Here Jaspers is in the grand tradition of such European free thinkers as Voltaire and Nietzsche. Jaspers continually emphasized personal "philosophizing," about oneself primarily, for only then is one in contact with reality, and he argued that philosophizing must be the principal, even the sole, concern of man. Such thinking cannot be relegated to the neglected books of the ivory tower but must be a practical activity. Again his and others' experiences under Nazism deserve comment in this context.

Specific concepts associated with Jaspers' philosophizing are the boundary situation, the centrality of struggle to life, and several metaphysical concepts, including the Encompassing, the nature of Being, **Existenz**, and the illumination of **Existenz**. As might be reasonably expected, most critics of these aspects of Jaspers' thought employ a metaphysical tone in keeping with the original writings. The characteristic of integrity comes to the fore here, as a question of the very nature of being necessitates a sincere reply to basic and primary questions about existence.

This multi-faceted approach is useful in explaining the relation of Jaspers to Nietzsche, for in both one finds a devotion to sincerity, authenticity, and integrity, and their variant means to achieve such goals demonstrate another aspect of the relationship. For Jaspers the greatest challenge put forth by Nietzsche was the notion of nihilism and Jaspers' response to the challenge is central to his subsequent thought. Jaspers found in Nietzsche a nihilism of strength, which could inspire men to heights, once philosophizing prevails, and he paid a notable degree of attention to the prospects of overcoming it. To a considerable extent this nihilism was the result of Nietzsche's famous statement that "God is dead." The values which Jaspers suggested in
response to this are indicative of his personal Weltanschauung as well as expository of complex new levels of thought in Nietzsche.

* * *

Necessary to gaining an understanding of Jaspers' thought is a firm grasp of the significant aspects of his life and the general nature of his thought found in the whole of his writings rather than in specific examples. Most important is his emphasis on changing one's life and on truth, loyalty, achievement, integrity, and wisdom, all of which find peculiar expression in Jaspers because of his notable inner tension.

Jaspers insisted that changing one's life was of cardinal importance, far above the importance he accorded theoretical analysis, and he insisted that the rational sphere is subphilosophic. The personal significance of philosophizing is thus shown, for Jaspers felt that philosophy should be a central part of every man's thought, the most significant, if not the sole, function of man. His notion of it was not confined to speculations which detached a thinker from life, but rather included the sorts of reflections through which one could reach a deeper understanding of Being. Jaspers emphasized the border situation (Grenze-situation) in which all previous knowledge and experience become no longer applicable and in which one is forced to look inward to find the basis for continuing. A confirmation of the individual is one of the central reflections that Jaspers created and donated to the doctrines of existentialism. Jaspers urged looking inward from the "far side of the abyss" for the values to bridge the chasm. Undergoing these border situations aided in achieving an understanding of Being also, but only insofar as a person would emerge victorious from them: were a man to sink into the abyss, Jaspers would be convinced that his poor philos-
ophical preparation had been the reason for his failure. Yet had the man encountered the border situation previously, if only in his mind, then he would have been prepared and could have bridged the abyss. To summon all the necessary courage to cross the metaphorical Angst is beyond the means of one who has not reflected to good purpose philosophically. Crossing the abyss requires philosophical thinking, which makes possible a change in one's life.

Although Jaspers is not the most popular of all existentialist thinkers, and few would argue that he is the most influential, his thoughts have had widespread effect within that body of modern thought. Of value to an analysis of Jaspers and his thought are the several autobiographical essays written after his place had become secure. In a section entitled "The Course of My Development" in an essay "On My Philosophy" Jaspers spoke of his early life and its influence on his later thoughts. He narrated that he was brought up with a high regard for achievement. The early inclinations remained with him throughout his life, and became the chief criteria through which he evaluated the world and his place in it. Since his schooldays he had been guided by philosophical questions and philosophy became the supreme and sole concern of man in his search for truth. As early classes in philosophy offered no fundamental experiences of Being or guidelines for inner action or self improvement, he began a study of medicine, thinking it offered the nearest proximity to the philosophical issues he would later pursue formally. With the beginning of World War I the age of naive life ended, making philosophizing more important than ever. At this time his psychology was an outline of the potentialities of the soul. He felt that psychology was a discipline which holds a mirror up to man to show him the grandeur of his potential. It shows man what he can be,
what he can achieve, and how far he can go. It is an appeal to freedom. Realizing that there was no true philosophy at the universities, he decided that even the weak should philosophize. Only through continual reflection and examination could one achieve truth, loyalty, and reliability.

The boundary or extreme situation is necessary for the fullest embodiment of Jaspers' integrity, moral arguments, and decisions, and his clear and economical writings which can only evoke our unqualified assent and respect. Wisdom and humanity are the distinguishing aspects of his writings and, although these characteristics are not confined to him alone, they predominate in his thought. Jaspers is a philosopher of humanity, whose efforts to understand the various ranges of metaphysics are grounded not in a desire to study the esoteric or arcane, but in a perspicuous infatuation with discovering the ultimate foundations of human activity. Humanist in the most traditional sense, he is a freethinker in rejection of systematic thought. He is not oblivious to the world, and his several books on political issues illustrate that his concern for man has not precluded an interest in men as well. His writings include works on the nature of mental illness, on academic freedom, on the responsibility of all Germans and all men for the debacle of National Socialism (a "total falsehood"), on the meaning and prospects of German unity, on the role of the Church in the modern world, and on the fate of man in the nuclear age. His wise reflections call for agreement and admiration, but throughout Jaspers' writing is a particular inner tension to which conceptualization cannot do justice. To an extent, tension characterizes Jaspers' thought, although it does not pertain to him alone among modern thinkers. Unequivocally, Malraux was moved by tension, as his strutting across a room while nervously
puffing a cigarette well illustrates. In fact, at one two-hour interview while imbued with this tension, Malraux spoke the equivalent of some seventeen columns in the *New York Times* on an extremely wide range of topics. Nietzsche's tension was probably biologically stimulated and it did not provoke him to outpourings of thought as it did in Malraux, but rather prevented him from working for long periods. Jaspers' tension is of a completely different sort, as it originates in his sincere attempt to cover the range of human existence or conditions for the bases of philosophizing, knowing full well that is is beyond coverage, but continuing to try in the name of an ideal. This tension does not serve to make Jaspers a shallow thinker, but rather it prevents accurate conceptual analysis or quick dismissive summarizing of his thought.

It is not necessary to approach Jaspers piecemeal or to study a fragment intensely in search of his entire thought: he can be treated critically, but indeed the pervasive concern must be the knowledge that all of Jaspers' reflections and speculations are interested in communication, which is the basis of all his thought.

Jaspers' emphasis on communication stems from his conviction that only through direct personal interaction can one achieve Being. Man merely exists and, to use the Sartrean existential principle that "existence precedes essence," man's true self, his Being, analytically can only be discovered and cultivated through exact, personal, and philosophical communication. The significance Jaspers accorded communication is based on the relation of it to his thoughts on the philosophical mood, on the reality of self Being, and on the problem of extreme situations. His relationship with his wife is a highly personal manifestation of his feelings toward communication. A claim has been raised by some critics that Jaspers' arguments for perspicuous clarity of expression have pre-
cluded the poetic, dramatic, and aphoristic style used by Nietzsche and others. To this Jaspers would reply that such extemporaneous considerations are actually detrimental to the cardinal purpose of communication, as they call attention to their own value and detract from the essential message. To Jaspers the message itself was the *raison d'être* and this conviction finds expression throughout the corpus of his lucid writings.

Communication is sufficiently applicable to ordinary situations, as is also the limited exercise of philosophy. In these so-called ordinary situations man is not in a state of crisis, nor are his very existence and value threatened. Yet when the boundary situation occurs, the extreme situation in which previous morals and mores are no longer valid, communication is paramount. The essential characteristic of the boundary situation is its loneliness. At this point, communication becomes far more than merely applicable: it becomes the absolutely necessary grounds for survival and growth. Jaspers recognized that without philosophical growth, decay, calamity, and disaster are the only alternatives. Communication attains a cardinal importance in the extreme situation, and there it must take place between persons who love honesty and openness, when the aspiration to the "truly human" can occur. The pursuit of Being can be seen in one sense as an extreme situation, yet severe problems exist here. First, if they are comparable, the use of two independent terms in their description is redundant. Second, if both are indeed linguistic metaphors for the same entity, only confusion can result from their alternating use. Finally, if the pursuit of Being is an extreme situation, and it may very well be, then we are at a loss to label accurately the reality which we are now satisfied to call extreme situations. If we equate the two terms from Jaspers' lexicon, we are left without an accurate description of, for
example, Jaspers' situation in Germany at the University of Heidelberg from 1933 to 1945. Because of his philosophical background in the humanist classical tradition of Goethe and Schiller, and because of the intense commitment to freethinking which was rooted in that background, Jaspers' situation during the Third Reich was an extreme one and, although not independent of a search for Being, it was sufficiently separated from it to be described by the same term. It is a fair and logical conclusion that the extreme situations in which communication attains its paramount importance have distinguishing, singular, and unique characteristics, which are intensely personal and beyond brief summarization. Because of this personal aspect of the boundary situation, accurate communication on a personal level is the only viable and tenable solution.

Jaspers' attitudes toward communication were shaped to a limited extent by his Jewish wife, a fact that contributed immeasurably to the intensity of the boundary situation from 1933 to 1945. During this time Jaspers was an administrator at the University of Heidelberg, a former hotbed of political radicalism, but since 1848 the university had become a bastion of the conservative forces operating in German society and politics. During the Hitler years Jaspers remained in Heidelberg, although pensioned by the Nazis, choosing to endure the present situation in anticipation of an improved future. Even at the height of Nazi fortunes, he retained a conviction that Germany would endure and emerge intact from the contemporary world political situation. He had no anticipation of the division of Germany but he did recognize that the thousand-year Reich would not run its full course. His exact reasons for remaining in Germany are obscure. Perhaps he followed this course to remain in a position to assist the German resistance. It
is a worthy point to mention that Jaspers' position was somewhat unique during the Nazi period, for he did not embrace Nazism, as did Heidegger, nor did he flee, as did Thomas Mann and Bertolt Brecht. For his chosen course a degree of personal accolade is justified, as his decision was intensely complicated by his wife's background. Throughout the period and beyond he retained his emphasis on communication, which is well summarized by the following:

We are able, without will to power, to struggle with love in discussing truth, and in truth to join with each other. Then we are capable of unaggressive silence—it is from the simplicity of silence that the clarity of the communicable will emerge.

Jaspers' writings illustrate the influence of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. A notable influence of the two nineteenth-century thinkers can be discerned in Jaspers' reflections on the nature of \textit{Existenz}. Few deny that Jaspers drew a significant amount of inspiration from them and that his philosophizing, like theirs, is an expression of individualism and unlimited reflection. His thoughts can be seen as a grasp for freedom through the agonizing and creative movement between the polarity of the rational and the non-rational. Yet unlike Kierkegaard or Nietzsche, his style of writing is not poetic, dramatic, or aphoristic. Rather it is an attempt to deal with some of the same issues in a more descriptive, critical, existentially analytical, and illuminating way. This is not beyond belief, for Jaspers in no way tried to imitate either of the two earlier thinkers. He felt that whoever tried had made himself look ridiculous. Although all three faced similar issues, the point of differentiation is their methods of approach to those problems. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche were exceedingly skilled at indirect communication, for they felt that the subtlety of their message would be conveyed by nothing less than indirect metaphor. Both, it is generally
agreed, were very proficient at this sort of subtle communication. Jaspers, however, consciously moved ever and against this in his aspiration to total communication. With these notions of authenticity and communication in mind, an examination of Jaspers' thought and its relation to Nietzsche's can proceed.

For two reasons it is necessary to examine some general thoughts of Jaspers as well as some of his criticisms of and comments on the world. First, these reflections are sufficiently broad to permit a view of his more specific thoughts. Attitudes plainly apparent in these general thoughts are necessary for understanding his more advanced work, yet because of the increasing complexity of the latter reflections, the core attitudes are seen only with difficulty. They must be known before approaching the advanced thoughts. Second, the general thoughts presented here are summarized and synthesized from several of Jaspers' works and from many of his critics. Therefore, enumeration of them is scarce and a reader is not likely to find them on cursory examination of the literature available on Jaspers or by indiscriminate acquaintance with his works. Yet these general comments set a tone which remains prevalent throughout his writings. This tone makes an easier access to Jaspers' more advanced thinking possible.

Since early life Jaspers was infatuated with philosophical questions, mostly of a metaphysical sort. As his thirst for answers to such questions was not quenched in his early studies in philosophy at the university, Jaspers turned to medicine as a career, where he felt that he could encounter the nature of philosophy, although not in the formal manner practiced at the universities. Yet science was unable to provide him with the sort of answers he was seeking and, unfulfilled, he returned to philosophy. Science, he felt, was unable to answer any questions,
fundamental ones included, with certainty. From this conviction there arose a general disregard for science and scientific methodology. Earlier thoughts on psychology came to the fore again, stressing the unfathomability of the human psyche. Jaspers refuted scientific methodology in theory and in practice by denouncing it as unsuited to the world. Scientific pigeonholing and endless classification were inaccurate and inauthentic manners of analyzing the world and science itself could be abandoned, he felt, as it failed to withstand its own criteria for truth. Neither was science capable of producing insights into the human condition. This dislike of science remained with Jaspers throughout his career and became merely accentuated in his writings on the fate of man in the age of the atomic bomb.

Another aspect of Jaspers' general thought is his conviction that knowledge and reason are limited. One critic has remarked that "More than any other philosopher in contemporary thought, Jaspers takes seriously the limits of knowledge in every field of endeavor." This emphasis on the limits of science and knowledge is not as surprising as it may initially seem, as Jaspers argues that we can approach truth, although we can only attempt to gain the proximity of the mathematical asymptote. Even the most accurate and personal communication can lead only to a proximity to the ideal, regardless of how infinitesimal the distance may be. Immanuel Kant and Hegel are primarily responsible for the development of Jaspers' early attitudes toward reason and its limits. From them he derived insights on the nature of reason and on its dialectical richness. From this background Jaspers' thoughts evolved and, although not actively hostile to reason, they were certainly drawn away from it because of its presumptuousness and cramping of life. These later thoughts are closer again to Nietzsche and Kierkegaard.
An interesting and valuable aspect of Jasper's thought can be seen in his opinions on German guilt for World War II in a book entitled *Die Schuldfrage*. At the bottom line it is a refutation of the thoughts concluding that Germany and all Germans are equally guilty. In the book he outlined four levels of guilt: criminal, political, moral, and metaphysical. Although he maintained that all Germans were not politically guilty for the war, he insisted that all Germans share equally the political liability for it. Germans living as citizens of the Nazi regime cannot exonerate themselves from the consequences of being members of the state, which gave them a limited though undeniable responsibility for the acts of that state. Although not properly history, Jaspers' book made a number of comments which an historian would find useful, most pertinent among them being his comments on Germany's geo-political situation and on the world-historical situation. The work was in no way autobiographical, as Jaspers used the first person illustratively and not literally. Of primary purpose to this discussion of Jaspers' general critical thought, the short book on the guilt question illustrated his continuing emphasis on the need for self-evaluation and self-examination, on the nobility of the pursuit of truth, and on the paramount importance of authenticity, for only authenticity can stimulate men to self-examination and to the pursuit of truth. Jaspers' proximity to Nietzsche was also demonstrated, though implicitly rather than explicitly. Jaspers was no raving Germanophilic apologist, as Wagner might in similar conditions have been, but rather he, like Nietzsche, was a "good European," aware of the characteristics which separated Western from German culture, and, insofar as Germanness was concerned, much more in the classical humanist tradition of Weimar than in the anti-Semitic and violent approach favored in Bayreuth.
With these general notions of Jaspers' thought in mind, we can now move on to the nature and specifics of his philosophy and how he is related to Nietzsche.

A similarity to Voltaire, Nietzsche, and the tradition of European freethinkers can be detected in Jaspers' revulsion toward doctrines. Instead of the thought restrictions of systems, Jaspers favors, and indeed has become known for, philosophizing. As is done in some Eastern religions, Jaspers emphasizes self-knowledge, the search for oneself, and, most emphatically, philosophizing about oneself. Philosophizing is an activity of sufficient import that Jaspers feels it should be the primary, if not the sole, concern of man. To refute those who might criticize such a thought because of its worldly untenability, Jaspers argues that philosophizing actually is a practical activity. It is these aspects of his philosophy that we shall examine next.

Jaspers's three-volume *Philosophie* was not intended to contain a doctrine, which would imply a ready-made answer to the questions that philosophizing poses, questions which have no pat answers. Jaspers is also rebuffed by the ability of systems and doctrines to be summarized in one paragraph, which is also no satisfactory answer to the questions of the modern world. The ability of some philosophers and teachers of philosophy to summarize the thoughts or systems of philosophers into a single paragraph repulsed Jaspers greatly. He recognized this, in fact, as one of the basic reasons for his rejection of the formal study of philosophy. Instead of summarizing, he came to feel that the surest way to knowledge about a thinker is the careful and detailed study of his works. Summarizing is only valid if one can rely on the credibility of the summarizer. Because of his long-standing advocacy of the pursuit of truth, the summary method of knowledge was artificial and inaccurate. The only way in which one can come to know Jaspers' own thoughts, then,
is either through several scholars who have attempted to synthesize his writings and basic attitudes to make his works accessible or to study the voluminous writings themselves, some of which have not yet been translated. Jaspers wrote in a manner not easily summarized in order to be suited to the complexity and difficult ambiguity of the times. The title of one of Joseph Goebbels' early diaries is *Die Zeit ohne Beispiel* (The Time without Precedent) and Jaspers felt that this lack of precedent was true for all ages and, although we certainly stand to learn from the thinkers of the past, he was strongly convinced that we can only progress if we philosophize about ourselves in the present. Jaspers' revulsion toward doctrines is not bombastic; it reflects his urgent conviction on the nature of our times.

Authenticity was another grounding point for Jaspers' continual emphasis on philosophizing. Intellectual honesty, much in the same fashion as advocated by Nietzsche, is very close to this conception of authenticity, and it requires philosophizing as the only authentic response to ultimate situations. Thus we can see Jaspers' philosophical response actually as a willingness to face reality.\(^9\) His advocacy of authenticity is similar also to an aspect of the thought of Sartre, who urged authenticity above all else in personal affairs. Authenticity and integrity remain paramount in Jaspers nonetheless and they are illustrated again in his assertion that no one has really begun to philosophize until he philosophizes about himself.\(^10\)

Jaspers' own words best illustrate his opinion that philosophizing was the primary, if not the sole, concern of man. In an autobiographical essay entitled "On My Philosophy" he wrote:

Since my schooldays...I was guided by philosophical questions. Philosophy seemed to me the supreme, even the sole, concern of man. Yet a certain awe kept me from making it my pro-
fession.... As the realization overcame me that, at the time, there was no true philosophy at the universities, I thought that facing such a vacuum even he, who was too weak to create his own philosophy, had the right to hold forth about philosophy, to declare what it once was and what it could be. Only then, approaching my fortieth birthday, I made philosophy my life's work.

Philosophy becomes the sole concern of man in a world where traditional values and morals are no longer valid. Nietzsche described, indeed helped initiate, such a world with the cataclysmic statement on the death of God. A further reason for every man to ask philosophical questions is the modern existence of thought-restricting totalitarian political systems. Such systems attempt to strive on mass followings of "true believers" who make themselves incapable of critical evaluation or repudiation of the movement. Additionally, the modern world lives under the threat of life-exterminating nuclear holocaust, giving the modern voting populace an even greater responsibility in choosing its leaders and insuring, as far as possible, their responsible action. Philosophizing, then, is an important concern of man as long as man remains a concern of himself. An additional excerpt from Jaspers' essay will serve to illustrate his conviction that philosophizing is a practical activity:

Philosophy grew in me through my finding myself in the midst of life itself. Philosophical thought is \textbf{practical activity}, although a unique kind of activity.

Philosophical meditation is an accomplishment by which I attain Being and my own self, not impartial thinking which studies a subject with indifference. To be a mere onlooker were vain.... The critical objectivity of significant knowledge is attained as a practice only philosophically in inner action....

Philosophizing is the activity of thought itself, by which the essence of man, in its entirety, is realized in the individual man.

Understanding now that Jaspers regards doctrines as anathema, that he favors philosophizing over philosophy, and that he is convinced that philosophy is the sole concern of man and is a practical activity, we can proceed to an examination of the specifics of his philosophy.
The several diverse aspects of the specific nature of Jaspers' philosophy have allowed the development of his reputation as a metaphysical philosopher. In his writings a metaphysical tone is readily apparent, a tone which some might find difficult, but which nevertheless is essential to understanding his total thought. Several notions in his philosophy are peculiar to him alone, while others have a long history and tradition. Thoughts on the boundary situation illustrate Jaspers' conviction that the sole concern of man in the tense modern world is philosophizing. The boundary situation is the way of the modern world and men must face it and reconcile themselves to it. Jaspers is also of the opinion that struggle is central to life. It is to be remembered at this point that although Jaspers lived through the Nazi period in German history, he was never connected with it in any way. His opinions on the centrality of struggle to life emanate in fact from his opposition to the Nazis, which, although finding few overt expressions, was strong in spirit nonetheless. Jaspers' metaphysics are the core of his thought. A framework for understanding the breadth of his metaphysical reflections can be gained through knowledge of the Encompassing, Being, Existenz, and the illumination of Existenz. It is to these aspects of his thought that attention must be given.

As was discussed earlier, communication plays a vital role in Jaspers' conception of the boundary or ultimate situation, which further articulates the standing need for clear communication. In the lonely limits of extreme situations communication between persons who love honesty and openness creates the "truly human." The concept of the boundary situation was introduced in one of Jaspers' earlier works, Die Psychologie der Weltanschauung (The Psychology of World Views), which marked a break with his previous writings by being more speculative.
Preceding *Die Psychologie* was an earlier study entitled *Psychopathologie* which encouraged the view of humans as unfathomable beings. In Jaspers' mind these two intellectual developments integrated and aligned themselves and created a fertile ground for the complete development of the concept of the boundary situation. Personally Jaspers experienced two dissimilar boundary situations. The first was the dilemma of his early life, when his pursuit of philosophical questions led him to the sterile study of philosophy, removed from life, at the university. This crisis of ideology destroyed Jaspers' established faith and belief in philosophy without the creation of a suitable replacement. The second boundary situation for Jaspers, indeed for most of the world, was the years of the Nazi regime, 1933 to 1945. At that time three aspects of his background led him to be severely criticized, although not persecuted. Those aspects of his background are (1) his role as a philosopher and active administrator of Heidelberg University, (2) the religious background of his wife, and (3) his views as a German thinker steeped in the humanistic tradition of Goethe and Kant. These boundary situations can best be seen as crisis points, from which a person will either succumb to the pressures of the moment or grow and conquer those same pressures. Jaspers, as we can see, survived both crises: nearly all of his substantial writings were completed after his decision to become a medical doctor, and his creative output has increased since the Second World War. Through this cursory examination, several generalizations can be made. First, the boundary situation is one in which man feels at the mercy of the forces of destiny around him. This alone is not sufficient reason for despair; rather, it is a challenge. Second, the boundary situation is not one in which world historical forces need be active: it can be a crisis of comparable severity and
intensity if only on a personal scale. Third, the only authentic response to a boundary situation is philosophizing, for only through critical reflection can a man discover the way to his personal salvation. Fourth, the boundary situation is a crisis and a turning point: its outcome is never assured and one can either succumb or succeed.

That struggle is an inexpungible part of life was recognized by both Nietzsche and Jaspers. Yet the manner in which each thinker envisioned struggle illustrates some of their differences. Nietzsche felt that the struggle was the large drive through a will to power to rise above the herd. The highest plane of achievement of such a drive was that of the Übermensch, the attainment of which placed one in the new elite. Jaspers' struggling was more a grappling with the basic metaphysical problems of existence. The boundary situation for him was the condition to be overcome, and anyone who could prove himself capable of doing so would become, by virtue of his act, "truly human." This state is not so much a diluted form of the Übermensch as it is something different in kind. Jaspers' metaphors were never as military as Nietzsche's and he never felt the same urgency to rise above the herd; moreover, Jaspers embraced the "herd" through his conviction that philosophy was for every man. Thus the "truly human" is not a creative demi-god but rather an ordinary man who, through communication with other ordinary men, has achieved Being. Jaspers' "truly human" is a state more readily realized than Nietzsche's Übermensch and also is not as intense, but it is a goal to whose realization more men can aspire. A concluding point in the comparison of the two is that the notion of the "truly human" is more difficult to be abused than the concept of the Übermensch, as evidenced by the National Socialists.
At the heart of Jaspers' philosophy is his metaphysics. Here he discussed the Encompassing, Being, \textit{Existenz}, and the illumination of \textit{Existenz}. It is peculiar and thus important to note that most of Jaspers' critics found his metaphysical tone so compelling that they imitated it in their own writings. One needs nearly an equivalent amount of philosophical training to approach the critics as to deal with Jaspers' works themselves. Jaspers has been subjected to severe criticism because of this metaphysical approach. Some critics feel that he has chosen to withdraw himself from life, even from a critical point in national life. This nevertheless is not the case and the accusation comes from too peripheral an acquaintance with Jaspers' thought.

Jaspers used the metaphysical approach because he felt it to be the only authentic one for the troubles of the time and his use was a legitimate facing of reality, not a flight from it. To be sure, Jaspers carried a long-standing association with the university throughout his long life. Yet this also was not a withdrawal, for during the period of the Third Reich, due to the brutal character of the National Socialists, the universities were least subjected to \textit{Gleichschaltung} or "coordination" of national activities. Jaspers also did not choose to flee Germany, even after the character of the Nazis was beginning to be revealed. His resistance was limited and he writes in \textit{Die Schuldfrage} (\textit{The Question of German Guilt}) that during the years 1933 to 1945 Germany was like a prison. Nevertheless he did not withdraw from reality into the murky and foggy zones of the unrealistically metaphysical but instead continued his emphasis on philosophizing. As his thought developed and became more articulate, he realized that only metaphysics would be able to preserve his work from being esoteric and uncommunicatable. His use of metaphysical terms may seem strange at first encounter, yet he defined and refined them whenever possible to insure that they
become and remain accessible. Jaspers did not discount other methods of expression as inaccurate; he merely realized that for his thoughts and abilities of communication, the use of metaphysics was the only authentic solution.

In the volume of the Library of Living Philosophers dealing with Jaspers, one can find a glossary of terms used by the philosopher in his writings. Although the short enunciation of these terms without prior acquaintance with Jaspers' thought is essentially meaningless, comment on them drawn from other works by Jaspers and other critical sources allows for their illumination. These terms are particularly important to any further study of Jaspers, as he used them continually. It is a point worthy of mention that Jaspers in no way tried to couch his philosophy in esoteric or mystical terms. Because of his long emphasis on the importance of clarity of presentation and communication, doing so would be in violation of his first principles. Jaspers is also willing to admit the fact that some terms which he finds essential can be assigned no unequivocal meaning. An example of such a term, according to Jaspers, is Sein (Being). A definition which states simply that it is what exists is insufficient, as it is more description than definition. Further, as the attainment of Being is one of the highest goals advocated by Jaspers, it must remain undefined. This is true as attainment of Being is a momentous personal and almost solipsistic accomplishment. Jaspers has a term for an approach to being, which is das Umgreifende (the Encompassing), which can connote either Being in itself, that which surrounds us, or Existenz. As is the case with Being, it is often better to consider it rather than attempt, through futility of effort, to define it. Existenz is an interesting thought, on which the description of Jaspers as a subjective philosopher is
often based, for Jaspers defined it as "that which never becomes object."
This definition comes from Jaspers' long book Philosophie, as does the
definition of Existenzheilung (the illumination of Existenz), which
Jaspers described as the ascertaintment in thought of breaking through
worldly experience and existence. Existenzheilung is a plane of
being from which all Angst and floundering are dispelled, and through
which one can become "truly human." These definitions are not
intended to be full exegeses of Jaspers' terms but merely working
definitions which aid an explication of the influence of Nietzsche on
Jaspers.

* * *

Similarities exist between many aspects of Nietzsche's and Jaspers'
thought, but this is not necessarily the result of a direct influence
of the former upon the latter; rather it came about largely by coin-
cidence. Thus the task of the intellectual historian is to distinguish
between these coincidences and actual influence among several thinkers.
The problem is very simple: because two or more thinkers exhibit similar
tendencies in their thought, is it necessary that the thought of the
more recent thinker grew out of seed planted by the former? In the
case at hand, a simple reply will not suffice, as we must examine
several possible modes of influence. First among these is Jaspers'
striking preoccupation with Nietzsche, which is beyond any explanation
by nationality or association with a particular movement. A second
valuable topic is whether or not Jaspers is a "Nietzschean;" that
is, whether any aspects of his thought—method, style, concern, pop-
ularity, or interest—bear unstated resemblance to Nietzsche. Third,
a valuable insight can be gained by examining Jaspers' book Nietzsche:
Eine Einführung in das Verständnis seines Philosophierens (Nietzsche;
An Introduction to His Philosophical Activity), in which Jaspers' relation to the Nazis can also be treated. Finally, a consideration of the existence of parallels or mere similarities will shed further light on the relationship of the two philosophers.

Of all historically significant modern philosophers, only Jaspers devoted two complete books and a host of other articles, essays, and miscellaneous writings to Nietzsche. It is also valuable to note that the books on Nietzsche were written some fifteen years apart, indicating that Jaspers' concern with him was not transitory. We must remain wary of simple and superficial explanations of this preoccupation, which will only serve to complicate further and obscure sound interpretations of either thinker or the relationship between them. The explanation that both were German will not suffice, as Jaspers could have chosen several German thinkers of comparable historical significance. Hegel, Gotfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and Kant would have probable and prominent alternatives, and the list of possible choices is long if not endless: Arthur Schopenhauer, Johann Gottfried von Herder, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Schlegel, Johann Friedrich Schiller, Leopold von Ranke, Heinrich Heine, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, and even Wagner. His choice of Nietzsche indicates a much closer affinity. That Nietzsche was in no way a metaphysical philosopher destroys any connections on grounds of philosophical genre. Jaspers also had available too many "founding fathers" of existentialism to choose Nietzsche solely for his contributions in that field. In fact, Jaspers chose Nietzsche as the topic of a substantial portion of his canon for the same reason that Karl Marx felt a closeness to Hegel and Maximillian Robespierre followed Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In each case the follower was enamoured in some way with the previous thinker, perhaps in style, approach, or topic, and finding an expression
of a germinal thought of their own, they sought to expand and articulate that thought further by embarking upon a study of their chosen master. This is particularly true in Jaspers' relation to Nietzsche.

It is worthy to consider if Jaspers is a "Nietzschean" because of this extended preoccupation. Topics which may shed further light on this will include a consideration of the kind of impetus that Jaspers gained from Nietzsche in comparison to what he gained from such diverse thinkers as Socrates and Kierkegaard, of the extent to which Jaspers responded to Nietzsche's destruction of past thought and method, and, most importantly, of the value of Nietzsche's thought as an antechamber to Jaspers' own work.

The grouping of four philosophers—Socrates, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Jaspers—is based on the extolling by each of the value and importance of living one's philosophy and on the pursuit of an elevated state of being. Socrates advocated that one must live one's philosophy in order to attain self-knowledge which, coupled with sagacity derived from acknowledgment of the limits of one's knowledge of the world, leads to an elevated state of being. Kierkegaard's advocacy of living one's thoughts is based on his devotion to perfervid individualism. His elevated being, moreover, was based on intuition. Thus Jaspers cannot be labeled a "Nietzschean," as he was stimulated in a similar fashion by both Socrates and Kierkegaard. Even in early life Jaspers was not a "Nietzschean" or even a follower of him because of the excessive breadth of similarities on this level. All four thinkers emphasized the attempt to live one's philosophy, the effort to raise oneself to a higher state of being, and to help others to do likewise, which illustrates that similarities may exist without direct, or in this case even remote, interrelationships.
Nietzsche's destruction of past thought and method is one of the most influential aspects of his contributions to Western philosophy. His personal legacy to the history of thought was also in confrontation to the contemporary excess of specialization and lack of unity, as he attempted to comment on virtually all aspects of life: politics, art, society, literature, love, and philosophy. Yet as a herald of the twentieth century, he destroyed much of the thought of the nineteenth and a substantial portion of what preceded it. In this endeavor his attack on critical frameworks and religious traditions was most valuable to Jaspers. Jaspers was much closer to Nietzsche than to Kierkegaard by recognizing no theological framework or commitment to a particular religious tradition, although Jaspers' writings have a significant number of references to God. Kierkegaard, the "Protestant's Protestant," gave no impetus in this manner to the non-sectarian Jaspers.

Nietzsche's alleged explosion of all finite positions is a second articulation of his destruction of past thought which Jaspers used to his own purpose. Jaspers valued this aspect of Nietzsche's thought as the logical function of philosophical reason, not philosophical faith. Additionally, it is worthwhile to consider the importance of the destruction of all finite positions to the necessity of philosophizing, for the elimination of thought-restricting systems must precede philosophizing. In his systemlessness, Jaspers is Nietzschean and illustrates two modern manifestations of Nietzsche's thought. First, his refutation of the interpretations of Nietzsche put forth by the circle of the poet Stefan George demonstrates his determination not to prostrate his critical functions before a human oracle, as George was held to be within his circle. Second, Jaspers's judgment has never been clouded by adherence to any party line. In both instances he retained his preference for philosophizing and was "Nietzschean" in the truest sense.
Yet in all manifestations of his admiration of Nietzsche, Jaspers used the nineteenth-century German primarily to introduce his readers to his own philosophy. At no time does he consider or even ask his readers to consider the intrinsic value that an understanding of Nietzsche may have. Because of the extensive treatment that Jaspers gave Nietzsche and because of several extant parallels in their thought, Nietzsche's philosophy became an integral part of Jaspers' work, yet only as an antechamber. Jaspers' in his long book on Nietzsche's philosophizing found the source of the will to power and the Übermensch inconclusive. His method involved the juxtapositioning of contradictory elements of Nietzsche's writings to forbid any organic whole or unified doctrine from being seen. As Jaspers thus makes Nietzsche inconclusive, we must be wary of his reading himself into his predecessor. Jaspers' autobiographical essay contains the statement: "Through my Nietzsche I wanted to introduce the reader into that loosening up of thought out of which Existenzphilosophie must spring." Another critic pointed out that Jaspers persistently read his own philosophy into Nietzsche and that his interpretation of Nietzsche is not really intelligible without a knowledge of Jaspers' own philosophy. Jaspers all too clearly used Nietzsche only to introduce us to his own philosophy.

Jaspers' conception of Nietzsche can be seen most clearly in his long book of introduction to Nietzsche's philosophizing, published in 1947. An examination of this book is valuable for two reasons germane to this study. First, it allows for a consideration of the accuracy of Jaspers' interpretation of Nietzsche, an issue which is yet to be resolved completely, yet one on which there exists a consensus of opinion. Second, a treatment of the book in juxtaposition with the life of the author during the Third Reich yields a crucial insight into
the workings of Jaspers' Lebensphilosophie during a critical period or
border situation.

Even one of the harshest critics of Jaspers' interpretation of
Nietzsche admitted that his study has value to a modern audience.
Kaufmann outlines aspects of Jaspers' interpretation and resultant
thought in the following manner:

It is surely one of the great merits of Jaspers' Nietzsche
that he gives due emphasis to Nietzsche's radical anti-
authoritarianism. And Jaspers has consistently followed
Nietzsche in rejecting the master-disciple relationship
and in teaching independence.

As was characteristic of Nietzsche's writings and of his method, Jaspers
also rejected systematized answers to individual pursuits of truth. If
he did not receive this stimulus directly from Nietzsche, it would be
surprising; yet the most conservative critic would grant that Nietzsche
was in no small manner responsible for the inclusion of this general
tendency in modern thought, that is, for the establishment of this
position in the general stream of thought, from which Jaspers could
test and expand upon it.

Jaspers' method is the most untenable aspect of his study of
Nietzsche. His work consists almost exclusively of juxtaposing
quotations for illustrations of Nietzsche's contradictions of thought.
He encouraged us never to accept a firm idea from Nietzsche until the
contradiction can also be found and Jaspers always managed to find one.
The value of this method is limited whereas its faults are serious.
It may lead to a discounting of Nietzsche's thought as only an unin-
telligible collection of demented and unreconcilable ideas. Jaspers'
method is primarily valuable first for unsettling the reader and
causing him to philosophize on his own and second for illustrating
the almost unfathomable diversity of Nietzsche's thought. Kaufmann
called the method "unsettling but unsound." Jaspers' _Nietzsche_ tried
to dissociate Nietzsche from all positions, all views, and all conclu-
sions that have been mentioned for him. Stressing the necessity of
finding the contradiction to any of Nietzsche's ideas, Jaspers collected
many quotations to demonstrate the inadequacy of all finished positions.
This attempt to disturb and disrupt the reader is philosophically unten-
able. His attempt to demonstrate that Nietzsche's thought cannot be
aliened down as simply as most people suppose made a mockery of the sub-
title. Nietzsche actually came to many striking conclusions, despite
Jaspers' attempt to show him as inconclusive.22

The chosen method, retained despite severe criticism, was used to
demonstrate a dual tendency in Jaspers' interpretation, seeing every-
thing of Nietzsche as a contradiction on one hand, and yet ignoring the
possibility of conceptual sophistication and development on the other.
This prevented his seeing anything of an organic unity in Nietzsche.23

In fact, Jaspers refused to take seriously the _Übermensch_ and recurrence,
the will to power and sublimation, or any other concept.24 A remark-
able and worthwhile aspect of this interpretation is that Jaspers con-
continued to assert it after the full development of similar organic thoughts
in his own canon. To a limited extent, Jaspers advocated systemlessness
to the point of making it a position, from which he rigidly refused to
depart.

A consideration of Jaspers, his book on Nietzsche, and the Nazis
is valuable for bringing new insight to each. The very appearance of
Jaspers' book, at a time when Richard Oehler and Alfred Baeumler were
loudly proclaiming Nietzsche as a proto-Nazi, when the author of the
most influential pre-Nazi interpretation had aligned himself with the
party, and when the author of a brilliant early monograph of Nietzsche
was carrying irrationalism and anti-Semitism to such extremes that even the Nazis did not follow, was indeed eloquent. The solid study by the respected Heidelberg professor, whatever its faults or their seriousness, presented Nietzsche as not having been a Nazi. Kaufmann wrote:

"The solid study by the respected Heidelberg professor, whatever its faults or their seriousness, presented Nietzsche as not having been a Nazi. Kaufmann wrote:

"In Germany, in 1936, these words were a slap, not only at the prevalent Nietzsche picture, but also at Nazi education generally. Even more outspoken was a later passage: "Nietzsche can be used by all the powers which he fought: he can serve ... the violence which mistakes the idea of a will to power as an order of rank for a justification of any brutality.""

For this creative and scholarly output, in general accord with later scholarship and far ahead of any Nazi contributions to the understanding of Nietzsche, the professor at Heidelberg was pensioner and relieved of his academic duties within one year. 26

Jaspers discussed his life during the Nazi years with a frankness which is characteristic of the entire corpus of his writings:

"In the years of National Socialism ... I ... remained internally free and did not yield to any pressure by committing a bad act or saying a false word in public, but I did nothing in the fight against this crime. I omitted to do what my heart told me to do, while caution advised against it. In 1945, therefore, confronted with false tales on the radio and in the press which glorified my alleged deeds as exemplary, I had to publish a correction with the conclusion: I am no hero and do not want to be considered one." 27

Still, despite Jaspers' outward appearance, which was not anti-Nazi, he was scheduled for arrest by the Gestapo during the spring of 1945. As the Allies liberated Heidelberg before the arrest could be carried out, Jaspers remained grateful and extremely praiseworthy of the Americans for the remainder of his life. Reasons for the scheduled
arrest may have rested in part of the background of Jaspers' wife. 28

The first point for consideration of the relationship between Jaspers and Nietzsche is whether or not an organic linkage between them exists, or whether they both express ideas, no matter how similar, completely independent of each other. Similarities in the thought of both men which will be considered here are the position of philosophers in the world, the notions of the will to power and ressentiment, the appreciation of the individual, the importance of philosophizing, and Jaspers' response to Nietzsche's nihilism. It is hoped that by examining these topics a better appreciation of the complex relationship between the two men can be gained.

Both Jaspers and Nietzsche felt that the philosophers are the movers and shapers of the world. It is not to be considered here if this idea is essentially correct or not, as strong cases can be built on either side of the issue, and the main point under examination is the relationship of this thought. In none of Jaspers' writings was reference found to indicate that he borrowed this thought from Nietzsche; rather, it is the case that both men came to such a conclusion inductively from viewing their respective world situations. By the same token, perhaps both realized that such an opinion is necessary for support of their notions on the importance of philosophizing, which makes every man, and thus, by definition, every mover and shaper of the world, a philosopher. Nevertheless, both share this thought, although no connection was found to indicate a direct influence.

With knowledge of Nietzsche's concept of the will to power, an unconscious creative force, already in mind, a second parallel, with Jaspers' notion of ressentiment, can be seen. In Die Psychologie der Weltanschauung Jaspers wrote:
Principles are made to serve for an apology, ex post facto, for something which originated from quite different sources. Among the oppressed, such an apology employs the doctrines of resentment which, by a revaluation, change the weak and bad into the stronger and better. It employs the superior ability to gain recognition for their power and their exercise of force as something that is right, and to permit themselves to experience it as right. Thus all contents of the spirit are, as it were, a mere arsenal of arms to give oneself significance.

Kaufmann feels that this is straight from Nietzsche and that Jaspers omitted the reference only to avoid being overly pedantic. It is worthwhile to mention that Jaspers' employment of such an idea, to whatever purpose, clearly indicates an acceptance of a particular portion of Nietzsche's thought and that Nietzsche thus influenced Jaspers' development.

Both philosophers hold forth a high appreciation for the individual, which reflects a deeper tendency in each toward "humanism." In a godless world, the world as denounced by Nietzsche, most thinkers felt that strength could only be found in man. This general turning back to man is as indicative of the existential movement as it is of the several thinkers not associated with that movement, such as Eliot, Stephen Spender, and W. H. Auden in England, Robert Frost and Eugene O'Neill in the United States, and Gide and Thomas Mann in Continental Europe. Clearly, then, this parallel is excessively broad for one to conclude that it reflects a direct connection between Jaspers and Nietzsche.

The closest connection between Jaspers and Nietzsche is the emphasis of both on the importance and necessity of philosophizing. Nietzsche advocated this by example in his use of the aphoristic method, by which he emphasized his opinion that anyone who approaches a problem with a ready-made and systematic answer was creating a major obstacle to original thought. Jaspers' advocacy was of a somewhat different sort. He felt that philosophizing was for every man, not merely for those of
the ivory tower, and that it was a necessary, even practical, activity. Kaufmann said "Jaspers is interested, and sees Nietzsche's historical significance, in what he considers Nietzsche's way of philosophizing, not in his philosophy." Another critic has offered the comment that one of the most significant parallels between Nietzsche and Jaspers is their mutual emphasis on philosophy as process, philosophizing. Both feel that man is a fundamental locus of meaning, indicating their humanism, and both raise serious questions about the supremacy of reason.

The area of greatest indication of Jaspers' response to the Nietzschean challenge is his response to his nihilism. Jaspers did not feel that God was dead and that all values, therefore, were in need of re-evaluation, although he certainly embraced critical examination for a host of other equally valid reasons. Jaspers was quite a mature thinker when he accepted Nietzsche's challenge of nihilism and his own words best express the importance of that acceptance: "Nietzsche gained importance for me only late as the magnificent revelation of nihilism and the task of overcoming it (in my youth I had avoided him, repelled by the extremes, the rapture, and the diversity.)." The notion of overcoming contained in that short selection is at least as important as the criticism of nihilism itself, for it indicated Jaspers embraced several diverse and conclusive thoughts of Nietzsche, including the will to power and some of the thought associated with the Übermensch. Jaspers' response was not unique, for only the isolated elements of the twentieth century—such as the analytic thinkers of the Anglo-American world—have remained outside the influence of the herald of their century.

Despite Jaspers' continual emphasis on clarity of communication and lucidity of thought, he has a far smaller reading audience today than does the perspicuous Nietzsche, whose aphorisms enlighten and amuse and
shock the reader into a newer, more sober, understanding. Jaspers' metaphysical tone does not lend itself well to popular consumption, but Nietzsche's almost "racy" style does. Both have expressed frequently profound judgments on the nature of civilization in their time, Nietzsche in his statements of disgust toward what he saw as the decadent bourgeois mediocrity of the last half of the nineteenth century, Jaspers in his statements of highly qualified optimism on the future of man after the atomic bomb. Many apparent parallels exist between these two so-called German existentialists, but linkages between them are very few. It could be that Nietzsche influenced the ages following him, of which Jaspers was a part, to such an extent that Jaspers, or few others writing or thinking today, feel the need any longer to express their debt. Yet that debt is large, and if we are to understand our own age with clarity and directness, we must begin at its precursor. The clear thinking mind that foresaw the problems, both philosophical and social, of the twentieth century, belonged to Nietzsche. We must return to him again and again in order to gain the vitally important understanding of the age of which we remain a part.
CONCLUSION

Probably the single most significant trend in modern thought is existentialism. Its development through three stages began with the dismantling of those beliefs identified with the mid-nineteenth century: reason as opposed to emotion, scientific certainty rather than irrational intuition, knowledge over feelings. The chief thinkers of this period were Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, who were not parallel and were split over the place of religion in society. The second stage in the development was exclusively philosophical, even metaphysical, and was dominated by Heidegger and Jaspers, who explored some of the possibilities of the world forged by the earlier proto-existential thinkers. The third stage is the literary development of existentialism through such major figures as Camus, Sartre, and Malraux, who investigated the broader implications of existentialism.

The three figures considered in this study are representative of each stage in the evolution of existentialism. In retrospect, it becomes hardly surprising that the earliest thinkers turned passionately to man himself as a source of worth and value in a world mechanized and regulated by science-oriented thinkers. Upon these foundations the French littérature explored the daily significance and implications of the new thought. Popularization was a key factor in the spread of existentialism. Their ideas were presented through readily available and accessible forms such as plays, novels, and essays, reaching an audience
not attracted to the earlier philosophical statements.

Man as the measure of all things has become almost a cliché, yet the thinkers who sought to restore a lost humanity both confirmed and expanded traditional humanism, reasserting and refining a major characteristic of the Western world. The crises which man has created and faced in the twentieth century know no parallel in previous experience: man's brutal excess and inhumanity to himself have appeared in incomprehensible quantity. Yet the bastion of humanity is man, who remains a central focus for values and meaning. The three thinkers treated in this paper viewed man as a being of enormous potential. Their views thus illustrated their times and simultaneously confirmed the present and future importance of man.
Notes

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