BURNSIDE:
Boats & Bridge

John Bigger
History 499
July, 1972
Dr. William Eidson

Acceptable

Wm D Eidson
Assoc. Professor of History

Before the Civil War ended the nation would hear a great deal of evil about Ambrose Everett Burnside. The disaster of Fredericksburg was to haunt him, but the "Burnside Expedition" and Antietam show the paradox of the strengths that were weaknesses of the man. These strengths when latter displayed by Burnside, as commander of the Army of the Potomac, were to be his undoing.

Graduating from West Point in1847 a year behind George B. McClellan with whom a close friendship developed, Burnside saw action as an artillery lieutenant in the Mexican War under General Robert Patterson. The action involved the final campaign of the war from Vera Cruz to Mexico City and Burnside did modestly well. The boring garrison life that followed the war led Burnside to resign in 1853. For five years he engaged in the manufacture of firearms at Bristol, Rhode Island. Burnside like McClellan had an inventive mind and he patented a breech loading rifle. Though a good weapon Burnside went broke when a government contract did not come through. The friendship with McClellan was enhanced when McClellan, as president of the Land Office Department for the Illinois Central Railroad, hired Burnside to help his friend re-establish his affairs. Burnside bailed out by McClellan worked hard rising to treasurer by 1861.[1]

---

[1] Kenneth P. Williams, Lincoln Finds A General: A Military Study of the Civil War (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1957), II, 480.

At the start of hostilities in 1861 Burnside promptly went into the service as a colonel of a fine Rhode Island regiment. He was a likeable sort — big, florid, friendly, his face adorned by an elaborate beard. Affecting the casual in dress, consisting of a low slung holster, loose fitting knee-length double-breasted jacket, and a wide brimmed soft felt hat, he looked more like an 1880's beefy city policeman. Burnside outgoing and forthright by nature was a popular officer with everyone he met.[2] Burnside performed admirably under General Patterson and at Bull Run and McClellan readily supported the commissioning of Burnside to brigadier general when his three month volunteer regiment mustered out in early August 1861. At thirty-seven Burnside was a promising officer seeking glory in service of his country.[3]

Federal plans for a strike at North Carolina coast originated in the fall of 1861 with Ambrose Burnside. He proposed the idea at a luncheon with George McClellan in late August. His idea was to create an army division numbering from 12,000 to 15,000 men from States along the northern sea-coast. These men would be familiar with the coasting trade and with an inherent number of mechanics necessary to the

---

[2] Bruce Catton, Terrible Swift Sword (New York: Pocket Books, 1967), II, 159.

[3] Kenneth Williams, Lincoln Finds A General, II, 481.

success of such a mission. Then transported by fleet of light draft steamers, sailing vessels, and barges this force could threaten the transportation in the rear of the Confederate main army in Virginia.[4]

McClellan took the idea as his own and on September 6, 1861 requested permission from Secretary of War Cameron.[5] The Secretary of War quickly agreed and General Burnside was the natural choice for command of the division by McClellan. Burnside was authorized to raise fifteen regiments and was given unlimited funds for equipment.[6]

Burnside's 13,000 troops were assembled at Annapolis, under brigadier generals Jesse L. Reno, John G. Parker, and John G. Foster. These officers were three of Burnside's most trusted friends with the four of them having been cadtes together at West Point. Meanwhile, Burnside labored in New York for transports. The U.S. Navy had been caught by the war as a shadow force of forty-two ships in April, 1861. Pressed by the "Anaconda" plan to blockade the htree thousand mile southern coast and guard U.S. shipping the Navy expanded wildly.

---

[4] C.C. Buel and R.U. Johnson (eds.), Battles and Leaders Of The Civil War (New York: The Century Company, 1887) p. 660.

[5] George B. McClellan, McClellan's Own Story: The War for The Union: The Soldiers Who Fought It, The Civilians Who Directed It and His Relations to It and to Them (New York: Charles L. Webster & Company, 1887), p. 205.

[6] John G. Barret, The Civil War in North Carolina (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1963), pp. 66-67.

By January, 1862 the Navy was acquiring any ships available and had already amassed 264 ships from U.S. ports. This was still far short of the minimum to do its job and the Navy was combing the coast for vessels. The Navy presented an obstacle to Burnside's attempts to find suitable craft. Though recognized as great for dispatching business, a trait from business and military training, Burnside was only able to assemble a motley fleet. Rejected North River barges and propellers were collected and modified under Burnside's supervision by placing parapets of sand-bags, bales of hay, and adding four to six guns.[7] Soon sailing vessels and passenger steamers were added. The sixty vessels gathered had few of the virtues and many deficiencies for an amphibious operation. The steamers pulled away from the sailing vessels when their engines were not broken down and the variety of drafts made the passage over the Hatteras swash questionable for the entire fleet. Burnside dismissed the weaknesses and moved the assortment of vessels to rendezvous at Fortress Monroe for their naval escort under Flag Officer Louis M. Goldsborough. The navy supported the plan primarily because in November, 1861 Goldsborough had submitted a similar plan to the Secretary of the Navy on a much less ambitious scale than Burnside's. A

---

[7] Ibid., pp. 67, 69.

great many people were pulling for the operation. General Burnside placed his headquarters onboard the steamer New Brunswick and moved toward Annapolis for his troops. He arrived on January 4, 1862 and the "Burnside Expedition" was formed.[8]

Burnside's haste was extreme. He was a mover and, immediately, started embarkation of troops. The men were bouyant, but none knew their destination. Only Burnside, Goldsborough, and the brigade commanders knew that North Carolina was the goal. The ship captains even had sealed orders and were in the dark. Embarkation started off well. Although, a light snow of "1 or 2 inches fell" it only made the scene more beautiful to Burnside. Especially, as the bands played Dixie with a large number of ladies present to see the expedition off into the unknown.[9]

The air was broken when reports of grumbling and balking about boarding the vessels by some of the men reached Burnside. It seems the rock-ribbed New England troops, mainly from Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Hampshire had taken one look at their makeshift transports and decided they had not volunteered to drown. Burnside answered the balking by moving his headquarters from the New Brunswick to the Pickett. The Pickett

---

[8] Ibid., p. 67.

[9] Buel and Johnson (eds.), Battles and Leaders, I, 661-662.

was the smallest and least sea-worthy craft and the gesture reassured and reproached the troops who started boarding.[10]

Now on board Burnside was forced to wait for orders. His haste had not been matched by McClellan. Orders did not arrive giving Burnside the final go ahead until January 7 and his troops had been on board ship since the 4th. These lengthy instructions outlined the major objectives of the operation. The main points were to:

a.) Assume command of Hatteras garrison.
b.) Take Roanoke Island and its dependencies and establish batteries and defenses necessary to hold it.
c.) Descend on New Berne and cut the railroad there as far West as Goldsborough.
d.) Attack Beaufort and take steps necessary to reduce Fort Macon and open that port.

Secondary points were also included to be determined by the course of the operation. If possible, Burnside was to effect the destruction of the Wilmington and Weldon railroad and reduce Wilmington. Finally, instructions on the conduct of the command were included. Burnside was discouraged from making a proclamation about "politics or the negro". Only statements that the fighting was for the preservation of the Union and was not intended to harm civilians minding authority were

---

[10] Shelby Foote, The Civil War A Narrative: Fort Sumter To Perryville (New York: Random House, 1958), p. 228.

allowed Burnside. All prisoners were to be sent North or exchanged according to the situation. Of most importance to Burnside was General Order No. 2, which created the Department of North Carolina under Brigadier General Ambrose Burnside. These detailed orders and restrictions were exactly what Burnside wanted and upon their arrival the fleet sailed.[11]

On January 9, 1862 the transports rendezvoused with the navy detachment and Burnside's arrival was delayed by the rough sea. The Pickett was the last vessel to arrive and a lusty cheer rose from the troops as it neared them. Touched Burnside doffed his cap and stood uncovered in the pilot house. Burnside was a natural showman and knew how to please his soldiers.[12]

A severe series of storms set in on the little fleet and for almost two weeks Hatteras was lashed by storm and fog. Nature claimed her due of the eighty vessels. Five craft had been lost and the water ships had been blown out to sea.[13]

All the problems of war visited the fleet because of the poor weather. Water shortage, food shortage due to the unexpected period at sea, and the fear of thyphoid in the cramped

---

[11] U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (129 vols.; Washington: Government Printing Office, 1883), Series I, Vol. IX, pp. 352-353.

[12] Ibid., p. 354.

[13] Barret, Civil War in North Carolina, p. 71.

quarters presented themselves. Burnside became familiar to his entire command during those days. Performing the duties of harbor master and looking after the well-being of his men Burnside won their loyalty and inspired them to the point that whenever the Pickett came alongside a transport a cheer went up for Burnside. The general was not faulted by his men for their problems. The navy received the ire of the soldiers. At last, the weather cleared on the twenty-sixth and the ships began crossing the swash. By February 4, they were across thanks to the skill and ingenuity of the navy in clearing a channel.[14]

The enemy facing Burnside was woefully weak. Confederate General O. Jennings Wise had 3000 men behind turfed and sand forts mounting 25 guns at Roanoke Island. Of the forts, Huger, Blanchard, and Bartow, only Bartow was in range to answer Goldsborough's 64 gun assault. Internal defense consisted of a causeway running down the middle of the island that connected the forts and was guarded by a three gun battery flanked by "impenetrable" swamp. Wise had only 1435 disheartened effectives and was incapacitated by pleurisy. This,in actually, was the bulk of the effective force left in North Carolina. The rest were only half-armed uncertain militia to face Burnside after Roanoke fell.[15]

---

[14] Ibid., pp. 73-74.

[15] Shelby Foote, The Civil War A Narrative, p. 228.

February 7, saw a storm lift that had delayed the invasion from the 4th. General Burnside signalled from the Pickett: "Today the country expects every man to do his duty." Though, not impressive as pre-battle signals go, the effect upon the men in 1862 was electric.[16]

At 10:30 the navy began its duel with Fort Bartow that was to last seven hours. While this action continued the barges inched into disembarkation position. The method of landing was hazardous but ingenious. Thanks to a Negro contraband, who supplied detailed information of the island defenses, and the courage of W.S. Andrew of the topographical engineers in sounding and inspecting the shoreline, Burnside selected a spot three miles south of Fort Bartow.[17]



[16] John Barret, The Civil War in North Carolina, p. 76.

[17] Ibid., p. 78.

Convinced of his position Burnside gave the orders to his brigadiers to land. The small surf-boats milled about until they were in precise order to present brigade front upon hitting the beach. As each brigade was ready a light draft steamer took it in tow and headed for the beach under full steam. Burnside stated, "I never witnessed a more beautiful sight. . . as the steamers approached the shore at a rapid speed each surf-boat was 'let go' and with their velocity and by direction of the steersman reached the shore line."[18]

The Confederates on the shore offered no resistance but withdrew allowing the brigades to land safely. By midnight approximately 10,000 shivering troops were bivouacked at the harbor. There had been no room for blankets on the landing craft and no fires were permitted to give away their position leaving the men somber. Battle orders from Burnside were weak, consisting of the simple plan of capturing Fort Bartow and rolling up the rest of the island. Moving up the island on a dreary morning the three brigades advanced abreast of each other. Surprised at the initial fire from the three gun battery on the causeway, the three brigades quickly overpowered the Confederate positions one by one. At 9:00 p.m. Burnside's

---

[18] OR, Series I, Vol. IX, p. 76.

able officers had secured the island by initiative and quick action in taking fortified positions. Burnside was so impressed by the performance of the generals that he re-named the captured forts for them.[19]

Losses were light at the Battle of Roanoke Island. Ambrose Burnside lost 37 killed, 214 wounded, and 13 missing. The Confederate casualties were placed at 23 killed, 58 wounded and 62 missing with 2500 captured.[20]

This action opened the North Carolina campaign. General Burnside's forces latter went on to capture New Berne, Beaufort, Fort Macon, numerous small towns, and cut the Wilmington and Weldon railroad. In short, he achieved his primary and secondary objectives within four months and was a dangerous thorn in Lee's side. All the operations were within the authority of his orders and displayed that Burnside was an orthodox officer. He did not gamble with his command beyond necessity. Burnside recognized his part in the war was conditional on pre-determined aims and stuck to the book.

The North Carolina Campaign demonstrated the best qualties of Burnside. The very idea of creating his division was brilliant planning. He forged a unit that could come splashing

---

[19] Ibid., pp. 77-79.

[20] John Barret, The Civil War in North Carolina, p. 84.

ashore at will anywhere along the extended Confederate coast. Virginia's rear was compromised and North Carolina lost as a major shipper and supplier for the South. There can be little doubt Burnside was a competent strategist at division level.

In forming the expedition Burnside used good sense and vision. His officers were old friends whose military talents were equal to anything that could be confronted. Their friendship created an atmosphere of harmony and friendship in the headquarters that passed down to the troops. General Burnside could count on Reno, Foster, and Parker to think in the field and lavished them with praise. He was a good C.O., who shared the glory.[21]

Perhaps, the greatest strength was the ability to make do and improvise. His fleet was a crazy quilt affair, but his modifications turned it into a unique force. It was the pattern for the amphibious assault for the rest of the war. Logistically sound and procured under the strain of war the force arrived intact and potent under Burnside's direction marred only by the weather.

Faced by balking troops at embarkation he was quick and

---

[21] OR, Series I, Vol. IX, p.74.

decisive in quelling it without using devisive force. Latter, Burnside would decide to exchange enemy prisoners to keep space open for military operations on his few ships rather than waste it on transporting them North. His regulating of the influx of contrabands and troop behavior were adequate. Burnside even established a provisional North Carolina government under Edward Stanly.[22] All these were administrative acts but were important in presenting an able officer capable of higher command functioning.

These strengths were also his weakness in part by nature of the operation, as well as the man. It must be noted that the Confederates facing Burnside were demoralized behind weak defenses.[23] Overwhelming numbers of 10 to 1 easily made up for a simple head-on attack declared by Burnside. In fact, if General Reno had not taken the initiative to flank the causeway battery losses would have been far higher for both sides. Burnside merely gave orders and turned his brigades loose. He then stepped back and rubber-stamped their actions. This was fine with able officers aware of the actions of each other and the enemy on a small scale.[24]

Burnside layed North Carolina open, but because of limited

---

[22] John Barret, The War in North Carolina, p. 127.

[23] OR, Series I, Vol. IX, pp. 161-162.

[24] Ibid., p. 80.

forces and no cavalry did not penetrate deeply inland. Without reconnaissance he did not know that only half-armed militia confronted him. He requested additional forces but the Penninsula campaign had forced McClellan to recall Burnside and the bulk of his forces. So the success went to little for the North, except that Burnside's star rose.

Between Roanoke and Antietam Burnside rose from division commander to wing commander in the Army of the Potomac. Upon recall he showed promptness, loyalty, and energy in contrast to Pope's ill-fated campaign. Subsequently, McClellan gave his friend and protege command of two corps, which formed the Right Wing. With the force given him Burnside fought the engagement of Turner's Gap at South Mountain.[25]

Turner's Gap marked the beginning of the end for the Maryland campaign terminating at Antietam. Burnside's flawed strengths showed their heads here in a manner that clearly lighted the limits of the soldier. Burnside's two corps were led by men whom Burnside reacted to with mixed sentiments. The IX Corps was commanded by Jesse Reno, whose career climbed with Burnside. The I Corps was led by Joe Hooker, whose

---

[25] Kenneth Williams, Lincoln Finds A General, II, 481.

scheming ambition turned the pleasant Burnside sour. The IX Corps was informal and made up of Westerners lacking the Eastern discipline and precision taught I Corps under McClellan.[26]

Lee had invaded Maryland and split his forces. McClellan learned of this and attempted to cut off Lee's divided army destroying it in detail. The key to quick victory was South Mountain and its occupation by either side. Lee reached there first preventing McClellan from trapping him alone. Now the Union army had to fight through the gap to stop Lee. It was there that Reno was killed on September 15, 1862 and the course of Burnside's role in the battle of Antietam was largely determined. As at Roanoke Island, where Burnside relied on his subordinates, at Antietam again junior officers would directly shape the fate of battle not Burnside. With Reno dead Burnside was heartbroken and his forces, though breaking through, had lost 533 men and a good deal of spirit.[27]

Lee was quickly brought to bay at Sharpsburg. To replace Reno, the senior division officer, Jacob Cox took command of IX Corps. Unfortunately, prior to the battle on September 17, Cox had the impression it was only a temporary post and would

---

[26] Bruce Catton, The Army of the Potomac: Mr. Lincoln's Army (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1952) pp. 219-220.

[27] OR, Series I, XIX, Part I, pp. 183,432.

not have a staff organized.[28]

Ccx and Burnside got along well and the combination did not seem too bad. However, Burnside's displeasure with Joe Hocker was coming to a head. Hooker had submitted a report of the engagement at South Mountain that implied that Reno had attacked without sequence and Hooker had been compelled to save the day. To slander an officer that had died in combat was something worse than criminal to Burnside. Besides, Burnside had on four occasions had to order Hooker to move forward on that day. This did not create harmony and Hooker's plotting only added fuel for the fire.[29]

McClellan had grouped his army into three wings under generals Sumner, Franklin, and Burnside. In planning the attack on Lee at Sharpsburg he scrambled this group. Partly, because Joe Hooker had persuaded McClellan that he could fight better independently from Burnside. Burnside was on the extreme left of the line and Hooker with half of Burnside's wing was stationed on the extreme right. Burnside was upset at the advancement of Hooker at his expense.[30]

Technically, Burnside commanded Hooker but really was

---

[28] Ned Bradford (ed.), Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1956), p. 241.

[29] OR, Series I, Vol. XIX, Part I, p. 422.

[30] Ned Bradford (ed.), Battles and Leaders, p. 242.

given a separate assignment subordinate to Hooker's assault on the left. Burnside alone and separate from the main army was to take a bridge on the Antietam and cut-off any possible retreat by Lee. All lines of responsibility had been cut and Burnside, new to the Army of the Potomac, was on his own. Burnside was alone in a battle that seemed designed to give glory to Hooker and the work to him.[31]

McClellan's battle orders for Antietam left Burnside miffed. He was supposed to command two army corps, but one had been taken away. The remaining IX Corps was given by Burnside to Cox. Burnside refused to take personal command and the implied demotion that accompanied it. Burnside remained a wing commander without a wing and even offered to serve on Cox's makeshift staff during the engagement.[32]

The result was that theIX Corps had two commanders, Cox and Burnside. Burnside received his orders form McClellan and passed them on to Cox with neither assuming direct responsibility. So the 17th broke fresh and clear with artillery opening on both sides at light and the men began advancing to the creek at about 7:00.[33]

---

[31] Bruce Catton, Mr. Lincoln's Army, p. 255.

[32] Ned Bradford (ed.), Battles and Leaders, pp 242-243.

[33] Bruce Catton, Mr. Lincoln's Army, p. 257.

McClellan had felt that the main thrust or diversion should be on the flanks. The chief assault being Hooker's attack he would not prod Burnside until that one failed. Facing Burnside's 19,000 man corps were 2500 men of which only 500 were at the bridge under Robert Toombs. But their line was one of the greatest natural works of the area. By 10:00 on the 17th the attacks by Sumner, Franklin, and Hooker had been stalled or bloodily repulsed. Burnside received the order to attack and drive up the Confederate line.[34]

Although, numerically weak the Confederates were more than equal to their bridgehead position. It was a deep valley and the curve of the creek made it safe from artillery from the Federal side, but the reverse was true for the Confederates. It was a perfect enfilade position and only an approach from the road over the exposed triple arch stone bridge for 300 paces could reach the Confederate line.[35]

Burnside, engrossed in the dramatic spectacle at the bridge that would bear his name, watched the charges from a hilltop. Repeated attacks took place until the bridge was carried at one o'clock. For three hours the IX Corps had attacked, been repulsed, and reformed to charge again under Burnside's view. When the bridge, finally, fell 500 men had been lost and the

---

[34] Shelby Foote, The Civil War A Narrative, pp. 697-698.

[35] OR, Series I, Vol. XIX, Part I, p. 424.

general demoralized. As the bridge fell a flanking column sent earlier by Burnside arrived. It had gotten lost in the woods trying to turn the bridge position.[36]

Burnside delayed his men after securing the bridge to replenish ammunition. Then he sent them off rapidly advancing toward Sharpsburg. The delay had given Lee time to bring in A.P. Hill's reinforcements. These units stopped and threw back the mentally defeated Burnside and his weary men. Back to the bridge came the Federals and waited for new orders from McClellan as they held the vital bridge so dearly won. So ended Antietam with Burnside holding the bridge but not as the officer the high command had thought him to be. The saving fact was that others had done much worse.[37]

McClellan and Burnside had written chatty "Burn" and "Mac" letters prior to the battle and on September 16 had been cordial. But McClellan had stripped Burnside of half a wing and Burnside had pouted through the battle about it. They never quite returned to the old relationship. It would appear that McClellan had perceived his friend's weaknesses. The chance Hooker got may have been due to the strain on Burnside of wing command and the loss of Reno McClellan had seen.[38]

---

[36] Shelby Foote, The Civil War A Narrative, p. 697.

[37] OR, Series I, Vol. XIX, Part I, pp. 425-426.

[38] McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, pp. 606-607.

Burnside's actions were questionable. Rather than cross the bridge at great hazard the creek could have been forded at any point without wetting the shoulders of the shortest soldier. Instead, he fixed his goal on a simple head-on rush relying on numbers and subordinates to compensate for any deficiencies in tactics. McClellan accused Burnside of having a weak mind, confusion, and allowing his officers to see defeat, instead of victory at the bridge assaults and of not even going near the bridge to handle his men.[39]

Burnside did cross the bridge and his hesitation to stand to Hill's counter-attack which resulted in retreat was based with McClellan. McClellan had spread the belief that Lee's army was double the size of the Federal army. Burnside felt then that to press on would have been to risk the last Union reserve.[40]

Burnside had relied on Cox, who was ill-prepared and lacked Reno's flair and initiative, to carry the day. Reno's loss still plagued Burnside and his mourning effected his judgement. Then McClellan had added insult by giving Hooker an independent command after the man had maligned Reno. Burnside was disoriented and insulted at Antietam. His reliance on Cox was unfounded on the short notice and strange

---

[39] Ibid., p. 608.

[40] Ned Bradford (ed.), Battles and Leaders, pp. 259-260.

situation confronting the IX Corps. At Roanoke Island Burnside's logistics were superb. Here again they excelled with Burnside's re-supplying troops, organizing, and moving troops after the breakthrough at the bridge. However, in a situation where time was critical Burnside allowed the enemy time to organize while he replenished the ammunition of his regiments.[41]

Offensively Burnside could do little else than a direct assault. To carry the bridge was his prime objective and when the flanker failed to arrive he continued toward that aim with his tried and true frontal attack. It seems that all he knew after Roanoke Island was to overrun an obstacle and the belief was to be reinforced here. Latter, at Fredericksburg it would cost the Union many lives.[42]

Burnside at Roanoke and Antietam displayed courage, loyalty, and a quickness to launch an attack. Though logistically sound, Burnside was a poor army intriguer and extremely weak tactically. Fredericksburg was to be his horror, but given the smaller and limited command and objectives of the island and bridge Burnside could organize a force that could handle itself.

Burnside's courage and loyalty were indisputable. "Burnside's

---

[41] Ibid., pp. 255-259.

[42] Bruce Catton, Mr. Lincoln's Army, p. 312.

Expedition " and "Burnside's Bridge" are monuments to the man. Both brought out the traits of the man. The expedition showed his personal force on a command succeeding by organization. The bridge marked his perserverance to a goal when the orders required it even though not trustful of the man who issued them. Both revealed the lack of ability of the officer for combat command during the actual fighting. Burnside recognized his limitations but never was able to surmount them.

Bibliography

Barret, John G. The Civil War in North Carolina. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1963.

Bradford, Ned (ed.). Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1956.

Buel, C.C. and Johnson, R.U. (eds.). Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. Vol. I. New York: The Century Co., 1887.

Catton, Bruce. The Army of the Potomac: Mr. Lincoln's Army. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1952.

Catton, Bruce. Terrible Swift Sword. Vol.II of "The Centennial History of the Civil War." New York: Pocket Books, 1967.

Esposito, Vincent J. (ed.). The West Point Atlas of American Wars. Vol. I. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.

Foote, Shelby. The Civil War A Narrative: Fort Sumter to Perryville. New York: Random House, 1958.

Johnson, R.M. Bull Run: Its Strategy and Tactics. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1913.

Lee, Fitzhugh. General Lee. Greenwich, Connecticut: Fawcett Publications Inc., 1961.

McClellan, George B. McClellan's Own Story: The War for the Union: The Soldiers Who Fought It, The Civilians Who Directed It and His Relations to It and to Them. New York: Charles L. Webster & Company, 1887.

Mitchell, Joseph B. Decisive Battles of the Civil War. Greenwich, Connecticut: Fawcett Publications Inc., 1955.

Murfin, James V. The Gleam of Bayonets: The Battle of Antietam, the Maryland Campaign of 1862. New Yok: Modern Lterary Editions Publishing Company, 1965.

U.S. War Department. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series I, Vols. IX, XIX. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1887.

Williams, Kenneth P. Lincoln Finds a General: A Military Study of the Civil War. Vol. II. New York: The MacMillan Co., 1957.