In Defense of Our Future: Legislative Lobbying for Higher Education

An Honors Thesis (HONRS 499)

by

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"For my part, I look forward with absolute confidence to the liberal support by the state of a school whose chief function is to add to the sum of human achievement." With these words, spoken on June 7, 1904, during his inaugural address at the University of Wisconsin, Charles R. VanHise summarized the mission of the state in supporting colleges and universities in America. State institutions of higher education were created to serve the residents of that state, offering a wide array of academic disciplines at one location, including arts, sciences, and humanities, and providing interaction among the students of these diverse studies. They have a societal obligation to be a "watchtower" over the sons and daughters of the state, strengthening creative work and providing limitless opportunity for knowledge (Brubacher and Rudy 1968, 166-67). In a society previously dominated by private institutions charging high tuition, the creation and development of state-funded postsecondary education has made "higher learning more functional and more closely related to the daily concerns of the average American . . . " (Brubacher and Rudy 1968, 389-90). Their presence has contributed to the United States moving "from a system of higher education open to a very small proportion of the population and largely peripheral to the economic activities of the country to a system of higher education offering access to all high school graduates and functioning at the center of the nation's economic, social, and political life" (Levine 1993, xi).

This alliance between the state and higher education necessitated a revised definition of the obligations of each party. "The most direct and tangible link between state government and higher education is usually the budget," (Layzell and Lyddon 1990, 15) and accordingly this
relationship is also the most complex. Without financial support, any long-range planning is pointless, and many controls over institutions are directly or indirectly tied to financing (Hines 1988, 21).

Budgeting is the process of making choices regarding how to divide a state’s limited resources among competing interests, or explained another way, “translating financial resources into human purposes . . . a mechanism for making choices among alternative expenditures” (Wildavsky 1992, 2). This “web of interactions” (Wildavsky 1992, 3) alludes to the struggles that arise from competing forces that each want to use the same monetary resources for different purposes.

Indiana is not immune from such a struggle. The efforts of the seven state-supported universities to gain sufficient funding to sustain and further develop their objectives are deliberate and resolute. Their leaders and supporters believe they provide an incredible opportunity to the state of Indiana. Representative Jerry Bales (R-Bloomington) states, “If we’re ever going to become a great state, and we’re a long way from it, we have to educate more of our citizens.”

The purpose of this work is to examine the process of appropriating funds to public institutions of higher education in Indiana. This will be done by considering the purpose and structure of the university; the roles of the government relations director or university lobbyist and the Commission for Higher Education; and the legislative and gubernatorial input given to the budget. An additional area of inquiry is the relationships between and among these actors.

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1 This and all subsequent references to comments by Representative Jerry Bales come from a telephone interview on December 6, 1995.
The Public University

Public higher education has come under great criticism over the past century as it has become more entrenched as an actor in the political process of state appropriations. Considering that fully 60 percent of its operating budget comes from government sources--mostly the state--it becomes an understandable focal point (Anderson 1992, 28). Only 15 percent comes from student tuition and fees; while this has been used to "improve services, enhance quality, and maintain a competitive edge over other institutions," (Hines 1988, 49) there has not always been this dependency upon public support.

State influence within the realm of higher education began significantly before the popularly cited 1862 Morrill Act (Brubacher and Rudy 1968, 145; Roche 1994, 28). Originally introduced in 1857, this act, which became known as the Morrill Land Grant Act, created land-grant colleges concentrating on agriculture and commerce; before the act was passed were schools including Transylvania University in Kentucky (established 1780), University of Georgia (1789), and University of Vermont (1791). While none of these schools offered instruction of level commonly accepted as "university work," the notable fact was that these institutions had been essentially private in nature. While they had been established under government charter and oversight, their management had been granted to a corporate group (Brubacher and Rudy 1968, 145). The year 1804 saw the first federal land grant for the establishment of a state-run university, following the state of Ohio's takeover of their university endowment, and by the time the Morrill Act was introduced in 1857, the national government had granted over 4 million acres of land to fifteen states to establish new universities (Brubacher and Rudy 1968, 154).
Occurring simultaneously was a modification of how the public valued postsecondary education. More students wanted to further their education beyond the rudimentary skills taught in the schools; not merely in a wider variety of areas but also to higher levels. Thus an ever-larger percentage of the population would be seeking the chance at higher education (Brubacher and Rudy 1968, 161). Public institutions, as an offering of the state, were being viewed as "service providers" geared to benefit the majority of the community, more so than the private institutions that had been available to date, and more adaptable to the changing needs of the maturing nation (Brubacher and Rudy 1968, 156). After the Civil War, the expansion of state-supported offerings in higher education took on a feverish pace, as the value of an advanced degree in later life was more widely acknowledged (Henry 1975, 211).

These expectations have taken the development of public higher education to an amazing prominence.

The modern higher education system is comprised of an assortment of institutions, varying in size, structure, academic focus, and fiscal autonomy. The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (hereafter Carnegie Foundation) classifies colleges and universities based on their level of degrees awarded, academic or research focus, and on any individual field specialization (Evangelhauf 1994, A17). School size ranges from the traditionally small community colleges and two-year junior colleges to the larger branch campuses and often enormous main campuses of state universities. In direct relation to the size of the campus, the educational mission of the institution varies, as it is "the underlying value of most state systems of higher education. The flagship research university has a different role and mission from that of the regional colleges or the community college system" (Layzell and Lyddon 1990, 17).
The Carnegie Foundation has designated Indiana University (Bloomington) and Purdue University (West Lafayette) as Research I; Ball State University (Muncie) as Doctoral I; Indiana State University (Terre Haute) as Doctoral II; University of Southern Indiana (Evansville) as Master's II; and Vincennes University and Ivy Tech State College as Associate of Arts Colleges (Evangelhauf 1994, A17). Research I institutions offer a full range of degrees from the baccalaureate to the doctorate and award 50 or more doctoral degrees each year. In addition they place high priority on research and receive at least $40 million in annual federal support. Doctoral I universities are similar to Research I institutions, awarding at least 40 doctorates yearly in at least five disciplines. The difference is an emphasis on teaching over research and any federal support is minimal. Doctoral II institutions differ from Doctoral I universities only in the number of doctorates awarded annually: at least 10 in three or more disciplines or at least 20 in one or more discipline. Master's II schools award 20 or more master's degrees annually in one or more disciplines and offer the same array of baccalaureate degrees. Associate of Arts colleges offer Associates of Arts certificates or degrees and rarely offer baccalaureate degrees.

These classifications are important in explaining to the legislature the missions of each school, especially when grouping them with similar institutions across the nation, according to Indiana Commission for Higher Education Deputy Commissioner Kent Weldon. In addition, when a school is planning a mission change, these “shorthand” classifications are useful in demonstrating what facilities or programs are necessary to move from one mission category to another.

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2 This and all subsequent references to comments by Kent Weldon come from a telephone interview on December 12, 1995.
With such a wide array of educational opportunities available, it is understandable how enrollments have multiplied by a factor of forty since the beginning of the 20th century (Levine 1993, xi). Unfortunately, the increase in students has resulted in an increase in operating expenses, and tuition has on the average increased at twice the rate of inflation (Hines 1988, 49). College officials explain that tuition and fees are often not sufficient to cover the cost of providing quality education for students. Between 1940 and 1960, public university tuition doubled; even with this astronomical increase, the president of Oberlin College in Ohio estimated, in 1927, that it paid only half the cost of a student's college education (Brubacher and Rudy 1968, 377). However, there is still a notion that government is obligated to provide low cost higher education to the people. Maintenance of low tuition through public subsidy, though, has provided "reasonable assurance of accessibility and equality of collegiate opportunity, institutional autonomy, and substantial support for institutional programs" (Stampen 1980, 1). As a service that comes under direct scrutiny of the state, and, based upon the level of state funding, may be limited in access to the public, there has been a growing interest in taking a more active role in the appropriations process.

The university often runs the risk of suffering in the budget process. Future funding is never certain from budget cycle to budget cycle, as "it is constantly being placed at the mercy of whatever political vicissitudes arise . . . " (Kurtz 1978, 289). No behavior pattern is truly predictable, regardless of which party is in power, be it taxing or spending, adjusting for inflation, or any other aspect of budgeting. Each biennial budget process can be considerably different from previous or following sessions as the fiscal situation varies or the state's needs and values change. Since neither the president nor the chancellor can control the institution's future, given the fierce competition among representatives and proponents of special interests, campus leaders have recognized the need to step up direct representation of their situations to
state government. Presidents and faculty, collectively referred to as educators by George Roche, former president of Hillsdale College in Michigan, have become more visible in state capital buildings. Roche asserts:

Educator conjures up the image of someone dedicated to the life of the mind . . . While many in academe still fit that description, more often than not the term now denotes a politically savvy power player. . . . Those who occupy these lofty positions . . . do understand that maintenance of the current system requires a lot of money. Accordingly, many have become very polished professional panhandlers. (1994, 82-3)

Often, especially for large universities with a wide range of academic programs, huge faculty rosters, and even branch campuses, the burden of maintaining campus and personal obligations while trying to oversee the budget process is more than they can handle. Merely depending upon legislators to grant requested legislative appropriations to meet expenses has had many drawbacks in the past for state universities because “lay opinion in the legislature was often at odds with professional opinion in scrutinizing items in the university budget” (Brubacher and Rudy 1968, 376). This has resulted in the creation of a university lobby at the state capital, and even professional lobbyists for the university system.

-University Lobbyists-

The university lobbyist has become more prevalent in state government as the demands of requesting institutional funding and other measures that affect higher education require constant observation of legislative and gubernatorial proceedings. Since campus leaders cannot be present at every session of the state legislature or take time to meet with influential leaders, the university lobbyist is sent to be a full-time representative. Often more diplomatically called a “government relations director,” the university lobbyist oversees the
appropriations talks, learns the political terrain in each session, and uses whatever means necessary to advance the institutional cause before those involved in the decisions. Most institutions today have even created an office of full-time staff whose primary responsibilities focus on government relations (Roche 1994, 85).

University lobbyists have been given a negative image along with other “hired guns” for special interest groups. Seen as money-hungry, self-interested representatives of special interest groups, they are shunned, ignored, and generally avoided. The university lobbyist is often grouped right along with others, such as organized labor unions and utility providers. This is an interesting tendency, since higher education is still presented as not-for-profit and strictly student-focused. Nevertheless, university lobbyists are faced with such negative reception as a result of what has been identified as a “lack of integrity, that . . . is the manifestation of the fallen nature of the universities. It is visible . . . and it is seen by the government officials” (Goldwin 1978, 216). Hayes E. Gahagen, a former Maine state senator, describes the lobbying process for higher education as “incredible . . . incessant wining and dining and other forms of attention from well-placed administrators as well as trustees and alumni . . . [receiving] favor after favor” (Roche 1994, 83). In addition, Charles S. Lenth, director of the Education Commission of the States, claims that university representatives “don’t define the issues in clear enough ways” (Mercer 1994, A22). These statements promote the negative bias against university lobbyists.

In response to these claims, though, Representative Bales believes that the university lobbyist is an important and effective tool in the appropriations process. He explains his perception of
their role as

a messenger between the institution and the General Assembly. They serve as
a sounding board, carrying the university's message to the legislature and then
fielding the resulting questions. . . . University representatives in Indiana are very
good at representing the full situation to the legislature and making themselves
available for explanations. They do a very good job at defining benefits of
higher education at the institution and statewide. Their true motive is the benefit
of the state.

A fundamental difference that distinguishes university lobbyists from professional lobbyists in
Indiana, as Representative Bales explains, is the professional lobbyist is a "hired gun" that
often represents a variety of interests, none of which he or she is directly a part. The
university lobbyist, however, is generally full-time staff for the institution, understands the
campus from an inside perspective, and knows the minutia of university operations and
infrastructure. Therefore, when the university lobbyist represents the requests before the
legislature, there is greater sense of identity with the cause and a stronger sense of urgency
as to why this should be granted, other than it is what the client wishes to occur.

Dr. John Huie, former budget director for Governor Otis Bowen and current director of state
relations for Purdue University, concurs with the role of the government representative for
higher education. "One way to get people together is to feed them," he states. "The university
has an obligation to the people and the state to plead its case before the legislators. . . .
Tactics such as tickets to a university function bring them closer to the issue (the campus) than
tickets to a pro ball game or some other non-related function."3 "If you choose to have a

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3 This and all subsequent references to comments by Dr. John Huie come from a telephone interview December 6, 1995.
relatively decentralized structure [of higher education]," states Kent Weldon, "with that will come a certain level of self-assertiveness, and with that will come individual means to advance their agendas." Mr. Weldon has not experienced a pervasive feeling of resentment from the legislature in regard to university lobbying methods in the past.

One approach being utilized by university representatives to address the negative impressions is to expand beyond the individual lobbyist into a coalition with other groups within the community—allies that would have vested interest in a sustained, successful system of higher education, e.g., business, industry, and primary education (Hines 1988, 32). Even among the university lobbyists, there is a sense of urgency for a unified coalition. While each school has its own lobbyist(s), Dr. Huie elaborates, there is a sense of common purpose and unity among the representatives regarding each school’s requests. In Indiana, there is a sense of cooperation among the schools in serving the citizens by providing higher educational services, and this cooperation extends to the legislative process.

-The State Higher Education Commission-

The apparent need for a strong presentation of worthiness and a beneficial image has, over the years, provided the rationale for an additional educational actor in the lobbying process. Section 1202 of the Education Amendments of 1972 to the Higher Education Act of 1965 began federal funding for state higher education commissions, and by the late 1970s, all states except Wyoming, several territories, and the District of Columbia had statutory state-level coordinating or governing boards for postsecondary education (Carnegie 1976b, 52; Hines and Hartmark 1980, 13; Layzell and Lyddon 1990, 27). Forty-three of these state boards have been given statutory power of review over institutional budgets and

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4 Clarification added.
recommendation power to the governor and/or legislature. This trend began at the end of the nineteenth century, as states which grew frustrated from unruly competitive institutions and the resulting factionalism. Efforts to overcome these trends included centralizing administrative efforts within state government (Brubacher and Rudy 1968, 381). The Education Acts merely codified the practice.

The role of the state higher education board is a volatile one, often coming under great fire: "When the campuses choose not to become involved, policy makers sometimes turn to state boards," Hines writes. "If the state boards do not become involved, lawmakers' continued support for higher education may become jeopardized; if they become too involved, however, campuses become critical of their intrusiveness" (1988, 1).

Two types of boards exist in the states: coordinating and governing. The basic difference is that "[s]tatewide governing boards tend to be more concerned with issues of institutional management, whereas coordinating boards concern themselves with issues of higher education policy" (Layzell and Lyddon 1990, 15). From the two types of boards, four structural models in the statewide system are identified; the first two involve governing boards, and the second two involve coordinating boards:

- **State-Agency Model** -- Coordinating agency and legislature make all budget decisions for institutions and exercise strict financial control.
- **State-Controlled Model** -- Coordinating agency is still primary authority for higher education but relies more upon institutional budget requests.
- **State-Aided Model** -- Joint responsibility for institutional financing is shared by the state and the institution, while agency tends to be more of an advisor.
• Free-Market Model -- Institution is financially responsible for itself, while agency is merely a provider of funds and the state contracts with the institution to provide educational services. (Layzell and Lyddon 1990, 27)

The advantages and disadvantages of both governing boards and coordinating boards are each rather clear. Governing boards oversee actual campus governance, appointment of the president, and authority over management of the campus budget. Governing board members tend, however, to become more aligned with the campuses than with the state government of which they are members, and in turn alienate relations with the state. They also are more inclined to exclude differing aspects of higher education, such as community colleges and private institutions. Coordinating boards, on the other hand, relate to many more aspects of postsecondary education, including the private sector. They also make statewide master plans into which each college falls without being very campus-specific, which affords greater institutional autonomy. They approve or refuse proposed degree programs and make appropriations recommendations to the legislature. In spite of these advantages, disadvantages include greater influence by governors in institutional affairs, greater independent behavior by campus officials, especially the president, and potential for total disregard from the institution for the board’s recommendations (Hines and Hartmark 1980, 2-3).

Hines and Hartmark reflect a definite preference for the coordinating board over the governing board based on these advantages. They explain that generally, "[c]oordinating agencies are seen as a buffer between the institution and the state and as a mediator between the needs of higher education and the demands of the state . . . “ (1980, 16). Further, this arrangement gives greater autonomy to each institution in determining individual operational policies and
mission statements, while the coordinating board maintains the greater statewide perspective, still sensitive to individual institutional needs. Coordinating agencies are more likely to be run by people with either previous educational experience or a stronger sympathy toward it rather than popularly-elected officials. In turn the state is more likely to operate in kind, with a broader statewide focus toward these appropriations (Hines and Hartmark 1980, 15).

The Carnegie Foundation expresses in its report The States and Higher Education: A Proud Past and a Vital Future the following concern about governing boards:

We regret this [the overall tendency toward centralization of authority over higher education]\(^5\) because:

- It reduces the influence of students and of faculty members and of campus administrators and of members of campus governing boards—all persons who know the most about institutions of higher education, and are the most directly involved in their operations. It also reduces their sense of responsibility. The governance of academic institutions should include an influential role for academics and for those in close relations with them.

- This centralization seems to have had no measurable direct impacts on policies or on practices. No provable case can thus far be made that higher education is in any way better because of the centralization, except, where it has taken place, in the one area of careful advance academic planning for higher education as a whole. It is, of course, not possible to know, however, what would have happened in the absence of the centralization that did occur.

- The governance processes are worse. They are more costly, more cumbersome, more time-consuming, more frustrating, and place more power

\(^5\) Clarification added.
in the hands of those who are the furthest removed and who know the least.

(1976a, 11)

The Carnegie Foundation summarizes its stance that what is needed is “good information, careful analysis of it, and thoughtful judgments about policy so that those with final authority, in any event, for most, and perhaps even all, major actions lies with governors and legislators, with [institutions] and with students. In between regulatory mechanisms cannot long exercise authority of importance strictly on their own” (1976a, 13).

The Indiana Commission for Higher Education, created in 1971 as an oversight board in the style of the state-aided model, serves to advise state institutions in the budget process and be an advocate for new degree programs. Deputy Commissioner Weldon elaborates that “statutory wording gives it an advisory position . . . coordinating universities but advising the legislature and governor.” He further explains that if Indiana were compared to the rest of commissions in the nation, the Commission would be almost entirely at the end of the spectrum that emphasizes the university’s individual role and the decentralization of the process. Each institution is encouraged to pursue individual efforts in addition to the Commission’s efforts. Bales states, “The commission was created to be an advocate of higher education and serve as an oversight mechanism to prevent duplication of professional education programs such as law, medicine, dentistry, etc., . . . while still affording each institution as much autonomy as possible.” The preference for coordinating boards is shared by Representative Bales and Dr. Huie. Dr. Huie explains, “We should always strive to make decisions at the lowest point in the hierarchy because they have the most information that directly relates to them and therefore will make a more educated decision.”
Bales warns that the Commission was overstepping its boundaries in the mid-80s, as it began to "micromanage the schools--dictating missions and programs rather than permitting institutional autonomy." He is hopeful that new leadership within the Commission will bring it back into what he believes is its appropriate focus.

- The Legislature -

From the earliest days of state support for institutions, an ongoing struggle for guaranteed funding has been waged by schools and legislatures. From the days of the first land grant colleges in the early 1800s, "regular and substantial tax support was necessary and . . . proved difficult to convince the American public of the wisdom of this policy" (Brubacher and Rudy 1968, 155). Many states, like Georgia, merely "endowed" their universities and left them to fend for themselves except for an occasional lottery endeavor or a rare appropriation (Brubacher and Rudy 1968, 146).

Indiana's earliest dealings with higher education were rather unstable as well. Vincennes University, the original land grant college in the state, was commandeered by a religious sect interested in establishing its own school. Indiana University was later overrun by the same group. Eventually, in 1828, the General Assembly established the Bloomington seminary and decreed that "no sectarian beliefs were ever to be taught therein" (Brubacher and Rudy 1968, 155). Even Article 8 of the Indiana Constitution, which establishes the public school system in Indiana, does not mention higher education of any form, especially not the state university (Henn 1993, 137).

Key factors that determine what portion of the budget will go to higher education as opposed to other areas include the state's demography, political history, and economy; the experience
of governors and legislators with higher education; the dominant values of a state's political leaders; and the place of higher education in the state's political culture (Berdahl 1978, 351; Hines 1988, 4; Hines and Hartmark 1980, 21; Layzell and Lyddon 1990, 20). In order to gather a general perception about a state's emphasis on higher education, it is important to examine "[p]atterns of public spending for education (that is, resources allocated among competing preferences) . . . For example, states with historically strong private sectors of higher education tend to spend less over time on public higher education relative to public education for kindergarten through grade 12" (Layzell and Lyddon 1990, 25).

Considering "higher education has become the largest discretionary item in the budget" (Layzell and Lyddon 1990, 31), state legislatures have been compelled to play a greater role in determining institutional spending. Since court decisions or federal statutes prescribe certain spending levels for items such as Medicare or prisons in the state budget, the discretionary areas, where the lawmakers and the state budget director can negotiate about dividing remaining funds, are left contending for larger portions of steadily decreasing revenues (Lively 1992, A22). Roche confirms this trend, as he notes that "[s]tates were spending a quarter of their budgets on higher education two decades ago; now, on average, they are spending 18 percent or less" (1994, 13). The Carnegie Foundation reports the effects this level of state spending has on the state taxpayer: "the burden, per student, has risen . . . by more than three times over and even more than that for the taxpayer at the federal level" (1976a, 30).

Legislators need to justify where the money they allocate will be going and that it is a valid expenditure, since they will be held responsible for their decisions during the following election. During the appropriations process, lawmakers evaluate diversity of missions among senior colleges, duplication of programs at many schools, accessibility to higher education for
"educationally underserved areas," and other unmet needs in the state's postsecondary offerings (Hines 1988, 1). Part of this call for legislative accountability appeared in a task force report from the 1986 National Governors' Association calling on states "to define institutional missions clearly, emphasize the importance of undergraduate education, . . . , provide incentives for the improvement of quality, and emphasize the importance of commitment to access" (Callan 1993, 5)

Often, the need to defend appropriations causes legislators to become overspecific in line-item allocation and dictate to institutions how to and how not to spend given monies (Roche 1994, 94). This stems from the Depression era, where state officers began to take stronger control over institutional budgets to control rising costs and eliminating waste and duplication among the schools (Henry 1975, 212). This tendency to be overcritical can result in what is often negatively termed a "gadfly" legislator, who seems intent on "micromanaging" higher education. Instead, says Pennsylvania State Representative Ronald R. Cowell, legislators "have a significant obligation to taxpayers and . . . desire to be ever more effective advocates" (Mercer 1994, A22). With more information on what the institutions are doing, they can insure that they are making a good investment.

The term "gadfly" is seen by many in Indiana as an undeserved negative label. Kent Weldon comments, "I see a gadfly as something pesky and insignificant . . . [these legislators] being called gadflies are actually executing their duties in a thoughtful and responsible fashion." Often, explains Dr. Huie, these legislators are in difficult situations, such as trying to balance budgets with limited funds and many deserving requests. They are not singly critical of higher

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education but often extend that same criticism to other public services and private interests that make requests, simply as a means of making the most judicious decisions possible.

-The Governor-

A political role that has been gaining greater influence in the budgetary decisionmaking for higher education is the state governor. Hines and Hartmark explain that as the "pattern of conflict in most states gravitates to disputes over total appropriation for higher education rather than more marginal issues of inter-institutional allocations, the principal conflict will be between the governor and state budget office versus the university system, regardless of the structure of governance or coordination" (1980, 16). In the mid-1970s, the Carnegie Foundation noted, "The governor, in many states, is now the one dominant figure in higher education . . . and suggest, as a check and balance, that governing boards be structured so that, first of all, governors not be members of them, and second, that appointments to these boards be recommended through appropriate screening mechanisms [such as selection committees fashioned by the governor and charged with specific areas to evaluate] and be subject to some form of legislative approval" (1976a, 19)\(^7\).

Hines notes that areas of greater gubernatorial involvement include access and quality, system consolidation, relations between private and public campuses, as well as how improved higher education opportunities might help improve economic conditions, particularly involving technology, industry, and job training (1988, 22).

Governors also, as Hines points out, tend to be results-oriented (1988, 77). As an advocate of economic development and job creation within the state, the governor can serve as a link

\(^7\) Clarification added.
between the legislature, whose job it is to make choices about how to allocate limited resources within the political process, and the education community that is battling countless other interests. However, as revealed in a 1986 survey, "governors listen to their own staff aides, the Education Commission of the States, and the National Governors' Association more than they do to campus presidents and state and federal higher education associations" (Hines 1988, 35-36)\(^8\). This only further supports the idea of expanded coalitions and continued efforts to attempt fresh approaches beyond the traditional styles of government relations.

A technique that is employed by current Indiana governor Evan Bayh is the use of a legislative liaison from the governor's office. Much like a university representative, the liaison represents the governor's interests on policy to the legislature. During the 1995 legislative session in Indiana, Stan Jones served as the liaison, attending committee meetings, testifying on issues related to higher education and expressing the governor's interests on such. Dr. Huie defined the liaison's role as "a communication link with the legislature—articulating executive goals, attending committee meetings, taking part in formulating policy strategies in the legislature. If he takes too active a role, he is accused of interfering, while too detached a role would cause similar criticism."

The role of the legislative liaison is an important tool for the governor, as he needs to keep abreast of current issues and how they will affect not only the state, but his performance. The liaison is able to report back regarding people who testify before committee, concerns brought up for and against legislation, and the likelihood of a bill passing that he would need either to sign or veto. For the Indiana governor, this is especially important, since the governor has a

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weak veto power, able to be overridden by a simple majority vote in the General Assembly. Representative Bales notes the "curious" nature of this role, since "in six years as governor, Bayh had never mentioned the words 'higher education' in a State of the State speech."

Another area in which the governor can exert influence over the university system rests with the power of appointments. The Indiana Code gives the governor the power to appoint the majority of the trustees on each state institution's board of trustees, as well as number of the members of the Indiana Commission for Higher Education. In addition, the governor has approval power for the student, faculty, and alumni representatives that are appointed by their respective constituencies to the boards and the Commission (Henn 1993, 29-30). This power of appointment and review gives control over the composition of boards that will be shaping university policy and missions, selecting university presidents and other administrators, and establishing institutional goals. Similarly, appointment power of the Commission influences whom the members will eventually hire as commissioner, what sort of guidance is given to the institutions, and the direction for higher education in Indiana.

Overall, the governor's role in the budget process is mostly an interested observer, watching the actions taken by the legislature and in the end approving or rejecting their decisions based on how he believes the state's residents will respond to such decisions (and if his chances of re-election will be helped). Most of the actual budgetary process is carried out by the budget director, who presents the official proposal to the legislature based upon submitted requests during the months before a budget session, and by his legislative liaisons who represent what he feels are the best interests of his citizens.
-Assessment-

In reviewing the roles of each actor in the budgetary process of allocating funds for higher education, it is apparent that each player has a very distinct role. The institution serves as a provider of education for those wishing to pursue postsecondary education. In that capacity, it is important to present and defend missions, programs, and future goals. The lobbyist serves to be a constant resource for those outside the institution and as a figurehead for the institution. The commission is charged with oversight and coordination among the varied institutions within the state as well as providing explanation and guidance to the legislature and the governor. The legislature is responsible for appropriating resources in the best possible way to serve the residents of the state, involved with or apart from higher education. Finally, the governor is seen as the state's executive officer, providing both leadership and administrative accountability.

Even with the distinct roles being conducted by each actor in the process, there is a great deal of cooperation built into the process. The institution provides the commission with the budgetary request, which the commission then presents to the budget director and the governor for consideration and approval by the legislature. While each branch has distinct concerns, direction, and motivation, there is an inherent need to abide by one another's needs and obligations in order to permit greater cooperation and progress.

The process in Indiana is clearly effective and well structured to the political climate within the state. Each institution prides itself in offering a slightly different atmosphere, selection of academic specialties, and student body and faculty composition that would serve the needs of the wide array of students within the state. Schools range from large main campuses with branch campuses around the state to mid-sized schools located somewhat centrally within a
region of the state to schools with small campuses serving more rural populations that otherwise may find it difficult to relocate to urban areas. They are accessible to the recent high school graduate, the returning advanced student, or the adult returning for a degree after years in the workplace or raising a family. Indiana prides itself in academic quality offered to any person wishing to partake. The legislators of the General Assembly are in general very supportive of the current structure and are critical only to the degree that they expect a high level of accountability from higher education’s leaders regarding educational integrity and a high rate of return for the amount of money that is being invested in these facilities and students.

As Representative Bales commented, "If we’re ever going to become a great state, and we’re a long way from it, we have to educate more of our citizens." Not only is Indiana well on its way to educate more of its citizens based upon current trends in higher education structure and spending, it is well on its way to producing a more capable, competitive, and productive class of graduates that will contribute to the development of Indiana’s future.
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Purpose of Thesis

The concept of "lobbying" for a cause or special interest has long been seen as a selfish, dirty practice that is the subject of scorn and criticism. However, providers of many services traditionally provided by the state are finding themselves in the position of having to defend their existence and importance to the state in order to secure funding to maintain operations. Among these are the public institutions of higher learning in Indiana.

This analysis of the players and their roles in the process of requesting and allocating state funding for higher education stems from my experience as a legislative lobbying intern for Ball State University during the 1995 budget session of the Indiana Legislature. It examines the functions of the university lobbyist, the legislature and governor, and the governing and/or coordinating boards in the middle.