

THE RECONQUEST OF NEW MEXICO, 1693-1694

An Honors Thesis (HONRS 499)

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ABSTRACT

This discussion of Diego de Vargas encompasses several major themes that existed during his time. They include the personal life of de Vargas, his quest to reconquer New Mexico, and his term as Governor of New Mexico. While covering de Vargas life in depth, you will read about the Pueblo Indian Revolt of 1680, the encomienda, the presidio, and the kiva. There is a deep comparison that is interconnected throughout the discussion that relates de Vargas life to the plight of the Native Americans. Herein lies the background and story of the reconquest of the New Mexican territory by Diego de Vargas in 1693.

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INTRODUCTION

The Spanish reconquest of the New Mexican territory under Diego de Vargas in 1692 was a vital part of continued Spanish expansion in the New World. The Pueblo Revolt in 1680 was the last major attempt by the Indians to throw off the yoke of Spanish domination, yet little is known publically about the reconqueror. The intention of this report is to delve further into the story of the reconquest and find out more about who Don Diego de Vargas Zapata Lujan Ponce de Leon was.

This report analyzes the various aspects of the reconquest, both from the point of view of the Indians and of the Spanish. The first chapter looks at the tension and conflicts which occurred between the separate cultures. The faith and stubbornness of the Spanish wouldn't allow them to understand the complexity of the pueblo Indians' faith and society. This resulted in the coordinated uprising that we know as the Pueblo Revolt of 1680.

The second chapter deals with the revolt and the period of twelve years that the Indians were free of Spanish influence. Here we take a look at the period during which the Indians reverted back to their way of living they possessed before the interference of the Spanish. We'll see the futile attempts by the Spanish colonists to plead their cause with the Spanish crown until Diego de Vargas ventures to the New World from Spain.

The third chapter details the organization and advance of the company led by Vargas to confront the Indians and win back the territory. It is in this section that the background of Diego de Vargas' life will be revealed and discussed.

The fourth chapter will cover the long process of recolonization of the New Mexican territory by the Spaniards. Not only did the soldiers and government administrators have it difficult, but the missionaries who were trying to convert the Indians did too. This section takes a closer look at the struggle of the colonists to tame a harsh, foreign land.

The final chapter is a brief overview of the history of the Spanish conquest prior to Diego de Vargas. This provides some background information that will help tie the previous four chapters together.

The Southwestern United States is a harsh environment for anyone to live in, but the success that the Native Americans have had in those surroundings is phenomenal. Part of the reason for that success has been the religion and traditions of this people. That the Indians were able to take those parts of Christianity that they could incorporate into their traditional religion is a factor which has allowed the very religion to endure and flourish.

Take a trip with me now back to that vital time in the history of the Southwest when Indians still practiced their traditional ways and the horse and the white man were foreign conceptions. This is the story of the pueblo Indians' greatest triumph and the man who forced them to adopt the ways of the whites.

TURMOIL IN NEW MEXICO

It was in early spring of 1598 that Spanish soldiers and colonists crossed the ford of the Rio Grande into the province of New Mexico. (Anderson, 353) It was at this point that the Spanish took possession of this territory for the Crown. They brought with them the items that would change the lives of the pueblo Indians forever. These items included domestic grains, gunpowder, metal tools, and livestock, especially horses. (Anderson, 353) Two of the most important things they brought with them that aren't mentioned already are Christianity and the Spanish colonial policy, the *encomienda*.

The *encomienda* was the form of colonial government first used by Christopher Columbus when he reached the West Indies. (Anderson, 353) This is quite possibly the reason why the Native Americans today refer to Columbus as a butcherer and a murderer. It's not so much that he massacred thousands of Indians, it's that he is credited as the first European to discover the Americas and developed the system which the Indians were governed by for over a century. Through *encomienda* the land belonged to the king and was parcelled to those who participated in the conquest of the territory. It also set up a crude form of serfdom through which an abundant source of labor was gained. This source was the Indians living on the divided sections of the territory.

The Spanish apparently disliked getting their hands dirty with trivial work because that is what was left up to the Indians to complete. The Indians were abused and forced to do the most menial of

tasks by their Spanish proprietors. Although slavery was outlawed, on the frontier where it was hard for the king's justice to reach it was practiced by some of the colonists. One of the main goals of the Spanish conquerors was to Europeanize the Indians, and the encomienda was one method that the colonists relied upon to handle this process.

The other method that the Spanish used was through their zealous attempts to convert the Indians to Christianity. The Indians were looked upon as pagans who worshiped the devil and his minions. The missionaries who journeyed to the pueblos to set up churches were an ever present nuisance to the Indians' traditional ways. Through Christianization it was believed that the souls of the Indians could be saved and that they might also learn a civil culture, like the Spanish have for example. To drive out the wickedness of the Indians' foul practices the priests and friars would have soldiers enter the kivas of the Indians and either destroy or confiscate everything they found inside. A kiva is an underground ceremonial chamber where the Indians rehearsed their ceremonials and conducted their most sacred rituals. The kiva is a representation of the pueblo Indian belief that they emerged into this world from a hole in the ground. Each kiva has a hole somewhere in it which is supposed to symbolize the point of emergence. After the priests had the kivas demolished they would try to persuade the Indians to denounce their ways. A converted Indian was considered to be one that had been baptized and was practicing Christian doctrine and attending mass. Eventually, pagan practices would be banned and anyone caught practicing them could be beaten or imprisoned. Indian

children were sometimes taken into the mission by the priests and raised as if they were European children. This was advantageous in that the children were educated and taught to speak Spanish, but in return they had to give up their traditional customs and language. They would only be allowed to visit with their parents on special occasions because they often wouldn't return to the mission once they were allowed to leave.

The tension that arose between the pueblo Indians and the Spaniards was caused by both the encomienda system and Christianity, but there were two other factors that played a major part in creating the hostilities. Those two factors were: the tributes levied upon the Indians, sometimes forcibly; and the lack of security the Spanish provided against the hostile, nomadic bands of Indians like the Navajo and the Apache. The tribute the Indians were forced to pay included items like maize, pottery, deerskins, beans, cottonblankets, fowl, and a number of other trinkets. (Anderson, 357) At first many of these items were offered freely to the white-skinned strangers, but as the need for food increased during the winter the amount of tribute demanded rose.

One of the primary outside factors that both the Spaniards and the pueblo Indians had to contend with was the raids by the nomadic tribes. The Spaniards never had enough soldiers in the New Mexican territory to protect the settlements, missions, and pueblos. Nomadic bands would sneak into places well stocked from recent harvests and steal whatever they could carry off. The introduction of the horse into Indian culture made this task easier because bands of Utes, Apaches, or Navajos could sweep into a settlement, take what they wanted, and be gone before any

threatening form of resistance could be gathered. These bands were a nemesis especially after the harvesting time had passed because they knew that there was a abundance of food available at that time. These four factors did nothing to improve the relationship between the Spanish and the Indians, and as the seventeenth century wore on frequent conflicts resulting in violence broke out.

A lack of respect and consideration for the Holy Office caused a considerable amount of conflict to arise between the church and the state in New Mexico. (Anderson, 369) The lust for wealth brought these two factions into conflict on several occasions when the various tributes were collected from the encomiendas. The church-state friction cut down on the effective administration of the territory by the government and eventually this would weaken the defensive front that the Spanish could present. The Spanish troops became lax in their duties and they would eventually regard serving at distant outposts as a form of punishment or banishment. (Anderson, 371)

During the late seventeenth century a series of droughts struck the New Mexico territory, adding to the hardships the Indians faced. (Anderson, 369) With the struggle to meet the demands of the tributes imposed upon them by the Spanish, the Indians had little time to take care of their own fields. Crops such as maize and cotton failed, and the Spanish demanded more work from the laborers. The populations of several of the pueblos declined during this period due to the resulting famine and disease. Also, the Indians ran away in a

desperate hope that they could find refuge among their nomadic neighbors and escape the harsh environment the pueblos had become.

THE REVOLT OF 1680

In the year 1680 there occurred what most historians consider to be the only major successful revolt by the pueblo Indians against the Spanish in their New World empire. Although the success was only temporary, the Indians managed to drive the Spaniards south of the present Mexican-American border and hold them at bay for twelve years. That was quite a feat considering the diversity of the various pueblos and the lack of unity they normally exhibit. The method used to unite the pueblos was ingenious, but has never been duplicated.

The pueblo Indians had been severely influenced by the culture introduced by the Spanish, although they vehemently resisted those parts they found unattractive. On several occasions there had been uprisings by the various pueblos prior to 1680. None of these had been successful, however, and the Spaniards had easily put down the revolts and remained in control of the territory. The events put into motion for the Revolt of 1680 to succeed were numerous and difficult to follow. After the revolt occurred, several pueblo Indians were captured and interrogated by Spanish officials in an attempt to discover who had devised and led the Revolt. Here's what they learned.

The pueblo Indians believe in a variety of spirits, generally having one for almost any natural occurrence or object. They call these

spirits "kachinas," although the spelling and pronunciation differs from pueblo group to pueblo group. The kachina that directed this revolt against the Spanish is said to have been Pohe-yemo, the sun spirit. (Chavez, 92) The individual who portrayed Pohe-yemo was not significant to the Indians because they believe that whoever wears the costume of the spirit has been possessed and is the form the spirit has deigned to wear on this world. Some historians have hypothesized that the reason that the sun spirit was chosen is because of its close resemblance to the Aztec god of Fire and War. (Chavez, 93) That would require a knowledge of the deities of the natives of New Spain, which few Indians would have possessed.

A theory developed by Fray Angelico Chavez suggested that Pohe-yemo wasn't even a disguised Indian, but rather a mulatto of Mexican-Indian ancestry. (Chavez, 95) This is unlikely, however, because the tight social structure of a pueblo and the years of apprenticeship would require a large span of time to achieve the status necessary to be the representative of Pohe-yemo. (Beninato, 418) Those captives who were interigated describe Pohe-yemo as being very tall and black. He was said to have large yellow eyes also. (Chavez, 87)

Most historians and writers point to a tribal leader named Pope as the moving force behind the Revolt. The Spaniards had forbidden kachina dances and raided the kivas to destroy masks and other ceremonial items. (Beninato, 418) Resistance increased among the natives as the missionaries became more determined than ever to bring a halt to these heathen practices. Indian leaders were often arrested and either

humiliated or killed by the Spaniards. Pope became the symbol of "uncompromising hostility to the conquerors" and the unquestionable leader of the major pueblos. (Beninato, 419)

Pope was a Tewa medicineman who struggled to resist the Spanish religion and keep alive the rituals and traditional beliefs of his people. Pope had been branded a troublemaker by the Spanish authorities and was kept under constant surveillance because of his persistence in conducting "heathen" rituals and kachina ceremonies. The Spanish government, however, believed that he acted alone. The Governor, Chacino, became so angered at a prisoner for telling what the governor believed was an Indian fable that he had the prisoner shot for mocking him. (Chavez, 88)

Pope began telling his people that the spirits were displeased with them because of their acceptance of the Spanish religion. The only way the spirits could be appeased is if the Spaniards were forced to leave their land. He moved his base of operations to Taos because of its remote location and began to hold secret organizational meetings. (Beninato, 419) One of the natives is reported saying the Pohe-yemo came from the north and instructed all of the Indians to take part in the treason and rebellion. (Chavez, 88) They feared the wrath of Pohe-yemo more than they feared the Spaniards, so they planned to take part in the revolt.

The plans were devised so all of the pueblos could revolt in a unified front and oust the Spaniards. Two runners were sent out to all of the pueblos, each carrying a knotted cord which signified how many

days would pass until the final message was delivered from Pohe-yemo. After the runners had passed through every pueblo, the medicinemen and chiefs began holding special gatherings. At these meetings the medicinemen would explain to the people that the spirits were angry with them and had sent a sign to show how they might be appeased. The people were told that a second sign would arrive heralding the moment when they were to rise up in rebellion against the Spaniards.

The Indian belief in spirits and the realization of what might happen if they didn't heed the warnings united unlikely allies at this juncture in the history of the pueblos. The Hopi Indians are a peaceful, gentle people who have never condoned the use of violence to solve their problems. However, during this period an exception was made and for the only time in the recorded history of the Hopi people they joined the revolt and rose up against the Spanish.

After a period of time had elapsed the runners again appeared in the villages carrying the knotted cords. On this occasion, each cord was knotted twice. This meant that the pueblo Indians should unite on the second new moon and attack and drive out the Spaniards. "So in August, 1680, after almost a century of oppression, the pueblo Indians rose in revolt and forced the Spanish to withdraw south to the El Paso region." (Schroeder, 298) The reason the plan worked so well was because only the chiefs and medicinemen were entrusted with its details until the day when the actual revolt occurred.

"The intentions of the Indians had been to arise at specified time and seize the arms of the surprised Spaniards, killing as many as

possible, sparing neither men, women, nor children." (Bailey, 2) Every location in New Mexico except Santa Fe was depopulated of Spaniards. A siege was laid on Santa Fe that lasted for five days. The Indians were routed at that time but the Spaniards were still isolated from any source of reinforcement. "All together, over four hundred Spanish men, women, and children lost their lives in the revolt, including twenty-one missionaries." (Bailey, 3) The victory was a complete success except for the failure to capture Santa Fe, and the Indians would be free of Spanish interference for twelve years.

During the absence of the Spaniards between 1680 and 1692, a number of pueblos moved to new sites. The Jemez, Keres, and Tanos moved their homes to new locations. The five Zuni pueblos merged into one because of pressure from Apache attacks. The Hopi, plagued by attacks from the Utes, moved all of their pueblos except Oraibi to the mesa tops.

(Schroeder, 299) Since the common threat had been disposed of, the friction between the pueblo tribes increased again and strife was ripe. This strife caused Indians from the southern pueblos to journey with the Spanish when they reentered pueblo country in 1681.

The shift of pueblos to defensive positions between 1680 and 1692 has been thought by some to have been due to fear of reprisal by the Spaniards if they returned. However, evidence suggests that old enmities as well as new ones flared high during the absence of the Spaniards and required immediate action to handle hostilities close at hand. The Spanish sent punitive expeditions northward during 1681 and 1687, but these discovered nothing of significance. The expedition by

de Vargas in 1692-93 found several pueblos ready to do battle, while others sought refuge elsewhere before the Spaniards approached their pueblos. (Schroeder, 300) After the return of the Spanish in 1692, Indian alignments shifted one way or another according to events.

THE RECONQUEST OF NEW MEXICO

Between 1681-1682 Governor Otermin made an attempt to regain the province with an unsuccessful and controversial campaign. It did afford, however, an opportunity to collect more important testimony from the Indians concerning the Revolt. Otermin discovered that following the defeat of the Spanish, Pope made a tour of inspection through all of his pueblos. "He demanded large tributes, taught the intricate steps of the old ceremonial dances, and insisted that they treat him with the same ceremony as they had accorded former Spanish governors." (Sanchez, 138) These actions quickly alienated the pueblos and brought about the downfall of Pope.

From 1692 to 1693 Don Diego de Vargas traipsed around the New Mexico territory resubjugating the various pueblos. However, he was born in Madrid, Spain, on 8 November 1643, Diego Joseph de Vargas Zapata y Lujan Ponce de Leon y Contreras. (Kessell, 11) What occurred in his life during the period between his birth and the reconquest? This is what we're going to look at at the beginning of this chapter.

Diego had an older brother, Lorenzo, whom he grew up with in Madrid. "The position that his father held allowed him to grow up with

the middle-ranking nobility of the capital. On 5 May 1664, Diego was married to Beatriz Pimentel de Prado." (Kessell, 12-13) From the summer of 1666 until the summer of 1672, de Vargas personally managed the family properties. There were a thousand minor details and more debts than income. Diego knew that among his family ancestors he had warrior-knights, bishops, and counselors to kings. The depressions and reverses that Spain was experiencing during his lifetime couldn't have escaped his notice. Difficulties in agricultural production forced cash-poor landed families like his deeper and deeper into debt.

Diego made a calculated decision due to his financial plight to enter into royal service. He was aware that this offered regular pay for honorable employment, and stories from America offered the prospect of making a fortune so that the family name could be maintained. In 1673 de Vargas made the crossing to New Spain and was granted a post southeast of Mexico City. (Kessell, 17) It was at this place that he learned of the death of his 32-year old wife, Beatriz, the mother of his four children. Letters mailed home from Diego hint of loneliness and homesickness, and in 1675 it is noted that he contemplated returning to Madrid. However, after his term of two years his performance was reviewed and he was judged an exemplary official. (Kessell, 17) Little is documented of the seventeen years he spent in New Spain before he rode north to assume the governorship of New Mexico.

Diego de Vargas had aspirations and hopes of reconquering the valuable country of New Mexico which had been lost to the Indians in 1680. He believed this accomplishment would win royal favor and

consequently rewards of new titles and higher appointments. Vargas planned on executing the entire expedition at his own expense, which would have been great indeed because he would have had to arm and supply the soldiers traveling with him. "On February 22, 1691, de Vargas began preparations for his journey north." (Bailey, 12)

After taking stock of the forces and supplies available to him he announced that the trip would have to be delayed because of the lack of food, supplies and reinforcements needed for this delicate operation. Due to unforeseeable obstacles, it would be a year and a half before de Vargas left El Paso on his journey north. Conditions became so unbearable in El Paso that the colonists petitioned to be allowed to move elsewhere because of the poverty and suffering that was present there. The enthusiasm of de Vargas was undaunted, however, and he endeavored to gain reinforcements for his task.

Final preparations for the reconquest were under way by April 17, 1692, and Vargas wrote to the viceroy that he would dispatch the first unit on July 12. (Bailey, 20) The former inhabitants of New Mexico were notified that they should prepare themselves for the trip. However, in spite of the offers in the form of land, titles, free munitions, arms, and food, the order was basically ignored. Vargas was angered by this because he lacked sufficient forces without the former inhabitants. "He was forced to petition for fifty additional troops, the only expense that wouldn't be charged to his account." (Bailey, 20) On August 21, after another series of delays, de Vargas decided not to wait for the arrival of the reinforcements. The journey of reconquest was on.

The reconquest marks the beginning of a century-long dependence on pueblo Indian auxiliaries for the pacification and defense of New Spain's northernmost frontier. Pueblo Indians were not used extensively by the Spaniards for early campaigns against the raiding tribes. These Indians were initially considered unwarlike, and it was assumed that they would be no match for the ferocity of the Apaches. (Jones, 36) For this venture Vargas was allotted three squads of soldiers from the presidio of El Paso and another fifty soldiers from another presidio. To complete his forces Diego was allowed to pick 100 Indian warriors from a nearby pueblo. (Jones, 38)

One of the invaluable services that these pueblo Indians did for the Spanish was to act as interpreters and reliable informants. The expedition moved northward on a course that roughly followed the Rio Grande. During most of the march the friendly Indian warriors went ahead of the main expedition to act as scouts so that the presence and strength of expected resistance could be determined. During the trip de Vargas learned from his scouts that several of the pueblos were fighting against each other. This allowed him to employ the technique "divide and conquer" in the re-establishment of royal authority in New Mexico.

Diego gained support at each of the pueblos he stopped at because each tribe wanted the aid of the Spaniards to fight against their rivals from the other tribes. Vargas would play each side against the other and work them until he got the price he asked for before agreeing to terms. By moving swiftly, Vargas was able to reconquer most of the province before the Indians could again unite.

Finding the pueblos along the Rio Grande abandoned because the Indians had fled, Vargas and his party continued to Santa Fe. They arrived after dark before the town, which was occupied by Tano Indians because they preferred the white man's form of habitation to their own. The Spaniards had a difficult time convincing the Tanos that they were truly who they claimed to be. "The Tanos believed these were not Spaniards, but Apaches and Pecos in disguise." (Bailey, 38) They threatened to "kill all of the Spaniards at one blow" because the spirit of fighting was upon them. (Bailey, 39)

The Spaniards were in a very unpleasant position because they had halted in an open field with no cover except for the rows of maize nearby. The Indians were very wary, even after Vargas spoke overtures of peace to them. They said that the Spanish soldiers had made peace agreements with the Apaches, then broke those treaties and killed them. They believed the Spaniards intended to do the same to them.

At this point the rest of the troops and the supplies arrived. Vargas orders them to halt beside the corn fields, but within musket shot from where the conflict was occurring. He also had the field cannons readied for use incase things got out of hand. The Indians were disturbed by these preparations and lost a lot of their defiant attitude. (Bailey, 41)

A crowd of Indians from nearby villages who were wielding long spears had gathered on the periphery of the conflict. Vargas, fearing treachery, ordered part of the soldiers to move into a position to intercept them if they should become violent. Then he put into action a

plan intended to isolate Santa Fe from its water supply and to prevent any attempt at outside communication. (Bailey, 42)

These measures were effective in forcing the Indians to talk on more agreeable terms. The Tanos asked why the Spaniards took these measures when they claimed to come in peace. They then asked that the padres accompanying Vargas' expedition be allowed to enter the villa. Vargas believed that the Indians planned to harm the padres. He also believed the Indians were stalling and was upset that they hadn't made any attempts to talk more about peace.

Vargas positioned his troops at strategic locations and then delivered an ultimatum to the Tanos. "He granted them just one hour to surrender; otherwise they would be destroyed with fire and great slaughter." (Bailey, 43) The Tanos responded that they would do as he wished, so Vargas had his troops step down but remain on alert. After waiting two hours Vargas sent in an Indian emissary to talk with the Tanos and to find out what the Indians planned. (Bailey, 43)

"Domingo, the Indian emissary, had little effect upon the Tanos and reported back that the Tanos were continuing to fortify the villa."

(Bailey, 43) Vargas, enraged and exasperated, ordered his soldiers back into position and prepared the cannons to be fired at the walls of Santa Fe. Vargas implored the Indians one last time to seek peace, knowing full well that he could defeat the Indians since their water supply was cut off. The Tanos realized the hopeless situation they were in and sent two unarmed delegates to discuss the terms of peace. (Bailey,

The Indian women were the first to surrender. Then the other Tanos gradually filtered out of the villa, unsure of the reception that awaited them. "The Spaniards patiently and carefully assured the Indians of their peaceful intentions and of their desires for native welfare and happiness." (Bailey, 45) The Spaniards then withdrew to their encampment and made precatious for nightfall. After a religious ceremony was held the following morning to absolve the Indians of their sins, the retaking of Santa Fe was complete. "Vargas later confessed that he had given up hope of convincing the natives to surrender without a fight." (Beck, 87)

The decisive factor which may have spelled success for the Spanish cause was when a former lieutenant of Pope entered de Vargas' camp and offered to assist in any way possible. This Indian, "Don Luis Tupatu," was very influential in organizing a force of friendly Indians to aid the Spaniards. (Beck, 87) Tupatu also brought valuable information about other pueblos with him.

Vargas was not one to lose an advantage, so in only four months of vigorous campaigning twenty three pueblos were restored to the territory of New Spain. (Beck, 87) "With the completion of this brilliant campaign the kingdom and provinces of New Mexico were once more under the protection of the Spanish flag and the Catholic church." (Bailey, 48)

"Some 2,214 Indians, mostly children, were baptized." (Beck, 87) This remarkable success could be accounted for by the very daring chances Vargas took. taking such a small group of soldiers into hostile Indian territory, especially that of the western pueblos, and

effectively scaring and intimidating them into submission was indeed a feat. "On several occasions some of the pueblos were prepared to rise against the Spaniards, but luck, fear of retaliation, and division among the Indians enabled Vargas to win." (Beck, 87)

RECOLONIZATION OF THE TERRITORY: 1693

Having at least obtained the silent submission of the pueblos, Vargas retraced his steps to El Paso to prepare for the permanent occupation of New Mexico. He was basically given a free hand in working out this phase of the enterprise. Everything necessary for the preservation of that which had been won was promised.

For the establishment of a presidio at Santa Fe, Vargas was authorized to enlist soldiers from among those of the presidios of El Paso and Parral who had participated in the expedition just completed. (Espinosa, 113) He was also empowered to enlist additional soldiers for the presidio from the area surrounding El Paso, guaranteeing the usual salaries.

Vargas was given permission to take from El Paso as many of the families there as he should deem necessary to colonize New Mexico, without endangering the security of that region. "Those settlers who had been driven out of New Mexico in 1680, and who had promised to return upon its restoration, should be notified that aid would be assured for their undertaking." (Espinosa, 113) It was also placed at Vargas' disposal enough pesos to pay the starting expenses for this second

expedition. Vargas was made personally responsible for thanking the military leaders, the missionaries, the soldiers, and any others who aided in the success of the first enterprise.

He was armed with absolute power when he began preparations for the second journey. To determine the exact number of El Paso residents willing to return to New Mexico and their economic status, he personally visited every household in the five settlements. This personally conducted census clearly revealed to Vargas the destitute condition of most of the settlers. "Espinosa, 116" They were without the essential necessities for their subsistence, which explained to Vargas why the households were so large, some having over thirty inhabitants. They lacked sufficient clothing and less than half had a horse to use for transportation. "Most of the residents expressed their willingness to resettle New Mexico provided government assistance was definitely assured them." (Espinosa, 115) "The sum of 40,000 pesos was deemed sufficient to finance the enlisting of soldiers and the gathering of settlers, the granting of necessary aid to the impoverished inhabitants of El Paso and the purchasing of supplies to sustain the expedition and the colony." (Espinosa, 118) Vargas was required to keep a complete inventory of all purchases so that payments could be made quickly. The governor was empowered to draw additional sums if he should consider it necessary.

Vargas looked into the future and tried to predict what might be useful for the protection of Santa Fe and the surrounding area. He requested new guns and ammunition, plus an additional amount of pesos to

be used for the building of the presidio at Santa Fe. Along with these he asked for four artillerymen. "A total of one hundred soldiers was enlisted for the expedition." (Espinosa, 129)

"All the train was declared ready at three o'clock in the afternoon of October 13, 1693, when it pulled out of El Paso for the great celebration." (Bailey, 91) Progress was extremely difficult because the trail was rough and broken from the recent rains that had washed the soil away. Vargas, who was to be both governor and captain-general of New Mexico, was seized by a fever which further slowed down the progress northward.

Vargas was told by an Indian informant that a spokesman among the pueblo Indians "had induced them to refuse peace with the Jemez, Teguas, and Tanos, and become friends of the Spaniards." (Bailey, 95) The present approach of the Spaniards had consequently aroused fear of a sudden and fateful end to Indian existence. He was told that the Jemez, Teguas, Tanos, and Picuris were planning to fight the Spaniards when they appeared.

At the same time, further north of Vargas' company, the Spaniards were suffering considerably from snow, frost, and wind. Eventually Vargas' company would meet up with this group. They stopped over at the pueblo of San Felipe, of which Vargas had this to write to the viceroy:

"And there was a stairway to the entrance of the pueblo and likewise in the houses, and in the strong plaza seats, benches, and new hammocks for me to be seated. And they gave us all to eat with great abundance, and made demonstration of great happiness; and repeated what is referred to above, adding that they would go with me to the Jemez who had more food supplies." (Bailey, 96)

The Indians offered to bring whatever food Vargas needed for his company in exchange for any support and protection they might need in the future. Vargas agreed, so the Indians sent mules loaded with meat, beans, flour, and maize.

"The entire Spanish force, which included three companies comprised of settlers, soldiers, and missionary fathers, were united on November 19, 1693." (Bailey, 101) Vargas issued orders for everyone to remain together while he and the fathers went ahead to find a better location for them to camp. They were welcomed by the Indians in Cochiti and took before a cross the Indians had erected within the pueblo walls. The Spaniards were rewarded with sacks of corn, threshed maize, and corn flour, which were carried to the foot of the mesa.

At the main encampment, Vargas held a parley with four Pecos Indians who passed on to him valuable information. They spoke about the assembling of Indians from several tribes who planned on ambushing the Spaniards at an abandoned pueblo. The Indians would have their forces divided between two hills, and as the Spaniards passed between them the Indians would fall upon them from the front and the rear. Having been warned, the Spaniards took care not to go near that area.

"Vargas set out on November 29, 1693, with his entire expedition for Santa Fe." (Espinosa, 144) There he planned on clearing up the confused reports regarding the attitude of the Tanos and Tewas. Their silence and aloofness spoke of a potential for hostilities to break out if the Spaniards weren't careful. "Camped on the south side of La Bajada mesa, the Spaniards were for the first time on the verge of

entering country where resistance seemed certain." (Espinosa, 145) They had no assurances that they would not all be trapped on the valley on the other side and annihilated. Those who had doubts about their survival became panicky. As they sat around their campfires that night before retiring, most of the conversation dwelt upon speculation regarding their fate. Fervent prayers were said and the soldiers probably slept with one eye open all night. A group of soldiers and settlers deserted during the night and planned on making it back to El Paso where they felt they would be safe.

The natives at Santa Fe were reported as being divided in their attitude toward the invaders. The inhabitants blamed the snow for preventing them from going out to welcome the Spaniards. Now that the Spaniards had returned they could hunt deer and plant their crops without fear of the Navajos who had raided their settlement earlier.

Far from home, and greatly outnumbered by unfriendly Indians fully capable of ejecting them by force of arms, the Spaniards were in a position that was indeed precarious. The danger of starvation was always present among the settlers. "By keeping the uncertain Indians divided, Vargas had been successful both at averting starvation and in virtually isolating the enemy stronghold at Santa Fe." (Espinosa, 149)

Vargas began organizing plans for the refounding of the missions and for the distribution of the missionaries to twelve of the pueblos. More rumors, however, were abroad that the Tewas and Tanos were planning an attack against the Spaniards. The rigorous weather continued with snow storms and cold winds. Sickness was spreading and children and

infants were dying. There were several adults who had already succumbed to the elements and constant complaining could be heard. Some of the deserters were brought back at this time, but Vargas used this to his advantage by saying that they were the vanguard of an army of reinforcements coming to aid the settlers. This helped bolster the spirits of the colonists and made them as fiesty as they were before.

The main complaint that the colonists had was that they were suffering in the cold while the natives were sheltered behind the walls of Santa Fe. Vargas realized that it was high time he did something to remedy that situation, so he called a general council of war. "Composed of all the leading citizens, the missionaries, and the military officers, the gathering was held in his tent, and there petitions and complaints were registered and opinions expressed." (Espinosa, 155) There was an unanimous decision by the council that the Tanos be obliged to return to their former pueblo and the buildings of the city be reoccupied by the Spaniards. Some favored the use of military force to expel the natives if necessary.

The Indians observed these meetings and grew angrier because they knew full well what the settlers were demanding and they were prepared to offer resistance. Each side believed they had right on their side, so fighting was inevitable. The Indians prepared their weapons for fighting under the pretext of going on a hunt. The tension grew between the opposing sides for two days.

Then, on the third morning after the Spanish councils' decision, word came down to the camp from the villa that an attack was imminent.

Vargas immediately sounded the alarm by means of the trumpet and the war drum. Soldiers and their families that were living inside the villa were warned to get to safety immediately. Sentries were posted at strategic points along the camp perimeter while Vargas rode forward to speak with the hostile natives. Remembering how well it had worked the previous year, he tried to calm the anger of the Indians. They boasted that the entire Indian community from miles around was supporting them. Finally the Indians said they would deliberate and give him their reply in the evening. No word came that evening, however. (Espinosa, 158)

The following morning as Vargas again rode toward the villa the Tanos shouted that they would kill all the Spaniards except the missionaries, whom they would make slaves of. Then "a storm of darts, arrows, stones, and other heavy missiles" poured forth from the villa (Espinosa, 159). "Santiago! Santiago! Death to these cattle!" cried out Vargas to his men, and the battle was joined. (Espinosa, 159)

The Spaniards were aided by the arrival of their Pecos Indian allies. They stormed the villa and within a day it was won. The rebels that were captured were executed on the following charges: "having stoned and destroyed a cross placed in the center of the square, broken a statue of the Virgin Mary, and committed treason against God and the Royal Crown." (Espinosa, 162) Those Indians who surrendered of their own free will were distributed among the soldiers and settlers in servitude for a period of ten years.

The Spaniards now had a solid foothold in New Mexico, but the results of the conquest were widespread in the land. The executions at

Santa Fe angered the war chiefs and medicinemen of the surrounding pueblos. This caused them to remain hostile and to fortify their positions on the mesa tops.

The walled villa of Santa Fe served as a strong base from which all New Mexico was eventually pacified. In early 1694, however, almost the entire countryside was hostile. "Of the twenty-odd pueblos, only four were the allies of the Spaniards: Pecos, the Keres of Santa Ana, Sia, and San Felipe." (Espinosa, 163) This entire year would be spent in strife with the surrounding pueblo tribes. "On July 20, 1694, the campaign was announced against the Jemez and the Keres of Santo Domingo. The following day Vargas and 120 men sallied forth from Santa Fe." (Espinosa, 199) By the middle of September, 1694, the Jemez and Keres had been defeated.

In 1695 New Mexico was at last laying the foundations of self-reliance and permanency. "Vargas wrote to the viceroy, 'With sails full we forge ahead.'" (Espinosa, 221) Twelve missions had been established by this year throughout the different pueblos. "The Spanish stronghold at Santa Fe consisted of a presidio of 100 soldiers with their families, approximately 130 families of settlers, and two missionaries." (Espinosa, 222) Livestock multiplied in number, but the colony was continually plagued by a lack of supplies and equipment. The extension of Spanish rule, plus the reestablishment of mission stations, was halted by the uprising of 1696. They were renewed after this conflict was solved.

Diego de Vargas sought membership in the prestigious military order of Santiago. His father, grandfather, and great-grandfather had been

members of this distinguished order he wanted entry into. In 1697 he wrote to a member of the Council of the Orders, asking to obtain a decree providing that a knight of Santiago invest him in the nearest church and that he be allowed an absence from New Mexico for one hundred days for the purpose. "Whatever the impediment - family enemies, lack of material wealth, charges pending against him in Mexico City - the recolonizer of New Mexico failed to gain membership in the Order of Santiago." (Kessell, 20)

In July, 1699, Vargas was confined in Santa Fe by order of his successor in office. He was the object of the usual accusations made against Spanish governors of the day: "cruelty to the natives and engaging in commerce for his own enrichment." (Beck, 89) He was released by orders from the viceroy and returned to Mexico City. His eldest surviving son, "Juan Manuel," met him there. (Kessell, 21) This was the first time in almost eighteen years that they had seen each other. While Diego prepared his defense, his son enjoyed himself around Mexico City. His son, Juan, whom he had made heir to all his properties he had been granted with the title of marques, was killed at the naval battle of Vigo. (Kessell, 22) This incident struck Vargas to the core of his being.

"In November, 1703, Diego de Vargas was back in Santa Fe for his second term as governor." (Kessell, 23) He must of had some sort of premonition because he wrote letters to his closest relatives and got his affairs in order shortly after his arrival back in New Mexico. "On the afternoon of April 8, 1704, he died while pursuing Apaches in the

Rio Grande Valley south of present-day Albuquerque. He didn't die from battle, but rather from the sickness known as typhus." (Kessell, 23)

"On the eve of his departure for America, he was a young man of average height, straight hair, and broad face, with a speech impediment. Although he had married well, the chronic indebtedness of the Vargas properties weighted heavily upon him. At the age of twenty-eight, in hopes of restoring his family's financial welfare, he took leave of them and set out for New Spain." (Kessell, 23-24)

Diego added little to his already encumbered assets and in the year he was appointed as governor of New Mexico, he wanted nothing more than to go home.

BACKGROUND TO SPANISH EXPANSION

The rapid advance of New Spain's northern frontier had been prompted by the discovery of rich silver mines, followed by missionary activity, and the establishment of extensive landed estates devoted to agriculture and the raising of livestock. Spaniards were constantly harassed by persistent attacks from nomadic Indian groups. They were a serious threat to the security of the mining and ranch frontiers and the trail on which the silver caravans traveled from northern Mexico to the capital. To keep the raiders in check, roving patrols were provided to escort wagon trains and scour the countryside. Indian auxiliaries were formed, and punitive expeditions were organized to go into native strongholds. "The most important innovation, however, was the

development of a system of forts and defensive towns placed at strategic points in the heart of the silver frontier of New Spain." (Warner, 6)

These forts were called presidios, meaning a garrisoned town or fortress. The line was constantly adjusted to meet new situations as the frontier advanced. From these presidios and defensive settlements the Spaniards waged campaigns of "fire and blood" against the marauding Indian tribes. (Warner, 7) This method only partially worked, so the new policy was to negotiate peace treaties, offering bribes of food and clothing to the Indians in the hope of inducing them to settle near the Spanish defense towns. "Once the natives had accepted a peace settlement, they were to be Hispanicized by another frontier institution, the mission." (Warner, 8)

At the mission the Indians were to be taught European customs and instructed in the Catholic religion. "It was expected that they would emerge from this training within ten years as useful, Christian, and loyal Spanish subjects." (Warner, 8)

The last twenty years of the seventeenth century saw the security of the northern frontiers seriously endangered by Indian uprisings. As a result, the presidial system on the northern frontier was reorganized. Also during the 1680's and 1690's, the threat of French encroachment on the Gulf coast introduced a new factor in the problem of frontier defense, and prompted the temporary occupation of Texas by Spain. The fear of foreign encroachment continued to influence Spanish government policy through the eighteenth century.

CONCLUSION

The history of the New Mexico territory has been a struggle between Europe and Native Americans since the Spanish first began their conquest in "New Spain." The Pueblo Revolt of 1680 is significant because it was the largest, most unified, and most successful attempt by the pueblo Indians to remain independent of European influence. Their greatest success only lasted twelve years, however, because the persistence of the Europeans wouldn't allow them to back down.

The encomienda system, the presidio, and especially Don Diego de Vargas all played a vital role in spreading and securing Spain's hold on New Mexico. After the intense struggle they put up to keep it, Spain would lose its control over Mexico and eventually the northern part of Mexico would fall into the hands of the United States.

Why was it so important for Spain to squander so much of its resources on a barren area like New Mexico? It wasn't to gain the natives support for their conquest. It wasn't to enlarge the amount of territory controlled by Spain. It was because of greed and a lust for silver which originally drove the Spaniards into New Mexico. The Native American Indians have paid the largest cost for the greed of the Spaniards. They have been reduced to a menial form of living, first under the Spaniards control, and then under the control of the Europeans which came to be called Americans.

This report tells two sad stories. One is not only the plight of Native Americans, but the tragedy of a man who had little but

a name but gave it all to help his family. Don Diego de Vargas helped Lujan Ponce de Leon come to New Spain to make a name for his family and to leave an inheritance for his son to inherit. Not only did he gain little other than a title, but his last male heir died a tragic death without ever getting to accept what his father had worked to give him.

Each event that helped shape the New Mexican territory happened through violence or conquest of some sort. It's a shame that such a wondrous region inhabited by such a fascinating people have had to endure so much even after all they really wanted was to left alone.

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