

**The Ramifications of German
Reunification:
Politics, Economics, & Public Opinion**

An Honors Thesis (ID 499)

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April 1990

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Introduction

November 9, 1990, will forever be known to the world as the day the wall came down.¹ This is, of course, referring to the Berlin wall which separated the German Democratic Republic (GDR) from the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) for nearly a half century. More occurred on that date than simply free travel for East Germans into the West; it also marked the beginning of serious speculation concerning the possibility of the reunification of the two Germanys. As time passed, the likelihood of a united Germany became more and more apparent. As one journalist remarked, "The unthinkable is fast becoming the inevitable."² It now seems probable, if not definite, that the world will soon see a united Germany. Even Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union -- three of the last nations to doubt -- have now admitted that one Germany will inevitably come about.³

Now, the question no longer focuses upon the possibility of unification; instead the question concerns the ramifications of a united Germany. Theories about the impact of the union began to surface immediately after the border's opening. Political scientists, economists, journalists, and ordinary people on the street began to wonder how the unification would effect the world and their daily lives.

These effects, in essence, are what this paper is all about. Within the following pages, most of the prominent theories of what will result from the union will be presented. In order to aid in the understanding of the paper's contents, a brief outline of the sections may prove helpful. The paper is organized into four separate parts. First, in order to bring the contents into

focus, a brief historical background of Germany is provided. This leads up to the separation of the nation into two. From this point, some of the key differences between the FRG and the GDR which have developed in the past forty years will be presented. In the next two sections, the effects of a unified Germany will be evaluated. This will include a section on the political ramifications and one on the economic effects. These appear to be the two major areas of concern. A final section will then follow involving public opinion in the Germanys. The objective of this section is to point out many of the feelings and concerns of the people most directly affected by this merger. In addition, it also attempts to give the paper a more human element.

The Two Germanys: Their History & Where They Stand Today

In order to bring the subject of reunification up to full speed, it will probably prove helpful for a brief historical review to be provided. Therefore, the key occurrences in Germany from the end of World War I until its breakup in 1949 will be presented. From this point, some of the key differences between West and East Germany, which have developed in the past forty years, will be examined. By no means is this section intended to account for hundreds of years of German history, it is merely presented in hopes of providing a basis for the discussion of reunification which will occur in following sections.

World War I spelled disaster for Germany when it came to an end. The monarchy was done away with, a great deal of territory was lost, and the Rhineland was demilitarized and occupied by Allied forces throughout the 1920's. The Weimar Republic had little popularity or public support, and Germany stood economically devastated after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. Just when the tide seemed to be turning with an economic upswing in 1923, the Great Depression began. Adolf Hitler, the leader of the Nazis, came to power as Germany's new chancellor, and the seeds for the Third Reich were planted. Hitler's fanaticism and quest for German expansion plunged the world into war once again.⁴

After World War II, the Allies split Germany and its capital, as well as giving a substantial portion of the nation away to other neighboring nations. The full effects of the split-up can be viewed in appendix A on page 30. Germany and Berlin were divided into four sections each. It was first hoped by

much less industrialized and modernized than its Western neighbor. East German factories, for example, use two and a half times as much coal and twice as much steel per unit of output as the FRG.⁹ Productivity in the East is even estimated to be 30 to 40% lower, and its economic growth is stagnate; this is even though the GDR has the highest productivity and the most skilled workers in the entire Eastern Bloc.¹⁰

Even in agriculture, the West Germans outproduce their neighbor. Granted, East Germany is substantially smaller in land mass compared to the FRG, but the FRG still produces thousands of tons more than the GDR. In fact, the Eastern nation falls behind in grain, rolled steel, automobiles, and energy-- just to name some of the key areas in both economies. In fact, it has been projected that it will cost between \$300 and \$650 billion dollars to bring East Germany up to West German standards.¹¹

Practically the only thing working in East Germany's economic favor is its high quantity of skilled workers. Even this, however, is a bitter-sweet advantage. Of all the refugees entering the West, a high percentage of them are professionals and skilled labor. It appears that East Germany is losing more skilled workers than it can produce.¹²

For additional information concerning the economic and political differences between the two nations, consult appendix B on page 31. By looking at the appendix and by reexamining the facts presented in this section, it is evident that East Germany has far to go before it will measure up to the standards set by the West. It further appears, however, that the journey upward is about to begin, creating additional political and economical ramifications that are beyond the scope of this section. These further questions and concerns are reserved for the next two sections of this paper.

the Allies that unification of the parts -- those divided and occupied by the United States, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union -- would occur relatively quickly. Disputes, however, between the Soviet Union and the other three Allied forces eventually resulted in the formation of two German states. The Federal Republic of Germany was formed in 1949 by the occupied parts of France, Britain, and the United States. The German Democratic Republic was officially formed as a communist state in that same year.⁵

From 1949 until just recently, the two Germanys continued on separate paths. Over the past forty years, a world of difference has developed between the two nations. As the reader is about to discover, bringing these two together could be difficult in light of the differences which have developed.

Politically, the two nations have diverged substantially. West Germany followed a course similar to the Western based Allies, while East Germany looked to the Soviet Union to be its role model. West Germany was established as a democracy in 1949, and it soon entered into NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. East Germany, headed by a totalitarian regime, became a communist state and joined forces with the Warsaw Pact. Its regime proved to be repressive in many ways and totally isolated the country from its brother to the west.⁶

Economically differences have also developed between the two nations. Currently, West Germany's GNP is over four times higher than the GDR's, and its GNP per capita is fourteen percent higher. Exports, in addition, are ten times higher, and West Germany's trade balance stands at \$72.8 billion while the East German balance is -.3 billion.⁷

The GDR's economic woes, in fact, run deeply while the FRG has an economy ranked fourth in the world.⁸ This is mostly because East Germany is

Political Ramifications of Unification

In a time of uncertainty, one thing that is definite is that unification of the two Germanys would definitely have a political effect on the shape of the Germanys, Europe, and the entire world. To what extent it will effect a political change is still a matter of conjecture. In the following section, many of the theories and major political concerns will be addressed.

The first area under this topic that should be acknowledged involves the way in which unification will politically take place. Will a federation, confederation, or some other formation link the Germanys together? To answer this question, two major theories have been developed, both of which have advantages and disadvantages.

The first theory is that Germany will unify in the form of a confederacy. In this form, each Germany would continue to exist sovereignly and equally, cooperating with each other rather than conflicting with each other.¹³ This perspective seems to be a reasonable answer to almost all nations including the Soviet Union, the United States, France, and Great Britain. Even Bonn has expressed that this plan may be acceptable.¹⁴ In addition, many East Germans fear losing their identity in the merger. Because of West Germany's dominance, it is likely that East Germany would become enveloped into the FRG.¹⁵ The confederation alternative would allow for the continuance of the separate lines of thinking which have developed in the past forty years. This configuration also would help alleviate many of the fears of neighboring nations who still express concerns for their safety. A federated Germany, as opposed to a quasi-united confederated Germany, would exhibit horrendous power as will be illustrated

later in this section, and anything to subdue this ominous power is welcomed by many nations, especially the Soviet Union.¹⁶

The disadvantages to this formation are also evident however. The major con to a confederacy arrangement stems from the difficulty of setting one up. A great deal of intricate work would have to go into the formation of a new constitution. Also, when it comes to legislation, would East Germany be entitled to one-half of the vote? Perhaps it should get one-third because its population represents about one-third of the total German population.¹⁷ Maybe representation should be decided based upon relative land mass. Questions such as this stand in the way of this formation. In addition, many Germans do not support the idea of a confederation. They want a whole unification, not simply a quasi one.¹⁸

The second viable formation would be a federation. Its main advantage is its relative ease. Most political scientists speculate that the former German states of Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia, Brandenburg, and Mecklenburg will replace the fifteen districts established by the communists in 1949. This could occur now, since new elections have just taken place in the GDR. From this point, each of the newly formed states--which were previously existing--would apply to Bonn to be recognized as a West German state. Within a matter of weeks, the whole arrangement could take place simply and fairly easily. This would avoid many of the problems associated with a confederation,¹⁹ because only slight legislative modification would have to take place.²⁰ On the other hand, the disadvantages to this plan which are, in effect, the advantages of a confederations should be taken into consideration. Even with many of the advantages of a confederation, however, it appears almost doubtless that a

federated Germany will prevail.²¹

Of concern to many nations around the world is the ominous power a united Germany would exhibit. Under present conditions if the two Germanys were to merge, a combined strength of 660,000 troops would put Germany in a position of overwhelming dominance over any European nation west of the Soviet Union.²² This has many nation frightened, especially the Soviet Union which lost 20 million people in World War II.²³ France and Great Britain, while less vocal, are also concerned with the military might a unified Germany would possess.²⁴ Because of this, only a Germany whose military status was circumscribed by an agreement between Germany and the victorious forces of World War II -- namely the United States, France, England, and the Soviet Union -- would be tolerated.²⁵ It can, therefore, be concluded that either a reduction in conventional forces within Germany would have to take place, or other nations would have to increase their conventional forces in order to dominate the new emerging nation. Because of the economical implications of increasing armies, it seems likely that Germany will be forced to reduce its armies.

To a certain extent both East and West Germany have taken steps in that general direction. Bonn already has plans to reduce its military by 75,000 within the next decade. East Germany is following suit, and a sharp reduction is scheduled for it as well. Eventually, it is hoped and thought that a German army would become a "small force equipped only for defense,"²⁶ and logically it appears that both Germanys are willing to make this sacrifice for unity.

A further political question has been posed concerning Germany's boarder. By referring to appendix A on page 30, it is evident that a substantial

part of what was previously Germany was absorbed by Poland. Further, Poland and Germany signed the Warsaw treaty [of 1970] giving Poland all rights to this portion of land.²⁷ The idea of unification frightens many Poles who are afraid that a united Germany would want the territory back.²⁸

Realizing the Pole's fears, the Bundestag reaffirmed that Germans would not now, nor in the future make any territorial claims upon Poland. This took place on March 8, 1990.²⁹ Since that date and before, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl has stressed that Germany realizes that it has no claims on any property outside of the two Germanys. Poland, as well as any other nation, should not be afraid. "The Germans have opened a new chapter," proclaimed Kohl.³⁰

By far, however, the largest political concern revolves around the effect Germany will have on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. Practically every nation has decided that a unified Germany should become a part of NATO. Even the West German government maintains that a united Germany must be a member.³¹

The only country standing in the way of Germany's acceptance into NATO is the Soviet Union. At first the Soviet Union's stand was clear. It would simply not allow Germany to be a part. Instead it pushed for German neutrality. The Soviets felt that Germany's alliance with NATO would upset the delicate balance of power within Europe.³² The United States, in turn, decided to step into the picture and try to change the Kremlin's mind. The argument of the United States was that a Germany outside NATO is more of a threat to the Soviets than a NATO backed Germany. If Germany were to become a neutral nation, it is feared that it would seek security by building up its armed forces and

even acquire nuclear weapons.³³ By becoming a NATO member, Germany would have no need to have a military buildup. Thus, the Soviet Union would be safer.

It appears that the Soviet Union is beginning to warm up to the idea that Germany will not be neutral, but it has not ruled out the idea of Germany taking on some role other than that of a fully fledged member in NATO. "Let nobody think that Moscow will remain indifferent if a united Germany joins NATO," Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze said. "We have some variants to suggest."³⁴ One such variant provides for each part of Germany to remain for a while in its current alliance. Another option would be for the united Germany to be a member of NATO, but only on a limited basis. This might include Germany's withdrawal from NATO's military wing. In any event, the Soviets ultimately desire a demilitarized Germany.³⁵

The United States is reported as feeling that eventually Gorbachev and the Soviet Union will accept a unified Germany as a member of NATO.³⁶ Some sources have reported that Gorbachev will wane on this point in order to avoid destroying the political credit he has accumulated so painstakingly in the West during the past few years.³⁷ Others seem to merely think Mr. Gorbachev is realizing that he cannot veto any decision reached by Germany and the West; by giving in on this point, he may put himself in a better position to shape future plans. Regardless of the Soviet's position, it is believed that a united Germany will become a member of NATO.³⁸ The West German stand appears to be quite clear on this issue.³⁹

Assuming that a united Germany is accepted into NATO, political scientists feel that NATO will have to be fundamentally altered reflecting the

transformation of Germany and the perceived erosion of the Eastern threat. Further, it seems unlikely that the Warsaw Pact will survive if Germany enters NATO. If it were to survive, its form would have to be changed even more than NATO.⁴⁰ Regardless of the outcome, it seems unlikely that neither NATO or the Warsaw Pact will be able to continue with business as usual.

One item which will definitely be coming to the bargaining table of NATO and the Warsaw Pact will be arms control measures which will most likely drastically reduce superpower troops and nuclear weapons in Germany. This could eventually be followed by a withdrawal of the superpowers from the area altogether.⁴¹ In fact, talks among the superpowers have already begun with a foreseen decision to cut back almost 100,000 troops.⁴²

With all of the political ramifications mentioned previously, one thing is certain. The process of hammering out all political concerns will be a long, arduous task for the "Two Plus Four"-- the two German states and the four victorious powers of World War II. Talks began on March 14, 1990 in Bonn.⁴³ It will be interesting to see how a united Germany will be mapped out politically.

Economic Ramifications of Unification

As illustrated in the previous section, a united Germany would affect substantial political change both internally and internationally. According to many specialists, however, the economic questions of unification are substantially more complex both within Germany and globally.⁴⁴ The following section addresses many of the economic issues and concerns and attempts to provide some answers, whenever possible, to many of the plaguing economic questions in existence today.

First, in order to bring the economic picture into better focus, a good starting place is to point out the economic strength of a united Germany. Currently, the West German economy is already the strongest in Europe⁴⁵ and the fourth-largest in the world.⁴⁶ In addition, it is also the world's largest exporter and world's largest foreign currency reserves holder.⁴⁷ Bringing the two Germanys together would produce a total population of 77.8 million -- the largest west of the Soviet Union.⁴⁸ Its gross national product would far exceed \$1 trillion, strengthening its fourth position even further.⁴⁹ (Consult appendices C-E on pages 32-34 for further comparisons) Further, because of its central European geographical positioning, it could become the "keystone for economic integration of all of Europe."⁵⁰ With these facts, it is no wonder that many countries are feeling uneasy.⁵¹

The economic implications within the Germanys themselves have even the Germans feeling uneasy, especially the people of the FRG. As pointed out in the first section of this paper, the East German economy is lagging

considerably behind that of West Germany. Many of the West German citizens see their money going into the East and are upset by this. Currently, East Germany already receives approximately \$2.7 billion each year from the FRG as a part of political and economic agreements.⁵² It is clear, however, that the economic implications would go much deeper if unification took place. One projection places social services alone to come to a total of six billion dollars annually in order to restructure the East German economy. It is further estimated that this will lead to a loss of 1.4 million jobs in the West.⁵³ Currently, it is still unclear just how much the West Germans will have to pay for economic integration, but it is definite that the payments will be massive.⁵⁴ It is also reasonable to assume that this will eventually lead to a substantial tax increase for the West Germans.⁵⁵

The immediate implications of paying East Germany have already begun. Nearly 2,000 East Germans exodus into West Germany daily.⁵⁶ First, each refugee is given 100 marks which, of course, comes from the pockets of the West Germans.⁵⁷ For those refugees who stay, housing, clothing, and food must be included. In addition, one year of unemployment insurance and social services is provided.⁵⁸ The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* summarized the situation: "Horrifying visions and statistics are being circulated concerning the burden placed on West Germany by the refugees."⁵⁹ The burden has been so great that many cities such as Bremen are asking refugees to stop coming into the area.⁶⁰

The trade unions are now beginning to have economic worries also. West German industry workers, for example, earn about eight marks more than their eastern neighbors. Many West Germans fear for their jobs. Already labor

unions are being forced to renegotiate payment contracts.⁶¹ Because the inflow of citizens from East Germany has been greatly professionals and skilled labor, professionals in West Germany are also afraid.⁶²

The economic implications, however, are not felt merely by West Germany, the East Germans also express concerns. Because economic integration will eventually take place between the two Germanys, many East Germans are afraid for their savings. A rate of exchange must be determined for the East German mark. If authorities value the East German mark at its current worth (about ten cents) millions of East Germans' savings would be entirely wiped out.⁶³ Also as mentioned previously, professionals and skilled labor are leaving by the thousands and taking money and skills with them. This is placing a huge strain on the East German economy.⁶⁴ Fears that the economy will collapse and that their money will become worthless are causing East Germans to "panic buy" food and other necessities. The East German government is urging the citizens not to panic because people will receive subsidies and will be compensated, but still the fear persists.⁶⁵

The next step in the economic evaluation of a united Germany is to discuss how economic integration might take place. Although the GDR has worked for forty years within a highly centralized economy, it would not be an enormous task to integrate the economies of West and East Germany. That is according to many economists.⁶⁶ They were previously predicting that economic integration would happen soon,⁶⁷ and it appears as though they were correct. West Germany has already taken significant steps into that general direction.

According to West German economist Klaus Lecijewski, a plan is

already underway which will lead to the integration of the economies. Within the next few months the West German mark will become the de-facto currency of East Germany. West Germany in the same step will begin investing billions of marks in the GDR's economy, building and refurbishing factories and hiring and training workers. It is then hoped by 1993 that East Germany would be able to enter the European Community. From this point, a second phase would be put into place. A shared economic ministry would be established and a totally new currency, the *neumark*, would be put into the economy. West German tax revenues would then be used for modernization of the East German infrastructure, particularly the road and telephone systems. The final step would be unification of the two Germanys into a federated system.⁶⁸

A problem may spawn from the economic integration that has many economists wary. It is feared that the tremendous infusion of capital into the East will cause a burst of inflation.⁶⁹ If this were to occur, it would cause inflation not only in the Germanys, but also world wide. Even West Germany's own central bank, the Bundesbank, is assuming that the billions of funding into the East could disrupt all Western economies.⁷⁰ The countries with trade deficits, like Britain, France, and the United States are expected to compete to attract investments, and this is expected to further perpetuate the problem of inflation.⁷¹

As the inflation rises, the next chain of events will be an increase in the interest rates.⁷² This, in turn, will reach many nations including the United States in the form of slower economic growth. An increase in bond prices is also a likely outcome. In fact, the German bonds are already reacting to these possibilities. West German ten year bonds surpassed the yield rate of the

United States for the first time in a decade.⁷³ Unfortunately, no one really knows for sure where all of this will lead.

It has already been seen how the union will have an international impact. Some fear that it will have a devastating impact on the European Community scheduled to begin in 1992. Mutterings of a threatening "Fourth Reich" have already begun to surface within many nations who are scheduled to take part in the economic integration. Some individuals are even afraid that the developments will lead to the demise of the European Community.⁷⁴ They point out that the community was never designed for a united Germany to be integrated into the scene.⁷⁵ Most, however, are more optimistic and see this as a mere delay for the pact. Even President Mitterrand of France does not see the community being derailed, only complicated and slowed.⁷⁶

It would not be a surprise, in fact, to see a united Germany complicate the European Community. By examining appendix F on page 35, it is easy to see that Germany would have a disproportionate weight within the European Community.⁷⁷ In fact, it seems reasonable that in the coming years a united Germany would produce fifty percent more than either France or Great Britain.⁷⁸ Some authorities feel that this might cause the community to try to dilute the power of Germany by opening the community to more nations. Countries such as Austria, Switzerland, Hungary, and Norway may be admitted "if only to keep the German industrial giant from becoming too dominant."⁷⁹

It is evident, however, at the present time that a strain has been placed upon the European Community. The French-German relationship is reported as being in its worst condition in years. In fact, the squabbling between the two nations has already eliminated an agreement to abolish boarder checks between France,

West Germany, and the Benelux countries that was scheduled to go into effect last January. In addition, France has openly expressed concern to the United States that Kohl's unification visions are standing in the way of the community.⁸⁰ Still, it appears that Mitterand and other leaders are going to have to accept the unification. Kohl has commented that if the nations of the European Community can not support reunification, West Germany may withdraw its support. Mitterand and the other leaders admit that West Germany's support in the community is crucial, and none is willing to let the European Community die because of Germany's vision.⁸¹ Realizing that reunification will take place, the European Community in the last few months have already taken steps to include East Germany in the arrangement.⁸²

The final step in the evaluation of the economic impact of a united Germany is to point out some other effects it will have internationally. It appears that nations will see good and bad from the union. On the positive side, the Netherlands and the Soviet Union are expected to see many rewards from the union. The Netherlands is reported as saying that it believes it will see increased trade resulting from the union, more than enough to make up for any disadvantages.⁸³ As for the Soviets, a united Germany would offer far greater access to Western technology, investment, trade, and credit than it now has. In addition, if the Soviets truly want to succeed in economic restructuring, and for Japan and the West to help in the endeavor, a healthy Western economy -- including a strong unified Germany -- is in its best interests.⁸⁴ Ironically, however, the Soviets have been one of the most vocal in condemning the union.

Many nations, on the other hand, will definitely suffer from the unification.

Few people argue that the West will pour millions into the East German economy. This will divert some of the funds that would have been seen by other nations. Poland, Hungary, and many third world countries will suffer as their economic aid is cut in order to go to the East Germans.⁸⁵ Southern Europe's growth will also be significantly slowed by investments into East Germany. Because worker's wages were lower in areas such as Spain and Portugal compared to other Western European nations, they had seen investments pouring into their countries. Now, however, with East Germany's low wage attraction, the important investments are being diverted.⁸⁶ Even though these effects will be felt more acutely in Southern and Eastern Europe, other nations such as Great Britain fear that investments will be moving across the German boarder.⁸⁷

After just seeing the definite and potential effects that the developments in the East have caused, it is easy to see why so many nations have expressed concerns over the formation of Germany, which would definitely be economic giant on the global scene. In addition, after seeing the concerns of the Germans who all face a potential loss of money either in taxes or through savings, it makes one keenly aware that many economic considerations will have to go into the planning of a unified Germany -- just as much, if not more planning, than will have to go into its political formation.

Public Opinion in East & West Germany

By turning to appendix G on page 36, it is quite evident that not everyone supports the idea of reunification. It has already been pointed out in the two previous sections why many countries and many individual Germans do not welcome the union. It would not be wise, however, to belabor a point by repeating the public opinion of countries other than the two Germanys, but the opinions of the people within East and West Germany should be acknowledged. After all, they are, according to many authorities, the individuals who will ultimately decide to reunify, as well as being those most directly effected by the merger.⁸⁸

As mentioned earlier, many individual Germans have fears about being united. The East Germans fear a loss of savings; however, more importantly, they fear a loss of identity.⁸⁹ "The East must be changed," says a restaurant worker, "but there should be two Germanys, I think. I work with a lot of young people, and most want to stay here. Most don't want one Germany. Maybe sometime in the next century. Maybe then." This worker is not alone. Many fear losing socialism to capitalism if they were to become mainstreamed into the West. "We want real socialism," remarked a nurse, "like the socialism we learned in school."⁹⁰

As for the West Germans, those opposed are mainly opposed merely for financial reasons. The reality is that many people in West Germany are afraid the East will disturb their comfort. The West Germans do not want to see their welfare state infiltrated by the millions of East Germans, and they fear for their jobs also.⁹¹

According to many Germans, they would like to see the process slowed a bit to give everyone a full perspective of what is about to occur. "Things are happening too quickly," remarks a schoolteacher in Bonn. "Are we supposed to turn our savings over to the people of [East Germany] so that they can live better? We worked hard for what we have."⁹² Many East Germans agree. "We need to slow down," says an East German woman. "We have a culture-- theater, opera, community -- the other side doesn't have."⁹³

According to public opinion polls, however, the Germans who actively oppose unification are in the minority. It does appear, however, that it has taken both nations a little time to warm up to the idea. In October of 1989, the majority of Germans wanted their nations to continue on separate paths. Even in January, a poll released by *Der Spiegel* said that a mere twenty-seven percent of Germans felt that the relationship between the two nations would be good enough that reunification would appear to be possible.⁹⁴

By mid-February, the tide had really turned in favor of unification however. In this poll, eighty-seven percent of East Germans and eighty-one percent of West Germans favored unification. By some reports, the West German response was not quite that positive, but still a majority in the West were supportive of the movement. In fact, nationalism appeared so strong that fifty-seven percent of West Germans said they were willing to become a neutral nation at the price of reunification.⁹⁵

As time progressed, nationalism appeared to grow in strength. "German nationalism is still ardently alive," said one reporter.⁹⁶ His statement appears truthful. An East German poll released just one week after the one mentioned previously reported that those in favor of reunification had increased to ninety

percent.⁹⁷ To further illustrate the nationalism present in East Germany, turn to appendix H on page 37. The Alliance for Germany, backed by West Germany's Christian Democrats, received forty-eight percent of the vote in GDR's most recent election. Dr. Gene Frankland, a professor in the political science department at Ball State University in Muncie Indiana, stated that this appears to be a mandate for reunification. The Alliance for Germany is dedicated to seeing reunification take place as soon as possible and are actively working to see their goal realized.

It now appears that Germans are overwhelmingly in favor of unification. The facts provided, indeed, back this statement. It is good to know that both the East Germans and West Germans generally support the movement that is happening even quicker than many thought possible. In many people's opinion, the Germans have spoken, and the momentum for reunification is unstoppable.

Endnotes

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
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APPENDIX A



REPRINTED FROM: Joseph R. Conlin, *Our Land, Our Time* (San Diego: Coronado Publishers, Inc., 1985), p. 703.

APPENDIX B: THE TWO SYSTEMS COMPARED


	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>East Germany</u>
INTERNAL DATA		
GNP, 1988 (Billions)	\$870.0	\$207.2
GNP per capita	\$14,260	\$12,480
Population (millions)	61.0	16.6
Pop. change, 1960-87 (millions)	+5.6	-0.5
Autos per 1,000 persons	446	209
Auto production, 1987	4,430,000	217,000
Life expectancy (years)	76	73
INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1988, Billions)		
Exports	\$323.4	\$30.7
Imports	\$250.6	\$31.0
Trade Balance	\$72.8	(\$0.3)

POLITICAL PARTY REPRESENTATION (FOLLOWING 1987 FRG ELECTIONS) (FOLLOWING 1990 GDR ELECTIONS)

CDU/CSU	44.3%	Alliance for Germany	48%
SPD	37.0%	Social Democrats	22%
FDP	9.1%	Democratic Socialists	16%
Greens	8.3%	Alliance of Free Democrats	5%
Others	1.3%	Others	9%


SOURCE: THE NEW YORK TIMES / March 18, 1990 & Frank L. Wilson, *European Politics Today* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1990).

Appendix C: Exports



1988 DATA, CIA HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC STATISTICS
AND U.N. MONTHLY BULLETIN OF STATISTICS


Appendix D: Balance of Trade



1988 DATA, CIA HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC STATISTICS
AND U.N. MONTHLY BULLETIN OF STATISTICS

Appendix E: GNP per Capita


(IN THOUSANDS)



1988 DATA, CIA HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC STATISTICS
AND U.N. MONTHLY BULLETIN OF STATISTICS


Appendix F: Predictions of Future European Community

35



SOURCES: STATICTICAL OFFICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY


APPENDIX G



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Appendix H: East German Election Results

(This suggests overwhelming desire to reunite)



SOURCE: THE NEW YORK TIMES / March 18, 1990