minute. Nevertheless, he believed that a total of 20,000 additional immigrant families could enter Palestine and be absorbed into the economy successfully.

The first eight years of immigration under the Mandate showed excellent overall results for the National Home. The Jewish proportion of the entire population of Palestine in 1929 was 16.8% compared with 11% in 1922, the year of the inception of the Mandate. There were 154,330 Jews in Palestine as the decade of the 1920's ended. Economic conditions began to improve in Palestine with the approach of the 1930's; immigration began to rise because of new prosperity and consequent opportunity. However, a different reason was the major cause of a vast wave of immigration that characterized the Mandate in the 1930's. This was the arrival of Nazism in Europe.

In 1930, the immigration laws were revised in order to prevent undesirable growth of population in Palestine. To help rectify the problems of persons of independent means (category A immigrants) lacking sufficient funds to establish themselves after entering the country, the capital requirements for this classification were raised from 500 pounds sterling to 1000 pounds sterling, although some provisions were left for individuals with less than this sum to immigrate. Category B (those immigrants with characteristics similar to those in class A, but without the capital on hand) was totally eliminated. The classifications of supported persons, orphans, students, and religious figures were changed. Immigration levels remained fairly low at this time, however; 4,044 Jews entered the country in 1930. Nevertheless, there was a wind of change blowing in the air in 1930.

The British government was forced to examine its responsibilities in Palestine because of the violence that had so far marred its
its administration of the Mandate. On October 20, 1930, the British government issued a white paper (sometimes called the Passfield Paper) on policy in Palestine. Several reservations regarding the effects of previous immigration policy were noted. The Passfield Paper stated that "immigration should no longer be determined by the test of the country's economic absorptive capacity, but that other considerations...such as 'wide spread suspicion' (of Jews by Arabs)...and the desirability of improving 'mutual relations' (of Arabs and Jews)...should be taken into consideration." The Paper mentioned that as long as Arabs believed that Jewish immigration was hurting them economically, relations would be poor. The Paper also stated the belief that Jewish immigration should depend upon the condition of Arab employment; should this be adversely affected, immigration should be suspended. The White Paper of 1930 also expressed reservations about the ability to further settle Jews on land purchased for this purpose, since available land was becoming scarce.

Although the government reiterated its determination to fulfill its obligations under the Mandate, the reaction of Jewish officials was that the White Paper was a repudiation of these obligations. The Jewish reaction was that the White Paper was an "emphatic statement of the limitations which must be imposed upon the growth of the Jewish National Home." At the very least, it did indicate that the British were plagued by the problem of Jewish immigration. The Paper was clearly a proviso to the concept of economic absorptive capacity as promulgated in the Churchill Paper of 1922. Whereas the Churchill Paper mentioned that immigration shouldn't deprive work from any section of the population, the White Paper of 1930 stated that the results of Jewish immigration should not prevent other sections of the population from finding work.
There was substantial Jewish backlash directed at the policies which were regarded as constituting a threat to the Jewish National Home. As a result of this outcry, Prime Minister MacDonald clarified his position on Palestine policy in a letter to Dr. Weizmann in 1931. In it, he reaffirmed Britain's commitment to the Jews in all of the world and not just those in Palestine. MacDonald acknowledged that Britain was obligated by the Mandate to facilitate Jewish immigration and to encourage close settlement of Jews upon the land. He further declared that there was no intention on the part of the British Government to halt immigration and the growth of the Jewish National Home, nor to alter the means of determining allowable immigration. In short, MacDonald took a 180 degree turn from the policies of the White Paper of 1930 because of Jewish pressure.

In the early 1930's, economic conditions were again set back. This time because of crop failures due to drought and locusts. But immigration levels rose, although they didn't nearly approach the levels recorded in the mid-1920's. In 1932, 5,923 immigrants entered in the approved manner. However, illegal immigration had been steadily increasing, and the government recognized the illicit entry of 3,730 persons in 1932. Thus, there were in reality at least 9,500 new Jewish residents in Palestine that year. Tension flared again because of the situation in the country. In 1933, Arabs organized a boycott of Jewish and British goods in order to protest against the growth of the National Home. Riots also broke out in that year. Still, the British held fast to their course. In its annual report to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations in 1933, the Palestine administration reported that there was no change made, and none was planned, in the policy by which immigration was regulated according to the economic absorptive
capacity of the country.  

Immigration began to pick up momentum in 1933. The appearance of Nazi power in Germany, and associated anti-semitism against the Jewish community there and in other sections of Europe, persuaded 30,327 immigrants to enter Palestine in that year. The Arab Executive issued a manifesto in that year which condemned the new settlers, expressed fear caused by their acquisition of land in the country, and accused Britain of planning to "pave the road for driving the (Arab) Nation away from its homeland for foreigners to supersede it."  

In 1934, 42,357 immigrants entered the country. The Arabs began that year a new campaign to prevent more land transfers. They pressured against such sales and carried on a plan of organized trespass and litigation in order to impede further settlement of Jews. The Arabs, however, were unsuccessful in restraining immigration levels -- in 1935, 61,854 Jews entered the land of Palestine.  

The immigration figures for the years 1933-1935 were terrifying to the Arabs. The Jewish population in Palestine was brought to 370,483 out of 1,336,518 Palestinians in total, making the Jews 27.7% of the population. If Jewish immigration continued at those rates, in the 1940's the Jews would have become the majority of the population.  

By 1936, although most of the Jewish population had settled in urban areas, the rural population possessed 12% of the cultivable land -- a figure intolerable to the Arabs.  

For the Arabs, there seemed to be no redress for these grievances. When they complained about the extent of immigration, they were merely informed by the High Commissioner that the immigration levels hadn't surpassed the determined economic absorptive capacity of the country, and therefore, according to the Mandate, the entry
of Jews had to continue. Further, the Secretary of State for the Colonies told Arab leaders in 1935 that no change from the policy of economic absorptive capacity was contemplated. In the spring of 1936, a pair of incidents in which Arabs and Jews were murdered precipitated riots in Palestine. After these were quelled by the government, the Arab Higher Committee, which replaced the Arab Executive as the political arm of the Palestinian Arabs, organized on April 25 a general strike throughout the country to protest the conditions which upset the Arabs and led to the disturbances; the Arabs now felt that the only way to press their grievances now was through defiance of governmental authority. The Arabs reiterated their demands — the now familiar litany of terminating immigration and land sales.

The British government was slow in attempting to settle the strike, which lasted several months. In May, they offered to send a royal commission to Palestine to investigate the abrasive situation there, if the Arabs terminated the strike. The Arabs were cool to this idea, but the British decided that an investigation was warranted anyway. The commission left for Palestine in the fall of 1936; however, the convening of the commission gave no satisfaction to the Arabs. On the day of the commission's departure, a new immigration schedule for that quarter was issued. The Arabs, incensed that immigration wasn't halted for the duration of the hearings, resolved to refuse to cooperate with the Commission. The Arabs eventually changed their opinion and decided it was in their interest to lodge their grievances with the committee; the strike was ended on October 12, 1936, and the Arabs testified during a special extension of the commission's hearing.

The commission, which was referred to as the Peel Commission
after its presiding member, agreed with the Shaw Commission that considerable difficulty was created by Jewish immigration. The Peel Commission stated among the basic causes of the 1936 riots the following factors stemming from immigration: the continuance of immigration against Arab wishes; Arab fear that they would be swamped and dominated by Jews; cultural conflicts due to characteristics of the immigrants which differed from those of the Arabs; and Arab alarm at the extent of land transfers.

Peel carefully analyzed the underlying concept behind the management of immigration, the economic absorptive capacity of the country. Peel determined that it was being decided according to some additional factors than when the policy was first initiated; in addition to the strength of the Jewish community, the economic status of the Arabs was being considered, as the Shaw Commission and the Passfield Paper recommended earlier. The future prospects of the field of employment involved were taken into account as well. But the Commission felt that these additional considerations were still insufficient in determining the effect additional immigration would have upon the country. Economic criteria were misleading in regard to how the new immigrants would be accepted in the country. The economic absorptive capacity could have been increased due to the use of Jewish philanthropic funds in developing the National Home, but this fact disregarded the Arab hostility accompanying such growth. Thus the Commission believed that, in addition to purely economic criteria, "account of political, social or psychological considerations and indeed estimate of any such matter" figure in the determination of immigration levels.

Peel went on to make several recommendations regarding immigration. The Commission suggested that the entry of persons in class
A (those of independent means with 1000 pounds sterling capital) be regulated by a schedule just like class C (laborers) was. Feel felt that the distribution of all immigrant certificates should be approved by the High Commissioner as a precaution against the abuses that occurred previously. Since the smuggling of unauthorized immigrants had become so extensive due to the situation in Europe, Feel made several recommendations for dealing with illegal immigration.

The Commission suggested legalizing the status of all the illicit immigrants then in Palestine, but advised that a special frontier force be employed to help prevent additional smuggling from occurring. The Commission proposed that the burden of proving authorization for residence in Palestine be placed upon the immigrant.

The Commission made one bold proposal which was broadly criticized by Jewish figures. It suggested that the economic absorptive capacity be considered as the maximum level that immigration might reach, but not as the absolute determinant of immigration for the period in question. The Commission therefore recommended that for the next five years immigration be limited to a ceiling of 12,000 authorized entries each year. This proposition was criticized by Jewish authorities as a violation of the Mandate and a repudiation of the Balfour Declaration -- the now-familiar litany of the Jewish side in the conflict in Palestine.

The Peel Commission offered another radical idea for dealing with the problem of the Mandate. It recommended a partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states. Under this arrangement, the Jews would be able to conduct immigration into their country as they saw fit, without arousing Arab animosity.

The British government was interested in the idea and on July 7, 1937, issued a white paper accepting the policy of partition. The paper announced that a plan of partition would be investigated,
and pending completion of this plan, Jewish land purchases in projected Arab regions would be prohibited; in addition, immigration would be restricted to a limit of 8,000 entrants from all categories. But after the commission appointed to investigate partition possibilities filed three unsatisfactory schemes, the British government abandoned the attempt to parcel the country.

In 1932, economic conditions were poor in Palestine due to another Arab boycott aimed at protesting government policies. Yet the conditions in Europe were so much worse for the Jews; thus demand for immigration was high. An immigration ordinance passed to handle the situation contained among its provisions a new limit on immigration. The High Commissioner in Palestine was empowered to determine the total number of immigrants to be allowed in, and in addition he could determine the proportion of Jews to be included in that figure. Thus the Jews would no longer possess a special status for immigrating into Palestine, according to this plan. There was immense Jewish reaction against this policy, as might have been expected -- the scheme was in apparent contradiction of Mandate bans on discriminatory laws. Because of this reaction, the controversial provision was eliminated, and the entire ordinance was set to expire on March 31, 1938. Between August, 1937 and March, 1938, 9,600 immigrants entered Palestine. Conditions in Palestine were such, however, that the ordinance was extended past its expiration date to March 31, 1939. Under this extension, 12,818 Jews immigrated. Thus from August, 1937 to March, 1939, over 22,000 Jews became residents of Palestine, bringing the Jewish population to over 400,000 -- 28.5% of the total population of the country.

When the results of the commission which investigated partition possibilities were analyzed and rejected, the British government realized that the conflict was irreconcilable without a miracle
occurring. Thus the government had to choose a policy in which
the obligations of the Mandate could be viewed as being respected,
but which would permit them to proceed with divestiture of Mandate
responsibilities. The formula the government devised was promulgated
in the White Paper of 1939.

The White Paper of 1939, which was referred to as the MacDonald
White Paper (after the Prime Minister, Malcolm MacDonald), was issued
in a climate of desperation and worry. The political situation in
Europe had degenerated into war. German and Italian propaganda was
having its effect upon the Arabs. The British realized that their
vital interest lay in retaining the goodwill of the Arabs, in order
to keep the Middle East stable. This necessity, combined with the
problem the British had encountered during the entire attempt to
establish the Jewish National Home, led to a decidedly pro-Arab
policy by the British government.

The MacDonald White Paper declared that it was never intended
by the British government to establish a Jewish State in Palestine;
it further stated that to place the Arabs under a Jewish state
against the former's will was contrary to British responsibilities.
The British, the Paper said, wished to create a unified state of
Arabs and Jews. The Paper stressed the need to begin planning for
the termination of the Mandate. The Paper also said that immigration
would be regulated more strictly by means of a quota of 75,000
immigrants to be admitted over the following five years; illegal
immigration was to be deducted from the schedules. Subsequent to
that permissable wave of entry, no further immigration would occur
without the consent of the Arabs. Finally, the White Paper expressed
the opinion that "His Majesty's Government are satisfied that,
when the immigration over five years which is now contemplated has
taken place, they will not be justified in facilitating, nor will they be under any obligation to facilitate, the further development of the Jewish National Home by immigration regardless of the wishes of the Arab population."86 The Jewish population would have reached 1/3 of the total population at the cessation of immigration.

This document was the first full admission by the British that their past efforts to achieve peace and unity in Palestine had all been vain. Nonetheless, the Paper did speak of the need for cooperation between Jew and Arab before independence would be granted to Palestine. It stated that if the two parties could not reach an accord, one would be imposed by the British. Such a statement would seem to represent a continuance of past policy; in effect it was. But the British government was now eliminating the factor of the continuing growth of the Jewish National Home from the formula for the development of Palestine, because of the difficulty that Jewish immigration had created for Britain -- an action drastic and improper under the terms of the Mandate.87

The changes that immigration wrought during the course of the Mandate can be seen in a comparison of the 1930 White Paper with previous policy statements. The 1922 Churchill Paper spoke of the necessity of Jewish immigration to the successful development of the Jewish National Home. The 1930 White Paper stated that the growth of the National Home was a detriment to the country, and therefore any immigration which contributed to this growth had to be checked. The Paper stated that Britain saw nothing in the Mandate which indicated that the Jewish National Home could not be established without indefinite immigration. The 1922 White Paper spoke of the need to regulate immigration according to the economic absorptive capacity of the country. The 1930 White Paper stated that the
alarm the Arabs felt was the determinant of immigration. Immigration was thus demoted from a right for the Jews to a privilege granted by the Arabs.

The reactions of Jews and Arabs were predictable. Jews were aghast at what they viewed as the crystallization of the National Home. They were distressed at the idea that the economic and commercial basis of the Jewish community in Palestine, which was heavily tied to immigration, was being curtailed. But the Jews' greatest fear was being left as the permanent minority at the hands of Arab rule. The Arabs were also unsatisfied with the policies of the 1930 White Paper, despite the gains they made. One reason was that immigration was not halted entirely. But more importantly, the White Paper required them to cooperate with the Jews in developing an independent Palestine. Thus the situation remained in the dilemma that it had been in for some time -- little hope of Jewish cooperation. The only change was that the Jews were now at a decided disadvantage.

The government was determined to stick to the policy of the MacDonald White Paper and not to retreat from its plans under pressure, as it did when the 1930 White Paper was published. The government announced a stern policy for curbing illegal immigration; the estimated number of illegal immigrants would be deducted from the future immigration schedules. Thus between October, 1939 and March, 1940, and between April and June, 1941, there was no legal immigration permitted due to the the extent of illicit entry.88 There was not the slightest hint of the traditional interpretation of Article 6 of the Mandate left in the British government's administration of Palestine.

One of the plans included in the MacDonald White Paper was a conference between the government, the Jews and the Arabs to settle
the dilemma in Palestine. This conference was convened in March, 1939. The government made an attempt to implement the principles of the MacDonald White Paper as a basis for building a post-Mandate Palestine. The government stressed that independence would be consequent upon proof of the ability of the Arabs and the Jews to cooperate in administering Palestine. Immigration would be restricted to 75,000 persons over the following five years, as was stated in the Paper.

Both the Arabs and the Jews brought their traditional animosities and distrust to the conference. Chaim Weizmann requested that the Balfour Declaration be fulfilled -- with immigration being restored to its previous large levels -- and that safeguards to prevent the Jews from being left in minority status be provided. Jamal al-Husaini, an Arab representative, requested that independence be granted as soon as possible, and that immediate cessation of Jewish immigration and land purchases be enacted. The conference therefore ended in the same blind alley that all other attempts to bring peace wound up in.

Wartime brought a measure of uneasy peace to Palestine as war efforts led to increased monitoring of disruptive activity and as the government obtained begrudging cooperation from the Jews and the Arabs. Post-war years saw the British government attempt to set up apparatus by which Palestine could be set free of British responsibility. Characteristic of a couple of the major proposals were plans to establish local Arabic and Jewish administrations which would operate within a kind of close confederacy. The Morrison Scheme proposed that there be Arabic, Jewish and British provinces, much like the old partition schemes would have established, and that these administrations have control over immigration, subject
to final approval by the central government. The Bevin Plan of February, 1947 proposed similar provisions for preparing Palestine for independence, calling for areas of local Jewish and Arabic administrations, limits on immigration, and establishment of a constituent assembly. But the Bevin Plan was presented in a context which was of particular significance to the Jews. The author, Ernest Bevin, stated to the House of Commons when he was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 1945 that the attitude of the Moslem world had to be considered in dealing with Palestine. Therefore, the commitment to the Jews of the world had to be counter-balanced by a commitment to the Moslems of the world -- and considering that the global Moslem population was over five times larger than the size of World Jewry, this commitment to the Moslem world would obviously become the more important one. Thus the special status of World Jewry in relation to Palestine was overwhelmed by the necessity of placating a much larger interest. The gradual whittling away of the British commitment to the Jews -- to establish through immigration a national home in Palestine for the Jewish people, displaced from their homeland for so many years -- was completed.

The problem in controlling Jewish immigration overshadowed the fact that there was significant Arab immigration occurring, and that this influx was also proving troublesome to the Mandate. During the first ten years of the civil administration in Palestine, more Arabs were leaving the country than were entering it because of poor economic conditions. As the economy improved in the 1930's, the trend reversed itself, but in a manner disturbing to the British. The bulk of Arab immigration occurred illegally.

Arabs often crossed the Palestinian frontier from Syria and Trans-Jordan with official sanction. Residents of Syrian districts
adjacent to the border were able to obtain readily available passes for temporary passage into Palestine. However, many of these "travelers" stayed on to work in the country. Arabs from Trans-Jordan were permitted to work seasonally in Palestine -- but many settled in the country without permission. The British encountered great difficulty when they attempted to strengthen their precautions against such illegal settlement. The British tried in 1935 to introduce a system of identification papers for all Trans-Jordan residents who wished to enter Palestine, but admitted the following year that the arrangement was largely unsuccessful in curbing the abuses.

In fact, the number of illegal non-Jewish settlers in the country was greater than the number of Jewish ones. Between 1933 and 1939, 11,601 persons in the country illicitly were deported. Of these, 10,145 were non-Jews -- a figure equivalent to 80% of the authorized non-Jewish immigration for the period. Many of these illegals were Arabs. It is hard to estimate how many were in the country, but the figure must have been high. The governor of the Huaran district in Syria estimated that between 30,000 and 36,000 Huaranese Arabs entered Palestine in the span of a few months in 1934.

The presence of the unauthorized Arab residents of Palestine irked the Jews. They charged that these Arabs participated in Palestinian disturbances and were of undesirable character. Yet it seemed to the Jews that the British were largely unconcerned with the Arab illegals and were interested in arresting only the Jewish infractions of the immigration codes. The deportation figures don't seem to bear out this allegation. But it was undoubtedly true that the more pressing problem to the British was the placement
of the Arab populace, which was larger and more volatile than the Jewish community; the restrictive immigration policies of the 1920 White Paper indicate such a need.

On February 18, 1947, the British threw in the towel in Palestine. A memorandum they sent to the United Nations requested it to undertake the development of a solution to the problem of the Palestine Mandate. After 25 years of headache and violence, the British were no closer to solving the problems of Palestine, and if anything had helped to aggravate them. The eventual outcome of the United Nations’ deliberations was the partition of Palestine and the emergence of the State of Israel and half a million refugees.

IMMIGRATION AND THE ISSUES OF THE MANDATE

By itself, the large scale Jewish immigration into Palestine was a disturbing occurrence to the Arabs of Palestine -- after all, it meant the influx of a large number of people who were vastly different from the Arabs. However, immigration acquired a much greater urgency because of its aggravating effect upon the problems encountered during the British Mandate. The most visible dilemmas were the issues of land and self-government. Economic grievances and of course socio-cultural complaints were also crucial matters that disrupted the peace of Palestine. If present on a small scale, these issues would not have been so upsetting to the Arabs -- at least not to the point where much of the populace would have rioted. Initially there was some Arab sympathy, if not enthusiasm, for the desires of the Zionists in returning Jews to Palestine. It was the obvious fact that the problems which developed would increasingly endanger the personal lives of the Arabs that the adament opposition to the Jewish National Home developed. The Arabs sensed that the increasing number of Jews in the country posed a threat to them.
Immigration was the most exacerbating factor in the rise of Arab-Jewish antagonism because it was the driving spark of the Zionists, and the root of despair for the Arabs.

POLITICAL COMPLAINTS

The political complaints of the Arabs were varied, but they largely related to their failure to obtain satisfactory political institutions for Arab self-government. This failure was also reflected in Arab cynicism regarding British promises made to them and regarding British policies which attempted to reconcile the differences between the Arabs and the Jews. The Arabs attributed lack of success in achieving self-rule to the Jewish National Home, born of immigration and increasing in size every day due to immigration, to the Arabs, the National Home was the major stumbling block in the way of their goals. The Peel Commission report on page 107 stated the Arab political grievances: 1. Reneging by Britain on the MacMahon Pledge, which the Arabs believed promised them sovereignty over Palestine. 2. Existence of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate. 3. Violation of their rights and position because of the prevention by the British of self-rule. 4. The unjustifiable privileged position of the Jews with the government and the excessive influence that this position granted them.

The Arabs entered the Mandate feeling that Britain had not honored her word. The Arabs had been given numerous promises and declarations guaranteeing their independence and sovereignty, such as the propaganda leaflets Britain dropped to Arabs in the Turkish army; the Anglo-French Declaration, which promised government responsible to the people; and the Declaration to the Seven, which stated that Britain was committed to Arab sovereignty. But the
pledge which the Arabs concentrated their grievances upon was the
eroinder issued in the Hussein-Mackintosh correspondence that promised them
territorial sovereignty. In this series of letters, Britain
contended that it was explained that Palestine would not be subject
to Arab sovereignty because of other commitments that the British
and Allies were involved with.22 The Arabs claimed that they were
given the impression that Palestine was to be granted independence
along with the other Arab lands. Several investigative commissions
convened later during the Mandate confirmed that there was sufficient
ambiguity in the text to warrant the Arab interpretation of the
.correspondence.

The Arabs of Palestine, therefore, entered the post-war period
of British administration with the distinct impression that they
were to be granted the independence promised to the other Arabs of
the Middle East. When the Palestinian Arabs saw that their political
aspirations were to be held subject to those of the Zionists, they
were infuriated. The influx of political Zionists into Palestine
was to the Arabs verification that rivals were going to seize the
rights due to the Arabs. The initial acceptance by some Arab leaders
was a political ploy, and it quickly vanished when the Arabs realized
that the immigration required by the HOME would endanger Arab political
aspirations. This realization, coupled with the interference of
France in the development of a free Syria, led to the nullification
of the Feisal-Weizmann Agreement.23 Additional attacks were made
on the activities of the Zionists as the Arabs refuted Zionist claims
of "historical connection" to Palestine. It was completely unthinkable
to the Arabs to allow a Jewish State to arise. The growing Arab
Nationalism of the time was a holistic concept; unless all Arab
lands were free, realization of Arab independence could not be
considered achieved. Thus, the immigration of Jews into Palestine was a challenge to Arab nationalism and had to be parried at every opportunity.

The issue of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate for Palestine -- which embodied the spirit of the Declaration -- was interpreted by the Arabs as involving the denial of Arab political freedom in Palestine. These documents seemed to the Arabs to relegate them to the position of being in Palestine by accident, and that their residence in the country was of no consequence. As Shaw and Peel both observed, the language of both the Declaration and the Mandate was vague and ambiguous -- the Arabs never could precisely determine the intentions of the British from these papers. But the Arabs knew that the Jews were favored under the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, and could only presume that it was the Jews and not the Arabs who were to benefit by these; such benefit would mean the blocking of Arab independence. The Arabs never accepted the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate as legitimate charters -- Arab leaders in February, 1922, informed the British Colonial Office that they were unacceptable, and the Arab Executive formed a policy which considered the two documents to be an affront to Arab sovereignty and ordered a position of Arab intransigence with the Mandatory. As Arab demands were thwarted in order to carry out obligations under the Mandate -- largely immigration responsibilities -- the Arabs saw further proof that "the subsequent growth of the National Home created a practical obstacle to the concession later of national independence."

The Arabs developed a great fear for their own well-being because of the Zionist challenge and the British administration of the Mandate's provisions which sanctioned it. The Arabs were
well aware of Zionist activity in London at the time of the War Cabinet's deliberations on post-war policy -- General Clayton reported to the government that the Arabs were nervous with the pace of progress the Zionist movement was achieving. Further, the military governor of Palestine reported that Palestinian Arabs were fearful of a Zionist takeover.

As the pace of immigration continued, riots flared from these fears of the Arabs. The Haycraft Commission reported that the riots of 1920 were caused by a "feeling among the Arabs of discontent with, and hostility to, the Jews, due to political and economic causes and connected with Jewish immigration and with their (the Arabs') conception of Zionist policy as perceived from Jewish exponents." The Commission reported similar causes underlying the 1921 riots, stating that it found Arab belief that the British favored the Jews over the Arabs; that the Zionist Commission had too much authority in Palestine; that the country was being overrun with immigrant Jews of superior commercial capabilities, thereby threatening Arab livelihood; and that immigrants were Bolsheviks and of undesirable character. The Arabs could hardly be expected to warmly greet the Jews when the latter were regarded with such negative attitudes.

The Shaw Commission reported that the Zionist Organization's tendency to disregard the immigration policy of the 1922 White Paper was known to the Arabs; coupled with the belief that Jews had excessive influence with the government, this led Arab leaders to justify their uncertainty about the future of government policy in Palestine. The Arabs knew that the Zionists pressured the government to admit large numbers of immigrants; analysis of the effect this Zionist policy of large scale immigration had led to
the conclusion that "the claims and demands which from the Zionist side have been advanced in regard to the future of Jewish immigration into Palestine have been such as to arouse apprehension in the Arab mind." The policy of "packing as many Jews into Palestine as possible," promulgated by several prominent Zionists such as Ruppin and Jabotinsky, was not imagined by the Arabs out of paranoia; it was reality. It was found that the consequences of Jewish activities -- which involved this ideal of immigration -- gave Arab leaders a means to convince their followers that "a continuance of Jewish immigration and land purchases could have no other result than that the Arabs would in time be deprived of their livelihood and...might ultimately come under the political domination of the Jews."100

The bulk of Arab exasperation stemmed from the Mandate and its implementation. The Palestinian Arabs argued that the Mandate was a violation of the portion of the Covenant of the League of Nations which encouraged the development of independence for the Arabs. The Arabs of Palestine believed they were as advanced as the Arabs of other areas101 and were entitled to the same form of Mandate as other territories received, without the Balfour Declaration included as a qualifier. The Arabs also maintained that Britain was required to set up self-governing institutions for Palestine which would lead to Arab rule; the failure of the British to do so led to Arab concern that their rights and position were going to be violated, despite injunctions in the Mandate to prevent this. Britain contended that such action as the Arabs desired would infringe upon the pledge to the Jews of establishing the National Home in Palestine. The Arabs also argued that article 6 of the Mandate, which concerned immigration, actually entailed restrictions upon immigration depending
on how it was encroaching upon Arab rights; Britain rejected this notion and relied upon the policy of the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine to regulate immigration. So it appeared to the Arabs that Jewish immigration was more important than the Arab's rights as a people.

When Britain proposed programs to develop self-governing institutions, the Arabs often found fault with the provisions of the plans. The first governing body established was the advisory council formed by High Commissioner Sir Herbert Samuel. It consisted of appointed members who had no power to legislate. Britain planned in time to replace this body with an elected legislative council as described by Sir Winston Churchill in the 1922 White Paper; this Congress would have contained both official and elected members, with the High Commissioner serving as President. But this body was never convened. The Arabs objected to the plan on grounds that it didn't give them sufficient control over their affairs, notably immigration; this objection came despite Arab dissatisfaction with the Advisory Council, which they regarded as a mockery of self-government as propounded by the Mandate. The Arab Executive issued this reply to the legislative council plan:

No constitution which would fall short of giving the people of Palestine full control of their own affairs could be acceptable...if today the people of Palestine assented to any constitution which fell short of giving them full control of their affairs, they would be in the position of agreeing to an instrument of government which might, and probably would be, used to smother their national life under a flood of alien immigration.102

What is remarkable about this rejection is that the legislative council plan contained a provision which would have set up an advisory body of members culled from the council to consult with the High
Commissioner about immigration matters. The Arabs felt that even this concession offered too little control, and that the Jewish Agency would still have more control over immigration than the Arabs would. The Arabs felt that only a representative government could suit their needs; therefore, the Arab Executive opposed the White Paper of 1922 and maintained that stance throughout the Mandate. 103

The fact is that the government worked closely with the Jewish Agency, an official body representing the minority in Palestine; this working relationship intensified Arab opinion that Arab rights were being subordinated to those of the Jews. The Jewish Agency was believed by the Arabs to be working for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine through mass Jewish immigration and was aimed at the creation of a Jewish majority. 104 The Jewish Agency did have extraordinary control over the character of the immigrants entering Palestine; many of them were essentially soldiers of the Zionist movement. To counterbalance this situation, the British offered in 1923 to recognize an Arab Agency, which would represent Arab interests. The Arab Agency would have had the right to consult the government about immigration matters. But this offer was rejected. The Arabs were not seeking a body of equal standing with the Jewish Agency. They were seeking the elimination of the privileged Jewish Agency as a factor in Palestine. The feeling among the Arabs that the Jewish Agency also gave the Jews a special liaison with the government which they could not achieve also sparked Arab fury.

The Arabs believed that the Jews had acquired too much influence in the British government. The Arabs contended that numerous policy decisions by the British supported their contention, and that this Jewish influence led to the continuing frustration of Arab political aims. After the Shaw report was issued, the Arabs expected a halt
to immigration and land sales; this cessation did not occur. When, in 1930, delegates from the Arab Executive were told by the British government that their demands for parliamentary government were unacceptable, since such a government would at that time violate the promise to the Jews to secure the Jewish National Home, the Arabs became further convinced that both the Mandate and the National Home were holding them back. When the Passfield Paper was issued, the Arabs were dissatisfied since it seemed to merely re-propose the 1922 legislative council scheme; however, they were aghast when Jewish opposition to the statements of the 1930 White Paper led to the MacDonald clarification, which virtually repudiated the content of the Paper. This retraction was considered by the Arabs to be absolute proof that Jewish influence in Parliament was working against them. The Arabs became convinced that no cooperation with their objectives could be expected from the government.

Thus, when the Peel Commission investigated the 1936 riots, there were these two significant causes found: 1. The Arabs were unable to effectively present their before the government, and 2. The Arabs increasingly distrusted British intentions, because of the numerous promises made to the Arabs which Britain abrogated. The Arabs felt that the pledges involved were breached in order to allow the continued flow of Jews into the country, to take it over and fulfill the promise of the "Jewish National Home." Without the proper connections with the British government, the Arabs felt that they had little chance of stopping the injustices through dialogue. With Jewish demand for immigration increasing due to oppression in Europe at this time, the Arabs perceived a worsening of their already precarious situation. Therefore, an explosion of seething hostility occurred.
There existed among the Arabs a feeling of animosity towards the Jews because of the former's inability to achieve political goals. This disappointment was blamed upon the activities of the Jews in developing the National Home; immigration was a basic aspect of this development and it was accorded a large portion of the blame. The Arabs eventually believed that they could not rely upon the government for justice. They felt that "a series of commissions had been sent to Palestine; that in each case they had reported in favor of the Arabs, and that in each case their recommendations had been rejected by the British government." The Arabs, therefore, increased their active opposition to the Palestine administration through a guerilla war which evolved out of the long-standing policy of witholding cooperation from the government.

The policy of witholding cooperation was grounded in an attitude which had steadily grown among the Arabs. Since the early days of the British occupation of Palestine, the Arabs believed that the British were often influenced in policy decisions by visible opposition. Nazism stated that British policy either deliberately or inadvertently influenced the Arabs to actively oppose Jewish endeavors; he concluded that considerable hostility between the Arabs and Jews resulted well before the civil administration took charge in Palestine. Arab violence was met with very restrained resistance by the British during the riots of the early 1920's, indicating to the Arabs that violence was a viable means of expressing their dissatisfaction. When the British government offered to form an Arab Agency in response to the criticism of the Jewish Agency, further encouragement was given to the Arabs to resist British attempts to fulfill the Mandate. The observation that Jewish opposition to the 1930 White Paper resulted in a retraction of its
intentions certainly spurred the Arabs to adopt similar tactics for pressing their grievances. Perhaps, though, the greatest encouragement to the Arabs to defy the authority of the British came from the fact that Britain always treated Arab violence with great leniency. This leniency cultivated the belief that resistance could continue, and the Mandatory might eventually give up its attempts to reconcile the Arab-Jewish conflict; for example, failure of the British to quickly crush the strike of 1936 encouraged the Arabs to believe that "they could defy Great Britain with impunity." 108

The list of incidents in which the Arabs refused to cooperate with the Mandatory is extensive. In each instance, the Arabs felt that their position in Palestine was being threatened by the results of the development of the Jewish National Home; this development was consequent to the Jewish immigration into Palestine which Britain was fostering. The Arabs seemed unable to achieve a cessation of the immigration and subsequent land transfers through discussion; hence resistance seemed to be their only alternative.

The Arabs also received encouragement to press for the liquidation of the Mandate from the political gains made by neighboring Arab countries. Arab newspapers in the 1930's made much of the fact that Palestine was the only Arab land lacking full sovereignty or significant progress towards it. A quote from one Palestinian paper is a good example of the rhetoric of the time: "Rise to rid yourselves (Arabs) from Jewish and British slavery...The leaders in Egypt have awakened. Where are our leaders hiding?" 109 The situation constantly reminded the Arabs of the fact that the National Home and its associated immigration were blocking the achievement in Palestine of the Arab political goals which were being attained in the other
Arab lands, where no interference existed. The successful progress that Trans-Jordan was making particularly incensed the Arabs of Palestine. Trans-Jordan had been separated from the jurisdiction of the Mandate's provisions in 1925 because of the excessive hardships in enforcing them in the area, and "its freedom from immigration supplied a model for Palestine Arab emulation." Trans-Jordan was viewed by the Arabs as "a clear example of what would be possible for Palestine should the Mandate and Jewish immigration be eliminated as obstacles. Thus opposition to British rule was further encouraged.

The Arabs reacted throughout the British involvement in Palestine with resolve to secure control over Palestine's future. Achieving this goal necessitated political control of the governmental structures and of immigration and land transfers -- in short, control over the growth and power of the National Home. Since the growth of the Home and the degree of land transfers depended upon the influx of Jewish settlers and capital, the control of immigration became most imperative for the Arabs.

Arab demands from the beginning of the military administration insisted upon political power -- after meeting with Weizmann on his 1919 rapport mission, Arab leaders insisted upon proportionate representation of the Arab population in the Palestine government, which of course would have meant majority representation. The Arabs rejected the legislative council schemes on grounds that these bodies gave them too little power. The Arab Executive issued before the enactment of the Mandate statements denouncing the Balfour Declaration and demanding renunciation of the Jewish National Home. As time passed, the Arab demands increasingly referred to the termination of immigration. Although the Peel Commission included many political factors among those causing the breakout of hostilities in 1936,
immigration and the amount of land transfers resulting from the entry of more Jews were articulated by the Arabs as a clear cause of the disturbances. A letter which was submitted to the Commission by Arab officials stated: "After a great deal of careful and conscientious consideration, we have no hesitation in recommending the stoppage of immigration as the only fair, humane, and honorable solution of the present deadlock." The Arabs reiterated such demands again in 1937, when a guerilla revolt broke out. At the 1939 London Conference between the British, Arabs and Jews, the Arab representatives demanded independence and immediate cessation of Jewish immigration and land transfers. When, after World War Two, the Arabs offered proposals for establishing an independent Palestine, these contained provisions for allowing restricted land transfers, but absolutely no Jewish immigration. The Arabs considered it most important that the Jews remain the distinct minority of Palestine, in order to ensure Arab power.

Thus the immigration of Jews into Palestine against the Arab population's wishes helped to create a powerful feeling of frustration among the Arabs, because of their failure to achieve their nationalistic goals. This failure was blamed upon the Jewish immigrants which infused fresh power and wealth into the Jewish National Home. The Home was pictured by the Arabs as the major stumbling block to their sovereignty over Palestine. The Arab discontent was therefore vented against the Jews and subsequently against the British administration, which eventually was condemned as the purveyor of all the evils which befell the Palestinian Arabs.

Socio-Cultural Conflicts

The large size of Jewish immigration into Palestine brought
two different cultures into a close contact that neither one was willing to adjust to. The Arabs of Palestine were living in a virtually feudal society; it was highly stratified, with rich, educated landowners (the effendis), and poor peasant farmers (the fellahin). The fellahin suffered from heavy debt, poor soil, poor markets, and backward farming techniques. The immigrant Jews, on the other hand, were a group kindled with the flame of realists — they were bright, enterprising, steeped in the knowledge and resources of Western culture, and determined to fulfill their destiny. Immigrant Jews were vastly different from the native Jews of Palestine. The latter were a passive, scholarly group, and the former were vigorous and resolute pioneers trained to build up the National Home. Although many Jews suffered from deprivation and poverty as the Arabs did, there was little common ground among the experiences of the Jews and the Arabs for them to work with.

From the start, it was obvious that problems would develop, because the immigrants made little attempt to mingle with the Arab inhabitants of Palestine — they were determined to isolate themselves. At first there was some interaction between the Jews and the Arabs; Jews provided work for Arab laborers, particularly on farming enterprises. But as immigration increased the number of Jews in the country, the Arabs were gradually let go to make way for the new immigrants. This replacement of Arab labor by Jewish labor was due to the philosophy of the socialistic nationalism widely held among the adherents of the early Zionist movement. Manual labor was perceived as one of the salvations of the Jewish people in Palestine; therefore, it was believed that all Jews in the National Home should be given the opportunity to participate in such work. Furthermore, "it had not been the aim of Zionism to establish a
class of landowners in Palestine whose vineyards and orchards and orange groves were worked by Arab plantation workers.\textsuperscript{114} The Zionists didn't believe the Arabs should have any role in the National Home. Thus many Arabs grew resentful of the loss of their livelihoods and at what they saw as increasing competition from the Jews.

The Zionists were also determined to stand up to the Arabs whenever the Jews were threatened. In the past, the Jews in Palestine paid tribute for protection from bandit raids, either to the Turks or to Arab leaders. Now the Jews fought back, and it often seemed to the Arabs that the actions of Jewish immigrants stemmed more from arrogance and contempt for them than from self-defense.\textsuperscript{115} The failure of the two communities to develop any rapport led to a continuance of misunderstanding and mutual suspicion.

The Arabs, in addition, disapproved of the different ways of the Jewish immigrants. They were shocked by what they regarded as brazen, arrogant and immoral behavior; such ideas as equality between the sexes, and the communal living that characterized many of the settlements, were unacceptable to the Arabs. The Jews in turn viewed the Arabs as a backward, ignorant people. Since no realistic attempt was made to develop tolerance of each other's social traits, disdain and rejection continued to seethe.

The mutual suspicion and misunderstanding which characterized the Mandate contributed greatly to one of the events which pointed out clearly the cultural conflict between the Arab and Jewish communities. In 1928, a disturbance over worship rights broke out between the Jews and Arabs at the Western Wall in Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{116} A series of charges and countercharges were leveled by the Jews and Arabs about the situation. The 16th Zionist Congress in Zurich
claimed that the Jews had the right under the Mandate to worship as they pleased at the Wall. But the Arabs retorted that the Zionist Congress "has started a strong campaign with a view of stirring up the Jews of the world...aiming at having the status quo relative to the Burma (the Western Wall) turned in favor of their groundless aspirations." The Arabs also referred to articles that were appearing in the Zionist press in Palestine to support their contention -- that the Zionists were attempting to seize control of the holy sites of the Wall. The heart of the matter for the Arabs was not so much the immediate situation at the Wall as the possibility that the Jews might eventually dominate the lives of the Arabs in Palestine. The ensuing activities by Arabs and Jews after the incident at the Wall led to the outbreak of riots in 1929.

It would be a misrepresentation of the facts to say that there was absolutely no sentiment among the Zionists for a rapprochement with the Arabs. Some leaders advocated the formation of an alliance with the Arabs. But the predominant attitude among the Zionists about the Arabs was similar to the one expressed by Richard Lichtheim, a leading German Zionist: "The Arabs are and will remain our natural opponents -- they do not care a straw for the 'joint Semitic spirit'... The Jew for them is a competitor who threatens their predomination in Palestine." The Zionists felt that there was no possibility of placating the Arabs. They couldn't understand why the Arabs didn't already appreciate the material benefits that immigration brought; they concluded that the effendis, in order to protect their position, were responsible for stirring up the Arab populace. So sympathy for a program of conciliation was rather weak, since detente was seen as virtually impossible.
Conciliation was indeed almost unattainable, and the reasons were more fundamental than the Zionists believed. It was not just because of the opposition of the effendis, but because of widespread rejection among the fellahin of the Zionist cause. The contention of the Zionists that the fellahin were not personally interested in politics was a fallacy. In the villages, literate people would read the highly nationalistic Arab newspapers to illiterates. During the non-farming season, the villagers talked politics; religious leaders often discoursed on politics to their followers. When the Mufti of Jerusalem told the Peel Commission that the Jewish minority in Palestine was too large, and the country couldn't contain it, he spoke for the popular sentiment of the Arabs in Palestine. Thus it was unavoidable that continued immigration would inflame the Arabs, because it would bring further growth of the hated National Home and would bring Arab subjugation to Jewish enterprise a step closer.

When the British began the Mandate, it was hoped that the Arabs would accept the growth of the National Home because of the material advantages this increase would bring. But culturally, the two communities were too nationalistic; conflict resulted, and "under the system imposed by the Mandate it could only be resolved if one or both of those ideals were abandoned." Neither Jews nor Arabs would tolerate a dilution of their national identities through a merger of their ideals. The educational systems of the Arabs and Jews in Palestine were highly nationalistic and did not encourage assimilation into a bi-national Palestinian identity. Arab and Jewish officials placed their loyalty in their respective communities rather than in the administration, and were powerless to perform their duties among rival communities. Facing such intransigence
from both sides, the continued immigration of Jews into Palestine could only sustain the tension by increasing the strength of the National Home and the opposition of the Arabs. The Peel Commission noted this and expressed on page 200 of its report the rising doubts about the course chosen by the British government for the Mandate, doubts stemming from the problem of pathological cultural conflict:

The continued impact of a highly intelligent and enterprising race, backed by large financial resources, on a comparatively poor indigenous community, on a different cultural level may produce in time serious reactions. Can it be the duty of the Mandate...to allow immigrants to come into the country in large numbers without any regard to an increasing hostility?

ECONOMIC COMPLAINTS

The Arabs viewed the incoming Jews as a serious threat. The Jews possessed much capital and business drive, and seemed destined to attain control over the economy. Economic matters became additional points of contention between the Jews and Arabs.

Economic complaints were discovered by the Maycraft Commission to be some of the reasons behind the outbreak of the riots of 1920 and 1921 -- from the beginning of the Mandate, it was believed by the Arabs that immigration was causing their economic woes. Economic grievances continued to cause problems in the late 1920's and the early 1930's as the economy faltered. Often the complaints became a "tit-for-tat" matter -- for example, the Jews would charge that road building to their settlements was being neglected, and the Arabs in turn would charge that such road building caused neglect of their villages. To a large extent, the needs of the Arabfellahin and the Jewish businessmen were incompatible under the Mandate -- therefore, the continued influx of Jewish entrepreneurs into Palestine was bound to create friction.
The Arabs believed that the growth of the National Home and the governmental measures this growth necessitated were a hardship upon their lives. The fledgling Jewish industries in Palestine needed to be protected by tariffs in order to permit them to develop. However, this caused added expense to the Arabs, who needed many finished products and found their cost driven up by the levies. The Arabs also resented the fact that taxes were so high. Much of this excess taxation was due to the needs of a large police force, which was required to maintain order (the Arabs viewed this expenditure as one solely for the benefit of the Jews). The Arabs maintained that more money would be available for social services if the National Home didn't require so much spending to protect it. Arab spokesmen stated the basic grievances: "The burden cast upon the taxpayer...was the direct result of the admission to the country of a larger number of immigrants than the country could at the time absorb."123

Immigration caused some basic strains upon the economy which eventually had repercussions in Arab resentment. It happened that many immigrants who entered as people of independent means spent their capital on constructing their homes; upon completion, insufficient funds were left for these people to establish themselves in their respective fields. Unemployment thus grew, and these people were forced to become a public charge and a drain on the tax revenues. Ironically, if it wasn't for the influx of Jewish capital into the country, much development wouldn't have occurred; the housing industry, when booming, provided work for both Arabs and Jews. However, this fact did not restrain Arab hostility. Further, the fact that, in reality, immigration often surpassed the economic absorptive capacity of the country complicated the innate faults of immigration -- these
excess residents could not find work and had to seek public relief.

Britain began the Mandate with the assumption that Arab opposition to the Mandate would disappear due to economic benefits received from Jewish enterprise. This assumption proved to be extremely naive. It was not true that the Arab could easily pattern his life after that of the Jew, and thereby profit from the Jew's enlightened ways; the Arabs lacked the cultural factors and the resources for such adoption. The Jew in Palestine became for the Arabs nothing more than a symbol of the denial of self-determination; he was viewed only as a rival and not as a model.

It became obvious to the British that the modern Jewish National Home could not prosper under a government which lacked experience in contemporary ways. Thus, to grant self-government at any time in which traditional Arabic values would be strongly asserted would not fulfill Article 2 of the Mandate, which required the British to establish conditions which would secure the Jewish National Home. Thus, the prosperity of the Home also became an obstacle to Arab political desires, and Arab leaders were given another reason to detect immigration.

Economic complaints contributed to Arab-Jewish hostility particularly when the economy was depressed. It was recognized by authorities analyzing the Mandate that as long as the Arabs believed that economic depression was due to Jewish immigration, there was little chance of improving relations between the Arabs and Jews; thus several policy statements conceptualized that it was insufficient to take account of only economic considerations when regulating immigration, and suggested that its effect upon Arab attitudes be considered. Economic fears were an integral component of this attitude.
LAND

Land ownership was one of the most important issues for the Arabs in Palestine. Land was the staple of the fellahin's livelihood and an important measure of wealth for the effendis. It was also of sacred value to the Zionists, who perceived a correlation between Jewish dignity and manual toil on the land, in addition to the practical necessity of providing prosperity for the National Home.

The British found themselves in a quandary when they tried to administer land policy. The Mandate stipulated that the encouragement of the close settlement of Jews upon the land was an obligation of the Mandatory. But in turn, the rights and position of the non-Jewish segment of the population had to be protected. Preserving these rights meant that the settlement of Jews had to depend upon the amount of cultivable land available for this purpose. Although much of the arable acreage in Palestine was already under cultivation, more land could be made available for Jewish needs through the spread of intensive cultivation techniques and the development of irrigation, thus allowing the Arab fellahin to produce as many -- if not more -- crops on less land. Therefore, it appeared that the solution to the matter of land ownership was a modernization of Arab farming techniques and subsequent sale of surplus land to the Zionists. But many intrinsic difficulties rendered such an easy resolution of the problem impossible.

A situation developed in which a sizable number of Arabs lost their land and had few opportunities to find alternative tracts or means of living; meanwhile, more and more Jews seemed to be usurping Arab ownership of the land. The Arabs testified in investigative hearings that "the general tendency of Jews to take possession of this holy country and their streaming into it by hundreds of thousands
through legal and illegal means has terrified the country." One of the most volatile issues of the Mandate was displacement of Arab fellahin because of the acquisition of their land by Jewish immigrants.

The past history of Palestine contributed to the problems of land ownership. In Turkish times, no records of land ownership were kept. Technically, there was no ownership, since land belonged to the State. When the Turkish Empire began modernizing and started to register land ownership, many Arabs were reluctant to press claims out of fear of involvement with the Turkish bureaucracy. Others bribed Turkish officials and obtained registration of land they did not own. The result was that many fellahin did not own the land they lived and worked on, and the effendis had acquired large tracts of land upon which fellahin lived as tenant farmers.

In the 1920's, many Arabs sold land willingly to the Jews. Many of the fellahin and effendis were in heavy debt, and the prices offered seemed inviting. It soon became apparent to the fellahin that the Zionist immigration and land purchases endangered their status in Palestine, and the fellahin became opposed to selling their land. However, many landlords who lived in Lebanon and Syria (which, with Palestine, formed Turkish Syria) were still quite willing to sell their land; what happened politically in British Palestine was of no concern to them. Transactions between the Jews and the absentee landlords accounted for most of the land sales.

An example of the effect such a sale could have upon the Arab population was the purchase by the Zionists of a large tract of land in the valley of Bederelon (which bordered the Mediterranean coast) from a Christian Arab family in Lebanon. 1,746 Arab families, for a total of 2,730 persons, were displaced as the Jews assumed control.
These uprooted Arabs had trouble finding substitute land; some turned to the unstable building trade to make a living, and were subject to becoming unemployed during the periodic slackening in demand that plagued that industry. All involved in the displacement encountered new hardships.

It was difficult in many cases to settle displaced Arabs. Grazers had difficulty in locating good grassland. Arab farming practices were backward and not applicable to marginal land; change was hard for them to accept. Further, there were cultural complications. Arab farmers were reluctant to leave land that their ancestors had cultivated for generations. Tribal identities became weakened as members were scattered from their traditional homes. In addition to farmers, Arab laborers were uprooted as well; since the Zionists maintained a "Jewish only" employment policy, these laborers had trouble finding other work. Arab villages in the past had absorbed displaced persons, but these villages were now saturated and could not accommodate more people.

Thus the land purchases mandated by the growth of the Jewish National Home led to increased physical and spiritual displacement of the Arab population. This disruption could only lead to increased animosity among the Arabs towards the Jews. Since there was virtually no alternative land to which evicted Arabs could move, a landless and discontented class was developing in Palestine. These people, along with their sympathizers, posed a serious danger to the peace of both the Mandate and the Jewish National Home.

British land policy originally clung to the strict letter of the Mandate. The land ordinances of 1920 and 1921 sought to ensure that the seller of the land and the tenants on it were provided with
sufficient land to maintain themselves. This ideal proved to be unenforceable. When the land regulations were revised in 1920, the new statutes failed to require that the tenants of a tract retain enough land to provide for their living, although the ordinance did order that tenants be equitably compensated for their loss. The result of the failures of the land laws was that many Arabs lost their land and did not obtain adequate substitute acreage to replace it.

Ample evidence that land policy was complicating relations between the Jews and the Arabs was provided by various reports for the British government. Sir John Hope-Simpson, in his report on land, concluded that further Jewish land purchases were undesirable until improvement in Arab agriculture was made so that the Arabs could safely relinquish land for Jewish settlement. He stated that existing legislation was inadequate to protect Arabs from becoming landless. On the matter of state lands, which under the Mandate were to be made available for Jewish settlement, he commented:

It is clear...that of the land which remains with the government at the present time the area is exceedingly small, with the exception of tracts which, until developed are required for the maintenance of Arabs already in occupation. It cannot be argued that Arabs should be dispossessed in order that the land should be made available for Jewish settlement. That would amount to a distinct breach of the provisions of article 6 of the Mandate. 129

The Shaw Commission report was even blunter about the problem; on page 123 of its report, it stated: "The plain facts of the case are...that there is no further land available which can be occupied by new immigrants without displacing the present population." Unless the fellahin embraced techniques of intensive cultivation, large scale land transfers could only aggravate the situation. Such farming
improvements required time, and the Jews were unwilling to concede any; they continued to press for more immigration. The land problem was tense enough that the Palestinian administration was reluctant even to attempt to consolidate widely scattered Arab holdings in order to permit more efficient Jewish development of land, because of the fear that this action would cause more agitation. However, land transfers continued because the British were obligated to allow these purchases and the conflict between Arab and Jew intensified as immigrants kept arriving on the scene -- and on Arab land.

The British eventually changed their interpretation of the Mandate out of expediency in order to cope with the land conflict between the Arabs and the Zionists. The 1930 White Paper began a de-emphasis of the Mandate's requirements that Britain facilitate close settlement of Jews on the land; the stress of government policy was shifted towards the protection of Arab cultivators. Various ordinances in the 1930's limited the area where land transactions could occur. This shift in emphasis was highlighted by the 1932 White Paper which stated that the High Commissioner would restrict land sales in those areas where Arabs were in danger of displacement. This land policy was concordant with the general purpose of the White Paper -- the crystallization of the growth of the National Home. This growth, fed by immigration of Jews, had caused too much disturbance for the British; therefore, the Zionist program would be halted in an attempt to resolve the conflicts in the Mandate.

Restrictions on Jewish settlement by the British were an obvious violation of the Mandate, which gave no directions that the Mandatory could undertake any such action. Further, this policy violated the Mandate provisions which prohibited "de jure" discrimination, as
well as article 17 of the Palestine order-in-council, which outlawed the same injustice. The issues of land and immigration, which were closely intertwined, had become so unmanageable that Britain felt she was forced to break the Mandate in order to cope with them.

The British had fulfilled the Mandate's land provisions poorly anyway. The Peel Commission faulted the British government for continuing the Ottoman land code, which it deemed unsatisfactory, when the Mandate required the British to take all measures to institute a land system appropriate to the needs of the country. Further, the Commission noted that after 15 years the government still did not know accurately how much state and waste land was held by it; the Mandate had directed that these lands be turned over to the Jews for settlement. Governmental irresponsibility represented by these incidents contributed to the severity of the land problem.

The land issue again pointed to the antagonism that Jew and Arab bore for each other. Jews charged that the land ordinances promoted unfounded litigation in courts and trespass to obstruct transfers. To a large extent this allegation was true -- these tactics were favored by the Arabs for their strategy in combatting land sales. When it was proposed to aid the Arab farmers with government money in order to facilitate the development of their prosperity, the Jews countered that this was an uncalled for expenditure of their money. With so little cooperation between the Jews and the Arabs on the land issue, it couldn't be expected that the continued influx of Jewish immigrants and the on-going acquisition of land to settle them would be accepted by the Arabs. In essence, they would be acquiescing to the needs of their hated political rivals.

By 1936, the Jews possessed about 12% of the arable land of Palestine. But the White Paper of 1930 had already declared that
the only land available for Jewish agricultural settlement was in vacant areas already in possession of the Jewish Agency. The Zionists were unwilling to modify this program in any way, and the Arabs were adamantly against the policy of establishing the Jewish National Home on their soil. Conflict was the outcome of the intransigence of both sides. As the Jews pressed on with their plans and as the Arabs maintained the conviction that "the policy of the Zionists in regard to land and immigration must inevitably result in the complete subordination of the Arabs as a race and the expropriation (of the Arabs)...from the soil..."150
The problems which the Mandate, instead of preparing a state consisting of two nationalities engaged in an active and constructive partnership, prepared the setting for world tensions and bitter war a generation hence, and with no solution in sight.

Was there any possibility that the plans of the Zionists and the nationalism of the Arabs could have been properly instituted in a secular, bi-national state suiting the needs of both peoples? The Zionist program could have been scaled down earlier in the Mandate, and the threat of foreign inundation of the land would have seemed remote to the Arabs. The Zionists could have been specifically informed of the extent to which their program could be carried out, and prevented from dreaming of political sovereignty. The Arabs could have been granted an explicit promise of self-rule over Palestine, so long as the rights and position of the Jewish minority were protected. Yet despite the attractive quality of such reasonable possibilities, the answer to the question is most likely no.

Once Arab nationalist fervor was fanned, the existence of a single Zionist who talked of a non-Arabic entity in the heart of Arab land was intolerable. This is not to say that Jews were anathema to the Arabs; quite the contrary, the Faisal-Weizmann Agreement, the statements of the Sherif Hussein, and the meeting between Chaim Weizmann and the Husaynis indicate that possibly some form of accommodation could have been reached between Arab and Jew if the Jews were willing to sacrifice. But leaders sometimes are ahead of the masses that follow them. The common Arabs were accustomed to
subservient, slavish Jews; the demeanor of the Zionists was bound to disturb them. When the nationalistic sentiment caught on with the common Arabs, there was no longer any room for rivals who would not accept the status quo.

George Bernard Shaw once commented that Britain's problems in Palestine stemmed from the fact that she gave away something that did not belong to her. He was right -- several times over. Britain said yes too often, and found too many suitors following her to the altar of Palestine.
FOOTNOTES


2. Ismail Fahmy, a minister in the present Egyptian government, recently stated that peace with Israel would depend upon a moratorium on immigration for 50 years. The issue still has residual impact.

3. A Vilayet was a province under Ottoman governmental structure.


5. Loosely, "Arab Nation."


7. Phillip K. Hitti quoted, ibid., p. 50.

8. The Jews are being considered a nation in the sense that they possess a common cultural heritage despite their widespread distribution.


10. This debate occurred not long after the abortive 1905 Russian Revolution, which led to vicious anti-Semitic pogroms.


15. Bernard Joseph maintains on page 35 of his book British Rule in Palestine (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1942) that a correct interpretation of the concept of the National Home would have to recognize that this would entail the right to unrestricted immigration for any Jew. This interpretation meant that the Jews had the right to become the majority. It is interesting to note that all British documents use the term when referring to the Zionist program.


3. This dissection was the origin of modern day Lebanon and Iraq.


6. Ibid., p. 57.


9. Emotional attachment to Palestine is so strong that a dispute between the Eastern Orthodox and Western factions of Christianity over the site of the birthplace of Jesus precipitated the Crimean War.

10. Although the Hussein-Makhzen letters preceded the formalization of the Sykes-Picot agreement, the basic principle contained in the letter was established by the De Bunsen Committee on post-war policy. When the Committee recommended that Palestine be treated specially because of the numerous interests in it.

11. The Arabs always maintained that the wording of the Makhzen letters did not exclude Palestine. In the 1930's, an investigative commission researching the matter reported that there was sufficient doubt as to precisely what the wording intended.


13. The Foreign Secretary of the Lloyd George government was Lord Arthur Balfour; he became one of the most significant forces in the realization of the Zionist's objectives.


18. Ibid., p. 57.

There is evidence that President Wilson held the same beliefs. He spoke of Palestine as a Jewish land, in much the same fashion as Lord Cecil did.

Hannah, British Policy, p. 35.

Weizmann attributed the change of the wording of the Declaration to the efforts of anti-Zionist Jews in Britain (see pp. 14-15).

Palestine Arab Refugees Office, Documents, Pledges and Resolutions, p. 27.

Ibid., p. 27.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 30.

Ibid., p. 32.

Ibid., p. 42.

Joseph, British Rule, p. 36.

This was not the King-Crane Commission, which recommended differently.

Lloyd George quoted by Hannah, British Policy, p. 36.

Lord Grey quoted by Clubb, Britain and the Arabs, p. 141.


Palestine Arab Refugees Office, Documents, Pledges and Resolutions, pp. 25-27 passim.

Bernard Joseph maintains on page 117 of his book British Rule in Palestine that the Mandate, in using such uncertain language, could only have envisioned a change in the political status of the Arabs as the proper condition under which to establish the Jewish National Home; otherwise, the legal language of the document would have been more specific in defining the status of the Arabs. He does not believe that the provisions in the Mandate for developing self-governing institutions were intended to lead to Arab sovereignty in Palestine.


Finlay quoted, Ibid., p. 54.

Lloyd George admitted in his book The Truth about the Peace Treaties that it was never intended by policy that the Jews should remain the
minority in the country. Support for a Jewish majority was demonstrated as late as 1904, when the British Labor Party stated that there was no meaning in a "Jewish national home" unless Jews were allowed to become the majority of the country.


59. Faisal spoke somewhat prophetically in a 1917 memorandum in which he said that the Arabs could not risk assuming the responsibility of guaranteeing that a clash between the Jews and the Arabs wouldn't result in Palestine.


62. Ibid., p. 470.

63. Lawrence quoted by Kimche, The Second Arab Awakening, p. 120.


65. The Sherif Hussein was eventually overthrown by Ibn Saud of the Nejd. He was a follower of the Wahabi sect, which was dedicated to strictly fundamental Islam. It is doubtful he would have supported Zionist activities in any set of circumstances. Thus, when both Faisal and Hussein were deposed, and when the Hashemites had to protect their control of Trans-Jordan after it was severed from Mandated territory, the Zionists lost all support they had among the Arabs.


68. Ibid.


70. Ibid., p. 152.


72. Ibid., p. 212.

Churchill realized in the White Paper of 1922 that immigration, which he stated was a necessity for the success of the National Home, would be problematic for the Mandate if subsequent Arab-Jewish confrontation arose. He recommended that a special committee be established to consult with the Palestine Government on immigration matters; the membership of this body was to be called from a legislative council elected by the populace of Palestine. But such a consultative body was never established due to political entanglements and feedback on immigration came to the government in less cooperative ways (see pp. 72-73).

78Ibid., p. 111.
80Ibid., p. 120.
81Ibid., p. 125.
83Hannah, British Policy, p. 113.
84This schedule, according to Glubb, was a concession to the Jews, since the commission was intended to investigate basically Arab grievances; it was one more example of British trying to "hold the line."
86Palestine Arab Refugee Office, Documents, Resolutions, pp. 70-71.
87Then Britain reported to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, the new MacDonald policy was deemed to be a violation of the latter's interpretation of the Mandate. In the Commission's view, article 6 required the British to facilitate immigration, and article 15 prevented the passage of discriminatory laws.
88Zionists protested the rigidity of this policy. They pointed out that many Syrians crossed the border illegally in order to obtain work in Palestine, and they were not stopped (see pp. 54-56).
89The British were always concerned, however, about Axis subversion through their efforts at propagandizing among the Arabs.
91Ibid., pp. 582-583.
92The Balfour Declaration, issued after the Maconeho pledge, was not a factor; the consideration in this case was French Interest in Syria.
Nasir, The Embittered Arab, p. 51.


10. Ibid., p. 153.

16. Both Winston Churchill and Mr. Sulemene of the League of Nations' Permanent Mandates Commission concurred with the Arabs, but stated that the authors of the Mandate chose to ignore this in favor of Jewish aspirations.


23. Ibid., British Policy, p. 126.


25. Ibid., British Policy, p. 78.


27. Such sentiment was not restricted to Palestine; the Arab world in general held this concept at the time. After a 1944 conference of Arab leaders in Alexandria, a statement was issued which expressed the conference's opinion that the storage of immigration was a permanent Arab right.


30. Ibid.

31. The Jews attempted to set up banches for the benefit of elderly worshippers at the Western Wall. But because the area in front of the Wall was considered by the Arabs to be a holy endowment to Islam (known as a Waqf property), they regarded the action as an infringement of their property rights and of the sanctity of the
site.

118 Ibid., p. 83.
119 Ibid., pp. 91-92
122 Ibid., p. 61.
123 Ibid., p. 106.
125 The reason some Arabs objected to the land ordinance of 1920 was the belief that it held prices down.
126 Yasir, The Excluded Arab, p. 55.
128 Ibid., p. 162.
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