmann visited Faisal in Aqaba to assure him that the Zionists were not seeking the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine and desired economic cooperation with the Arabs. 59 The outcome of their talks was the so-called Faisal-Weizmann Agreement of 1918. In this document, it was proclaimed that both Arab and Jew were aware of racial kinship. The document goes on to indicate that it accepts the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine, which is remarkable in light of Weizmann's disclaimers regarding the issue. The agreement called for the definition of boundaries between "the Arab State and Palestine"; for the exchange of "duly accredited agents" (ambassadors) between the Arab state and Palestine; for the establishment of provisions ensuring that the Balfour Declaration would be enacted in the constitution of Palestine, and finally encourage and stimulate immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale... . 60 But Faisal also stipulated that the agreement would be valid only if Britain fulfilled her promises of Arab independence. 61 In any event, the agreement provided the Zionists with further encouragement about establishing a Jewish state.

Thus it seemed to the British War Cabinet in December, 1918, that an "era of good feelings" existed between the Jews and Arabs, and that the Arabs would accept reasonable Jewish immigration into Palestine; they resolved that it would be good policy for Britain to administer Palestine according to the plans the government had
made. However, the climate of good relations was more illusory than real. It was true that the Syrian delegation to the World War One Peace Conference had stated that the Jews would rule in Palestine should they become the majority. But in 1919, the General Syrian Congress declared that they viewed the Zionists as a threat to their political and economic status. The Sherif Hussain's statements of good will towards the Jews were representative of Arab opinion before the onset of political Zionism. The fact was that the Arabs had to deal with politically active Zionists as the bulk of the Jewish community after the immigration program commenced. Moreover, Hussain's stance reflected the position of only one political faction among the Arab nationalists.

Hussain was the patriarch of the Arab clan known as the Hashemites; Faisal of Syria was one of his sons, and so was Abdullah, who eventually ascended the throne of Trans-Jordan. Hussain had declared himself king of the Hejaz (a region of Arabia) in 1916. However, he had greater ambitions; he envisioned the formation of a great Arab confederation consisting of all Arabic lands, with himself as its head of course. He and his kinsmen were interested in finding a formula which would achieve this goal of confederation by satisfying the interests of all parties -- the British, the Arabs, and the Jews. It was most imperative, according to Hussain's beliefs, that the British be satisfied with the plan; he correctly saw them as the key to the success of any political scheme in the Middle East. Taken in this context, the statements issued by Hussain to Colonel Hogarth and the Faisal-Weizmann Agreement show themselves to be very self-serving.

In Palestine, the political attitudes were much more provincial. The desires of the leaders in Palestine were to preserve the territorial
integrity of Syria, as long as this seemed possible, and to counter the Zionist program. These aims were enmeshed within grass-roots politics, for one of the overriding concerns of the Palestinian effendis was the maintenance of their power and position. It was generally accepted by the effendis that a Jewish incursion into the Arabic character of Palestine would affect their status; therefore, it was important to them that the Zionists be contained.

There were two major factions in Palestine -- the Hussinis (no relation to the Hashemites' Hussain) and the Nashashibi-Dajini alliance. Of the two, the Hussinis were the dominant party. Both groups opposed the Jewish National Home. The Nashashibi-Dajini group sometimes seemed to be more willing than the Hussinis to Jewish development in Palestine. But this tolerance was merely an appearance designed to curry the favor of the British in an attempt to gain political advantage over the Hussinis. When it appeared that belligerence towards the Jews would gain Arab support, the Nashashibi-Dajini faction would adopt such a position.

It was the Hussinis in the long run who held sway over Arab relations with the Jews. The two most powerful members of the cabal, Mohammed Amin al-Husaini and Musa Kazem, held the most important positions among the Arab nationalists. Kazem became the head of the Arab executive, which claimed to speak officially for the Arab nationalist movement, and Amin al-Husaini became the Mufti of Jerusalem and the president of the Supreme Moslem Council. He was a feudal, intransigent man who was responsible for inciting much opposition to the Jews within the Arab national movement in Palestine.

The Hussinis were ardent rivals of the Hashemites, although they didn't subscribe to vast Pan-Arabic ideals. When Colonel
T. E. Lawrence (the famous Lawrence of Arabia) told them that Faisal was prepared to "make a deal with the devil, let alone the Jews" in order to overcome the French threat to Syria.\(^6\) The Husainis felt that action was needed to protect their position. Their strategy in political dealings was to play the British against the French, and the Jews against both. Thus, Kazem and Amin al-Husaini took the initiative in 1918 to meet with Chaim Weizmann, who was visiting the Middle East in an attempt to build rapport between the Arabs and the Zionists.

Weizmann blundered at the meeting by stating that the Zionists wished to establish a confederation of Palestine joined with a "Greater Arabia" under Hashemite rule. This position convinced the Husainis that there existed a conspiracy among the Zionists, the Hashemites, and the British for control of the area. Nevertheless, the Husainis offered terms of cooperation with the Zionists. They informed Weizmann that the Western ways of the Zionists were not welcome and would have to be changed; that not the slightest hint of "Bolshevism" would be tolerated; and that the Zionists should hold no further talks with the Hashemites without the presence of Palestinian and Syrian nationalists. At least one source reported that Weizmann agreed to these stipulations. However, one month after the meeting with the Husainis Weizmann met with Faisal. This action broke the reputed accords with the Husainis and hardened their opposition to the Zionist program. The activities of the Husainis to hinder the Zionists in later years presented some of the greatest obstacles to the smooth functioning of the Mandate.

The Palestinian leaders demanded complete acceptance of their terms in order to maintain control over the Zionists. These leaders regarded the Zionists as a threat to Arab political control over
Palestine. They even rejected the fundamental Zionist concept of historical connection to the land, because the Palestinian leaders believed that the Arabs owned Palestine outright. This rejection of the Zionists was based strictly upon politics and not religion; the "old" Jews of Palestine were treated amiably by the Arabs. The major thrust of Arab nationalism in Palestine was toward national independence under Arab control; therefore, the platforms of the Arab political parties in the country were opposed to the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate. The Sherif Husain and the Emir Faisal did not speak for the Palestinians -- any basis among the latter for acceptance of the Zionist's aims had been eliminated. Thus the forcing of Zionist endeavors upon the Palestinian Arabs by the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate could have only led to active resistance.

There was friction which existed well before the issuance of the Balfour Declaration. Native Palestinian Jews and Arabs did have respectable relations before 1914. They lived near each other, transacted business together; many Jews spoke Arabic. These "old" Jews were an unobtrusive minority; many were dependent upon charity for their survival. Relations were still amicable with very early immigrants. But with the influx of Zionists beginning around the turn of the century, Arab attitudes toward the Jews began to change. The Arabs saw these new arrivals as representative of a movement, supported by foreign powers and foreign funds, which threatened the lives of the Arabs as they knew it.

Clashes between Jews and Arabs began almost from the beginning of the entry of Zionists into Palestine. In 1891, some Arab figures complained to Turkish officials that the Jews were "depriving the Arabs of all lands, were taking over their trade, and were bringing
arms to the country. In 1868, there were reports that there had been numerous fights between Jews and Arabs. In 1905, an upsurge in Arab nationalism resulted in more attacks on Jews. A newspaper campaign in that year "reached even the fellahin in their mud huts and the Bedouin in their tents" in condemning the Jews and the Zionist movement. During the Turkish revolt of 1908, leaflets were distributed throughout Palestine asking Arabs not to sell any more land to Jews and demanding a halt to Zionist immigration. Press campaigns occurred again shortly before the outbreak of World War One, railing against Jewish settlement and land purchases. Thus, significant opposition to Zionist objectives was established in Palestine well before the issuance of the Balfour Declaration.

Zionist activity in Britain at the time when the Balfour Declaration was being considered was known to the Arabs, and it increased their apprehensions about the future of Arab rule in Palestine. General Clayton, the Chief Policy Officer in Cairo, wrote in December, 1917 that "the Arabs are still nervous...that the Zionist movement is progressing at a pace which threatens their interest."71

This apprehension which existed among the Arabs led to the failure of Weizmann's mission to establish understanding with them. He reported that the Zionist Commission found an unfavorable attitude among Arab officials, and negotiations failed to succeed. He stated that he found an atmosphere of fear and anxiety among the Arabs, as if the Jews were intending to enslave or ruin them.72 The Military Governor of Palestine, Ronald Storrs, added to Weizmann's statements that the Arabs and Christians of Palestine were extremely disturbed since Zionists arrived; articles in the British press and speeches by various Jewish figures gave the Arabs the impression that Jews were out to take over Palestine.
Further complicating the early efforts of the Zionists to implement the Balfour Declaration were poor relations between them and the British military administration. The military government regarded the Zionist's desires as a nuisance to its administration of the country. Vaisman reported that he found much personal prejudice among officials, and he said he feared that the deliberate mistreatment of the Jews by the military government would encourage opposition among the Arabs to the Zionist's plans.73

Vaisman wrote that Arab fears were due to misconceptions about Zionism and to the promulgation of these misconceptions by enemies of the Zionists. He said that by the time a civil administration succeeded the military government, the gap between the Arabs and the Jews was already difficult to bridge.74 But the Jews had to shoulder much of the blame for the situation. The Zionists gave too little consideration to the effect that their programs would have in Palestine among the Arabs. Critics charged that the Zionists paid remarkably little attention to the Arabs when formulating their policies -- they were simply too absorbed in their own nationalism to realize that the Arabs were undergoing a similar nationalist revival. The Zionists even seemed to hold the attitude that the Arabs had no right to do so.75 Lequer maintains that when the Balfour Declaration was issued, the Arabs were still cordial to the Jews, but found them unwilling to compromise. It was hard for the Jews to conceive of ways through which they could reach rapport with the Arabs; they also felt the need to concentrate only on their own requirements in order to keep from overextending their resources. In the long run, they lacked sufficient insight about the results of the course they had chosen; they were seeking nothing less than a position of ultimate power in Palestine, something that the
Arabs readily perceived. The stage was set for further deterioration of relations between the Arabs and the Jews and for further physical combat.

IMMIGRATION POLICY DURING BRITISH INvolvement

Although Jewish immigration had been occurring since the war ended, the first regulations governing it were enacted in 1920. In these, several categories of immigrants were established. The A class was comprised of those who were capable of supporting themselves. The B class consisted of those in religious occupations, orphans to be supported by institutions, and students. The C category contained persons with a prospect of employment. The D class consisted of the dependants of the other classes.

The first waves of immigration were small -- at the rate of less than 8000 per year -- but this rate was sufficient to arouse Arab opposition to the creation of the National Home. On the Moslem holiday of Nebi Musa in April, 1920, riots broke out in Jaffa -- many were killed in the melee. The following year, after immigration rates had risen, riots occurred again. The British government empowered a commission, led by Thomas Haycraft, to investigate the causes of the disturbances. The commission found that Arabs were infuriated by immigration and that the Jews accused the military administration with acquiescence to Arab violence towards them. The commission recommended a suspension of immigration. This cessation was enacted on May 14, 1921.

In response to the investigation, Sir Herbert Samuel, the High Commissioner of Palestine, ordered a revision of legislation governing immigration. Categories for professionals and laborers were created. Only those aspirants in the labor class with definite
prospects for work were allowed to immigrate; quarterly quotas were also established.

At this time, Sir Herbert Samuel helped in formulating the philosophy which was to govern immigration during most of the Mandate. This guideline was the concept of economic absorptive capacity. It meant that only as many immigrants as the economy in Palestine could provide for would be permitted to enter. This limit was initially determined by the economic strength of just the Jewish community in Palestine. Later in the Mandate, the government decided it would be judicious to include consideration of the economic condition of the country as a whole. Under this latter interpretation, the economic status of the Arabs was included in determining what level of Jewish immigration could be tolerated. The policy of economic absorptive capacity as the limiting factor for immigration was officialized by Secretary of State Winston Churchill in his 1922 white paper on Palestine.76

The Jewish Agency was given the responsibility by the British government to request a quota for immigration and to distribute immigration certificates to prospective immigrants. For workers, these certificates were granted under what was known as the labor schedule. Part A was comprised of experts and skilled workers who were specifically requested to immigrate to Palestine because of a need for their expertise. Part B consisted of non-specific experts and workers. Part C contained the relatives of workers. Part D encompassed general laborers with no specific skills. Part E was a category reserved for emergency purposes.

From 1921 to 1924, immigration averaged less than 8000 per year. In 1924, the rate increased to 12,580, and in 1925, 33,801 Jews entered the country. Although many of these people settled in urban
areas, notably Tel Aviv, many were purchasing land or were settling in the kibbutzim which were established on land acquired from Arabs. This transition of land ownership aggravated an existing fear of the Arabs and caused them further alarm. Furthermore, the economy of Palestine was showing a strain because of the new arrivals. In 1926 an economic setback hit the country, leaving many Arabs and Jews unemployed, and Arab resentment of Jews reached new heights.

To meet the exigencies of the situation, the government revised the immigration laws of 1926. Category A was placed under specific restrictions. In order to be granted permission to enter as a person of "independent means," professionals, merchants, and agricultural workers needed to possess 500 pounds sterling per year; orphans with support, religious officials, and students were added to this category. Category B contained the same classifications of Category A, but omitted the capital requirements. Category C was comprised of individuals who had job prospects in Palestine. The dependents of those in the previously mentioned categories were placed in category D.

The hardships of the economy led to a new development in the pattern of immigration. The government granted fewer labor certificates; 13,081 Jews immigrated into Palestine in 1926, and only 2,713 immigrated in 1927. But emigration of Jews finding conditions unsuitable for establishing themselves in the country commenced; 6,952 left in 1926, and 5,071 emigrated in 1927. Thus the ideal of the Jewish National Home seemed to be foundering, to the satisfaction of the Arabs.

The economic difficulties of the late 1920's were not sufficient to squelch the National Home though. Jewish nationalistic sentiment was given a tremendous boost by an incident in the year 1928; Arab
Nationalism was similarly inflamed. Disagreement between Arabs and Jews over religious worship at the Western Wall in Jerusalem in 1928 led to the outbreak of fighting and a subsequent campaign of nationalism by both sides. In 1929, the situation exploded into full scale rioting. To determine the causes of the problems angering the Jews and the Arabs, and to recommend solutions, a commission was dispatched to Palestine -- this body subsequently became known as the Shaw Commission.

Concerning immigration, the committee found several faults. It reported that many who entered Palestine as immigrants of independent means spent most of their capital constructing their home. They then had insufficient funds to establish themselves in their particular fields, thus becoming a burden upon the economy.

The Commission expressed the belief that the Zionist organization strayed from the policy of using the economic absorptive capacity in determining the extent of immigration. Further, the committee reported that in selecting immigrants for Palestine "it is the practice of the Federation (of Jewish Labor) to have regard to the political creed of the several possible immigrants rather than to their particular qualifications for admission to Palestine."77

The Commission recommended that a clear definition of immigration policy be issued by the government, and that it control immigration more strenuously. The Commission proposed that the distribution of labor certificates be more carefully regulated by the government. The Commission recommended that the excessive immigration of 1925 and 1926 be prevented from occurring again; further, it was suggested that the government consider the Arab birth rate when pondering immigration levels. The Commission also urged the government to consult with representatives of the non-Jewish populace regarding
immigration, and that the sections of the Balfour Declaration concerning the rights of non-Jews be clarified.

The overall tone of the Shaw Commission about Jewish immigration was a pessimistic one. The Commission regarded the matter as extremely troublesome; it declared: "We consider that the claims and demands which from the Zionist side have been advanced in regard to the future of Jewish immigration into Palestine have been such as to arouse apprehension in the Arab mind." The fire burning in Palestine was well fueled.

The Shaw Commission felt that there existed a strong link between the issues of land sales and immigration. It advised that a land survey be undertaken in Palestine, and pending completion of this report, immigration should be suspended. Such action was enacted by the government in May, 1930, and the imposed moratorium on immigration lasted until the land report, prepared by Sir John Hope-Simpson was submitted to the government.

The Hope-Simpson Report was presented to the government in 1930. In addition to discoursing on the land situation in Palestine, Hope-Simpson's report examined the immigration problem. His investigation found several undesirable practices. Hope-Simpson recommended that the government be more careful in regulating the distribution of labor certificates; he also recommended that illegal immigrants be expelled from Palestine. Hope-Simpson suggested that additional factors besides the economic strength of the Jewish community be included in determining the number of immigrants to be permitted to enter Palestine; such factors would include the level of Arab unemployment and the prediction of future unemployment in general in the country. Hope-Simpson also reported that the amount of land available for settling Jewish immigrants was very