DISARMAMENT: PREREQUISITE TO WORLD PEACE

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ABSTRACT

My Honors Thesis is written to demand an end to the nuclear arms race between the superpowers and to explore ways of reducing the frequency of war.

I believe war in any form is a horror which should be avoided if at all possible. Nuclear war carries its own special terrors which make it absolutely imperative to prevent such a war. I have discussed the reasons for war and for peace, and I believe the costs of war are far outweighed by the gains of peace.

International cooperation is necessary to avoid war. But no effective international cooperation is possible while the nuclear arms race between the superpowers continues. I have found no good reason to continue the buildup of arms, and many good reasons to stop it. Therefore, I see the immediate cessation and reversal of the arms race as the most important prerequisite to peace. From this beginning, we can build to eventual complete disarmament of the world and the growth of peaceful coexistence.

If disarmament is achieved, I see many ways of maintaining peace. Personally I prefer world government as an effective orderkeeper. Through the achievement of peace, we can develop a stronger economy and a diversion of the resources currently being wasted on the arms race to more pressing world problems such as hunger and energy. I hope for a more free movement of people and ideas, and the education of all people.

However, these and other goals cannot be gained as long as the nuclear arms race continues. Therefore, we must end the arms race and give ourselves a chance at peace.
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In this paper I want to discuss the problem of war and the hope of peace in the world. I will discuss the causes of war and the reasons and requirements for peace. My main emphasis will be on the urgent and immediate need for disarmament.

I WAR: ITS CAUSES AND EFFECTS

Man is continually in conflict: with himself, with nature, with his society in general, or with other persons in particular. The essence of this conflict is violence; of thought or action. Violence leads to domination, and often to pain. I believe the desire to dominate and to hurt other human beings is basically implanted in persons by the societies of the world, with their emphases on violence and competition. World government authority Inis Claude, on the other hand, seems to believe that these desires are inherent in human beings:

"I take it as a basic postulate that human beings will always be capable of doing damage to each other. They cannot ultimately be deprived of this capacity; given brains and brawn, men can contrive instruments of lethal warfare, be they clubs or hydrogen bombs. The management of power is the real issue....I have expressed the conviction that the power to do violence in organized fashion is inherent in human groups, whether or not they be designated sovereign states. In the abstract, then, I would regard the elimination of the potential for violence as unattainable." ¹

Whatever of these positions one accepts, it is one of the basic postulates of this paper that human beings are capable of violence and thus war, and now tend to begin wars easily. But is war anywhere a danger to all persons
everywhere? I would answer this question with an unqualified yes. Given these beliefs, my obvious goal is to abolish war. I do not believe this is completely possible, but it should still be attempted. In this attempt, we may at least reduce the occurrence of war. And through the times of peace thus achieved, we may be able to change our societies for the better.

"War is a condition, as you know, of society where one branch of it has unilaterally given itself licence to kill and destroy another with, at bottom, gain as a motive, however mendaciously flamboyant the patriotic posters."² This definition of war comes from a work of fiction, but it is nonetheless a very good description of war in our world. My underlying assumption in this paper is that no war is good. War, to me, is a curse laid upon mankind, which should be avoided. War in our modern society has a special horror because of the technology which can enable us to destroy much more than armies. Nuclear war can and would destroy most of our world's societies. Therefore, any war but especially a nuclear war must be avoided. I realize that it sometimes only takes one nation to make a war, and that if a nation is faced with a choice of fighting or being conquered it will fight. War here is the only acceptable way out of a pressure trap. There are still in our world values worth fighting for.

"The urge for peace at any price may guarantee that the price demanded will be utterly exorbitant in terms of human values...an absolute preoccupation with peace for the sake of survival may not only endanger the values that give significance to human existence but also turn out to be self-defeating in the most literal sense. On the other
hand, it is impossible to conceive of values or interests which can have validity for mankind in the absence of mankind; values without survival are no more meaningful than survival without values. The development of reasonable security against war is essential to the values which transcend survival as well as to survival itself."

Our task here is to remove the frictions and pressures in international relationships which can lead to these traps.

As I have said, I believe war should be abolished. One paper cannot hope to do justice to the topic of war, let alone remedies for it; therefore, I will limit my discussion to reducing the likelihood of war through nuclear disarmament.

If one wants to stop wars, one must first study the causes of wars. Why do nations fight? Gain is one of the basic motives of war. Nations have fought and probably will continue to fight for advantages in natural resources, food, land, and so forth. I believe the desire for gain is implanted in human beings along with the desire for domination by our competitive society. Scholars have been listing various reasons for war for centuries, and still have not given them all. Space does not permit me to give a long list, but I would like to mention the reasons given by Emeric Cruce, who wrote The New Cinea in 1623 to demand world peace, Cruce said there were four main causes of war: honor, profit, to right a wrong, and exercise. Honor is the justification most accepted by history, but no real honor can be gained in war.

"...why should so much value be placed on something that the most stupid animal can do? Hurting and killing are easy. A little asp, a single fly can accomplish it. That ought to be
enough to humble those bullies who boast of having killed so many men in various skirmishes and battles. It is an honorable thing, they say, to defeat one's enemy. Do we have any enemies other than wild beasts?...ordinary valor, having no other foundation or support but brute force, is not really worth praising. I say 'ordinary valor' to distinguish it from magnanimity which is characterized by steadfastness of courage and scorn for all adversities. These are the marks of true valor: to reject all wrongs and to do none; to suffer death and all other misfortunes nobly when they occur, but not to go seeking them in the hope of finding some ill-defined honor....there is more dishonor to be feared than honor gained in war."^4

Cruce said that nations ruin their treasuries waging war. Today, wartime booms in the economy can be large and profitable, but they are inevitably offset by recessions and unemployment after the war, as defense orders are cut. I have already mentioned the desire for gain which leads many nations into war.

As for war to right a wrong, Cruce said this should not be attempted. According to him, monarchies are given by God, and if He chooses to take them away, monarchs must surrender their power gracefully. I do not agree with the divine right of monarchs. For one thing, there is no longer a predominance of kingdoms. The rulers of the world's democracies do not perceive their power as coming from God, but from their constituents. If they do not protect their constituents' interests, they will be removed from power. Also, as I mentioned earlier, peace at any price is not an acceptable position. If one nation is determined to fight, its opponent must also fight if it wishes to protect its rights as a nation and values as a society.
Cruce's fourth reason for war is exercise:

"How will all our valiant men, who can smell only gunpowder, whose hand is at home only on the hilt of a sword, and whose foot is at home only on a battlefield or the breach of a wall, spend their time? The answer to this question is very brief. The world is not made for the sort of man who can do nothing but evil....It is an unnatural man who seeks repose in disturbance, honor in infamy, and a pasttime in inhumanity." 5

The usefulness of war as a training ground and testing area for men and weapons has long been recognized by the military. The danger is that the leaders of the military become convinced of the "good" to be achieved in war; the noble motives, the gains, the exercise. I do not believe any of these is an adequate excuse for the horrors produced by war.

Other reasons for war include military pressures and traditional diplomacy, the demand for military and arms work jobs, and East-West suspicions. Again, none of these reasons is a strong enough excuse.

I have not found any good excuse or reason for war, except possibly to protect values--self-defense. I am, however, biased. Next I would like to examine the costs of war; the reasons for peace.

Alva Myrdal, a longtime advocate of peace and disarmament, has listed six human costs of the weapons culture, which I will amplify. These are:

1) the human costs of the actual warfare, 2) the brutalization of warfare, 3) the encouragement of more warfare, 4) the militarization of the world, 5) the psychological impact, and 6) the risk of banditry.

The human costs of actual warfare alone are appalling. The number of killed, lost, wounded, prisoners of war, and refugees multiplies with each war. There are material costs; the massive destruction of homes, hospitals,
and schools; factories and fields, dams and dikes, land and forest. War interrupts the functioning of society, the forces of production and consumption. War weakens and sometimes destroys the economy. There is an almost permanent effect upon health care and education. There are broken families. And there are social costs—the moral degredation of the soldiers. The corruption of American soldiers in Vietnam is a recent tragic case in point.

The second cost is the brutalization of warfare. A recognized function of war is to test new weapons and to train new troops. The respect by governments for international law against inhumane warfare is deteriorating. New weapons harm both man and his environment. Weapons such as napalm and fragmentation bombs are developed despite the fact that they are unnecessarily cruel. They are so defined because their effects in causing pain and agony are in excess of what the laws of war consider legitimate; what is required to put an enemy soldier out of action. With each new war, the proportion of civilian casualties rises, and so does the number of refugees.

Myrdal's third cost is the encouragement of more war. The production and export of armaments encourages nations to prepare for and engage in hostilities. For example, recent Middle East wars have been crucially tied to arms deliveries from the two superpowers.

Fourth is the cost of the militarization of nations. The acquisition of more and more arms builds in a trend of continuing the arms race, and contributes to a strengthening of the military in domestic affairs. Foreign affairs are more and more generally discussed in terms of military strategies, undermining peaceful international cooperation before it has been given a fair chance. This militarization is also conducive to military coups.
Fifth is the disturbing psychological impact of the weapons culture. Violence is becoming commonplace. Nuclear terror is ever present. People today have a psychological background of uncertainty, fears, anxiety, and sometimes social rejection or disillusionment. The effect of the mass media in bringing realistic war to people (Vietnam as the war made for television) leads to a gradual desensitization of the general public to the occurrence of violence. There is here the question of the impact of violence on young children—the TV violence can of worms. Myrdal says the blame is not on the media, but on the occurrence of violence in real life—of politically directed violence. I feel that this psychological background of uncertainty and fear was one of the causes for the unrest of the 1960s. But while the unrest seems to have faded away, the uncertainty and fear are still present.

Myrdal's sixth cost is the risk of banditry. It is becoming a widespread impression that officially condoned violence in wars creates the notion that violence belongs to our way of life. There is danger in weapons being readily available to the general public: when instruments for aggression and violence are available relatively easily, the risks are greater that they will be used by some individuals who are psychologically less balanced or morally more unscrupulous than others. To this category belongs the current epidemic of international terrorism—the Baader-Meinhof gang in Western Germany, Middle Eastern terrorism, the kidnapping game in Italy.

I think these reasons alone are good enough to demand an end to the weapons culture and the abolition of war. Unfortunately, the solution is not as simple as merely saying "This shall cease." It is far easier to shout stop than to do it.
"Power exists in states. It may be used in competitive struggle, producing intolerable destruction. It may be used unilaterally, producing enslavement and degradation of its victims. In short, both survival and freedom, both existence itself and the higher values that enrich existence, are implicated in the problem of power."^6

Power, the power to destroy or the power to build, exists. There is no way to eliminate power without eliminating the world’s productive capacity and industrial society. For most of the world, this is simply too high of a price to pay. Without modern production techniques, it would be impossible to feed all of the world’s population, let alone clothe or shelter it, or maintain any kind of a standard of living. The world is now too heavily settled to allow a return to pre-industrial society. Therefore, since we cannot eliminate power, we must find ways of dealing with it.

"The establishment of community mastery over the potential violators of peaceful order, whether it takes the form of collective security or world government, requires the lodging of some power in some human hands, and this means that the problem of preventing the abuse of power is one that can never be definitively eliminated but must always be subjected to the precarious processes of political management."^7

Given the now desperate need to avoid war among nations, it is obvious that the peoples of the world should turn their attention to preventives for war. Among these preventives can be substitutes for scarce natural resources, better agricultural techniques, widely practiced birth control techniques, and a narrowing of the gap between the rich and the poor nations. However, to achieve these preventives, nations must cooperate. World tensions are now too high to allow effective cooperation. And world tensions cannot be lessened while the nuclear arms race between the superpowers continues. Therefore, the first goal is to stop the arms race.
Where did the arms race come from? After World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, the U.S. began to rely upon a policy of containment to stop the spread of communism which was perceived as dangerous to the U.S. Containment, the brainchild of George Kennan, is the policy of meeting expansion with force designed to stop that expansion. Kennan saw communism as a force of endless patience but endless steady pressure toward the goal of world domination, which might not be attained for generations:

"Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates itself to them. The main thing is that there should always be pressure, unceasing constant pressure toward the desired goal....it (Soviet aggression) can be effectively countered not by sporadic acts which represent the momentary whims of democratic opinion but only by intelligent long-range policies on the part of Russia's adversaries--policies no less steady in their application than those of the Soviet Union itself. In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."³

Fear of this pervasive influence quickly prompted U.S. policy makers to include containment in U.S. foreign policy, along with U.S. economic influence such as the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine. Containment led to the balance of power alliance system and to a form of collective security in the United Nations. This collective security is devoted to maintaining the status quo.
The U.S. had developed the atomic bomb, but refused to share the knowledge. This made other nations, especially the U.S.S.R., resentful at being kept out of the secret, and influenced their determination to catch up with the U.S. Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. mistrusted each other, and both sought their own security in increasing levels of nuclear armaments. Thus was born the arms race. Containment as a policy failed with the hopeless "defense" of Vietnam, but the arms race continued. As weapons levels continued to increase, and the U.S.S.R. reached parity with the U.S. in the late 1960s, both nations finally saw the sense in trying to stop the arms race. But there had been such hostility and mistrust between the two nations for so long that neither seemed to know exactly how to go about peace. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks began and produced some results in limiting certain weapons systems, such as Anti-Ballistic Missiles. But no substantive reductions or abandonments have been achieved, and, in the worst failure of all, no restrictions have been made on qualitative improvements, leaving the door open for more and "better" weapons systems.

"The only reason we are given for engaging in this preposterously expensive race with all of its dangers is that we have to do it because the Russians have a very large arsenal and if we do not do it we will expose ourselves to danger from them, and they in turn use the equivalent argument to justify their race. Neither the Russians nor the Americans dare to use these weapons against each other. It would mean certain national suicide. Yet, we stretch our imaginations to find reasons for further weapons development, using scenarios that seem to me to be detached from reality. The whole thing has become an enormous burden to both countries, let alone the danger it poses to civilization, and yet
it has no practical or diplomatic use. When we resort to arms, they must be conventional arms. What advantage is it to point to a nuclear arsenal that we dare not use? This is a grotesque burden that we have pulled upon our shoulders."

The excuses given by the U.S. and similar to those of the U.S.S.R. for the continuance of the arms race are the need to offset Soviet influence, especially in Europe, and deterrence and national security. I would like to first discuss the question of the balance of power in Europe.

Present scenarios mention the possibility of nuclear war over Europe. Such a war would be fought between the superpowers and over and in Europe. European nations themselves are unlikely to start a war; they have over the years developed close economic and cultural ties between eastern and western countries, and are likely to continue and strengthen these bonds. The superpowers say that any war would be a "limited" war. What this really means is that the homelands of the superpowers become sanctuaries, while the war is fought in the territories of lesser powers. There is a deep division between western European and American security interests which is increased by the more and more open preference in the U.S. for the limited war strategy. There seems to be a mutual superpower interest in keeping their homelands as sanctuaries and letting Europe bear the brunt of any possible war--an idea which obviously is not viewed with any great favor by Europeans. "This sanctuary idea naturally can never be a European interest nor shared by any lesser power. If the war is a superpower war, so should the battle be." These differences in interests are becoming more and more apparent in recent years as European nations assert their independence. Dissensions in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are more frequent and more serious.
I do not believe, for the reasons given, that the superpower idea of "protecting" Europe with nuclear weapons holds any validity. What about deterrence?

"Peace is maintained through the threat of mutual destruction.... Deterrence--the policy of preventing an action by confronting the opponent with risks he is unwilling to run--depends in the first instance on psychological criteria. What the potential aggressor believes is more crucial than what is objectively true. Deterrence occurs above all in the minds of men." 11

In the nuclear age, deterrence requires a sufficient arsenal of nuclear warheads to insure that the other superpower will be deterred from an attack by the knowledge that after his attack the defender will still have enough strength to deliver an unacceptable level of damage to his homeland. Albert Wohlstetter, in "The Delicate Balance of Terror" in 1959, offered some of the most thoughtful reasoning on the requirements of deterrence to be found:

"Deterrence...is not automatic....To deter an attack means being able to strike back in spite of it. It means, in other words, a capability to strike second....Perhaps the first step in dispelling the nearly universal optimism about the stability of deterrence would be to recognize the difficulties in analyzing the uncertainties and interactions between our own wide range of choices and the moves open to the Soviets....These are the choices that determine whether a weapons system will have any genuine capability in the realistic circumstances of a war.... Some but not all of the systems...can be chosen and the problem of choice is essentially quantitative....deterrent systems must ha(ve) (a) a stable, 'steady-state' peacetime operation within feasible budgets....They must also have the ability (b) to survive enemy attacks, (c) to make and communicate the decision to retaliate, (d) to reach enemy territory to complete their mission, (e) to
penetrate enemy active defenses, that is, fighters and surface-to-air missiles, and (f) to destroy the target in spite of any 'passive' civil defense in the form of dispersal or protective construction or evacuation of the target itself.... Deterrence demands hard, continuing, intelligent work, but it can be achieved.... Deterrence... provided we work at it, is feasible, and what is more, it is a crucial objective of national policy.... Deterrence is a matter of comparative risks. The balance is not automatic.... it would be a fatal mistake to suppose that because strategic deterrence is inadequate by itself it can be dispensed with. Deterrence is not dispensable. "12

Deterrence as a concept has existed throughout the history of warfare. It would be foolish to suppose that it can now be dispensed with. Indeed, there is now a greater need for deterrence than ever. The nuclear strength of the two superpowers deters them from beginning a nuclear war, and thus performs a valuable function. However, a point often overlooked is that armaments above a minimum level necessary for deterrence can actually contribute to national insecurity and weaken the stability of the deterrent.

"Not even the two superpowers can gain greater security through the arms race. Their nuclear weapons strength long ago exceeded what might be needed even for a 'terror balance', that is, for a deterrent that forbids both, knowing what retaliation lies in store at the already existing level of overkill, to use force against the other. Temporary gains on one or the other side cannot make it more tempting to use nuclear weapons for an attack. In addition, competition, inherent in the arms race, tends to make relative superiority unstable."13

I believe we have long ago reached the minimum level of deterrence. In 1969, for example, Jules Moch analyzed the arms race. Taking into consideration how many tons of explosives are needed to kill the average
number of people on each area of a square kilometer, he figured that the stocks of nuclear weapons then available were enough to kill the total world population 690 times over. Damage in a nuclear war could not be limited to the two warring nations, either. An estimated 10,000,000 casualties from cancer and leukemia would result in countries well away from the two, and genetic problems would affect many millions now and for centuries to come—all of this provided that warheads do not simply go astray and physically destroy most of the rest of the world. Alva Myrdal has estimated that there is the equivalent of between three and twenty tons of TNT for each person on earth. In an age in which the American people are demanding higher moral standards in the government leaders, do we ask if our share in this is moral?

How much is enough in the nuclear arena? Dr. Paul Doty, in testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1974, discussed the minimum level problem, and listed five reasons for the acquisition of nuclear weapons: deterrence, hedges against the vulnerability of the deterrent, nuclear war fighting, political and diplomatic advantage, and maintenance of research, development, and production.

"More than a decade ago, a rather broad consensus developed that the capacity to deliver roughly 400 warheads (1 MT, but with low accuracy) constituted an adequate deterrent. Perhaps twice this number would be required to take care of failures of various kinds and first strikes possible in the sixties. With the buildup of Soviet missiles in recent years, it is increasingly argued, but not by the Secretary of Defense, that protection against a first strike requires much greater redundancy. And indeed, the MIRVing of our forces has produced this—now by a factor of 10—as we approach 8,000 warheads in our forces. How much redundancy is needed here
is a part of the present debate. Even if it were conceded that most of our ICBM force and some of our bombers were at risk, this would still leave three-quarters of our warheads secure. Moreover, if the threat to our ICBM's is believable, it would seem that certain measures could be taken to counteract this. For these and other reasons the hedges referred to in the second category above could be continued, I believe, by another doubling of our warheads. This brings us to 1,600, the number we had about a decade ago. And any mutual reductions that would be negotiated would presumably diminish the threats to vulnerable parts of our deterrent and, therefore, diminish our needs below 1,600. Since the justification of warheads assigned to deterrence and the backup of deterrence account for only about 20 percent of the U.S. arsenal, the rationale for the remainder lies not in deterrence but in the last three items in my list. Inasmuch as low-level nuclear-war fighting can be carried out with these warheads within the 1,600 set aside for flexible responses and the quite separate tactical nuclear forces numbering many thousands of small nuclear weapons, the need of further warheads is justified only by the claims of large-scale warfighting. Clearly, this broad spectrum of putative need calls for imposing a cutoff. An acquaintance with the magnitude and duration of damage that would be inflicted even at the lower end of this spectrum counsels severe restraint. Before we reach midway in this spectrum, the superpowers would cease to function as coherent societies even if urban areas were not intentionally attacked. We must, therefore, view the temptation to move into this realm of war fighting as increasingly contradictory to our national survival. My own view is that beyond a few hundred weapons, the hard justification vanishes, the rationalization for the remainder is sustained only by unreal scenarios that mask national suicide. 

Alva Myrdal has estimated that 400 one megaton warheads would be sufficient for Mutual Assured Destruction (aptly nicknamed MAD), guaranteeing the deaths of 25% of the population and the destruction of the majority of the industrial capacity of the superpowers. But in compromises reached for the SALT II
agreement, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. placed an overall limit on strategic missiles and bombers of 2,200 to 2,500. If one accepts any of these or other estimates of the minimum level of deterrence as I do, it is obvious that there are too many nuclear weapons allowed today. Why does not the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. unilaterally if necessary dispose of the extra warheads? They are not necessary for deterrence, and actually have a destabilizing effect. Aside from lessening the risk to both nations (and the rest of the world) this would help in building trust between the two superpowers, and give the disarmament process a much needed push. This reduction would also be valuable in stopping proliferation of nuclear weapons. The other nations of the world see the two superpowers trying for more and more weaponry, and acquire their own supplies in self-defense. The attitude of the U.S. immediately after World War II that the U.S. was designated the guardian of nuclear might and no other nation should possess the capability caused much resentment and led to the growth of the nuclear club: the U.S., the U.S.S.R., China, France, Great Britain, and India. Proliferation can only be stopped if the superpowers themselves stop increasing their levels of armaments and cease using the weapons as threats to non-nuclear countries:

"This can only be done if the 'haves' pay the price they should have paid from the beginning to make the other nations satisfied with being 'have-nots'. ...The first political payment should be a grand gesture of historical significance: the nuclear-weapons powers--jointly, bilaterally, or unilaterally--should give a pledge never to attack non-nuclear-weapons powers with such weapons."¹⁵

Aside from stopping nuclear proliferation, there are many reasons to stop the arms race. Dr. Doty listed five in his Senate testimony. First,
arms reduction would provide a means of compensating for qualitative improvements (which should also be banned, but that is another subject). Second, at moderate rates, arms reduction would provide for the orderly elimination of old weapons systems without their being replaced by new ones. Third, an arms reduction agreement would engage the military of both sides into an institutionalized and continuous process of scheduling reductions and verifications. Fourth, arms reduction would provide a highly visible signal that arms control is being exercised by the superpowers—a signal of hope to the lesser powers. Fifth, the process of reducing arms to the minimum level is readily available. The only problem is the psychological barrier to the premeditated destruction of usable weapons to the military and to the thrifty taxpayer. I believe this barrier can be overcome by education to the need for disarmament.

One of the most pressing reasons to end the arms race to me is the sheer cost of it. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that the superpowers spend $300 billion a year on the arms race. World military expenditures are greater than either world expenditures on health or education, and 15 times greater than official aid provided to underdeveloped countries. World military costs are equivalent to the combined GNP of all of the countries in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. This is hardly moral, or even economically efficient. The arms race is a growing burden on the resources of all nations. Military competition results in an ever increasing superiority (militarily and technologically) of the already overstrong superpowers, thus sharpening the discrimination against all of the lesser powers which have become defenseless against them.
In terms of resource allocation, the arms race is equally senseless. In 1970, the U.S. military used 14% of the world's total bauxite and copper, 7.5% of iron and manganese, and 4.8% of petroleum. 400,000 scientists and engineers are engaged in military pursuits in the advanced countries. The total manpower directly or indirectly involved in military purposes is estimated at 50 million people. U.S. military expenditures for the last 20 years are almost equal to the total sum of personal income taxes paid for the same period. These same resources could be more valuably employed in attempting to solve the world hunger crisis and to assist underdeveloped nations. The saddest comparison is this: to provide 100,000 elementary school teachers for a year at a salary of $10,000 each would cost $1 billion—the same as or less than the construction cost of one nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, without equipment.

Alva Myrdal says and I agree that the arms race and current foreign policies must inevitably undermine the morality of the people. Relations between individuals and groups have been controlled by ethical rules which are inherited and commonly accepted. These rules change gradually as the society changes. They are drawn from individual moral beliefs. These rules form the basis of social order—they are not dependent on criminal law, courts, and police. Social order would break down if these rules were not followed voluntarily and habitually. Why, for instance, do most students continue to attend classes and do assignments? It is not because of any physical power of the professor to force the student to do so, but rather because of the rules governing social (specifically student) conduct. But international relations are becoming Realpolitik, outside traditional moral precepts, and
carried on in terms of power and the justification of violence, threats of violence, large scale spying, bribing, and lying--questions of right and wrong have been lost in the shuffle for power. This atmosphere must have a debilitating effect on internal social order. It is not possible to preserve intact a social order founded upon ethical prescripts when foreign policy is openly conducted as amoral. The arms race is a leading contributor to international amorality. It is intellectually unreasonable and morally unsound. It must be stopped.

III DISARMAMENT: PREREQUISITE TO PEACE

Nuclear stability in the world can be said to depend on a balance of strategic and conventional forces between the major nuclear powers. This balance requires three elements. First, each side must have a sufficient counterstrike capability (the ability to deliver a nuclear strike after being attacked with nuclear weapons). The only militarily important fact is how strong capabilities would remain for retaliation. Crucial strength is determined by how many nuclear arms are invulnerable and how effective they would be, not how many nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles can be marked up in the inventory sheet for each side. Neither side can be allowed to develop a first strike capability.

Second, each side must have adequate and diverse military forces to meet all possible threats without resort to brinkmanship and massive retaliation. Third, the raising of the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons enhances the stability of deterrence. The nation's conventional capability must be able to meet all conventional force threats. This balance is broad and difficult to upset. But when both sides possess an already too high level of armaments, the balance becomes meaningless.
After many uneasy years--the massive retaliation policy of the 1950s, the Vietnam fiasco of the 1960s--I believe that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have reached a state of nervous stability. However, this is not the best of all possible states. As long as qualitative improvements are allowed, the introduction of new weapons systems will be destabilizing. And stability cannot exist while a surplus of arms exists. They are mutually exclusive. The number of nuclear warheads in the world is still far too high for stability, and if people no longer build back yard bomb shelters, neither are they safe.

"What the matter comes to, therefore, is that if the peoples of the world really want to prevent war, they must be willing to pay the price in the shape of disarmament which is not only universal and enforceable, but also complete. If the Western nations want to see the communist bloc disarmed, they must recognize the fact that the communist bloc has an equal desire and interest to see a disarmed West. And if the communist nations cannot feel safe until the West is disarmed, they must accept the proposition that their own freedom from fear cannot be achieved until they also disarm at the same time and to the same extent. In short, they must both realize that disarmament can be achieved only by the simultaneous and reciprocal abolition of all their military forces and implements of war."

The first step on the long road to world peace is the immediate cessation of the arms race. As has been stated, the superpowers possess much more than the needed minimum level of deterrence needed to avoid nuclear war. All armaments above this level lead to national insecurity and contribute to world tensions. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. should immediately and unilaterally if necessary declare a halt to the arms buildup,
destroy unneeded arms, and allow only such research and qualitative improvements as are needed to maintain the perceived level. Here we run into the problem of parity. Parity—the approximate equivalence of forces—is difficult to determine. There are difficulties in comparison of weapons, asymmetries of geographical, technological style and capability, allies, openness, hostility to neighbors, and attitudes on deriving political leverage from military postures. But we can still use the principle of essential equivalence because there is no need to measure any further. Only a minor fraction of the already existing forces is necessary for assured deterrence.

The second step is the reversal of the arms race. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. must agree to a level, comply with this level, and then in succeeding stages agree to reductions in the level, eventually reducing the number of armaments to a fraction of the level. We must first agree to the level and then agree on how to reach it; this will avoid the political problems of parity and balance. "Realistically, the problem is how much weaponry is needed for a strategy of deterrence. This is the only relevant question. Continuing to match each other's destructive capacity is irrelevant." 17

The SALT negotiations are useful in providing for less secrecy and a machinery for negotiations. But they have not accomplished much and are not an end goal. Arms limitation negotiations should be multilateral and committed to a goal of success.

"The nuclear arms race between the two superpowers continues unhampered. Competition for even more destructive technology is steadily accelerating. A frightening new momentum is spreading nuclear weapons capabilities to more and more countries. And conventional arms of ever greater military effectiveness are being
acquired by all countries, particularly in regions where conflicts are brewing. Truly it is no exaggeration to say today that 'unless significant disarmament measures are soon achieved, it is difficult to see how catastrophe can be avoided.' The mounting dangers are of cataclysmic dimensions. Rationally, all peoples have a common interest in stopping this insane development. Yet the world finds any will toward resolutely halting the arms race faltering. Why?...
a major responsibility falls upon the two superpowers, who are so blindly driven by their desire for world hegemony. Even granted their perception of a needed deterrence, they could unilaterally begin to reduce their nuclear weaponry without losing real power. Indeed, the closing of the current competitive phase would make them militarily more secure, and the saving of resources would make them economically and socially stronger. But so far they have refused to take any major steps. Other nations also share the responsibility to varying degrees, especially the other three nuclear-weapons powers. And all nations sin by their silence on the madness of the arms race and by participating in the militarization of the world in their humble way.  

The nuclear arms race is a world problem, contributed to by all nations. All nations have an interest in, and the responsibility for, ending the arms race. But the major blame lies with the two superpowers, and therefore the major effort to end the madness must come from the superpowers. What is needed is a comprehensive effort to end the arms race and put severe controls on all nuclear power in the world. I do not hope to totally eliminate nuclear power. I do hope to render it controllable. "And it is not our part here to take thought only for a season, or for a few lives of Men, or for a passing age of the world. We should seek a final end of this menace, even if we do not hope to make one."
This effort requires recognition of the arms race as a serious problem, and the national will to solve the problem. It also requires cooperation among the nations of the world.

"The trouble with disarmament is that it must begin at some point in time, and no time is ever quite right—in the eyes of all the essential participants—for beginning it. Indefinite procrastination, not definitive repudiation, is the political reaction most responsible for the gray hairs of the champions of disarmament... The urge to avoid the worsening of the national power position is the universal passion of participants in disarmament conferences; far more significant than any enthusiasm for disarmament itself; responsible statesmen may be prepared to consider the forswearing of national ambitions, but never to entertain the idea of reducing the relative strength of the nation.... It is a fact of international life that no nation is likely to believe that it enjoys more than the essential margin of safety, or to admit that its competitors have confined themselves to the military preparations necessary for the defense of legitimate interests." 20

Procrastination must be stopped, and nations convinced of the fact that the imagined loss in their security will be more than offset by the relaxation of tensions and the lessening of the threat to the world. All nations, and especially the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. must learn to trust one another, and to be worthy of that trust. Coexistence is now a necessity. Nations must conduct their foreign policies upon an ethical basis which asks what is best for the nation and the world. I have already mentioned the amorality of world relations. This must be changed. However, there is a big difference between ethical foreign policy and moralistic foreign policy. Ethical foreign policy is based upon the ethical rules of the society. Moralistic
foreign policy is moral precepts made law. In moralistic foreign policy there is no room for compromise. "I'm right and you're wrong" is the rule of the day. We have had enough damage from this kind of policy during the Cold War. It seems to be a fact of international life that each nation thinks it alone has the "right" answer:

"If we were even content to favor our own customs, there would be no cause for astonishment or complaint, but in this we are unlike other lovers who do not desire rivals. On the contrary, we want everyone to embrace our own beliefs as an infallible rule....wise and holy men look beyond and consider that the harmony of the world is composed of differing opinions and that what is praiseworthy in one place is not thought to be good everywhere."21

As the old saying goes, variety is the spice of life. It would be an unbelievably boring world if everyone acted, thought, and believed the same way. The art of international relations is to coexist and cooperate despite different beliefs.

The third step toward peace is for all nations to disarm. All nations must recognize that better solutions to problems can be reached through peaceful negotiations. There should be a total test ban to stop the introduction of new weapons systems, and a gradual dismantling of old systems. If nations learn to trust each other and to find peaceful alternatives, there would be no need for weapons stockpiles. And hopefully, if there were no weapons stockpiles, nations would find it easier to use peaceful alternatives.

Alva Myrdal has outlined an agenda for a World Disarmament Conference which is very worthwhile to examine. The agenda is dependent on two pledges from the superpowers: 1) a pledge not to be the one to initiate any act of nuclear warfare, and 2) a pledge not to attack any nuclear-weapons-free
country with nuclear weapons. Both pledges have been rejected by the superpowers, but both are necessary for any hope of progress. Myrdal's agenda is as follows, in order of priority:

"1. **Quantitative disarmament of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles** by sharp curtailment of both strategic and tactical arsenals. Air: agreement on de-escalating towards a minimum deterrent.

2. **Qualitative disarmament of nuclear weapons** by total cessation of further development of such weapons, both strategic and tactical, as well as further development of their delivery vehicles. Immediate action: a comprehensive test ban to fasten the padlock on the ongoing proliferation of nuclear weapons types and on the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries. Agreeing on a time-limited moratorium might be a first step.

3. **Similar quantitative as well as qualitative disarmament of conventional weapons** by mutually balanced reduction of arms production and by regulating and restricting trade in arms.

4. **Prohibition of production, stockpiling, trading, and deployment of chemical weapons.**

5. **Prohibition of the use as well as the production of cruel anti-personnel weapons**, i.e., weapons characterized as causing unnecessary suffering.

6. **Prohibition of indiscriminate warfare befalling civilian populations as well as prohibition of environmental warfare.**

7. **Agreements on demilitarization of ocean space**, not only prohibiting installations of certain weapon categories but also regulating the deployment of tracking, refueling, and other devices for military purposes.

8. **Agreements on eliminating foreign bases, withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from foreign territories, and prohibiting passage through foreign territorial seas.**"
I am in agreement with Myrdal concerning the above agenda, except that I would add "Prohibition of the militarization of space, and of nuclear powered spacecraft or satellites without adequate safeguards." This of course is prompted by the recent fall on Canada of a Soviet nuclear-powered satellite. This satellite fortunately fell on a relatively unpopulated area. But the radioactive materials that fell have caused some contamination. The matter would be much worse if the satellite had fallen on a populated region. Therefore, I would prohibit nuclear-powered satellites, and require safeguards to keep radioactive materials from falling to Earth from nuclear-powered spacecraft. I do not insist on banning the latter (although it might be preferable) because nuclear energy is one of the more efficient power sources available for space exploration, and I am a firm believer in the continued exploration of space.

Unfortunately, none of the above goals can be achieved until the first item on the list, disarmament, is accomplished. I have already listed reasons for ending the arms race, and I see no good excuse for continuing it. Therefore, I demand an end to it, and am determined to work toward that goal.

Disarmament will not solve the world's problems, and it should not be seen as the magic solution. What disarmament will do is remove one of the symptoms of a troubled world and leave the way open for the finding of a cure.

"The concept of disarmament is at its theoretical best when it is combined with other approaches to peace....Whether or not disarmament per se constitutes a valid approach to peace, it is probable that any adequate solution to the problem of
world order must include disarmament as one of its elements. The uncontrolled accumulation of military strength by national states is a symbol and a consequence of failure to solve the political problems of world order. It is futile in the sense that it offers states no prospect of meaningful and permanent security. It is dangerous in the sense that it may increase the probability of war, and that even if it has the opposite effect, it nevertheless makes any possible war a more certain catastrophe for human civilization. It is damaging to global society because it consumes economic resources to such an extent that it hampers the achievement of human welfare, thereby facilitating the encroachment of totalitarian tyrannies upon free peoples without the necessity of military conquest and contributing to the creation of fundamental economic and social evils which render the world more susceptible to war. It is incompatible with the launching and operation of experimental schemes which offer hopeful possibilities of solving the basic problems of world order.  

IV FUTURE FACTORS FOR WORLD PEACE

If, by some magic, we could end the arms race and disarm the world, what should be the next step? I think that the nations of the world will learn to trust each other, and will grow into peaceful coexistence. I would like to see all peoples educated, not only in the traditional sense, but also in the sense of removing prejudices implanted by old societies (why, for instance, did many American soldiers in Vietnam think of the Vietnamese people only as "gooks"?) A perfect, unprejudiced society is not very likely on this earth. But that is no reason to stop us from trying to remove attitudes we now recognize as unfair and wrong. I also think that all persons should be encouraged, and possibly even required, to study foreign languages. Language study can be of great value to international understanding.
I would also hope that a free movement of ideas and people could come to pass. I am of course referring to totalitarian societies. I hope that when there is no longer much reason to fear attack from the outside that these governments can learn to allow dissidents. Perhaps I am being overoptimistic here to hope that dictators might allow movements which could overthrow them, but I am hoping that the people of these countries will arise and demand the right to dissent. I consider this a vital human right.

"The distinction between individual lawlessness and individual leadership of group dissidence is a crucial one for government; nothing is more likely to promote disorder than to treat leaders or organized political protest as if their activities were merely criminal....What a government leader must not do is assume that the conflicts which arise in a pluralistic society can invariably be settled by ignoring the corporate reality of lesser associations within the state and proceeding against their leaders as if they represent nobody but themselves....One of the lessons of governmental experience is that coercion can seldom be usefully invoked against significant collectivities which exhibit a determination to defend their interests as they conceive them, against the public authority. The order-keeping function of government is not fulfilled by the winning of a civil war, but by its prevention. If groups cannot be coerced without the disruption of the order which the government exists to maintain, it does not follow that the alternative tactic of coercing individuals should be adopted. What follows is rather that the difficult task of ordering group relationships by political means should be attempted."

Another result of ending the arms race would be the achievement of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. As long as the other nations of the world see the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. holding vast stocks of nuclear weapons, they will not listen very closely or believe very strongly in
superpower requests for non-proliferation of nuclear arms. But if the superpowers give up the weapons, they would have a stronger bargaining power to influence other nations. An effective Non-Proliferation Treaty might then be ratified.

My final goal for a peaceful world is one world government. I do not believe this will happen for many years, perhaps even centuries, because of strong opposition from people and governments. People are presently unwilling to give up national sovereign power. There is no faith in other nations of the world, or in the United Nations.

"...the problem of building effective international organizations is ultimately the problem of building a world community. This task involves more than devising foolproof legal structures or ingenious mechanical devices; it involves working on the underlying factors which shape international politics--the loyalties, values, prejudices, fears, hopes, and expectations of human beings."25

Before a world government can be achieved, a change in the way people think about the world is necessary. People currently see the world as a physical space containing many nations, each with their own concerns and goals. I believe in one world of people, who need to realize their unity.

Inis Claude describes the theory of world government as envisioning the erection of authoritative and powerful central institutions for the purpose of preventing international war. This task is taken to require the endowment of those institutions with the legal authority to establish and apply whatever rules may be needed, and with the coercive capacity to enforce those rules. World government would involve the reduction of the legal competence and the military capability of states to the point of making them subject to effective war-preventing control. World government
requires effective and enforceable international law and the centralization of power and policy. I believe the loss of power by sovereign states would be more than offset by the achievement of world peace.

The first and most necessary step toward world government is to diminish nationalism, ethnicism, and ideology. These forces may hold nations together, but they at the same time divide the international community and cause friction. They must be broken up to achieve peace.

Alliances must also be dissolved. When there are no more arms, there will be no need for defensive alliances, and perhaps vice versa. Being a member of an alliance today can be dangerous for a nation that desires peace: "...no country inside a military alliance can insist on a right not to be bombed--a major purpose of belonging to a nuclear-free zone--if its super-power ally participates in nuclear warfare." If all nations are unaligned, they will be better able to pressure aggressive states to cease--the collective security function of the United Nations.

A major accomplishment toward peace and world government will be the strengthening of international law, with the addition of enforceable sanctions. At present, there is no way to force a nation to comply with an accepted principle of international law (such as human rights). We already have a substantial body of international law, drawn from custom, treaties, and international conferences. We must build on that body of law and make it applicable to all. The matter of sanctions will be somewhat difficult, since one cannot put a nation or a government in jail, but I believe that if all nations agreed to be bound by international law, a solution could be achieved.

International law is necessary. However, we must take care not to concentrate on law to the exclusion of international politics. Politicians
are as necessary as statesmen. Inis Claude discussed this problem in *Power and International Relations*:

"Law is a key word in the vocabulary of world government. One reacts against anarchy--disorder, insecurity, violence, injustice visited by the strong upon the weak. In contrast, one postulates law--the symbol of the happy opposites to these distasteful and dangerous evils. Law suggests properly constituted authority and effectively implemented control; it symbolizes the supreme will of the community, the will to maintain justice and public order. This abstract concept is all too readily transformed by worshipful contemplation, from one of the devices by which societies seek to order internal relationships; into a symbolic key to the good society. As this transformation takes place, law becomes a magic word for those who advocate world government and those who share with them the ideological bond of dedication to the rule of law--not necessarily in the sense that they expect it to produce magical effects upon the world, but at least in the sense that it works its magic upon them. Most significantly, it leads them to forget about politics, to play down the role of the political process in the management of human affairs, and to imagine that somehow law, in all its purity, can displace the soiled devices of politics....The political process by which governments attempt to manage the relationships of segments of society with each other and with the society as a whole, with all the pulling and hauling, haggling and cajoling that it involves is not so neat and orderly, so dignified and awe-inspiring, as the law-enforcement process by which they assert authority over individuals. But it is a vitally important aspect of the role of government, and the one which bears the closest relation to the problem of establishing order in international relations....In a society of contending groups, law is not the only effective way of preventing violence, or even the most important method; instead, politics is the device which has proved most useful. The American Civil War was the result of a failure of political adjustment among sectional forces, not of breakdown of law enforcement against individuals."
Law, then, is not automatic, for laws are only as good as the people who make them. Nations and societies must thoroughly learn and practice the fine art of compromise, for compromise is what holds societies together.

Enforceable law postulates a body to enforce it. This power should go to the United Nations, since it already exists and is accepted. The UN operates to promote peaceful settlement of situations which might boil over into violence. Through its agencies and commissions, it helps nations cooperate on problems of concern to all, and accustoms nations to coexistence. It has also aided in the process of dissolving colonial empires and assisting in the development of new nations. According to Inis Claude, an important function of the UN is to strengthen the deterrent effect of the balance of terror by symbolizing the universal demand for prudent and responsible behavior, exercising restrictive influence upon the maneuvering of political antagonists, and undertaking to hold the competitive operations of contestants in the balance of power system within bounds of moderation.

"The best hope for the United Nations is not that it may be able to develop a military establishment which will enable it to exercise coercive control over great powers, but that it may be able to continue the development of its capacity to serve the interests of the great powers—and of the rest of the world—by helping them to contain their conflicts, to limit their competition, and to stabilize their relationships. The greatest potential contribution of the United Nations in our time to the management of international power relationships lies not in implementing collective security or instituting world government, but in helping to improve and stabilize the working of the balance of power system, which is, for better or worse, the operative mechanism of contemporary international politics. The immediate task, in short, is to make the world safe for the balance of power system, and the balance of power system safe for the world. Finally, the United Nations
may serve as a means by which the world may not only transform but even transcend the balance of power system. It is at once the symbol of mankind's urge to move beyond the precarious order of the balance system, and an agency which may be used to promote the development of conditions and the preparation of measures necessary to the achievement of a more reliable system for the management of power in international relations. In its constructive operations in economic, social, humanitarian, and cultural fields, its promotion of the techniques of international cooperation and the spirit of international responsibility for the general welfare, and its furtherance of the tendency of statesmen to regard the problems of the world, as challenges to be met by coordinated or combined action, the United Nations has the potentiality of contributing to the evolution of a global community which will be capable of sustaining higher forms of organization. The ultimate task is to convert the world into a pluralistic society marked by a high adjustment potential--by the existence of component parts which are susceptible of regulation in their relationships with each other and with the whole, through the process of political accommodation."

Inis Claude sees the function of the United Nations as maintaining a peaceful status quo, and working for a better future. I agree with this, except I believe that the UN can and should be given more power now.

The greatest difficulty in obtaining world government or even a more powerful United Nations is that states will not willingly give up their power. Here we must work to change basic societal attitudes. I believe that the days of sovereign independence are quickly passing. The world has grown too small to allow so many different rulers, each pursuing different paths. Like it or not, we must learn to accept the delegation of power to a higher organization than our national government. This is the greatest obstacle in the path, and one which will require much effort to overcome. I believe that
it can be overcome, but only after a long time of gradual change. World
government cannot be forced. It must be voluntary. People must learn to
believe in world government and the need for peace. If the people of a
nation desire world government, their national government must obey.
Change must come from inside the society, not imposed from the outside.

If states are convinced of the worth of world government as a peacekeeper,
how can the diverse groups of people in the world be joined together in a
working union? The most commonly discussed form of world government is
federalism. A federal government suggest the creation of a superior agency
which is supreme over the constituent units of the community which have the
status of non-sovereign members. I believe that a world government must be
democratic, to keep member states satisfied with their status. A world
dictatorship, while not impossible, is clearly undesirable. World government
itself cannot prevent wars. Therefore, to minimize the risk, the government
must be good and acceptable to the governed.

"The assertion that peace cannot be maintained without world
government is but an introduction to the theme that the latter
can do the job. World government is necessary because all
alternative schemes for producing order are inadequate; it is
proper because it represents an adequate approach to the task....
The world government school of thought tends to focus on dis-
armament, law, and the enforcement of law, which can be taken
to mean that states are rendered incapable of fighting, are
forbidden to fight, and are compelled not to fight; if these
things are effectively accomplished, there would seem to be
little room for doubt that states will not fight. Government, of
course, is not a mere abstract concept, a hypothetical system the
merits of which are to be determined by logical derivation from its
definition. It is a social institution with which man has had considerable experience; it has a long and extensive record of performance available for examination and evaluation.\textsuperscript{29}

While doing research for this paper, I continually found myself envisioning a world government which might work. While I am not an authority on the subject, I would nevertheless like to suggest my rough idea, perhaps to be polished at a later date.

I based my system mostly on democracy, American style. Although I am obviously biased, I still consider the U.S. form of government to be the most effective and most desirable method currently existing of binding many independent areas into a working union. In my system, there would be a World President (or whatever title one might prefer) to supervise the executive branch, a World Congress to create international law, and a World Court as the final authority to decide matters of international law.

The most important requirement for any effective government is a written constitution. A written constitution is the final source of authority and law, and must clearly set out powers given to the various branches of the government and powers reserved to the nations.

Nations would still exist as regions and administrative structures, and each nation would have control over its internal affairs. Matters of the economy, civil law, criminal law, and form of government would be decided by each nation for itself, with such exceptions as will be noted later. There must be, however, free movement of people allowed. This would allow each person to decide the kind of society he or she wishes to live in, and move to that society.
The President would be elected directly by the people of the world. In a time when communication skills are improving so rapidly, I do not think that worldwide direct popular elections would even now cause too many technological difficulties that could not be overcome. The world government must of course take precautions to guarantee the fairness of the election. I am not really sure how the candidates for President could be suggested. Perhaps each continent might nominate a candidate. The candidates from each region would then be voted on by the people. The President's job would be to coordinate relationships between states, and to be the spokesman of the government in time of crisis. He or she would also oversee executive departments created by the Congress such as world councils on agriculture, health care, technology, and so forth. The President would have the power to veto acts of Congress, but such vetos could be overruled by a two-thirds vote of Congress.

The Congress would be composed of two houses, a Senate and a House of Representatives. The American solution of the problem of representation seems to me to be the best which has yet been thought of. Large nations would not agree to a one-nation one-vote system, while small nations would justly protest the unfairness of representation based on population. Therefore, members of the Senate would be selected on the basis of one-nation one-vote (or two, or whatever number is decided upon), and House members would be selected on the basis of population. Again, members of the Congress would be elected by direct popular vote, but of the nation which they would represent. The Congress would be the source of law for all matters concerning relations between nations, the maintenance of peace, and matters of concern to all people, such as a minimum standard of human rights. National governments
would be the source of all internal law for the particular country. Congress would have the power to impeach the President.

In this model, national governments must not attempt to interfere in the affairs of other nations. All reprimands and praise must come from the world government. Nations would have the power to make contracts with each other on economic measures, cultural exchanges, extradition of prisoners, and so forth, but all such contracts would be subject to regulation by the world government. This is to insure that some nations do not cooperate to gain an advantage over others. The world government would have only limited economic control, for use in cases of famine, natural disaster, or other crisis, to order help, food, and other aid sent to the area.

The members of the World Court would be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Congress (both houses). This Court would be the final authority for the interpretation of international law and questions of violation by national governments of such matters as human rights. In addition, there should be a system of regional courts and appellate courts for nations who feel their rights have been infringed upon by another nation, or for individuals with a grievance against a nation, to present the matter to a court. These courts would perform the valuable function of mediators, and so help to keep the peace. While nations have the right to appeal any decision of the world court system, the final opinion must be binding and enforceable upon the nations. The world court system should have the power of judicial review, to put a check upon possible excesses of the Congress or the President.
The system I have briefly proposed seems rather attractive to me. However, it is important to beware of the fallacy of composition—to realize that what is good and workable at a national level might not be equally good and workable on the international level.

"Aside from the obvious point that macro-government would not necessarily function as effectively as micro-government, the hard fact is that the record does not support the generalization that the establishment of government, within a social unit of whatever dimensions, infallibly brings about a highly dependable state of peace and order. The ominous phrase civil war serves only as the most dramatic symbol of the fallibility of government as an instrument of social order."

The fact that world government might not be workable (at least in this form), added to the fact that world government cannot prevent war if a nation is determined to fight, does not add up to the futility of the idea. I said at the beginning of this paper that I believe wars will always be possible. I believe that the hope for world government is that it will be able to help nations to live in peace and cooperation, and so reduce the likelihood of war.

"Peace without government is, despite dogmatic denials, sometimes possible; war with government is, despite doctrinaire assurances, always possible. Wars sometimes occur in the absence of government, in the exercise of the freedom from higher social discipline which prevails in that situation. Wars also occur in the presence of government, in protest against and defiance of the central control which is attempted. In short, the concept of world government deserves not to be seized upon as the one and only solution, the obviously effective solution, to the problem of the management of power in international relations, but to be treated as a theoretical approach promising enough to warrant careful consideration....The
establishment of world government will not in itself produce a magical transformation, rendering states insignificant and making it possible to define the problem of world order in terms which excluded the necessity of coping with the potential disorderliness of states. A proposal to create a world federal system may be taken as a plan to eliminate the multistate system, but it does not involve the elimination of the states; by the same token, it does not abolish the task of preventing states from serving as the focal points of disruptive movements."

The achievement of world government will not solve all of the world's problems. It will remove, or at least render manageable, one of the worst problems: war.

V LET US HAVE PEACE

As I have repeatedly said, the arms race is an unnecessary waste and a danger to the world. It is a great obstruction on the road to peace. Let us therefore be rid of it. Why do not the people of the world demand an end?

"The truly astonishing fact is that people all over the world have become conditioned to live on unconcerned about the steadily increasing risk that holocaust might suddenly destroy us all and our civilization....It is as if we have been conditioned to go on living with the threatened dangers to our lives and our civilization, as we live with the inevitable personal catastrophe of our own death, attending in an unconcerned way to daily duties and pleasures. The difference is that while individuals can do little to alter their ultimate fate, a collective nuclear suicide can be prevented by effective agreements on arsenals and warfare methods." 32

We need to break through this conditioning and all of the ideology and mistrust and convince the people of the world of the danger of the arms race. The people must then demand, and see that their governments carry out, an end to
the madness. Then we the people of the world can decide what the next step should be; whether we should follow the path I have outlined toward world government or take another way. The crucial matter now is that we be given the chance to decide. We have the power to give ourselves that chance, in ending the arms race and disarming.

"One must be careful not to claim too much even for a successful execution of the arms control suggested. A reduction of our mutual strategic capabilities by half would leave us just as vulnerable to nuclear devastation. But the process of accommodation that would be established and institutionalized in getting us there, say, a decade hence, would make us much more secure than would the doubling or trebling of both sides' strategic capability as a consequence of following the present course."33

We already have too many weapons. We do not need any more. Haven't we had enough of war? And we have had only the horror of conventional war. A nuclear war is beyond our imagination or our nightmares. Let us have peace.

"We are no longer living in an age when one should be dreaming of trophies to be won. We must do away with these barbarous customs and show the people the road to humanity and true honor so that they will not continue to live so brutally. We must establish the reign of reason and justice, and not violence, which is fit only for beasts. In the past men have been most free with human life. We have seen a universal deluge of their blood capable of turning the land and sea red. Enough....Whatever the reason, doing evil becomes tiresome. Let us put the sword back in its scabbard. Let us no longer try to immortalize our animosities. We have stirred up enough storms. Now is the time to try to bring calm and serenity to this great ocean by throwing on it the oil of complete reconciliation."34
Mary McGrory, a nationally syndicated columnist, wrote recently of the frustration of disarmament groups:

"'What we need,' said an official of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the little government bureau charged with trying to cool off the Pentagon, 'is a Sadat, someone who can break through all the guff and say "let's do it".'... They feel that the constituency for disarmament is there--just as all of Egypt rose up to applaud its bold president. Given the choice, Americans, like Egyptians, would vote for sanity. But it is slow going, the opposition storms and leaks horror stories about the progress of the SALT II talks, and the administration, bound by secrecy, cannot answer." 35

Let us make the choice for sanity.
FOOTNOTES

1 Inis Claude, *Power and International Relations*, p. 7.
3 Claude, *Power and International Relations*, p. 5.
4 Emeric Cruce, *The New Cineas*, p. 9, 10.
5 ibid, p. 19.
6 Claude, *Power and International Relations*, p. 5.
7 Inis Claude, *Swords into Plowshares*, p. 272.
9 Paul Doty, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, (Senator Church speaking) p. 189.
11 Henry Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy", *American Foreign Policy*, p. 15.
13 Myrdal, op cit p. 8.
14 Doty, op cit p. 185-186.
15 Myrdal, op cit p. 182 emphasis Myrdal's.
17 Myrdal, op cit p. 115.
18 ibid, p. 317-318.
21 Cruce, op cit p. 39.
Footnotes continued

22 Myrdal, op cit p. 325-326 emphasis Myrdal's.
23 Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 265-266 emphasis Claude's.
24 Claude, Power and International Relations, p. 266-267 emphasis Claude's.
25 Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 7.
26 Myrdal, op cit p. 199.
27 Claude, Power and International Relations, p. 260-261, 262-263, 265 emphasis Claude's.
28 Claude, Power and International Relations, p. 282-284 emphasis Claude's.
30 Claude, Power and International Relations, p. 220 emphasis Claude's.
31 Claude, Power and International Relations, p. 223, 255.
32 Myrdal, op cit p. 318-319.
33 Doty, op cit p. 192.
34 Cruse, op cit p. 58.
35 Mary McGrory, Ball State Daily News 1/12/78, p. 4.
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