Blameworthiness and privileged moral failure
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Abstract
In this paper, I will argue that epistemically damaged privileged individuals are usually not blameworthy for the harm they cause to non-privileged individuals as a result of that privilege Insofar as a person is privileged, s/he is likely epistemically damaged in the sense that s/he has internalized a social form of biased perception that does not allow her/him to realize that s/h causing harm. I believe individuals are not blameworthy for their privileged acts when they fail to satisfy the epistemic condition for blameworthiness. Recognizing that typically the right place to focus energies is on restoring the harmed party, I will claim that because a function of oppressive systems is to maintain privilege-protecting ignorance, most privileged individuals do not meet the epistemic control condition and are therefore not blameworthy.