This thesis connects the literature in the psychology of sexuality to that of epistemology to argue that there are instances of injustice that occur during seemingly permissible sex. I use this pairing to argue that because epistemic injustices can occur during consensual sex, not all consensual sex is ethically right. However, because epistemic injustices are relevant during sex, so are displays of epistemic virtue. I apply the importance of epistemic virtue to Katherine MacKinnon’s charge that sex in patriarchy is wrong by highlighting ways men and women can be epistemically virtuous in such a way that avoids her concerns. I begin by arguing that fake orgasms, a common sex act among women, represent an instance of performative smothering. Performative smothering is an injustice that happens when someone is unable to share testimony about their knowledge because they know that their audience will be unable to recognize them as having knowledge, while nonetheless putting forth a performance that matches the testimony the audience wants to hear. Fake orgasms, an instance of performative smothering, are both epistemically and sexually wrong because they deprive women of sexual pleasure, and because men harm women in their ability to know about and share knowledge regarding their own sexuality. Since harms like fake orgasms regularly occur during sex, some sex we think is right is actually wrongful in some ways. This coheres with MacKinnon’s charge that because sex is predicated on power imbalances between men and women, all sex is violent, and thus sex in patriarchy is wrong, even if consent is obtained. I challenge this conclusion by identifying ways that epistemic virtue can be employed to co-create a consensual sexual exchange that is not coerced and is absent of ethical wrongs, even in the presence of sex acts associated with dominance and submission. I conclude that our capacities as knowers are critical to evaluating the rightness, and determining the quality, of our sexual exchanges with others.