THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INDIANA IN AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY

An Honors Thesis (ID 499)

by

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I. INTRODUCTION

Indiana, known as the "Crossroads of America,"¹ lies at the heart of the United States. One of the smallest states, ranking 38th in size and embracing only 36,354 square miles, it is frequently regarded by long-distance travellers as "simply something to get across on the way from Ohio to the Mississippi River, or on the route between Chicago and Louisville."² Indiana is, in fact, the smallest in area of the contiguous 37 states west of the Allegheny Mountains, and yet nearly all of the greatest inland trade and emigration routes since 1700 have passed through her boundaries.³ Because of her central location, Indiana attracted a wide variety of emigrants during the early westward flow of population, many of whom settled on her fertile soil. This diverse representation of so many sectional and social backgrounds within the state created a miniature semblance of the "great American melting pot." Meredith Nicholson noted in 1900 that "Indiana has always lain near the current of national life," while Mark Sullivan observes in his 1926 work, Our Times, that the typical American of 1900 "more nearly resembled a Hoosier than he did the inhabitant of any other state."⁴ Irvin Cobb reiterates this point by noting, "Your Indianian of today, pure Northern on one side and one hundred per cent Southerner on the other, is the most typical American in the whole democracy."⁵ The fact that the center of the nation's population was located
in the state for six consecutive decades, from 1890 through the 1940's, longer than in any other state, has contributed to the self-appraisal that Hoosiers must represent the average American. A 1941 work entitled *Indiana: A Guide to the Hoosier State* expands on this point by noting that

> [Indiana] is not wholly a typical corn-belt State. Wide topographical variations, a close economic balance between agriculture and industry, and the fact that it is directly in the path of the Nation's greatest east-west traffic flow, combine to make it almost a microcosm of the United States.

We shall see later that Indiana's position as a gathering ground for such a great diversity of people and lifestyles not only caused her to resemble the character and composition of the country, but also provided the background from which she advanced to a leading role among the states in a number of areas.

Owing largely to her location on the great fertile Midwestern plain left by the receding glaciers of ages past, Indiana has long played a dominant role in the nation's agricultural production. She has consistently ranked among the top three to five states in the country in the production of corn, soybeans, tomatoes, hogs, chickens, and eggs. By the mid-1970's, the state was producing one-fifth of the nation's popcorn and boasting the nation's highest yield per acre in soybeans and corn.

Besides Indiana's high production of crops, her fertile soil produces non-agricultural products which have played a vital role in the history of the state. William Wilson observes that "[i]n spite of Indiana's division and its variety,
Indianians are homogeneous in at least one respect. All natives and inhabitants of Indiana exhibit a strong and sometimes egotistical pride in their state.\textsuperscript{9} A second trait, which appears to have commanded equal universality, has been an intense interest in politics. Howard Peckham suggests, with some exaggeration, that

\begin{quote}
. . . the first words of a Hoosier baby are: "I'm not a candidate for office, but if nominated I will run, and if elected I will serve." The false modesty fools no one. Most Hoosiers enjoy politics. They participate more intensely than citizens of many other states.\textsuperscript{10}
\end{quote}

Wilson more boldly asserts, " . . . in the first dozen years of state government, horse-trading and logrolling became the tradition of Indiana politics, a tradition that has given Indiana the reputation of being the most politically minded state in the Union.\textsuperscript{11}

With these three factors coinciding within one state: a balanced representation of the major differing sectional and social backgrounds, a strong sense of state identification and pride, and a high intensity of political interest, the significance of that state in national politics might well merit observation. The fact that Indiana has possessed these characteristics, as well as a diversified and generally healthy economy, a strong nationalistic outlook, a very intense devotion to the Union of the States, and a strong and steadfast attachment to political moderation based on a balanced two-party system,\textsuperscript{12} has attracted considerable national attention to the state. It shall be the contention of this
paper that, as a direct result of these and related factors, the state of Indiana has been afforded a disproportionate amount of national political attention relative to its size or population, and it has consequently played a more prominent role in the nation's political history than what would be reasonably expected of a state of such size. By examining a number of areas in which the significance of Indiana's role in national politics has been manifested, an attempt will be made to support this contention. It should be noted from the beginning that no attempt will be made either to exhaust all of the possible areas in which political significance could be demonstrated, or to quantitatively analyze Indiana's role in national politics. It is hoped that by examining party conventions and nominations, presidential elections and appointments, and major congressional leadership roles, it can be sufficiently established that Indiana has played a prominent role in the nation's political history.
II. HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF INDIANA

In order to more fully understand the background out of which Indiana emerged into the national scene, it might first be helpful to explore the major historical developments leading to her political prominence. The name "Indiana" was coined by Congress when, in 1800, it separated the state's present land area from the Northwest Territory. The word, meaning "Land of the Indians," implies that the actual history of the future state began long before its congressional appellation. 13

For perhaps ten thousand years before the first white man set foot on Indiana territory, various Indian tribes lived in her woods, roamed across her plains, and fished in her rivers and lakes. Very little is known about these early mound-building Indians or their origins 14 except that they were probably ancestors to the later Shawnees, Miamis, Potawatomis, Piankashaws, Delawares, and others that occupied the same territory several thousand years later. 15 It is believed that most of these Indians were driven out of the area between the Ohio River and the Great Lakes near the middle of the seventeenth century by warring Iroquois tribes from the New York area. The Iroquois had nearly depleted the population of fur-bearing animals in the East and had stormed into these western lands in what was known as the Beaver Wars. 16 The Miamis probably returned to the Indiana region during the last half of the seventeenth and
early eighteenth centuries. The Potawatomis and Delawares were later in returning, probably arriving during the early decades of the eighteenth century.¹⁷

At the same time that these tribes were settling back into the Hoosier woodlands, French coureur des bois were also making inroads into the area. Robert Cavalier Sieur De La Salle became, in 1679, the first known white to explore the region, and by 1732 the French had established three forts in the territory.¹⁸ The Fort of the Miamis (also known as Fort Miamis) was erected at the portage connecting the Maumee River with the Little Wabash, where Fort Wayne now stands, around 1700. A second stockade was constructed a few miles below the present city of Lafayette in 1717, known as Fort Ouitanon for the Wea Indians there, with whom the French traded. Fort Vincennes, the largest settlement constructed by the French in this area, was completed in 1732.¹⁹ These three fortifications were strategically located both as trading centers for the Indians and to secure the territory as a part of New France. France controlled the region for 84 years until the Treaty of Paris of 1763, following her unsuccessful part in the French and Indian War with British and American troops, demanded the removal of all French settlements.²⁰ George Rogers Clark led a successful attack against the British troops at Fort Vincennes during the American Revolution, which marked the decline of England's brief control of the region, and in 1800, Vincennes became the capital for the new Indiana Territory.²¹

In 1811 the Assembly of the territorial government of Indiana petitioned Congress for statehood; the petition was
denied. Four years later a second memorial for statehood was sent to Washington, and in April 1816 Congress passed an enabling act which cleared the way for Indiana to become the 19th state in the Union. Only five other states: Vermont, Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, and Louisiana, had been admitted to the Union prior to 1816, but within the next five years, Mississippi, Illinois, Alabama, Maine, and Missouri were added as well.22

Shortly after achieving statehood, Indiana began to acquire a distinction it would not soon outgrow or live down; it was becoming known as the "Hoosier State." Although the precise origins or meaning of this term are not known, one author notes, "[t] has been used to describe Indianians for many years, and, after 'Yankee,' is perhaps the best-known sobriquet applied to the people of any particular division of the country."23 There are at least a half dozen feasible theories relating to the invention of the word "Hoosier," most generally referring to a crude backwoodsman or a rough frontiersman. Regardless of the origin, however, by the late 1820's the word was in standard usage. John Finley's 1830 poem, "The Hoosier Nest," appeared in the January 1, 1833 Indianapolis Journal and became one of the earliest public uses of the term in print,24 while that same year the Ohio Republican, a Cincinnati newspaper, commented that "[t]he appellation Hooshier (sic) has been used in many of the western States for several years to designate in a good natured way an inhabitant of the State of Indiana."25 The distinction of this unique name was not lost on the character of the people who bore it. William Wilson notes:
The Hoosier's friendliness and hospitality are universally recognizable. He is easy to meet and quite ready to talk about himself. His eagerness to share his possessions as well as his private life sometimes appears naive to the outsider accustomed to the self-protective reticence and suspicion of more thickly populated regions. But the Hoosier is not naive. He inherits his tradition of cordiality from lonely pioneer days when every stranger was at once a welcome friend and a helpless supplicant; yet from those days, he inherits a talent for quick and accurate appraisal of character.

These early Hoosiers were, for the most part, American emigrants. Unlike their ancestors and many of their neighbors, they were neither fleeing British religious persecution nor any American political repressions.

They were a post-Revolutionary generation of full-fledged Americans imbued with all the freedoms earned on the tidewater, and exultant in their hopes. They migrated for the purpose of improving themselves economically while maintaining what their parents and grandparents had won. They were not starting over, but starting up.

Finally, as one last description of these early Indianians, it should be noted that they were primarily agrarians or small businessmen and strongly leaned toward early nineteenth century Republicanism.

Like other States formed from the Northwestern Territory, early Indiana founded its political and social life on an economy of agriculture. The pioneers brought a political ideal of equalitarian democracy that stemmed from Thomas Jefferson and reflected the interests of the farmers and small mechanics of the Colonial period. A case is recorded in the early days of Franklin County in which a citizen collected $1,000 in damages in court because a neighbor had called him a Federalist.

This strong identification with the "People's Party," the party of Jefferson and later Jackson, dominated the state's political attitude for the first twenty or more years of statehood. Not until about 1840 did an opposition party--the Whigs--challenge
the supremacy of the Jacksonian democracy. However, once introduced to the options of a two-party system, Hoosiers soon created such a closely balanced party rivalry that the state was to be labeled "doubtful" ever since. 29

Immigration patterns probably played one of the greatest roles in the determination of these early political trends which eventually led to Indiana's strong, balanced, two-party system. As mentioned earlier, Indiana lay at the junction of most of the great emigration routes through the United States, and by being so situated, she attracted a wide representation of Americans to settle her fertile soil. Irvin Cobb describes this phenomenon, noting:

... as the virgin domain beyond the mountains opened up, that impulse which is as old as the human race is, set in motion toward the sundown side of the horizon two restless living streams--one a stream rising in Connecticut and Northern New York and heading west by south, and the other rising in Virginia and the Carolinas and Georgia, with supplementary trickles out of Kentucky and Tennessee, and winding its course west by north. They met and ran together in human eddies in Indiana. 30

For the first 30 or more years, however, by far the larger of the two streams flowing into the Hoosier boundaries was from the Upper South. Donald Carmony observes:

Indiana was settled more largely by Southern immigrants than any other state of the Old Northwest--perhaps more largely than any northern or free state. Especially until about 1830 Indiana was principally settled by persons from the Upper South--from Virginia, North and South Carolina, Maryland, Kentucky and Tennessee. Settlers from Virginia (including present West Virginia) and Kentucky were quite numerous. From the beginning, however, settlers also came from the Middle Atlantic States, notably Pennsylvania and New York, and also from neighboring Ohio. Between 1830 and 1860 the flow of population from the Middle Atlantic States and Ohio
became larger than that from the South. Only a few came from either New England or the Lower South.\textsuperscript{31} Edward Leary reiterates this point by noting that Indiana has often been characterized as "... the most southern of all northern states..." as she could claim "... more southern immigrants than any other state of the Old Northwest."\textsuperscript{32}

John Fenton, in his discussion of the balanced, two-party system in Indiana, observes that the very earliest Hoosiers generally tended to settle in the southern half of the state with the Ohio River serving as one of the primary reasons. The Ohio was the principal means of transportation for most of the early years both in terms of bringing new people to the state and for the importation of needed supplies and the exportation of furs and surplus produce. Most of those newcomers from the South settled in the southern portion of the state. Even as the National Road began to stretch across the state, emigrants tended to move southward toward the "lifeline" of the Ohio River. However, by the late 1830's and 1840's, as more pioneers moved in from the northern states, especially New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, many of these new Hoosiers began to settle the northern half of the state in greater numbers. One significant factor for this development was the gradual removal of the Indians from the northern regions of the state during the 1820's and 1830's. A strong Indian population in the area prior to this time inhibited greater early settlement.

The primary significance of these two immigration patterns is that each strongly represented the two central political ideologies of the country. The southern portion of the state
was largely settled by those adherents to the Jeffersonian Republican and later the Jacksonian Democratic Party. They were strong proponents of individual rights and liberties, equally strong opponents of a powerful central government, and the immediate predecessors of the Democratic Party. The northern counties, on the other hand, were more frequently populated by advocates of a strong central government and supporters of business and industrial interests; by Federalists and Whigs—the precursors of the modern Republican Party. So distinct was this stratification that the National Road was long held to divide Indiana into two separate states. Fenton observes:

The road, in the minds of its people, bisects the state culturally and politically. The people in the area south of the National Road have long been regarded as predominantly southern and Democratic, and the people north of the road as largely northern and Republican. These two opposing political halves of the state strongly contributed to the perpetuation of a balanced political rivalry in the state.

By the late 1840’s and early 1850’s the north-south population in Indiana had reached such a close balance that the dominance of the Democratic Party was seriously challenged in the state. A political rivalry had been stirring since the late 1820’s, but not until the emergence of the Republican Party in the mid-1850’s was any serious challenge presented to the Democrats. From that point on, however, Indiana was rarely ever considered a "safe" state by either party. So balanced was the political rivalry that Indiana was to be known as one
of the great "doubtful" or "swing" states for the next one hundred years.\textsuperscript{34}

In terms of population numbers, Indiana climbed through the ranks rather rapidly in her early years but gradually fell behind the pace set by other states such as California and Florida. In 1800, at the time she achieved territorial status, fewer than 2,500 inhabitants could be counted along the Ohio River. Sixteen years later, however, the new state boasted a population of 75,000 and four years after that the federal census of 1820 counted 150,000 Hoosiers, ranking Indiana 18th among the 23 states.\textsuperscript{35} During the next four decades the Hoosier population exploded to nine times its 1820 count, totaling 1,350,428 in 1860. An unusually high birth rate and very heavy immigration were principal factors in this rapid expansion of numbers—a growth that elevated Indiana to the position of sixth most populous among the nation's 33 states.\textsuperscript{36} This number was nearly doubled at 2,516,000 forty years later, an increase of about 1,200,000 from 1860 to 1900. This growth, however, slowed considerably during the next forty years, reaching 3,428,000 by the 1940 census, an expansion of only 900,000—less than forty percent of the 1900 figure.\textsuperscript{37} Although the next forty years saw a more rapid increase, growing more than sixty percent to a 1980 count of 5,490,000, Indiana continued to decline in the total population ranking, falling from the eleventh to twelfth position among the nation's most populous states.\textsuperscript{38} Aside from the fluctuations in the number of congressional districts and national political convention delegates allocated to the state resulting from these population trends,
it is possible that the political significance of the state in national elections has been indirectly, if not directly, related to these trends as well. This possibility will be discussed in more detail in the conclusions of this paper.
III. INDIANA: A "SWING STATE"

By the late 1840's or early 1850's the balance between the two major political parties was rapidly reaching that point of unpredictable dominance. Hoosiers were emerging from the individualism and isolation of the frontier which had so tightly bound them to the political philosophies of Jefferson and Jackson. Paralleling this emergence was the genesis of the Republican Party which offered some political alternatives to disgruntled Democrats. Labeling the 1850's as a "decade of transition," John Barnhart and Donald Carmony note:

Although the transition from a frontier to an industrial commonwealth was gradual in Indiana, this trend was marked during the 1850's. For Indiana this brought a significant transition from frontier and pioneer conditions toward a new economic order which nourished the seeds of urbanization and industrialization.

After nearly 40 years of being regarded as a "western" or "frontier" state, Indiana was gradually acquiring the sophistication and maturity necessary to earn the respect of her sister states. This maturing process naturally lead to the development of competing, alternative political views.

This transition toward an industrialized state, however, was by no means a complete metamorphosis. Agriculture continued to play a major role in the Hoosier economy and remained as a vital segment even until today. The fact that Indiana developed a balanced and diversified economy, with industrial and agricultural interests complementing one another, allowed the state to
avoid several of the economic slumps suffered by many other single-industry states. The generally sustained health of the Hoosier economy prevented either of the major political parties from assuming any prolonged dominance in the state because of drastic failures of the other to effectively deal with extended depressed periods. On the contrary, the general prosperity usually permitted both parties to remain healthy and strong, while periodic slumps allowed for frequent changes of control. Barnhart and Carmony observe that, during the 1850's,

Indiana's economic ties had been and still were mainly with the South, but the rising volume and proportion of trade with the East and Northeast fostered union sentiments and loyalties. In political contests Indiana might vote with either the southern states or the Middle Atlantic-New England bloc as the issues varied. . . .

From this observation it can be seen that Indiana's balanced political system developed not only from the maturation and industrialization of the Hoosier economy, but also from strong sectional sentiments, in which Indiana maintained a balanced relationship. Had Indiana either remained a primarily agricultural state or developed into a totally industrialized commonwealth, the future of her balanced political system probably would have been drastically different. As it was, the balanced economy permitted a sustained interrelationship with both the Democratic South and the Republican North.

This political balance did not dissolve during the Civil War years, however; rather it emerged as a strong and lasting Hoosier institution. Clifton Phillips analyzes this political phenomenon:

Why did Indiana maintain an even political balance between the parties--more so than the neighboring
states of Illinois and Ohio? One reason may lie in its comparatively stable social and economic position in the decades immediately following the Civil War. Indiana in 1880 was still an old-fashioned commonwealth. In the middle of a rapidly urbanizing and industrializing Middle West, the Hoosier state remained predominantly agricultural and rural, with few large cities and no metropolis. Its population also continued to be relatively homogeneous, little affected by the new currents of immigration in America until after the turn of the century. One scholar noting that New York owed its doubtful political character to a "Democratic metropolis . . . balanced by a Republican rural population," pointed out that, on the contrary, "Indiana is doubtful because the voting constituency of the two parties is distributed evenly between city and country in all sections of the State."41

In the twentieth century, although the Republicans maintained a slight advantage, the two-party balance remained active. John Fenton writes that "[a]fter 1932, the Republican party was dominant geographically, but the Democrats balanced the electoral scales with a large urban vote."42 Later in Midwest Politics, he comments further: " . . . Indiana unquestionably enjoyed a virile two-party system in the 1960's, for both parties were well organized and in elections either one of them had an excellent chance of emerging victorious."43

Aside from the agricultural-industrial or country-city divisions which maintained the strength of the two-party system in Indiana, and earned the attention-drawing classification of "swing" or "doubtful" state for the Hoosier commonwealth, two other factors played major roles in the maintenance of this focal standing: political moderation and a degree of party polarization resulting from Civil War sentiments and traditions. Although these factors may appear contradictory, they in fact blend together to form a strong bipartisan institution. Each party established a core of devoted adherents which remain loyal
to the party regardless of issues or personalities. Usually, however, neither of these core groups constitutes the necessary majority to win elections consistently and so each has to battle for the support of the undecided voters. Donald Carmony observes:

Since at least the 1840's Hoosier politicians have usually traveled the middle of the political highway. Normally jostling with each other for possession of the center of the road, political leaders have seldom occupied either the right or left berm. In most elections the platform of either major party would be almost as suitable for its rival as for its own nominees. . . . Moreover, whenever politics has tended to move to the right or to the left, both major parties have normally moved cautiously in the same direction. 44

In attempting to explain the reasons for Indiana's propensity toward political moderation, Carmony continues:

No fully adequate explanation can be offered for Indiana's persistent attachment to political moderation. Four factors, however, explain much of the basis for this moderation. First of all, political parties were born in the pioneer era when Indiana life . . . rested on a broad democratic base. Hence, during the years of party formation, other factors tended to perpetuate its continuation. The rapid growth of a diversified, expanding, and generally healthy economy supplied an economic context which fostered and nourished continued moderation. Moreover, although political changes have mainly come piecemeal, they have principally had bipartisan support and they normally soon become widely accepted. Once these changes and adjustments are made, they are generally incorporated into a new moderate stance. Finally, . . . Indiana election laws and patronage practices have given prolonged and significant support for political moderation. . . . From the Jacksonian era to the present, Indiana politicians have fought for and then distributed governmental positions as if such a right were as inviolate and deeply embedded in the Bill of Rights as freedom of religion! 45

Clifton Phillips assesses the foundations of the loyal party blocs, noting:

Another important factor in the narrow division and harsh competitiveness of Hoosier politics was the impact of the Civil War, which left a bitter heritage of divided
sympathies and distrust during and even after the Recon-
struction era. ... According to a recent statistical
study of Indiana election returns by two political sci-
entists, the Civil War also bequeathed a legacy of tradi-
tional voting patterns persisting as late as 1900. Over
this period they show that many counties in the state
tended to retain fairly consistent partisan attachments
apparently derived from Civil War traditions related to
the previous proslavery or antislavery sentiments of
their residents. These counties in which a large part
of the inhabitants had eastern or Quaker antecedents
usually voted Republican, while those chiefly settled
by Southerners or German immigrants were more often
found in the Democratic column. Regardless of the is-
sues raised in the campaigns, a large portion of the
electorate rarely deviated from these long-established
patterns of political behavior. \(46\)

In order to slightly clarify this situation, a review of
those major factors contributing to Indiana's position as a
"swing" or "doubtful" state in national politics might be in
order. Indiana contained a balanced representation of the major
differing sectional and social backgrounds of the nation, es-
pecially a balanced North-South population. These Hoosiers
developed a strong sense of state identification and pride,
and assumed an intense interest in politics. Indiana developed
a closely balanced two-party system resulting from this inter-
play of North-South immigrants and an equally measured agri-
cultural-industrial or country-city division; the two-party
system was perpetuated by a strong, diversified economy and a
dedication on the part of both parties to political moderation.
Although these factors are by no means conclusive, and are in
fact largely dependent upon one another and upon other less
major factors, they appear to represent what historians most
frequently identify as the primary contributors to Indiana's
political vacillation.
Taken by itself, the fact that Indiana remained in such a volatile political state year after year probably would have sufficed to attract some national attention directed toward tipping the scales in favor of one party or the other. The fact, however, that Indiana was such a large state with a substantial number of electoral votes to be carried off by the victorious party considerably increased the political stakes and caused both national parties to pay a great deal of attention to the Hoosier State. As noted earlier, Indiana achieved the rank of sixth most populous state in 1860 and maintained that position for several years. By 1850 the state had earned thirteen electoral votes and that number was increased to fifteen for the sixty-year period from 1870 to 1930. Especially during those years before the admittance to the Union of most of the western states, Indiana's electoral vote represented a substantial prize to be won by the party most able to persuade the few thousand undecided Hoosiers needed to capture the state.

At least two closely-related situations emerged from Indiana's "swing state" status, both of which will be discussed in more detail later. Both political parties waged intense campaigns virtually every four years in Indiana in order to win the state; the party that was able to carry the Hoosiers' vote won the national contest as well in a surprising number of elections. One of the tactics used to win the state was the inclusion of Hoosier politicians on the national ticket, or the promise of important federal appointments, which resulted in a number of Indiana names appearing on the fall ballots across the country or at least being seriously discussed at the national
conventions. Regardless of the personal qualities or accomplishments of the individual, it was frequently considered a strong asset to have a Hoosier either on one's election slate or in one's presidential cabinet.

In discussing what has often been described as a "weather-vane" effect, Donald Carmony observes:

The rivalry between Republicans and Democrats was especially intense during the period between the Civil War and World War I. Two factors help explain this intensity. First, Indiana was a doubtful state in numerous local contests as well as in state and national elections, and the margin of victory was often extremely close. Second, Republicans and Democrats alike, within and without Indiana, considered Indiana's vote essential in their efforts to win the Presidency and Congress. From 1850 to 1914 Indiana's electoral vote was always cast for the winning presidential nominee, except in 1876. (The rightful winner of this election is still much disputed by historians.) With Indiana important and worth fighting for, both parties sent prominent speakers, campaign literature, party workers, and money to "help" carry it for their side. This situation encouraged the inclusion of Hoosiers on major tickets.49

Continuing this point in another of his works, Carmony noted in 1966:

In voting for presidents, Indiana has been a reliable weathervane. In the 38 contests since we became a state in 1816, we have been with the winner 29 times and with the loser only nine. Four of our nine wrong guesses have come in the last 25 years; we went down with Willkie in 1940; Dewey in 1944 and 1948, and Nixon in 1960. In short, the mood of the nation has usually been ours. . . .50

Since the publication of this book, Indiana has continued its support for the winning candidate in three of the last four elections, giving her a record of 32-10 (18-4 in the nineteenth century and 14-6 in the twentieth century). It is interesting to note that of the ten candidates who carried Indiana but lost the election, four were already occupying the office of
the President, or were eventually to occupy that office: Andrew Jackson was Indiana's losing choice in 1824, William Henry Harrison lost in 1836, Richard Nixon took the Hoosiers in 1960, and Gerald Ford followed in 1976. Also among those unsuccessful ten tickets were four men closely associated with Indiana. Although William Henry Harrison ran as an Ohio resident, he had served as Indiana's first territorial governor from 1801 to 1812. Thomas A. Hendricks was defeated in 1876 as Samuel Tilden's running mate when a partisan Electoral Commission reversed a handful of contested electoral votes to give Rutherford B. Hayes the victory despite a sizable popular majority for Tilden and Hendricks. In 1916, Indiana turned against a second term for Woodrow Wilson and Hoosier Vice President Thomas Marshall in favor of Charles Evans Hughes and another Hoosier vice-presidential candidate, Charles W. Fairbanks. The fourth of these losing Hoosiers who carried their home state was Wendell Willkie, who made a strong showing against Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1940.

These two sets of circumstances seem to do little more than bolster a record which is already quite impressive. Few other states have been able to match this winning percentage. So intense was the campaign warfare conducted by the two national parties to win the state that Clifton Phillips refers to Indiana as "... a 'dark and bloody ground' where opposing partisan armies fought bitterly and long for political control of state and nation and the spoils of office." Donald Voorhees, a prominent United States Senator from Indiana, dubbed his home state the "Belgium of politics, the debatable land between great contending parties and opinions." Logan Esarey describes
the Hoosier state as a "... political battle ground where the fight never ceases and where every officer is a political soldier and every voter a politician."\(^5^4\)

Howard Peckham explains one of the key reasons for the intensity of Hoosier politics by stating:

A deflection of one or two percent of the votes would determine which party got the electoral votes. Hence every vote counted, and the party organization was devoted to getting out the voters and combating indifference. Within the state, each party was promised federal appointments and frequently given national nominations. Victory within the state meant patronage to dispense, of course, for the spoils system was not only approved but felt to be necessary.\(^5^5\)

Peckham substantiates his statement that both parties work hard to stimulate voter turnout by showing that the percentage of eligible voters participating in Hoosier elections has consistently run between five and fifteen points higher than the national average. Voter turnout was recorded at 66% and 70% in 1828 and 1832, respectively, when Jackson carried the state, 83% in 1840 with Governor Harrison on the ballot, and 86% in 1860 when Lincoln first ran. In 1868, with favorite-son Schuyler Colfax running on the Grant ticket, an unbelievable 92% of the eligible Hoosier voters turned out at the polls, only to be surpassed eight years later when 95% of the Hoosier electorate (a national record and several percentage points above the national average) participated in the controversial election between Tilden and Hayes. In 1948, when the national average dropped down to 53%, Indiana maintained a healthy 67%, and, after a mild increase, while the nation returned to a 53% showing in 1976, Indiana voters climbed to 75%. These statistics seem to strongly support the statement that Hoosiers take an avid interest in their politics.\(^5^6\)
As mentioned earlier, one of the tactics frequently used by both of the national political parties as additional ammunition in the Indiana battlegrounds was the nomination of Hoosier statesmen as candidates to the two highest offices in the nation. William Wilson comments:

Seven presidential candidates have been either natives or, for considerable numbers of years, residents of Indiana, and three of them--Lincoln and the two Harrisons--were elected. Of eight candidates for the vice presidency, Colfax, Hendricks, Fairbanks, and Marshall were elected.

Clifton Phillips discusses the role of Indiana's position as a "swing" or "doubtful" state in the frequency of presidential and vice-presidential candidates being selected from the Hoosier State. He explains:

The passing of the Civil War and Reconstruction eras brought no truce to the political wars of Indiana... Like Illinois and Ohio in the Midwest, and New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut in the East, Indiana was a doubtful state, whose uncertain and shifting electorate could tip the scales toward either of the major political parties and determine the nation's choice of the President and control of the Congress of the United States. Both the Republican and Democratic parties recognized the peculiar political character of the two groups of states by choosing many of their presidential and vice-presidential nominees from them. Second only to New York in the number of men placed on the national party tickets between 1880 and 1896, Indiana had many favorite-son candidates for the highest office in the land. Yet it sent only one of its citizens to the White House--the Ohio-born Republican, Benjamin Harrison--and generally had to be content with vice-presidential hopefuls.

Logan Esarey provides a more detailed examination of this situation as he illustrates the extent to which Indiana and New York, as the two great "doubtful" states, dominated the party tickets for a period of 56 years. He writes:

Since the Civil War Indiana and New York have taken part in 14 presidential campaigns. In only one campaign has there been no candidate on one of the dominant party tickets from one or the other of these states. In
1868 Horatio Seymour represented New York and Schuyler Colfax, Indiana; in 1872 Horace Greeley represented New York; in 1876 Samuel J. Tilden and William A. Wheeler were from New York and Thomas A. Hendricks from Indiana; in 1880 Chester A. Arthur was from New York and William H. English from Indiana; in 1884 Grover Cleveland was from New York and Thomas A. Hendricks from Indiana; in 1888 Cleveland and Levi P. Morton were from New York and Benjamin Harrison from Indiana; in 1892 the representative candidates remained the same except that Whitelaw Reid of New York took the place of Morton; in 1896 no representative was on either ticket from the two states; in 1900 Theodore Roosevelt was from New York; in 1904 Roosevelt and Alton B. Parker were from New York and Charles W. Fairbanks from Indiana; in 1908 John W. Kern was from Indiana and William Sherman from New York; in 1912 Roosevelt and Sherman were from New York and Thomas Marshall from Indiana; in 1920 Franklin D. Roosevelt was from New York. Out of 27 leading candidates for the presidency during the period the two states have furnished twelve; Indiana two and New York ten; out of the same number of candidates for vice president they have furnished 17; Indiana nine and New York eight. During twenty years the president has been from one of the two states and during 36, the vice-president. Only twice during that time has the vote of Indiana been given to an unsuccessful candidate. In 1876 its vote went to Tilden by a plurality of 5,515; in 1916 to Hughes by a smaller plurality.59

Although presidential and vice-presidential nominations are clearly the most obvious means of appealing to the local interests of a state, there are definitely other considerations which can entice and appease a wavering electorate which seeks assurances that it will be directly represented in a new administration. Indiana has scarcely been lacking in the number of executive appointments throughout her political history; the number of appointments during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, however, was especially prominent. Ralph Gray assesses this situation as follows:

There is, however, more to the story of Indiana as a "weathervane" than the size of its electoral vote and
the "swing" voting pattern of its electorate. For whatever reasons, the state produced a series of capable and talented political leaders, diplomats, and writers during Indiana's "golden age" in both politics and literature.  

Gray continues by quoting an article by Holman Hamilton entitled "Versatility and Variety: Hoosier Literary, Political, and Diplomatic Prominence, 1871-1901:"

"One citizen of Indiana occupied the White House. Another was chosen for the second highest office. Three natives of Indiana served as secretary of state. Six other cabinet portfolios were held during the period by native sons or longtime residents of Indiana. Seven Hoosiers loomed as outstanding figures in the United States Senate and House of Representatives. Foreign countries where Hoosiers were entrusted with coveted diplomatic missions girdled the globe stretching from China to Mexico, Great Britain, Spain, Austria-Hungary, the Turkey of the sultans, and the Russia of the czars." Hamilton suggests, in addition to the pivotal state thesis, that cultural diversity and the rich blend of southern and northeastern immigration streams must also be considered.

In this section, an attempt has been made to establish that the following characteristics existing in Indiana have contributed to her political composition: balanced North-South emigration patterns and agricultural-industrial or country-city populations, an intense interest in politics, and a strong two-party system dedicated to political moderation. If it can be accepted that these characteristics have indeed caused the Hoosier State to maintain a continued "pivotal" position in national politics, then the following political situations existing within the state might well be considered direct factors of the "swing state" phenomenon: the unusually accurate "weathervane effect" in which Indiana has so frequently voted with the winning ticket (it appears to have been a common belief among many presidential candidates and their managers that anyone who could carry Indiana
could win the election), the exceptionally large number of presidential and vice-presidential nominees, and the numerous executive appointees selected from the state (or perhaps awarded to the state). A more in-depth examination of Indiana's role in national politics, both in terms of the national campaigns and elections and in that of political leadership, might further reveal the significance of that role.
IV. THE ROLE OF INDIANA IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS

As has been mentioned earlier, Indiana's earliest years were dominated for the most part by the primary forerunners of the Democratic party. Indiana was generally considered a western state with a largely Southern, agricultural population, and which advocated a broad democracy and the elevation of the "common man." A solid majority of the Hoosiers strongly identified with Andrew Jackson and eagerly supported his presidential bid. Jackson carried the state in all three of his campaigns, the unsuccessful attempt in 1824 and the victorious elections of 1828 and 1832. Although Indiana supported her former territorial governor, William Henry Harrison, for the presidency in both 1836 and 1840, this action probably represented more of a personality appeal and a rejection of Martin Van Buren than any major shift away from the Democratic party and into the Whig camp. Any Whig hopes of controlling the state were certainly erased by a period of depression which hit in the early 1840's and secured the Democrats' claim to this agricultural frontier state at least until the mid-1850's. Even as late as 1858, the Democratic New Albany Daily Ledger considered Indiana to be a solid Democratic stronghold. On November 28, 1858, it carried an article stating:

Since the rise of the Republican party, the Northern Democracy have lost, one after another, nearly all their ancient strongholds. In the contest of 1856, Mr. Buchanan carried five Northern States but three of them were
carried in consequence of divisions among our opponents, leaving only two, Pennsylvania and Indiana, which gave our President a clear majority. Of these, two, Pennsylvania and New Jersey, have since gone into the embrace of the Black Republicanism, leaving only Indiana with a clear Democratic majority. It is this position of Indiana, as the most reliable Northern Democratic State, and not any particular merit of her prominent politicians, that attaches more than ordinary interest to the movements of the Democratic leaders within her limits.

By the late 1850's, however, Indiana was actually far from being a solid Democratic state. As mentioned earlier, the annual emigration of Northerners had begun outnumbering that of the Southerners since 1850, and the decade immediately preceding the Civil War marked an era of transition for the Hoosier State as she began to emerge as a powerful industrial commonwealth as well as a leading agricultural state. Byron Troyer observes that the "... pageant of Indiana's growth was an exciting, fast-changing scenario. By 1850, only 34 years after becoming a state, Indiana became one of the great states, and a leader in the nation." Although Indiana already had one favorite son, Harrison, in two presidential elections, and another, George W. Julian, as the vice-presidential candidate on the 1852 Free Soil ticket, Indiana did not really blossom into a powerful two-party "swing" state until the mid-1850's. John W. Davis became the first of many Hoosiers to hold major party leadership positions by chairing the 1852 Democratic National Convention. Four years later, Hoosier Senator Jesse Bright, popularly supported for the Democratic presidential nomination, threw the decisive support of the Indiana delegation in favor of James Buchanan on the fifteenth ballot in exchange for the control of all major Federal appointments for the Northwest. Buchanan felt
that the price was high, but won the nomination and the election with at least some credit going to Senator Bright. 67

If Indiana had not emerged as a "doubtful" state in the 1850's, certainly she would have by 1860; the parties had then become so balanced that either faction could win. Many historians believe that Indiana was considered a crucial state in order to elect a Republican president, a fact which might explain part of the reasoning behind the selection of Henry S. Lane as chairman of the Republican National Convention in Chicago. 68 The fact that Indiana had 26 uninstructed delegates to this convention, second only to Ohio among the States of the Old Northwest, meant that "... her support was coveted by the managers of the various candidates." 69 One author notes: "Because of Lane's unswerving devotion to Lincoln, the delegation voted as a unit for the great ex-Hoosier on every ballot; indeed some historians believe that their solidarity on the first ballot influenced many wavering States and made Lincoln's nomination possible." 70 Gayle Thornbrough and Dorothy Riker take an even stronger stance here, asserting:

There is no doubt that the unanimity of the Indiana delegation for Lincoln was the cause of his nomination. If Indiana had divided, or given her strength to any other candidate, it is absolutely certain that no concentration could have been made on Lincoln, for it was only the united efforts of the Indiana and Illinois men that secured the co-operation of Pennsylvania and some New England States at the last hour. The firmness and unanimity of Indiana, who had no candidate to interfere with a disinterested choice, nothing to induce her to adhere to any man from personal motives, and no purpose but to produce a result, which would command the widest approval, was acknowledged on all hands at Chicago to be the primary and potential cause of Lincoln's nomination. 71
Henry Lane was not the only Hoosier whose support was earnestly sought by the Lincoln camp; Caleb Smith, a man for whom Lincoln held little professional respect, seconded the Railsplitter's nomination in exchange for a position in the Lincoln cabinet. As was the case in 1856 with Buchanan, Lincoln won the nomination and the election, carrying Indiana, his home state from 1816 until 1830, by a majority of 6,000 votes over all three of his opponents.

Although Indiana played a fairly quiet role in the election of 1864, Daniel Voorhees received 13 votes for vice president on the first ballot at the Democratic National Convention, and John Defrees was in the process of serving an eight-year term as Secretary of the Republican National Committee.

In the election of 1868, Schuyler Colfax, the first Hoosier to be named by a major party for the vice-presidency, helped his Republican running mate, Ulysses Grant, carry Indiana by a wide nine thousand votes, and subsequently the nation was won. Colfax's fellow Republican, Conrad Baker, meanwhile, had a much more difficult time defeating his gubernatorial opponent, Thomas Hendricks. Baker won by a margin of less than one thousand votes in an election characterized by "the most stupendous frauds and the most lavish and corrupt expenditure of money of any election to date."

In 1872, both Colfax and Oliver Morton were seriously considered for the presidential nomination at the Republican convention, but, out of loyalty to Grant, refused to permit their names to be used. Colfax lost his bid for re-nomination for the vice-presidency, losing to Henry Wilson, 321 1/2 votes to 364 1/2.
George Julian received $134\frac{1}{2}$ votes for the vice-presidency on the first ballot at the Liberal Republican Convention in Cincinnati, but neither that, nor the five votes he received for the presidential nomination at the Labor Reform Convention in Columbus, was enough to secure a place on the ballot. In that fall election, due to the death of Horace Greeley, the Democratic presidential nominee, Thomas Hendricks became the second highest vote-getter, losing to Grant in electoral votes, 286 to 42.

The election of 1876 has already been discussed; it was one of the rare elections where Indiana failed to support the winning candidate, although many Americans continue to debate as to the identity of the real winner of the election. This was a year of "near misses" for Hoosier politicians. Thomas Hendricks had strong hopes for the Democratic presidential nomination, and received 140 votes on the first ballot before bowing out to Tilden. Hendricks was then handed the vice-presidential nomination by acclamation. The Indiana Republicans declared at their state convention that Oliver P. Morton "possesse[d] in an eminent degree the ability and qualities which fit him for the office of President of the United States," and recommended that he be nominated for that office at the national convention in Cincinnati. Morton received 125 votes on the first ballot and ran strongly for the next five ballots. Finally, on the seventh ballot, Indiana made the crucial switch to Governor Hayes of Ohio, which quickly placed him in nomination. The Republican state convention also gave its endorsement to the gubernatorial candidacy of Godlove Orth, five-time Congressman from Indiana and the current United States Minister to Austria. Orth, however,
resigned from the campaign three months before the election for lack of party support. The Republicans quickly selected Benjamin Harrison to replace Orth and he was able to conduct a vigorous campaign. After a long delay in announcing the final outcome of the October state election, it was determined that the Democrat, James D. "Blue Jeans" Williams, had defeated Harrison by some 4,000 votes. Harrison, who had based his campaign on national issues, spent the three weeks prior to the national election in November campaigning for Hayes throughout the country. Although he lost the governor's chair, the national recognition he received in 1876 paved the way for Harrison's election to the presidency in 1888. 79

Indiana has probably never been quite as dramatic and dynamic of a political battleground as it was in 1880. Both parties sent favorite-son candidates to the convention seeking the number one spot on the respective tickets, and, although neither was successful in the bid, both delegations played crucial roles at the national conventions. At the Democratic National Convention in Cincinnati, Senator Joseph McDonald abandoned his own presidential ambitions to support the nomination of Thomas Hendricks. Hendricks received 49 ½ votes on the first ballot but quickly withdrew to support the eventual winner, Winfield Scott Hancock. The Democrats, hoping to hold on to their narrow 4,000 vote margin in Indiana from the election four years earlier, and combine the Hoosier's 15 electoral votes with New York's 35 and the Solid South's 138 for a three vote majority at 188, selected Hoosier banker William H. English as their vice-presidential nominee. 80 At the Republican National
Convention in Chicago, Benjamin Harrison, another favorite-son hopeful, held the majority of the Indiana delegates for James G. Blaine until the 35th ballot, when he helped to start the swing to Ohio's James A. Garfield, a compromise candidate and the ultimate victor. Although Harrison was considered for the vice-presidential nomination, the bid eventually went to Chester Arthur. Clifton Phillips notes:

Both major parties made strenuous efforts to win Indiana in this last October election. From his farm in Mentor, Ohio where he helped direct the Republican campaign, James A. Garfield frequently reminded his correspondents of the importance of Indiana in the national strategy. In August he wrote to his running mate, Chester A. Arthur: "If we carry Indiana in October the rest is comparatively easy. We shall make a fatal mistake if we do not throw all our available strength into that state."81

After the election, which Garfield won by a narrow 6,642 votes, widespread charges of bribery and corruption were hurled back and forth. Phillips writes:

The election of 1880 brought forth sensational charges of the bribery of voters and the expenditure of extraordinarily large campaign funds in the state. Not long after the October election returns proclaimed a Republican victory, Kentucky's eminent Democratic editor, Henry "Marse" Watterson, published the accusation that Indiana had been "bought right out of hand" by a flood of five-, two-, and one-dollar notes freshly printed for that purpose by the GOP-controlled United States Treasury.82

Immediately following this election, Hoosier politicians began devising a long series of campaign laws designed to eliminate, or at least reduce, the widespread corruption problems that had become associated with Indiana's bitter political contests.

Although the 1884 campaign is frequently overshadowed in historical accounts by the previous election, it was by no means a less significant political contest for the Hoosier state.
Clifton J. Phillips thoroughly accounts for the differences and similarities between the two conventions, noting:

In 1884 Indiana had two favorite-sons who aspired to first place on the Democratic national ticket. Perennial presidential hopeful Thomas A. Hendricks nominated his colleague, Joseph E. McDonald, in return for his deference to Hendricks' candidacy four years before, but later permitted his name to go before the Chicago convention, setting off a gallery demonstration engineered by Tammany Hall and other opponents of Governor Grover Cleveland of New York. But the tactic failed and the reform-minded Cleveland won the nomination easily, Hendricks having to be satisfied with the second place on the ticket, just as in 1876. . . . The Indiana delegation to the Republican nominating convention in the same city was split between supporters of Benjamin Harrison and his old rival, Postmaster General Walter Q. Gresham. Because of this no Hoosier candidate was presented to the convention, and Indiana Republicans were generally content with the nomination of James G. Blaine of Maine. Although Blaine made overtures to both Gresham and Harrison for the vice-presidential candidacy, neither made any response, and the honor went to John A. Logan of Illinois. 84

Both parties continued their strenuous campaigns to persuade those few thousand "floating" voters to line up with their candidates. This time the Democrats came out on the winning end with a 6,572 plurality, only 130 votes less than Garfield's margin of victory, four years earlier. 85

The power-packed political drama continued to unfold in 1888 as Indiana retained her role as one of the leading actors. The rivalry between Harrison and Gresham intensified at the Republican national convention in Chicago. Gresham received 111 votes for the presidential nomination on the first ballot, and, although Harrison eventually emerged as the victor, Gresham retained control of 59 votes on the eighth and final count. 86 Esarey observes that this was ". . . the first time Indianians had had a chance to vote for a 'favorite son' for the presidency.
with any prospect of electing him, and this was the most distinctive feature of the campaign. The state proved one again to be a bloody battleground between the two parties; Esarey notes: "Scarcely a public orator of any note in the United States but was heard in Indiana. . .[t]rainloads of political literature were distributed." A political bombshell was exploded in the Harrison camp a few days before the election, when Democratic newspapers in Indiana and New York published a letter, allegedly from the treasurer of the Republican National Committee, instructing county chairmen in Indiana on the techniques of purchasing the votes of blocks of "floaters." Despite the setback, Harrison was able to squeak out a victory in Indiana by a margin of slightly more than 2,300 votes. Harrison won the electoral vote by a count of 233 to 168, but fell behind Cleveland in popular votes by more than 90,000. The election of 1892 pitted these same two candidates against one another, and, even though the Democrats snubbed Indiana by selecting Adlai Stevenson over Isaac Gray as Cleveland's running mate by a vote of 402 to 343, the New York governor carried the Hoosier president's home state and the nation.

The Indiana Democrats of 1896 committed themselves to the nomination of favorite-son Governor Claude Matthews "first, last, and all the time" at the national convention. When Matthews was quickly passed over and the nomination ultimately delivered to William Jennings Bryan, some Hoosiers bolted from the party to support their own gold standard platform. William Dallas Bynum of Indianapolis, former Minority Whip in the United States House of Representatives, helped organize the National
Democratic Party which held its nominating convention in Indianapolis. Meanwhile, as the Republican National Convention approached, many Hoosiers sought a third consecutive nomination for Harrison. When the former president refused to be considered, the Hoosier Republican pledged their support to Ohio's Governor William McKinley. McKinley personally requested the selection of Indiana's Charles W. Fairbanks as the convention's chairman pro tempore; he was duly appointed and subsequently directed the nomination of the Buckeye Governor. In November McKinley carried the state with an absolute majority of 11,000 votes, one of the largest margins since the emergence of the balanced two-party system in Indiana. Phillips assesses the implications of this election and the unusually large margin of voting by stating:

The election of 1896 inaugurated a period of Republican hegemony which would last for slightly more than a decade, destroying the relatively even balance of political forces which had made Indiana such a critical element in presidential elections. No longer so doubtful a state, it was perhaps never again to be quite so bitterly fought over as it had been in the eighties. Yet Indiana did not cease to play a significant part in national politics. Producing a host of prominent state and national politicians in both major parties and at least one minor party, the Hoosier state continued to be the "Mother of Vice-Presidents." The political battle of the 20th century in Indiana would differ in many ways from those of the eighties and nineties yet retain much of the passion and partisan rivalry which characterized the politics of a pivotal state.

Indiana's role in the election of 1900 was relatively minor in comparison to past campaigns. Two features which are, however, noteworthy include the fact that William Jennings Bryan officially responded to the Democratic National Convention's second consecutive nomination and officially opened his campaign
by delivering his acceptance speech in Indianapolis, and the fact that Eugene V. Debs, homebred political reformer and major figure in the popularization of the Socialist Democratic Party of America, began his presidential campaigning career, which spanned five elections, in 1900.93

After a relatively inactive campaign season in 1900, Indiana was back in the middle of the action in 1904. Thomas Taggart, former Indianapolis mayor and wealthy hotelman, campaigned vigorously for the nomination of Alton Parker of New York at the Democratic National Convention. When Parker subsequently won the nomination, Taggart was rewarded for his support by being appointed chairman of the Democratic Committee. On the Republican side, national speculation was that Indiana possessed two potential running-mates for Theodore Roosevelt in her two United States Senators, Fairbanks and Beveridge. Beveridge, however, was more interested in advancing his career in the Senate and agreed to support Fairbanks' nomination in return for support for his re-election to the Senate. Fairbanks, who had been closely associated with both McKinley and Roosevelt, received the convention's unanimous nomination. Roosevelt carried the state and the nation, making Indiana the mother of her third vice-president.94

The election of 1908 turned into a series of disappointments for Indiana after the early campaign season appeared to offer a number of bright promises. By 1907, Vice President Fairbanks was generally considered to be the leading candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in 1908. The fact that fellow Hoosier Harry S. New was currently serving as chairman of the
Republican National Committee and Senator Albert Beveridge had been recommended by President Roosevelt to deliver the convention's key-note address certainly enhanced Fairbanks' prospects. By late summer, 1907, however, the picture quickly darkened. Collier's Weekly published a severe muckraking attack against the Vice President, which badly tarnished his career. The next spring Beveridge, who had lost favor with the conservative Republicans, was shunted aside as the key-note speaker and Roosevelt named William Howard Taft as his personal choice for successor. Taft eventually won the nomination fairly easily and subsequently made strong overtures to both Fairbanks and Beveridge for the vice-presidential nomination. Both Hoosiers firmly rejected the offers and the spot went to James Sherman of New York. At the Democratic National Convention, John W. Kern, twice an unsuccessful candidate for Governor, was selected to run with William Jennings Bryan, and the Peoples Party awarded the vice-presidential nomination to Samuel W. Williams. Taft and Sherman won the election and Indiana completely lost out on what had promised to be a successful year.95

The campaign of 1912 went much better for Indiana, as she had two favorite-son candidates to receive serious consideration for the Democratic presidential nomination. Although John Kern received only a smattering of votes for the nomination on several different ballots, he did play a key role in the fight between Bryan and Parker for the temporary chairmanship and consequently was awarded the chairmanship of the resolutions committee which drew up the platform. Thomas Marshall, Indiana's nationally renowned governor, on the other hand, received considerable
support for his nomination. By means of shrewd political maneuvers, Tom Taggart, the Hoosier Democratic boss, kept Marshall's nomination bid active long after there was any hope left of victory. Suddenly, on the 29th ballot, Taggart switched 29 of the Indiana votes to Woodrow Wilson in a dramatic move which prompted a series of similar shifts and which eventually led to Wilson's nomination on the 46th ballot. Although Wilson did not hold Governor Marshall in very high regard, he agreed to abide by the deal struck between McCombs, his floor manager, and Taggart, in which Marshall would be delivered the vice-presidential nomination, in return for Indiana's dramatic shift, which precipitated Wilson's eventual nomination. Marshall was awarded the nomination with Wilson's endorsement, and became Indiana's fourth vice president a few months later, when a divided Republican Party opened the door to a Democratic victory.96

Four years later, in 1916, Indiana was placed in one of those rare situations in which the state could not lose, no matter which way she turned. Wilson and Marshall were both renominated by the Democrats and Charles W. Fairbanks was given another chance as the Republican vice-presidential nominee. Fairbanks had made a strong showing in the early ballots for the presidential nomination, but eventually gave way to Charles Evans Hughes and acquiesced to the number two spot on the ticket. A third Hoosier, former Republican Governor J. Frank Hanley, was awarded the presidential nomination on the National Prohibition Party's ticket. A political cartoon of the campaign shows a swollen-chested Hoosier directing the attention of Uncle Sam to a Political Bulletin which reads: "On Democratic Ticket for
Vice-President Thomas R. Marshall of Indiana/on Republican Ticket for Vice-President Charles W. Fairbanks of Indiana/on Prohibition Ticket for President J. Frank Hanley of Indiana." 97 This also happened to be one of those rare occasions in which Indiana's choice did not coincide with the rest of the nation. Hughes and Fairbanks carried the state by slightly less than 7,000 votes, yet the nation decided to return the other Hoosier to Washington, along with President Wilson, of course. 98

By the end of World War I, Indiana had lost, in some way, that political dynamism which demanded the nation's attention. Although she continued to produce a steady flow of prominent national figures, and the number of native-son presidential candidates did not significantly drop off during the next twenty years, Indiana had lost some of the political uncertainty which had kept her in the national limelight for more than sixty years. By the 1920's the Republicans began to consider Indiana a "safe state," and, except for the first two Roosevelt campaigns, the assessment was fairly accurate on the national level. Continuing through the 1970's, Indiana remained an active two-party state in which Democrats and Republicans generally shared an equal opportunity in state elections. However, on the national scene, Indiana clearly leaned toward the Republican column. Lyndon Johnson, who carried the state in 1964, has been the only Democrat to capture the state's electors since Roosevelt in 1936. This change in political atmosphere seriously dampened Indiana's prospects of placing her favorite-son candidates into the national nomination. 99
Those Hoosier politicians who attempted to gain their party's nominations in the decades since World War I have generally met with less success than their Indiana counterparts in the decades before the war. Regardless of whether or not the cause is to be found in the relative stabilization of the Hoosier voting trends, the fact remains that they were less successful. In 1920, Will Hays, chairman of the Republican National Committee, earnestly sought his party's nomination. A strong supporter of Hays, Colonel George Harvey, gave a lavish dinner party at the Chicago Blackstone Hotel, in which he hoped to win support for his candidate. The party devolved into the proverbial "smoke-filled room" at which behind-the-scene political decisions are made (coining the phrase), but unfortunately for Hays, the delegates at the party chose Warren G. Harding as the man to receive the nomination. Four years later, Thomas Taggert applied the same shrewd kind of political tactics that gained Marshall's vice-presidential nomination in 1912 in attempting to secure the top spot on the Democratic ticket for former Indiana Governor Samuel Ralston. Taggart kept Ralston in the fight until the 92nd ballot, at which time he commanded 196 3/4 votes, but finally withdrew when there appeared to be no hope for victory. In 1928, James E. Watson was the state's favorite-son candidate for the Republican nomination, but he was quickly crushed by the "Hoover steamroller." Another Indiana Governor, Paul V. McNutt, was a serious candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1940. When the convention renominated Roosevelt for a third time, McNutt forces conducted an intense campaign for the number two spot on the ticket. Roosevelt, however, insisted on his
personal choice, Henry Wallace, and McNutt faded from the national scene. The 1940 campaign, although the last in which Hoosier favorite-son candidates were to play any significant roles, was not a totally fruitless event. Indiana-born Wendell L. Willkie received the Republican presidential nomination that year after the convention could not reach an agreement between Thomas Dewey, Robert Taft, and Arthur Vanderberg. The appearance of Willkie on the Republican ticket and the Democrat's snub of Governor McNutt were probably the major reasons for Indiana's failure to go with the victorious Roosevelt in 1940. However, the fact that Indiana was leaning farther and farther to the right side of the political spectrum, and that there was a growing conviction that no man should occupy the White House for more than two terms, certainly contributed to this phenomenon. Indiana also failed to support Roosevelt in 1944, Truman in 1948, Kennedy in 1960, and Carter in 1976—voting for the Republican candidate each time. If not be 1920, certainly by 1940, Indiana's prominence in national elections had severely waned.

Donald Carmony summarizes the decline of Indiana as a significant participant in the quadrennial elections by noting:

From World War I through the 1950's Indiana exhibited a strong tendency toward caution and conservatism with regard to political innovations. It also exhibited a strong preference for Republicans over Democrats, especially in presidential elections, which was in marked contrast to the nip and tuck, and often divided situation which existed between the Civil War and World War I. The tendency to favor Republicans, however, had shown signs of becoming a trend in the years from 1896 to 1914. At any rate, in twelve presidential and gubernatorial elections from 1914 through 1960, Indiana voted ten times for Republican presidential nominees and seven times elected Republican governors. This preference for Republicans made Indiana much less a doubtful state than it had been. Moreover, Indiana voted for the losing
presidential candidate five times during the period from 1914 through 1960 as against only once between the Civil War and 1914. 105

In spite of the negative tone of this statement, the underlying assumption clearly seems to be that Indiana has, at least at one time, played a significant role in the nation's presidential campaigns, and furthermore, that this prominent role was, to some extent, influenced by Indiana's unpredictable situation as a "swing state."

Let us consider for a moment the significance of Indiana in the nation's presidential campaigns in an area other than the number of her candidates and the shifting of her votes; it is possible that the number of national party conventions held in or near the Hoosier boundaries bears some political significance. The Republican Party has held thirty national conventions since its rise to political prominence. Of those thirty gatherings, eighteen have been virtually held on Indiana's border, while another was held in nearby St. Louis. The 1980 convention was held in Detroit, two others in Cleveland, one in Cincinnati, and fourteen in Chicago alone. During the sixty years between 1860 and 1920, when Indiana was probably at the peak of her political prominence, the Republicans met at Chicago in 1860, 1868, 1880, 1884, 1888, 1904, 1908, 1912, 1916, and 1920; they also convened in Cincinnati in 1876 and in St. Louis in 1896. 106

The Democratic Party, on the other hand, has held 38 national conventions in its political history, sixteen of which have been held within the Hoosierland area. Chicago has been the site of ten Democratic conventions, while Cincinnati has hosted two and
St. Louis four. During the same sixty year period, the Democrats met in Chicago in 1864, 1868, 1892, and 1896; they also convened in St. Louis in 1876, 1888, 1904, and 1916 and at Cincinnati in 1880. Although a number of minor parties also held their national conventions in the Midwest, at least three met in Indianapolis: the National Greenback Party in 1884, the National Prohibition Party in 1888, and the National Democratic Party in 1896. Considering only the two major parties, of their 68 national conventions, no less than 35 have been held in the Indiana vicinity. During the sixty years that Indiana loomed as a significant political power, 21 of the thirty conventions were held within close range of the Hoosier state. Certainly there were other factors which must have contributed to the location of these national conventions, and, if this were the only criteria by which to establish the proof that Indiana has played a prominent role in the nation's political history, the numbers would probably not be convincing. However, taken in conjunction with a number of other facts which suggest the same conclusion, the frequency with which national conventions have been held in and around the Hoosier boundaries does seem to contribute further positive substance to this claim.
V. NATIONAL LEADERS SELECTED FROM INDIANA

Thus far, in terms of evidence supporting the significance of Indiana's participation in national politics, we have examined the state's role in various elections—how the shifting of her votes influenced the election outcomes and how the major parties attempted to influence the shifting of those votes—and we have looked at the possible political significance of the frequency with which national party conventions were held in and around the state. One final area which merits our consideration is the significance of the number of national political leaders selected from Indiana. Although this subject has been alluded to a number of times already in this paper, its significance to this thesis affords it further development.

Indiana has long been regarded as the "mother of vice-presidents," a title of which she has not been totally undeserving. Four Hoosiers have been elected to the nation's second highest office and have held that position for a total of seventeen years. Two other native sons were awarded the vice-presidential nomination on major party tickets, but lost, while at least three more were given the honor on minor party slates. More than a dozen other Indianians were seriously considered for their various parties' nominations but failed to secure the convention's approval. Of the nineteen states that have provided the nation with vice-presidents, only New York has sent more men to that office than has Indiana. 109

Akin to the reputation of Virginia, Ohio, and New York as "mothers of presidents," Indiana has long been known as the "mother of vice presidents." Thomas R. Marshall (Vice President for eight years) says, "Indiana has struck a right good average. It has perhaps no towering mountain peaks, but it has surely furnished as many first-grade second class men in every department of life as any state in the Union."\(^{110}\)

Irvin Cobb continues Gray's thought by adding:

I nearly was forgetting to mention Indiana's magnificent yield of vice-presidents. On no account should this product be excluded from a paper aimed to prove the nationalistic normalcy of Indiana. Indiana gives us our vice-presidents and our vice-presidential candidates because she is the average American State. And by the same token, the average Indianian makes a suitable vice-presidential material because he is absolutely just that--average. If he were sub-average he couldn't get the nomination, and if he were super-average he wouldn't take it.\(^{111}\)

William Wilson provides even less of a flattering account of Indiana's vice-presidential product by asserting:

It was during the period from the Civil War to World War I that Indiana became known as the "mother of vice-presidents." Schuyler served under Grant during the General's first term, but Grant rejected him the second time around because he found Colfax "too ambitious." Perhaps he also had doubts about Colfax's honesty. Thomas A. Hendricks served under Cleveland for one year of Cleveland's first term and died in office. Charles W. Fairbanks was vice-president under Theodore Roosevelt, who said of his running mate's candidacy, "Who in the name of heaven else is there?" Thomas R. Marshall, who described the vice-presidency as "a disease, not an office," endured the ailment for two full terms under Wilson.\(^{112}\)

Setting aside for a moment Cobb's proposal that Hoosiers are selected simply because they are average, if one accepts this repeated suggestion that Indiana's vice-presidents were not outstanding political leaders, is it not possible that these men were placed on their parties' tickets, not because of
their personal qualities, but because of some consideration of what they represented—a native-son candidate from a state whose electorate could be persuaded to vote either way, depending upon feelings about the electorate's interests being served? Whether or not this is the case, Indiana was unquestionably well-represented in the national elections between 1852 and 1920. George W. Julian appeared on the Free Soil ticket in 1852 and Joseph Lane ran with Breckinridge on the Southern Democrat ballot in 1860. Schuyler Colfax won in 1868 as Grant's Republican running-mate while Thomas Hendricks repeated the feat in 1884 on Cleveland's Democratic ticket, but only after losing in 1872 as Charles O'Conor's "Straight Democrat" running-mate and in 1876 as the Democratic vice-presidential candidate with Tilden. William H. English, in the meantime, ran with Democrat Winfield S. Hancock in 1880, but lost to Garfield and Arthur. Charles W. Fairbanks became the next Hoosier vice-president after a successful campaign with Theodore Roosevelt on the Republican ticket in 1904, but lost a second bid with Hughes in 1916. John W. Kern ran with Democrat William Jennings Bryan and Samuel Williams appeared on the People's Party ticket in 1908, but neither candidate could bring William Howard Taft to defeat. Their losses were somewhat avenged, however, in 1912 and 1916 when Thomas R. Marshall became one of the first vice-presidents to serve two consecutive terms. Marshall had to defeat fellow Hoosier Charles Fairbanks in order to attain that distinction in 1916. From 1852 to 1920, nine Hoosiers ran a total of thirteen times, six of them on major party tickets in eight campaigns, and four of them winning in a total of five elections. Indiana has unquestionably earned the title "mother of vice-presidents."
Indiana has also made a number of contributions to the nation's presidential contests; she has, however, been much less successful in this area. Although Indiana does not hold a "clear and free" claim to any American president, most historians credit Indiana as the home state of Ohio-born Benjamin Harrison. Harrison spent most of his adult life in Indiana and was involved in Hoosier politics for nearly twenty years prior to his election in 1888. He is considered to be of sufficient Hoosier breed for Tim Taylor's *The Book of Presidents* to classify Indiana as one of only fourteen states to produce a president.¹¹⁴ Harrison, who lost his bid for re-election in 1892, was the great-grandson of Benjamin Harrison, signer of the Declaration of Independence, and the grandson of William Henry Harrison, Indiana's first territorial governor and ninth president of the United States. Most historians consider the elder Harrison to belong more to Ohio, his place of residence when elected, or Virginia, his place of birth, than to Indiana in spite of his fourteen years of service to Indiana's territorial government.¹¹⁵ A few Indiana historians attempt to claim that Abraham Lincoln, as well as Harrison, was a "Hoosier president" because he spent fourteen years of his childhood in the southern part of the state, from 1816 to 1850, but virtually no one outside of the state concurs with this designation.¹¹⁶

Four other Hoosiers who received their parties' nominations for the presidency but failed to carry the election include: John P. St. John, 1884 Prohibitionist candidate; Eugene V. Debs, Socialist candidate five times between 1900 and 1920; J. Frank Hanley, 1916 Prohibitionist presidential aspirant; and Wendell
L. Willkie, Republican hopeful in 1940. Dozens of other Hoosiers have been considered serious contenders for the presidential nomination, including Birch Bayh in the 1972 and 1976 campaigns, but only four have made it to the fall elections. Although not nearly as numerous as Indiana's vice-presidential candidates, the number of her presidential contenders is still significant and should be considered a contributing factor to Indiana's prominence in national elections.

As mentioned very briefly once before, presidential and vice-presidential nominations may be viewed as only one effective means of appealing to the local interests of a state. Another tactic which could be used to appease and entice a waiving electorate is the guarantee of executive appointments in the new administration. In this area as well, Indiana has fared admirably.

Hoosiers have been appointed to at least 23 cabinet positions and have controlled seven different departments; all but eight of those positions were held during Indiana's crucial years, 1860-1920. Lincoln was the first president to name a Hoosier to his cabinet, appointing Caleb B. Smith to the office of the Secretary of the Interior--Lincoln's convention manager had promised Smith the appointment in return for his help in securing Lincoln's nomination. Hoosiers have held five positions in the department of the Treasury (three of them by Hugh McCulloch), five as Postmaster General, four in the Agriculture department, four in the State department, three in the department of the Interior, one as Attorney General, and one in the department of the Navy.
The three secretaries of State, John W. Foster (1892-1893), Walter Q. Gresham (1893-1895), and John Hay (1898-1905), played important roles in the direction of American foreign policy during the "age of imperialism" and the United States' rise as a world power. Hay was responsible for sponsoring the Open Door policy in China and supported President McKinley's determination in controlling the Philippines. 119 President-elect Garfield attempted to persuade Benjamin Harrison to accept a post in his new cabinet, but Harrison decided to retain his United States Senate seat "... even though his refusal of Garfield's offer meant that Indiana would be denied the representation in the new cabinet which its key role in the election had earned." 120

There is really no way of determining how many of Indiana's cabinet appointments were politically motivated and yet the drastic change in frequency between the periods 1860 to 1920 and 1920 to 1980 (fifteen appointments in the first period and only eight in the second) would seem to suggest some correlation between Indiana's position as a "swing state" and the influence she could generate through cabinet appointments. Validating the truth of this conjecture, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. A list of the appointees and their posts, the period of their tenure, and the administrations within which they served must suffice for evidence.

In the Lincoln administration, Caleb B. Smith served in the department of the Interior from 1861 to 1863, followed by John P. Usher in the same department from 1863 to 1865. Hugh McCulloch was appointed a member of the Treasury and served during 1865. During Johnson's term of office, Hugh McCulloch
continued to serve in the Treasury, leaving his post in 1869. John P. Usher returned to the department of the Interior in 1865, also under Johnson. Only one Hoosier served as a cabinet member under Ulysses S. Grant—James N. Tyner was Postmaster General from 1876 through 1877.

Serving in the cabinet of Rutherford B. Hayes was Richard Thompson, as a member of the department of the Navy, from 1877 to 1881. Chester A. Arthur three times appointed Hoosiers to his cabinet: Walter Q. Gresham was Postmaster General from 1883 to 1884, and served as a member of the Treasury during 1884, and Hugh McCulloch returned to the Treasury from 1884 to 1885. Harrison's administration saw the first Hoosier Attorney General, William H. Miller, in office from 1889 to 1893, and also supervised the appointment of John W. Foster to the State Department in 1892, where he served through 1893.

Walter Q. Gresham returned to the cabinet as a member of the State Department under Cleveland, serving 1893 to 1895. John Hay came to the same department in 1898, under McKinley, and remained until 1901. His appointment was continued in Roosevelt's administration, and the State Department enjoyed his services from 1901 through 1905. Warren G. Harding appointed Wil H. Hays to the post of Postmaster General in 1921, where he remained through 1922, and was replaced by Harry S. New, still as a Harding cabinet member.

Calvin Coolidge saw fit to retain Harry S. New as Postmaster General, and he remained there from 1923 through 1929. Under the direction of Roosevelt, Claude R. Wickard was appointed to the fitting department of Agriculture, and served from 1940 to

Two other appointments that should be mentioned here as well as the previous ones are those of Willis Van Devanter and Sherman Minton to the United States Supreme Court. Van Devanter, who served for 26 years following his appointment by Taft in 1911, was not residing in Indiana at the time of his appointment and is often not classified as a Hoosier; he was born in Marion, Indiana, however, and graduated from DePauw University. Sherman Minton was an active Hoosier politician before his 1949 appointment to the Court by President Truman. Minton retired in 1956.122

The significance of all of these appointments is not so much in the quality of leadership they produced, in the tremendous programs they initiated, or the lasting policies these men engendered. Rather, the significance lies in the number and frequency with which Hoosiers were selected to hold these positions—a frequency which appears to be greatly disproportionate to the size and population of the Hoosier State. Two final areas which we shall briefly examine that seem to perpetuate this over-representation phenomenon include the political party chairmanships and congressional leadership roles.

At least twelve times Hoosiers have been asked to take command of the leadership of their parties, six times for the
Republicans, four times for the Democrats, and twice for minor parties. Five times the responsibilities of presiding over a national convention were delegated to a man from Indiana; the other seven chairmanships were for control over the national committees. In 1852, John W. Davis was selected as chairman for the Democratic National Convention; eight years later, the Republicans gave the same duties to Henry S. Lane. Reverend Gilbert De La Matyr, another Hoosier, was given charge over the National Greenback Convention of 1880, while the National Prohibition Convention of 1892 selected Eli Ritter to serve as its presiding officer. Finally, Charles W. Fairbanks was given the chair at the Republican National Convention in 1896 at the personal request of William McKinley. In terms of national committee chairmanships, the Republicans have had four Hoosiers while the Democrats have had three. Republican chairmen include: William W. Dudley (1888-1891), Harry S. New (1906-1908), Wil Hays (1918-1921), and Everett Sanders (1932-1934). The Democratic chairmanships have gone to: Thomas Taggart (1904-1908), Frank E. McKinney (1951-1952), and Paul M. Butler (1955-1960). Both major political party organizations have been controlled by Hoosiers for a total of about ten years each. 123

The final aspect of Indiana's political significance to be examined in this paper shall be her role in Congressional leadership; once again this appears to be an area in which the state has played a disproportionately large role. Indiana has provided three Speakers of the House of Representatives: John W. Davis (1847-1849), Schuyler Colfax (1863-1869), and Michael C. Kern (1875-1876). Colfax, the only Republican of the three,
quit his position in the House in 1869 to assume his new leadership role as Grant's vice-president. Only one Hoosier, Republican Charles A. Halleck, has served as a House Floor Leader; Halleck, however, has held that position five different times: Majority Leader (1947-1949 and 1953-1955) and Minority Leader 1959 to 1961, 1961 to 1963, and 1963 to 1965. Indiana has contributed four House Floor Whips, two Republicans followed by two Democrats, all of them serving on the majority side. They include: James E. Watson (1905-1909), Albert H. Vestal (1923-1931), Arthur H. Greenwood (1933-1935), and John Brademas (1977-1981). On the Senate side of the Capitol, John W. Kern served as Democratic Majority Floor Leader from 1913 to 1917, Republican James E. Watson, who moved over from the House, served as Majority Floor Leader from 1929 to 1933, and Sherman Minton, a few years before being selected as an Associate Supreme Court Justice, served as Democratic Majority Whip from 1936 to 1941. As in each of the other areas discussed, Indiana appears to have played a significant role in the congressional leadership, as we have seen.

In viewing each of these phases of political leadership: presidential and vice-presidential nominations, cabinet and Supreme Court appointments, and congressional leadership, in total, the evidence appears to overwhelmingly suggest that Indiana has actively participated in this nation's political history—perhaps to a degree far above that which could be reasonably expected from a state her size. If this hypothesis were examined in conjunction with all other situations previously discussed—
the political composition of the state and the role she has played in many of the particularly close elections--one can begin to form some sort of definite conclusions concerning the significance of the total role played by Indiana in American political history. This result shall be the purpose of the final section of this paper.
VI. CONCLUSION

In this paper, an attempt has been made to survey a number of factors and facets of Indiana's participation in America's political history. By examining the early settlement and development patterns of the state, especially those which produced a strongly balanced two-party system based on a balanced North-South representation and an equalized agricultural-industrial economy, and dedicated to political moderation, it was determined that Indiana's electorate was so evenly matched between the two political parties that either party could easily win in the state. This situation earned for Indiana the distinction of being known as one of the great "doubtful" or "swing" states, meaning that neither party could safely rely upon the Hoosier electorate to cast its vote for the favored candidate; on the contrary, the outcome of the Indiana election could be expected to swing to whichever party a majority of the people felt would best represent the Hoosier interest at any given time.

This situation of political vacillation lasted from about 1860 to roughly 1920. Prior to 1860, Indiana was evolving from a frontier wilderness to an industrial commonwealth and had not yet balanced the Jacksonian democracy of the western frontier states with the more sophisticated political philosophies of a modern, industrial state. After 1920, Indiana began to settle into a national political attitude of moderate conservatism even
though the intense party rivalries remained active on the state level. As a general rule, both Hoosier parties seem to have followed the same conservative movement which permitted a perpetuation of this political rivalry while the balance between the national parties gradually tipped toward the conservative end of the political spectrum.

Seemingly paralleling this period of political doubtfulness, Indiana began to take an extremely active role in national political leadership. Between 1852 and 1920, Hoosiers appeared on the national ballots thirteen times for the vice-presidency and nine times for the nation's highest office. During that period four of those men succeeded in attaining the vice-presidency and occupied the office for a total of seventeen years, while one other made it to the White House for a period of four years. Three Indiana Congressmen presided over the House of Representatives from the Speaker's chair for a total of nine years between 1847 and 1876. Five national party conventions selected Hoosiers to preside over their deliberations, and four other Hoosiers were chosen to serve as national committee chairmen during this period. Finally, eighteen cabinet positions were given to Indiana men between 1860 and 1923.

Also paralleling Indiana's period of political doubtfulness was a strong ranking in the nation's population. By 1860, Indiana had become the sixth most populous state in the nation and controlled thirteen electoral votes. From 1870 until 1930, Indiana held fifteen electoral votes, a total which could cause a thirty-vote variance in the Electoral College count, depending upon which direction the Hoosier electorate swung. In 1930 the
electoral vote dropped to fourteen, in 1940 to thirteen, and in 1980 was scheduled to fall to twelve, effective 1982. By the third or fourth decade of the twentieth century, not only had Indiana lost her status as a "swing state," but she had also begun to suffer a marked decline in the prominence of the position she held in accordance with her population, relative to that of the nation. By 1980, Indiana's rank among the most populous states in the nation fell to twelve. When these two factors (the loss of "swing state" status, and the loss of rank in terms of population) are considered in conjunction with one another, it seems reasonable to suggest that they jointly contributed to Indiana's decline in national prominence after 1920. This decline, however, has not been without compensation, as has been evidenced in the number of Indiana's successful congressional leaders in the twentieth century and the continued success of Hoosiers as national party chairmen.

With the examination of this evidence, it is hoped that it has been sufficiently established that Indiana has played a prominent role in American politics. That the three paralleling situations--the status of Indiana as a "swing state," the considerable number of party leadership positions awarded to Hoosiers (even to men who might not be considered the most qualified candidates for the positions), and the significant number of electoral votes controlled by the state--which existed in Indiana between 1860 and 1920 were interrelated is a largely conjectural statement. It has been the contention of this author, however, that one of the major reasons for many of the leadership positions being awarded to Hoosiers was in the attempt
to swing the small number of undecided votes necessary to carry the election over to the party making the appointments. The placement of a Hoosier in the vice-presidential nomination was frequently considered a very positive step toward carrying that state, which, in turn, greatly improved the chances of overall success. Indeed, in five of the fifteen elections between 1860 and 1916, a Hoosier vice-presidential candidate helped to carry the election, and in a sixth election, Thomas Hendricks helped Samuel Tilden win a large popular vote margin, but a partisan Electoral Commission gave the election to Garfield. The shift-able nature of the Hoosier electorate and the number of electoral votes available to the winner made Indiana a desirable enough target for political maneuvering for it to garnish an extra-ordinary number of political considerations. It is believed that this is a key reason why it may be contended that Indiana has played a significant role in American political history.
NOTES


4 Peckham, p. 188.


6 Peckham, p. 188. Nicholson's quote and Sullivan's quote are taken from the text and are not footnoted by Peckham.


8 Indiana Department of Commerce, Agriculture Division, Indiana Agriculture (n.p., n.d.), pp. 2-7.


10 Peckham, p. 130.

11 Wilson, pp. 96-97.


13 Leary, Appendix 1.
14 Leary, p. 7.

15 Wilson, p. 13.


17 Donald Francis Carmony, A Brief History of Indiana (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1961), p. 6.

18 Leary, p. 10.

19 Carmony, A Brief History of Indiana, pp. 7-8.

20 Leary, p. 10.

21 Leary, p. 16.

22 Carmony, A Brief History of Indiana, p. 20.

23 Writer's Program of the W.P.A., p. 3.

24 Peckham, p. 12.

25 Writer's Program of the W.P.A., p. 3.

26 Wilson, pp. 16-17.

27 Peckham, p. 9.

28 Writer's Program of the W.P.A., pp. 4-5.

29 Writer's Program of the W.P.A., p. 5.

30 Cobb, p. 20.


32 Leary, pp. 4-5.


35 Leary, p. 23.


37 Carmony, *A Brief History of Indiana*, p. 36.


40 Barnhart, p. 10.


42 Fenton, p. 157.

43 Fenton, p. 163.


52 Phillips, p. 5.


55 Peckham, p. 138.

56 Peckham, pp. 136-138.

57 Wilson, p. 15.


59 Esarey, pp. 963-964.

60 Gray, pp. viii-ix.


62 Carmony, A Brief History of Indiana, pp. 31-32.


64 Troyer, p. 46.


66 McKee, p. 74.


68 McKee, p. 96.


70 Writer's Program of the W.P.A., p. 65.


72 Wilson, pp. 135. See also Stampp, p. 39.

73 Wilson, pp. 13, 135.

74 McKee, pp. 122-123, 136.

75 Emma Lou Thornbrough, pp. 240-241.

76 Esarey, p. 85.

77 McKee, pp. 144-145, 149, 160, 162.


81 Phillips, p. 10.

82 Esarey, p. 955.


85 Esarey, p. 958.
86 McKee, p. 238.
87 Esarey, pp. 960-961.
88 Esarey, pp. 962-963.
89 Phillips, pp. 27-29.
90 McKee, p. 261.
92 Phillips, p. 49.
93 Phillips, pp. 76, 81.
94 Phillips, pp. 89-91.
95 Phillips, pp. 46, 103-104.
97 Phillips, pp. 112, 121-123.
98 Esarey, pp. 1065-1066.
99 Peckham, p. 150.
100 Carmony, Indiana: A Self Appraisal, p. 45.
101 Carmony, Indiana: A Self Appraisal, pp. 48-49.
102 Carmony, Indiana: A Self Appraisal, p. 44.
103 Barnhart, p. 487.
104 Barnhart, p. 487.
105 Carmony, A Brief History of Indiana, p. 51.

108 Esarey, pp. 954-961.


111 Cobb, pp. 51-52.

112 Wilson, pp. 104-105.

113 Gray, pp. x-xi. Note also Wilson, p. 105.

114 Taylor, p. 673.


116 Wilson, p. 105.

117 Leary, p. 53. Compare Wilson, pp. 16, 105-106. Also note Gray, p. x.

118 Wilson, p. 135.

119 Barnhart, p. 357.

120 Phillips, p. 17.

121 World Almanac, pp. 282-283.


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