Abstract:
This thesis connects the literature in the psychology of sexuality to that of epistemology
to argue that there are instances of injustice that occur during seemingly permissible sex. I use
this pairing to argue that because epistemic injustices can occur during consensual sex, not all
consensual sex is ethically right. However, because epistemic injustices are relevant during sex,
so are displays of epistemic virtue. I apply the importance of epistemic virtue to Katherine
MacKinnon’s charge that sex in patriarchy is wrong by highlighting ways men and women can
be epistemically virtuous in such a way that avoids her concerns. I begin by arguing that fake
orgasms, a common sex act among women, represent an instance of performative smothering.
Performative smothering is an injustice that happens when someone is unable to share testimony
about their knowledge because they know that their audience will be unable to recognize them as
having knowledge, while nonetheless putting forth a performance that matches the testimony the
audience wants to hear. Fake orgasms, an instance of performative smothering, are both
epistemically and sexually wrong because they deprive women of sexual pleasure, and because
men harm women in their ability to know about and share knowledge regarding their own
sexuality. Since harms like fake orgasms regularly occur during sex, some sex we think is right is
actually wrongful in some ways. This coheres with MacKinnon’s charge that because sex is
predicated on power imbalances between men and women, all sex is violent, and thus sex in
patriarchy is wrong, even if consent is obtained. I challenge this conclusion by identifying ways
that epistemic virtue can be employed to co-create a consensual sexual exchange that is not
coerced and is absent of ethical wrongs, even in the presence of sex acts associated with
dominance and submission. I conclude that our capacities as knowers are critical to evaluating
the rightness, and determining the quality, of our sexual exchanges with others.
