some suggest that the principal reason for the survival of the C-5A program, which continued even after the tandem FDL program (Fast Deployment Logistical ships) was dropped, was the influence of Senator Richard Russell. Senator Russell, then Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, represented the state of Georgia, where the C-5A was being built. 48

Examples abound of Representatives and Senators whose ties to the MIC make their objectivity on the "minimum needed" for defense extremely questionable. More than 60 own stock in aerospace or related firms. 49 Among the reserve officers in Congress were Senators Barry Goldwater (R Arizona) Brigadier General, USAFR; Howard W. Cannon (D Nevada) Brig. Gen., USAFR; Kenneth B. Keating (R New York) Major Gen. USAR; and Representatives James Roosevelt (D California), Brig. Gen. USMCR; and Robert L. F. Sikes (D Florida) Brig. Gen., USAR. 50

 Examples also abound of men who have used their seniority, position, and influence as a principal means of excessively advancing and enriching their own district through copious military bases or multi-million and billion dollar contracts. Many are familiar with the boasted pork-barrel of men like Mendel Rivers, Carl Vinson, and Richard Russell. Less visible are examples like Representative Robert L. F. Sikes, whose district's "many military installations are its most notable feature....The military is the economic mainstay of the district." Sikes, member of the Appropriations Committee, member of its Defense Subcommittee, and chairman of the Appropriations
Subcommittee on Military Construction, has been able to see to it that about $460 million dollars in DOD outlays flow into his district each year. 51

Every state in the union and almost every Congressional district has defense spending, contracting, and a defense establishment. 52 The average congressional district has almost 10,000 persons (slightly over 5 percent of the work force) directly engaged in defense work. The average Armed Services Committee member has 18,000 defense-related jobs in his district (about 10 percent of the work force). 53 Congressmen, too, cannot afford to ignore the political power of labor unions whose 3½ million workers directly involved in defense may be vindictive to the non-cooperative Representative. 54

The result of all of the above-mentioned factors weighs heavily in favor of funding defense monstrously in excess of national security needs. While there are few incentives for Senators and Representatives to defy the power of the Pentagon and exercise meaningful control over it, there are profuse and keen incentives to comply with military desires or to support them actively.

The lack of congressional ability or desire to limit defense spending to rational levels in line with realistic national security needs imposes almost incalculable costs on society. Section Seven will consider some of these costs.
Section Seven

Alfred Vagts, in his classic work, *The History of Militarism: Civilian and Military* defines militarism as the domination of the military man over the civilian, an undue preponderance of military demands... It means the imposition of heavy burdens on a people for military purposes, to the neglect of welfare and culture, and the waste of the nation's best manpower in unproductive army service.... Militarism transcends military purposes, permeates society, may become dominant over industry and the arts and may hamper and defeat true military objectives.¹

Since 1945 the federal government has spent one trillion seven hundred billion dollars for goods and services. Of this amount, one trillion three hundred billion dollars — that's 80 percent — has gone to the military.²

There is no real way to learn how much is spent for military purposes simply by examining the Defense Department budget. Defense expenditures not recognized as such by the federal government include: all veteran's benefits, compensation, and insurance; federal maritime subsidies (justified on national defense grounds); interest on the national debt (most of which is the result of financing wars); etc.³ War and military preparedness accounted for about 54 percent of total federal outlays and from 80 to 85 percent of all federally provided goods and services during the late 1960s and early 1970s.⁴ In other words, at least 80% out of every dollar the federal government expended on goods and services went directly or indirectly for one program — the military! Obviously, that left only 20% of each dollar for all other goods and services the federal government provided.⁵

*See Addendum.*
Senator Fulbright, adamant critic of the military, made several comparisons in the FY 1970 budget which are very illuminating. Approximately $80 billion dollars was budgeted for defense. Total federal budget requests for all of education were $3.2 billion. The cost overrun of the C-5A was equal to $60 billion. Education was worth, in budgetary terms, about 30 percent of the F-111 fighter cost overrun! Fulbright explained, "Less is proposed for elementary and secondary education than it costs to assemble an attack carrier force; we have 15 such carriers."

A conservative estimate of military-related spending in 1967 was $100 billion. This was a sum greater than all federal, state, and local expenditures on health, hospitals, education, old age benefits, welfare, unemployment, and agriculture! Yet these are only obvious costs; there are other costs which are just as real, but less easily seen. Think of it: the United States could move the wounded marine from the jungles of Vietnam to the finest medical care in a matter of minutes; yet today cannot do the same thing for a critically ill child in the Mississippi Delta or a child dying of malnutrition on an Indian reservation! Funds can be found to replace the unneeded $18 billion SAGE anti-Soviet-bomber system with an equally unnecessary and more expensive AWACS system; yet our country "cannot afford" a decent mass transit system.
About 40 percent of the nation's scientists and engineers are absorbed directly in research and development financed by the military. Obviously, when these men and women spend all of their time developing ultra-sophisticated means of man's destruction, they cannot be assisting in life's preservation and improvement.

The United States ranks 13th among other nations of the world in infant mortality rates. On nearly every index available, the poor and racial minorities fare worse than their opposites. They have shorter lives, they have more chronic and debilitating illnesses. Their infant and maternal death rates are higher. They have far less access to health services. For "lack of available money" ten million Americans are going to continue suffering the agony of hunger and chronic malnutrition. Twenty-two million will remain below even the government's minimum poverty line; twenty million Americans are housed in grossly substandard, rat-infested dwellings.

This writer flatly refuses to believe that the United States (whose GNP increases every five years by an amount equivalent to the total GNP of West Germany) could not - had it merely the desire to do so - create a society totally free from hunger, uniformly well-educated, and able to give medical care to all who need it. For example, had just the contractor excesses (e.g. the 56% contractor profit mentioned in an earlier section) been eliminated, Head Start education could have been provided for an additional 2½ million children - with enough left over to provide school lunches for 20 million
children for an entire year. One might only guess what might have been done with the $9 billion dollars that went to the F-111 cost overrun.

This tragic human cost is paralleled by the depletion of industrial-technological capabilities. Examples include the following:

1. The U.S. merchant marine fleet ranks 23rd in the world in age of ships. In 1966 the average-aged vessel in the United States was 21 years old; Japan's ships averaged less than half that figure.

2. By the end of the 1960s, U.S. industry operated the world's oldest stock of metal-working machinery; almost 2/3 was ten years old or more.

3. In the late 1960s, the U.S., for the first time, had to import more machine tools than it exported.

4. As is widely appreciated, U.S. railroads and mass transit systems could not compare to Japanese and most European systems.

Meanwhile, more than 50 percent of the nation's research funds, and as much as 2/3 of all R&D, scientific and engineering talent are siphoned off for the military. Spillover benefits into the civilian economy of military outlays are generously over-estimated at no more than 10 to 15 percent of total military spending.

High military spending in an inflationary period only worsens the problem of rising prices. "Pump-priming" in areas other than military R&D and Procurement may be less inflationary and confer more benefits in underemployed districts. Currently, the correlation between military spending growth and price increases is too strong not to be considered a principal reason, if not the main cause, for inflation.
In sum, excessive military spending imposes huge social costs upon our nation - costs that are morally unjustifiable and pragmatically misguided and irrational. Defense from atomic devastation in the age of the intercontinental ballistic missile, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and the thermonuclear warhead is clearly impossible. The destructiveness of nuclear weapons is so enormous that it overwhelms all possible defenses. Deterrence, not defense, must be the aim of strategic policy. The important question then becomes, "How much is enough to deter?" The answer is primarily a psychological consideration. But what possible gains could be worth 60 million, 80 million, or 120 million deaths in one's own country? Only a madman would think such casualties feasible. And a madman cannot be deterred nor defended against in the thermonuclear age - no matter what the multiples of overkill! We must stop to consider the costs of pursuing the myth of total security.

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft--from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. The world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.16

Whose words are these? A leftist radical's? Or those of a naive, "do-gooder" youth? No. These words, spoken over 20 years ago, were those of former supreme Allied Commander in Europe and Five Star General Dwight D. Eisenhower. What was of great concern to him 20 years ago should also deeply concern
us all today, when budget requests for defense for fiscal 1975 stand at more than 92 billion dollars and the "lack of available money" denies food, clothing, and shelter to millions who cannot afford life's necessities.

Section Eight

The reader by this point must certainly agree that the problems spoken of above are very serious ones. There are no easy solutions or guaranteed answers. Unlike the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who in November 1969 eliminated cost overruns by purging the term from military usage, this writer does not believe it possible to cause a problem to disappear by erasing the symbols used to label it. The answer lies rather in meeting the problem head-on. This section will attempt to give some suggestions to lessen the debilitating effect of excessive military spending. The suggestions are those thought most crucial by this author. The list is far from exhaustive.

The first and probably the most important step that must be taken is this: the public needs to be informed of the excess of military spending and power. Americans - rich and poor, black and white, liberal and conservative - must overcome their conditioned response to buy anything wrapped in the flag and deemed essential by the Joint Chiefs. Perhaps if taxpayers can be shown what senseless duplication of weapons, exorbitant contractor profits, and meaningless increases in
overkill are costing them. In missed opportunities, they will be less willing to give the Pentagon a blank check. If it were widely realized what could be done, citizens would be more concerned about a $92 billion budget for the Defense Department. (As one senator reportedly observed, "A billion dollars here and a billion there, and by gosh, pretty soon it adds up.")

Charles Schultze, former Director of the Budget, suggests the creation of a Joint Committee of Congress on National Priorities to act as a forum for debate and reflection upon the country's goals. The committee would serve as a focal point of public attention and raise and discuss important questions of the nation's needs. Critics who would condemn it as merely a political arena are exactly right. But what a great and necessary function the arena would serve: to raise issues and answers which have for too long been accepted as "given". New interest groups must be given the chance to vie for funds. Committee testimony, findings, and analyses should be widely publicized and reported.

Congress must take the first step of independence and provide its own sources of analysis and budget preparation. At a minimum, the funding, staff, and functions of the General Accounting Office should be increased. Another possibility is the establishment of a second congressional agency modeled after the GAO. This agency, according to Richard Kaufman, author of the War Profiteers, should have the authority to determine overcharges and excess profits on individual contracts, to require refunds, to suspend government payments, to reform contract prices and to file civil suits against contractors for default.
Senate and House Appropriations and Armed Services Committees should request larger staffs of budget analysts whose past links with the MIC may be less likely to bias their opinions.

The functions, authority, funding, and staff of the Renegotiation Board, which investigates defense contracts for excess profits, should be significantly enlarged. This independent agency returns each year excess profits equal to 18 times the cost of its operations.³ The utility of such an investigatory body for prevention, detection, and adjudication of contractor crimes and fraud cannot be overestimated.

Accounting practices of defense contractors must be made uniform to greatly increase the difficulty of concealing padded costs and illegal profits. Currently, the lack of consistent methods of book-keeping makes the task of corporate investigation unnecessarily troublesome and may be a considerable impediment to oversight.⁴

The military should be forced to develop one consistent strategic doctrine. The price-tag of the Defense Department's wares is preposterously too expensive to allow the childish aptitude of "mine's better than yours" among the service branches to influence decisions on weapons developed and procured.

Investigation at the initial stages of project development and "concept definition" must scrutinize more closely the real necessity of each new weapon system. Programs stopped at this level may not only save wasted R&D funds, but will also
make decisions less subject to narrow interest group pressure for militarily unjustifiable weapons development.

Further thought should be given to the idea of defense industry nationalization where firms are predominantly dependent on defense contracts. John Kenneth Galbraith, proponent of this concept, does not suggest that such action itself could reduce the power of the military-industrial bureaucracy. In fact, nationalization would increase the power of the military by placing selected industry directly under its control. Galbraith's contention, however, is that there are advantages in making obvious what currently constitutes a disguised part of the bureaucracy.5

The following are suggested as means to restrict in part excessive weapon system cost escalation:

1. System Acquisition Reports must be upgraded to eliminate crucial information omissions. 6 (For examples, see page 28.)

2. Concurrent R&D and Procurement "should require explicit approval by the Secretary of Defense and full justification to Congress. "7

3. Contractor capital investment must be considered in profit-determination negotiations. 8

4. Estimates of individual total program costs through development, fielding, and system life should be made available to Congress in non-classified form. Five year projections of total defense costs, as well as consequences of authorized and proposed programs, should be declassified and distributed to Congress.9

5. Occasional program failure should be accepted, unless it can be shown that program feasibility and utility were absent from the outset. This suggestion may, while legitimating some mistakes, lower bureaucratic insistence upon proceeding with projects obviously doomed to failure but politically more expedient to continue and cover-up.10
6. Competition among contractors must be stressed whenever possible. New public-funded research organizations might be encouraged to create competing claims for what are presently virtually guaranteed funds to the military.

Efforts at negotiated arms limitation - SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) - must be continued and supported. Although the second round of SALT talks is apt to be difficult and slow even at best, the United States and Soviet Union must recognize the absurdity of arms races and destructive capability contests and act accordingly. As Joseph Coffey, author of Strategic Power and Nation Security, affirms:

Whatever the difficulties, the dangers, and the uncertainties of trying to ameliorate the present conflict among nations, this process is more rewarding than that of continuing them. It is also more likely to promote the national security, in the only meaningful sense of that phrase.

Conclusions

Self-defense is a legitimate, desirable goal. Self-defense also comes only at a price. War and military preparedness make this price exceedingly high. The Cold War has been the national burden for almost 30 years. A fundamental fact about the Cold War, however, is that in consequence of massive outlays presumably for national security ($1.3 trillion), true defense is unattainable for both the United States and Soviet Union - not to mention the rest of the world.

This writer has stressed repeatedly that the only realistic strategic doctrine is deterrence - making critical acts of overt aggression incomparably less desirable than any
conceivable benefits stemming from them. Meaningful superiority of U.S. or Soviet destructive capabilities in the advanced thermonuclear age is clearly impossible and exorbitantly expensive. Nevertheless, the Nixon Administration's stated intention is to re-establish strategic superiority so that the U.S. may negotiate in the SALT Talks from a "position of strength." Why is it that all Soviet attempts to match U.S. military power are "aggressive," while all American efforts to increase credible threats to Soviet survival are "defensive" and result only from peaceful intents?

The desire for defense or deterrence is only one of the motivations for extraordinarily high Pentagon spending. The coincidence of interests among industry, labor, the military, and politicians, etc., is the basis for a great portion of the irresponsible expenditures loosely and unjustifiably excused under the whitewash of "national defense needs." The influence of the MIC is inordinately powerful and pervasive. The success of MIC's narrow interests means shockingly high contractor profits, critically deficient weapon performance, senseless duplication of efforts, distortion of national priorities, and incalculable social costs.

Real control of the military machine has been lost. Bureaucratic inertia and Executive and Congressional compliance with the MIC's goals trample over rational decisions concerning adequate defense levels and strain toward the nihilistic land of Overkill Unlimited. Absent are desires to discuss and debate in any significant way the true necessity of current
defense expenditures. Wrap it in the flag; remind them of the enemy threat; recall for them the economic benefits of a new weapon - you're half-way home to meaningless increments in overkill and assured multi-billion dollar cost overruns!

America must recognize its greater willingness to amass the means of destruction and killing than to develop and utilize the means of building and healing. The United States must come to grips with the fact that giving the military an unlimited leash may mean societal stagnation or strangulation. America must learn not to equate its every interest with the incentives of the Military-Industrial Complex and must revise its national priorities - for on this depends the closer attainment of social justice, international cooperation, and the hopes of parents for their children for generations to come.
Addendum

Because overall federal expenditures have very recently (FY 1973, 1974, and requested 1975) experienced such dramatic increases, the military component of the budget has declined relative to spending for other programs. However, it is crucial that the reader not be lulled into the belief that defense expenditures are actually declining. DOD requests for FY 1975 (plus FY '74 defense supplements) stand at over $92 billion -- or about $12 billion more than FY 1974 estimates.

This writer was unable to find the most current data on how general spending hikes affect the Pentagon's share of total goods and services provided by the federal government. It would seem largely unjustified, nevertheless, to assume any significant change in this proportion -- especially since more than half the overall increase from FY '74 to FY '75 came in the form of transfer payment additions. Significantly, "seed money" in the form of R & D expenditures is slated to rise 20 percent to $8.4 billion - (see pages 7-8, and 31-32.) In thinking of relative national priorities, one might consider the following: the wasted effort of developing and procuring the F-111 was equal in dollar terms to about 600 percent of the total FY 1975 budget requests for all federally sponsored medical research efforts. *

Footnotes

Section One


5 Ibid., p. 9.

6 Coffey, Joseph I., Strategic Power and National Security, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971, p. 22.

7 Ibid., p. 23.

8 Ibid., p. 22.

9 Ibid., p. 24.


13 Melman, op. cit., p. 137.

14 Coffey, op. cit., p. 170.


16 Ibid., p. 165.

17 Ibid., p. 110.

18 Kissinger, Theory and Practice of War, p. 282.

Section Two


2. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p. 58.


5. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, pp. 27, 58.


9. Ibid., p. 207.


13. Proxmire, Report from the Wasteland, p. 7 and IX.

Personal letter from J. H. Stolarow, Deputy Director of Procurement and Systems Acquisition Division of United States General Accounting Office, February 14, 1974.

Kaufman, op. cit., p. 47.

Ibid., p. 11.


Proxmire, Report from the Wasteland, p. 63.

Melman, op. cit., pp. 63-64.

Kaufman, op. cit., p. 120.

Defense Industry Profit Study, p. 2.


Ibid., p. 291.


Carey, op. cit., p. 11.

Kaufman, The War Profiteers, p. 70.

Ibid.

Proxmire, Report from the Wasteland, p. 15.


Ibid., p. 283.

Defense Industry Profit Study, p. 28.
36 Ibid., p. 65.
39 Ibid., pp. 70-71.
41 Proxmire, Report from the Wasteland, p. 61.
42 Status of Selected Major Weapon Systems, op. cit., p. 17.
43 Ibid., p. 20.
48 Ibid., p. 15.
49 Ibid., p. 17.

Section Three

1 Carey, op. cit., p. 33.
2 Kaufman, The War Profiteers, p. 120.
3 McConnell, op. cit., p. 702.
5 Ibid., p. 196.
6 McConnell, op. cit., p. 702.
8 Ibid., p. 136.
Section Four


3. Ibid., pp. 35-36.


10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., p. 25.

12. Ibid., p. 27.

13. Ibid.


Section Five


10. Ibid., p. 85.

Section Six


4 Schilling, op. cit., pp. 116-118.
5 Carey, op. cit., p. 61.
7 Cost Growth of Major Weapon Systems, p. 45.
8 Schilling, op. cit., p. 90.
9 Ibid., p. 91.
12 Kanter, A., op. cit., pp. 130, 134, 137.
14 Ibid., pp. 212-213.
15 Schilling, op. cit., p. 55.
16 Froman, op. cit., p. 209.
20 Kaufman, War Profiteers, p. 254.
22 Ibid., p. 138.
23 Ibid., p. 132.
24 Ibid., p. 131.
25 Wolfinger, op. cit., p. 29.
26 Ibid., p. 30.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., pp. 39-40.
29 Ibid., pp. 36-37, 31.
30 Ibid., p. 48.
32 Ibid., pp. 182-83.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., p. 182.
35 Personal Letter from Stolarow, op. cit.
37 Wildavsky, op. cit., p. 52; Kanter, op. cit., p. 139.
38 Kanter, op. cit., p. 140.
39 Carey, op. cit., p. 58.
40 Melman, op. cit., p. 181.
41 Wildavsky, op. cit., p. 61.
42 Kanter, op. cit., p. 139.
43 Schilling, op. cit., p. 92.
45 Kaufman, War Profiteers, pp. 185-186.
46 McConnell, op. cit., p. 697.
47 Carey, op. cit., p. 58.
49 Carey, op. cit., p. 58.
50 The Military Lobby, op. cit., p. 1582.
Section Seven


3Kaufman, War Profiteers, op. cit., p. 38.

4Ibid., p. 38, 204; McConnell, op. cit., p. 697, 139.

5Fulbright, W., quoted Kaufman, War Profiteers, p. 245.


7McConnell, op. cit., p. 697.


12Melmen, op. cit., p. 3.

13Ibid., p. 87.


15Kaufman, War Profiteers, p. 203.

16Eisenhower, Dwight D., "The Chance for Peace," Address by the President before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 16, 1953.
Section Eight

1 Schultze, Progressive, op. cit., p. 28.
2 Kaufman, War Profiteers, p. 294.
3 Ibid, p. 162.
4 Kaufman, "MIRVing the Boondoggle," p. 289.
8 Defense Industry Profit Study, pp. 54-55.
9 Kaufman, War Profiteers, p. 276.
10 Carey, op. cit., p. 65.